Commnr. Of Income-tax, Guwahati-I v. M/s. Meghalaya Steels Ltd
[Citation -2015-LL-0805-5]

Citation 2015-LL-0805-5
Appellant Name Commnr. Of Income-tax, Guwahati-I
Respondent Name M/s. Meghalaya Steels Ltd.
Court SUPREME COURT
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 05/08/2015
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags principles of natural justice
Bot Summary: Ultimately the High Court after stating in paragraph 2 that two substantial questions of law arose under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act went on to answer the two questions. In the present case, since this Court did not formulate the substantial questions of law for adjudication before hearing of the appeal on merit, there can be no escape from the conclusion that hearing of the appeal prior to its admission has to be treated as a hearing on the admission of the appeal in order to determine if the substantial questions of law, as contended by the appellants, had or had not arisen and it was only upon having formulated the questions of law, which according to the High Court, were the substantial questions of law for adjudication in the appeal that the appeal could or ought to have been heard. As the omission, on our part, to formulate the substantial questions of law and invite the parties to have their say in the matter amount to denial of opportunity of effective hearing to the parties concerned, particularly, to the review petitioners, we must have the magnanimity and courage to acknowledge our mistake, recall the judgment and order dated 16.09.2010, and decide the appeal, on merit, after having formulated the substantial questions of law, which this Court may deem necessary for adjudication of the appeal. 3 Mr. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue, assailed the aforesaid judgment dated 08.04.2013 stating that it was factually incorrect that no substantial questions of law have been framed and that such questions are to be found in the very beginning of the judgment dated 16.09.2010 itself. He pointed out to us that in point of fact the question as to whether there were substantial questions of law at all had been argued before the very Division Bench which Division Bench had in fact reserved order and then gone on to dispose of the appeal on merits without any pronouncement on whether there were substantial questions of law at all. The Division Bench went ahead and by its judgment dated 16.09.2010 referred to two questions and went on to answer them. Insofar as the second question is concerned, we accept the submission of Mr. Subramaniam that High Courts being Courts of Record under Art.


1 IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10495 OF 2013 Commnr. Of Income Tax, Guwahati-I Appellant(s) VERSUS M/s. Meghalaya Steels Ltd. Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1619/2012, 4631/2012, 11223/2013, 795/2014, 1792/2014, 2410/2014, 6360/2014, 7727/2014, 7728/2014 and 8592/2014 O R D E R Civil Appeal No. 10495/2013 and Civil Appeal 1619 of 2012 arise out of two judgments delivered by High Court of judicature at Guwahati. By first judgment dated 16.09.2010 various points on merits were gone into, inter alia, as to whