IN HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 13075 of 2019 JUGAL KISHORE MAHENDRA BIYANI Versus INCOME TAX OFFICER Appearance: MS VAIBHAVI K PARIKH(3238) for Petitioner(s) No. 1 MRS KALPANAK RAVAL(1046) for Respondent(s) No. 1 CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE A.C. RAO Date : 27/08/2019 ORAL ORDER (PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA) 1. Rule returnable forthwith. Mrs. Kalpana Raval, learned senior standing counsel waives service of notice of rule for and on behalf of respondent. 2. By this writ application under Article 226 of Constitution of India, writ applicant has prayed for following reliefs : 7. petitioner, therefore, prays that this Hon ble Court be pleased to issue writ of mandamus or writ in nature of mandamus or writ of certiorari or writ in nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order and be pleased to : (a) direct Respondent to release refund for Page 1 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER Assessment Year 2004-05 along with interest; (b) pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, direct Respondent to release refund due to petitioner for Assessment Years 2004-05; (c) any other and further relief deemed just and proper be granted in interest of justice; (d) to provide for cost of this petition. 2.1 writ applicant seeks to challenge inaction on part of respondent in not releasing refund for Assessment Year 2004-05 legitimately issued to writ applicant under provisions of Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short Act, 1961 ). writ applicant is engaged in business of trading in textiles. writ applicant filed his return of income for Assessment Year 2004-05 (i.e. year under consideration) on 01.11.2004 declaring total income at Rs.NIL. said return of income was initially processed under Section 143(1) of Act. Later, case of writ applicant for year under consideration was selected for scrutiny assessment. Eventually, assessment was framed under Section 143(3) of Act vide order dated 30.12.2011 determining total income of writ applicant at Rs.9,58,11,340/- as against returned income of Rs.NIL. Page 2 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 2.2 It appears from materials on record that four additions i.e. (1) addition of Rs.6,51,00,020/- in respect of bogus opening stock, (2) addition of Rs.1,21,34,503/- in respect of bogus credits, (3) addition of Rs.1,83,89,471/- in respect of bogus credits and (4) addition of Rs.1,87,346/- in respect of certain expenses were made. demand of Rs.6,09,60,380/- was raised in case of writ applicant. 2.3 writ applicant challenged assessment order in appeal before Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). CIT(A) partly allowed appeal vide order dated 12.03.2013. 2.4 It appears from materials on record that two appeals came to be preferred before Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, one by Revenue and another by assessee i.e. writ applicant herein. Appellate Tribunal vide its order dated 14.02.2018 substantially, decided issue in favour of wit applicant herein excluding issue of Rs.93,673/- in respect of disallowance made byt eh Assessing Officer in respect of certain expenses. 2.5 It also appears that matter was carried before Page 3 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER this Court by Revenue by preferring Tax Appeal No.1000 of 2018. appeal preferred by Revenue came to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated 14.08.2018. 2.6 issue now is with regard to refund. grievance of writ applicant is that despite repeated reminders to respondent as well as PCIT and CCIT, respondent is not releasing refund legitimately due to writ applicant for Assessment Year 2004-05 i.e. year under consideration. In such circumstances referred to above, writ applicant is here before this Court with present writ application. 3. In response to notice issued by this Court to respondent, Mrs. Kalpana Raval, learned senior standing counsel has appeared for Revenue and opposed this writ application. Mrs. Raval invited our attention to affidavit-in- reply filed on behalf of respondent, duly affirmed by one Santosh Kumar, Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(3)(2), Surat. Our attention was invited, more particularly, to paragraph 10 of reply. Paragraph 10 reads as under : 10 It is further submitted that, appeal effect to order of Ld.CIT(A) was given on 25/04/2013 and Page 4 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER appeal effect to order of Hon ble ITAT was given on 06/06/2018. appeal effects to above appellate orders were given manually and same was uploaded on 31/01/2019 and duly forwarded to CPC Bangalore so that resultant effect would entail assessee to receive refund of Rs.77,76,561/-. But unfortunately, due to some technical problem beyond control of undersigned, uploaded appeal effect had not been processed which resulted into non issuance of refund to assessee. request with incident ID 717939 was registered with ITBA helpdesk on 04/05/2019 vide which it was brought to notice of ITBA help desk that refund has not been issued to assessee. In response, it was replied by ITBA Helpdesk that It is seen from CPC portal for PAN and AY, return has been processed and determining refund. Refund for same is being issued. Request taxpayer / AO to wait for same. Subsequently, incident ID 717939 was auto closed by ITBA Helpdesk. On 23/05/2019, fresh request was raised on ITBA helpdesk with incident ID 746064 recalling previous instances and it was again requested to issue refund in favour of petitioner. In response, it was replied by ITBA Helpdesk that As seen in CPC portal for given AY refund of Rs.7776561/- determined and same has been in under process. Once refund release from CPC AO will get notification. Subsequently, incident ID 746064 was auto closed by ITBA Helpdesk. However, no refund has been issued to petitioner till date due to some technical error or technical issue. Another incident with incident ID 797337 was registered with ITBA Helpdesk recalling previous instances and it was again requested to issue refund in favour of petitioner. In response, it was replied by ITBA Helpdesk that As seen in CPC portal for given AY refund of Rs.7776561/- determined and same has been in Ready for Refund Banker. Once refund release from CPC AO will get notification. issuance of refund in Page 5 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER case of petitioner is pending at end of CPC and procedurally nothing is pending on part of this office. 3.1 Thus, stance of Revenue is quite clear and fair too. However, Revenue has expressed helplessness as regards issue on grounds of technical error or to be precise, technical issues. 4. Having heard learned counsel appearing for parties and having gone through materials on record, we are of view that there is nothing much to be adjudicated in present writ application. As indicated above, stance of Revenue is very clear. Revenue has accepted that writ applicant is entitled to refund as claimed and has also accepted that there has been delay in refund of particular amount. 4.1 issue as such raised in this writ application is no longer res integra. We may refer to decision of this Court in case of Nima Specific Family Trust vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax reported in [2018] 100 taxmann.com 262 (Gujarat), wherein this Court has explained scope of Section 244A of Act, 1961. We may refer to relevant observations made by this Court in Page 6 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER above referred decision : 9. We would first address petitioner s grievance of undue delay in granting refund. We may recall that after Assessing Officer passing order of assessment on 29th December 2006 making substantial additions, raising tax demands, sum of Rs. 97.41 lakhs [rounded off] was recovered through adjustment of refund for earlier assessment year. Subsequently, petitioner s appeal was substantially allowed by Appellate Commissioner on 5th March 2009. This gave rise to petitioner s claim for refund of excess tax collected. Though Department had filed appeal against order of Commissioner [Appeals], there was no stay granted by Tribunal. Thereafter, Tribunal also dismissed Department s appeal on 30th June 2011. Again, Department filed appeal before High Court. Such appeal is pending without any stay. 10. It is well settled legal proposition that order passed by judicial or quasi judicial authority should be implemented within reasonable period; if no specific time frame is provided in such order. aggrieved person may reasonably pursue appeal options but not wait indefinitely to implement adverse order. Mere pendency of appeal would not prevent implementation of order under challenge. Unless order is stayed, same must be given effect to within reasonable period. 11. Department therefore cannot take shelter of pendency of appeal before Tribunal and thereafter before High Court, since in both cases, appellate for had not granted any stay against order of Appellate Commissioner. In present case, even after Tribunal dismissed Department s appeal on 30th June 2011, no steps were taken by Department to refund excess tax. First proactive step taken by departmental Page 7 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER authorities was passing of order dated 8 th March 2018. Even such order was mere paper order not giving any relief to petitioner, since as noted, in such order authority noted that petitioner s request for refund of adjusted tax of Rs.97.41 lakhs [rounded off] cannot be granted since same is not reflected in Department s portal. Only after High Court issued notice in present petition that Assistant Commissioner passed further order granting actual refund of excess tax collected. At all stages, thus, departmental machinery moved rather slowly. For years together, Department waited for outcome of appeals. Eventually, even after passing of order recognizing petitioner s right to receive refund, actual refund was delayed on ground that tax was not reflecting in department s portal. No explanation would be sufficient to cover period of nine years. What ever tax structure of petitioner and group entities and whatever Department s resource limitations be, delay of nearly nine years in granting refund simply cannot be explained away. 12. This brings us to claims of petitioner. In this context, learned counsel Shri Soparkar had made two principal claims one was that additional interest under subsection [1A] of Section 244A of Act should be granted. He argued that this provision was inserted by legislature by way of remedial measure and should therefore be applied to all pending cases, even those which might have arisen prior to enactment of such section. His second prayer was to grant compensation for long delay in granting refund. He contended that though Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Ltd. v. CIT [2015] 377 ITR 307/230 Taxcmann.com 204 [Guj.] had disapproved claim of interest-on-interest, had not held that compensation for delay in giving refund cannot be ordered. Page 8 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 13. In this context, we may refer to relevant statutory provisions. Section 244A of Act pertains to Interest on refunds. Subsection [1] of Section 244A mandates Revenue to grant interest at statutory rate where refund of any amount becomes due to assessee under Act. situations envisaged under subsection [1] of Section 244A are subdivided into three parts contained in clauses (a), (aa) and (b). Clause (a) of subsection [1] of Section 244A covers situations where refund is out of any tax collected at source under section 206C or paid by way of advance tax or treated as paid under section 199 of Act. Clause (aa) refers to refund which arises out of any tax paid under section 140A of Act which pertains to self-assessment and clause (b) pertains to claim of refund in any other case. For all three situations, period during which such interest would be computed and rate of interest to be paid are specified. 14. Subsection [1A] was inserted in Section 244A of Act by Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f 1st June 2016 and reads as under: [1A] Where whole or any part of refund referred to in subsection (1) is due to assessee, as result of any amount having been paid by him after 31st day of March 1975, in pursuance to any order of assessment or penalty and such amount or any part thereof having been found in appeal or other proceeding under this Act to be in excess of amount which such assessee is liable to pay as tax or penalty, as case may be, under this Act, Central Government shall pay to such assessee simple interest at rate specified in subsection (1) on amount so found to be in excess from date on which such amount was paid to date on which Page 9 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER refund is granted. 15. Simultaneously, legislature has also amended Section 153 of Act which pertains to time-limit for completion of assessment, reassessment and re-computation. Entire section 153 was substituted for original by Finance Act 2016 w.e.f 1st June 2016. Subsection [5] of Section 153 of Act reads as under : [5] Where effect of order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 is to be given by Assessing Officer, wholly or partly, otherwise than by making fresh assessment or reassessment, such effect shall be given within period of three months from end of month in which order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 is received by Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner; as case may be, order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by Principal Commissioner or Commissioner : Provided that where it is not possible for Assessing Officer to give effect to such order within aforesaid period, for reasons beyond his control, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on receipt of such request in writing from Assessing Officer, if satisfied, may allow additional period of six months to give effect to order : Provided further that where order under section 250 or section 254 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264 requires verification of any issue by way of submission of any Page 10 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER document by assessee or any other person or where opportunity of being heard is to be provided to assessee, order giving effect to said order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 of section 263 or section 264 shall be made within time specified in subsection (3). 16. We may note that in earlier form, Section 153 of Act did not contain any provision similar or equivalent to subsection (5) of Section 153 of Act. 17. Brief analysis of above provisions would show that prior to amendments in Act, by virtue of which Section 244A [1A] and Section 153 [3] were brought into effect from 1st June 2016, Legislation did not envisage any interest on refund in addition to interest prescribed under subsection [1] of Section 244A. Likewise, Section 153 of Act did not contain any provision prescribing time limit for giving effect to appellate or revisional orders. With amendment, subsection [1A] of Section 244A now provides that in case where refund arises as result of giving effect to order under section 250 or section 254 or section 260 or section 262 or section 263 or section 264; wholly or partly, otherwise than by making fresh assessment or reassessment, assessee would be entitled to receive, in addition to interest payable under subsection (1), additional interest on such amount of refund calculated at rate of three per cent per annum for period beginning from date following date of expiry of time allowed under subsection (5) of Section 153 of Act to date on which refund is granted. Provisions of subsection [1A] can be summarized, thus - [i] this subsection would be applicable : (a) where refund arises as result of giving Page 11 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER effect to appellate or revisional order under sections mentioned therein. (b) is otherwise than by making fresh assessment or reassessment; [ii] In such circumstances, in addition to interest under subsection (1), assessee would receive additional interest at rate of three per cent per annum. [iii] period during which such interest would be computed would begin from date of expiry of time limit referred to in subsection (5) of Section 153 of Act and would end on date when refund is granted. 18. Subsection (5) of Section 153 provides that where effect to order of appellate or revisional authority under various sections of Act is to be given by Assessing Officer, otherwise than by making fresh assessment or reassessment; wholly or partly, such effect would be given within three months from end of month on which such appellate order is received by Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, or passed by revisional authority; as case may be. 19. Proviso to subsection (5), however, provides that where it is not possible for Assessing Officer to give effect to such order within such time, for reasons beyond his control, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, on receipt of such request in writing from Assessing Officer, if satisfied, may allow additional period of six months to give effect to order. further proviso to sub-sec. (5) provides that where appellate or revisional order requires verification of any issue by way of submission of any document by assessee or any other person, or where opportunity of being heard is to be provided to assessee, Page 12 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER order giving effect to such order shall be made within time specified in sub-sec. (3). Subsection (3) in turn provides for time limit for passing fresh assessment pursuant to appellate or revisional order by prescribing time limit of nine months from end of financial year in which order under section 254 is received, or order under section 263 or section 264 is passed. 20. Analysis of subsection (5) of Section 153 would show that said provision prescribes time limit of three months for Assessing Officer to pass order giving effect to appellate or revisional order from end of month in which appellate order is received or revisional order is passed. Such time limit could be extended by additional period of six months by Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, if he is satisfied that it was not possible for Assessing Officer to give effect to such order within time prescribed, for reasons beyond his control. Cases where appellate or revisional order requires verification of any issue by way of submission or documents, or where opportunity of being heard is to be given to assessee, would be governed separately. time limit prescribed therein would be same as in subsection (3) of Section 153. 21. In absence of provisions contained in subsection (5) of Section 153, Assessing Officer was under no obligation to pass order giving effect to appellate or revisional orders within particular time. Subsection (5) now lays down such time limit. Likewise, in absence of provisions contained in subsection (1A) of Section 244A, there was no further adverse effect on revenue for not passing consequential orders giving effect to appellate or revisional order which may be in favour of assessee; except for paying interest as prescribed under subsection (1) of Section 244A. These provisions, therefore, on one hand Page 13 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER lay down time limits for giving effect to appellate or revisional orders and on other hand, provide for payment of additional interest at rate of three per cent per annum from end of period for passing order giving effect to such appellate or revisional orders. For obvious reasons, inability of Assessing Officer to pass orders giving effect to appellate or revisional orders which had given relief to assessee within time prescribed under sub-sec. (5) of Section 153, would not make proceedings nonest. It is assessee who stands to gain out of appellate or revisonal order, and therefore, would be eager to have Assessing Officer give effect to such order. Assessing Officer, if for some reason cannot pass order within prescribed time, must still do so but, this would trigger liability of revenue to pay additional interest; as provided under sub-sec. [1A] of Section 244A. 22. This somewhat detailed analysis of statutory provisions was necessary in order to ascertain whether provisions are meant to be applied prospectively or retrospectively. It is well settled that statutory amendment making substantive changes would have prospective effect unless either expressly or by necessary implications, legislature has provided for retrospective operation thereof. In his book Principles of Statutory Interpretation , Justice GP Singh refers to observations of Frankfurter in his article Some reflections on Reading of Statutes , wherein, it is observed that, Legislation has aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply and indequacy, to effect change of policy, to formulate plan of government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of air, it is evidenced in language of statute, as read in light of other external manifestations of purpose. 23. Though it is well settled that statutes dealing with substantive rights are prima facie prospective, unless it is Page 14 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective operation, such rigors are not recognized by Courts when it comes to dealing with remedial statutes. Nevertheless, whether remedial statute is meant to apply to past situations arising before introduction of provisions in statute book must depend on language used in statute and purpose for which amendment was being made by legislature. 24. We have noticed that prior to relevant amendments made in Act and introduced w.e.f 1st June 2016, there was neither limit prescription for passing orders giving effect to appellate or revisional orders in which relief partially or fully may have been given to assessee nor was there any adverse impact on revenue if such action was delayed; except for paying statutory interest under sub-sec. [1] of Section 244A of Act. Subsection [5] of Section 153 introduced time limits for passing such orders. Such time limits were also prescribed in graded manner. Ordinarily, Assessing Officer would have three months to pass orders giving effect to appellate or revisional orders. If Commissioner was satisfied that it was not possible for Assessing Officer to do so within such time, he could extend time by further six months but no more. In cases where order required verification of any issue by way of submission of document by assessee or any other person, or where opportunity of being heard is to be provided to assessee, time limit from outset would be longer. This laying down of time limit per se would be of no consequence unless non adherence to time would result into some adverse consequences to Revenue. It is therefore that subsection [1A] of Section 244A provides for additional interest at rate of three per cent per annum upon Assessing Officer failing to pass order giving effect to appellate or revisional order withing time frame. Page 15 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 25. These provisions thus are in nature of deterrence to Assessing Officer s inaction. Simultaneously, assessee would be compensated for delay by way of additional interest. 26. These provisions are thus remedial in nature and meant to address issue of inordinate delay in giving effect to appellate or revisional orders made in favour of assesses. However, minute examination of these provisions would show that same were not meant to have retrospective effect. computation provision for granting such interest provides for two terminal points beginning point is end of period beginning from date following date of expiry of time allowed under section (5) of Section 153 and end point of computing interest would be date on which refund is granted. Applying such provisions for past period would immediately throw question as to from which date such interest liability would arise. For past period, there being no provision in subsection (5) of Section 153 laying time limits, computation of beginning of period for granting interest would be unworkable. Claim of interest for past period cannot be accepted for want of any machinery provided by legislature to calculate such interest. legislature therefore by necessary implications did not desire to give any retrospective effect to these provisions. claim for additional interest therefore cannot be granted for periods when provisions of Section 244A [1A] and 153 [3] as they stand now were not in statute book at all. 27. There would however be caveat to this proposition and it is this. There may be cases where appellate or revisional order may have been passed long before 1st June 2016. Till relevant provisions of Section 244 [1A] and Page 16 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 153 [5] were added by legislature on 1st June 2016, Assessing Officer may not have passed consequential order. Even after such amendments, he may not have passed order within time provided ion such amendments. Even in such case, if amended provision of subsection [1A] of Section 244 of Act is not applied for period past 1st June 2016, same would give rise to two class of cases [I] where appellate or revisional order is passed after 1st June 2016 and other where such order is passed before such date. In former, all provisions of subsection [1A] of Section 244A as well as subsection (5) of Section 153 of Act would apply. In latter, if harmonious construction approach is not adopted, Assessing Officer could contend that he is under no obligation to pass order giving effect to appellate or revisional order, nor would revenue be liable to pay additional interest even after time available to Assessing Officer for passing such order has expired. legislature could not be expected to have brought about such situation. Any such interpretation would also restrict prospective effect of these provisions. In such circumstances, harmonious construction of statutory provisions would require that if any order giving effect to appellate or revisional order is not passed by Assessing Officer within time permitted under section 153 [5], after amendments were made in statute book, even though appellate or revisional order was passed before 1st June 2016, liability to pay additional interest under subsection [1A] of Section 244A would arise upon completion of such period as if starting point for computing such period for passing order was 1 st June 2016. To this limited extent, petitioner would be entitled to additional interest for limited period, but not for entire period starting from original order of Commissioner dated 5th March 2009. Page 17 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 28. Learned counsel Shri Soparkar had, however, argued that compensation for delayed payment of refund should be granted. This contention and claim was independent of claim for interest on interest which he agreed would not be payable by virtue of judgment of Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited [Supra] and also independent of additional interest under subsection [1] of Section 244A. This judgment has short history, which we may record. As is well-known, Supreme Court in case of Sandvik Asia Limited v. CIT [2006] 150 Taxman 591/280 ITR 643 [SC] had occasion to consider situation in which advance tax paid by assessee became refundable pursuant to appellate decision. principal was refunded but refund of interest was withheld for long time. Supreme Court posed question to itself whether on general principles, assessee ought to have been compensated for inordinate delay for receiving monies properly due to it. It was noticed that revenue has retained such monies of assessee for periods ranging from 12 to 17 years. Court held that revenue having unjustifiably withheld refund for seventeen years without any reason, assessee would be entitled to receive such amount with further interest. larger Bench of Supreme Court considered question whether decision in case of Sandik Asia Limited v. CIT [Supra] lays down principle that interest on interest is payable when refund is delayed. Supreme Court explained decision in case of Sandvik Asia Limited [Supra] observing that Supreme Court in such case was considering issue as to whether assessee who was made to wait for refund of interest for decades should be compensated for great prejudice caused to it due to delay in its payment after lapse of statutory period. It was in this background, Court directed Revenue to pay compensation which cannot be seen as direction for payment of interest on interest. Supreme Court held and observed as under : Page 18 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER 6. In our considered view, aforesaid judgment has been misquoted and misinterpreted by assesses and also by Revenue. They are of view that in Sandvik case [Supra] this Court had directed Revenue to pay interest on statutory interest in case of delay in payment. In other words, interpretation placed is that Revenue is obliged to pay interest on interest in event of its failure to refund interest payable within statutory period. 7. As we have already noted, in Sandvik case [Supra] this Court was considering issue whether assessee who is made to wait for refund of interest for decades be compensated for great prejudice cause to it due to delay in its payment after lapse of statutory period. In facts of that case, this Court had come to conclusion that there was inordinate delay on part of Revenue in refunding certain amount which included statutory interest and therefore, directed Revenue to pay compensation for same not interest on interest. 29. For subsequent year also, in case of same assessee Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited, similar issue came up before Supreme Court. Upon appeal against judgment passed by High Court, Supreme Court remanded proceedings before Court after making reference to its earlier judgment in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited [Supra]. It was in this background that Gujarat High Court in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [2015] 377 ITR 307 [Guj.] was examining issue of payment of interest for delayed refund made by Page 19 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER Revenue. Court noticed observations of Apex Court that interest on amount of refund, if provided by statute, such would govern field. Court was of opinion that in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited [Supra], Supreme Court did not shut out question of directing Government to pay compensation for non payment of statutory interest. In this background, Court gave suitable directions for payment of compensation. 30. situation therefore emerges is that as held by Supreme Court in case of Gujarat Flourochemicals Limited [Supra], whenever statute provides for interest on delayed refunds, same would hold field. Further, there cannot be any direction for payment of interest on interest. In present case, statute provides for interest on delayed refund in terms of subsection [1] of Section 244A of Act. As and when applicable, newly inserted subsection [1A] of Section 244A provides for additional interest. statutory provisions thus govern situations where interest on delayed refund would be paid as also rate on which such interest is to be calculated. There cannot be any further direction for payment of interest over and above such statutory prescriptions. This is not case where principal refund is granted at one point of time, withholding interest and Revenue thereafter, having frozen liability of interest seeks to avoid making any further payment of compensation on amount of interest which remained unpaid for long period of time. 5. In view of aforesaid, we dispose of this writ application with direction to respondent to release refund for Assessment Year 2004-05 in accordance with provisions of Section 244A(1) of Act within period of Page 20 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 C/SCA/13075/2019 ORDER six weeks from date of receipt of this order. We hope and trust that writ applicant may not have to comeback to this Court redressing any further grievance. 5.1 With above, this writ application is disposed of. Rule made absolute to aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted. (J. B. PARDIWALA, J) (A. C. RAO, J) Dolly Page 21 of 21 Downloaded on : Tue Mar 24 08:29:03 IST 2020 Jugal Kishore Mahendra Biyani v. Income-tax Officer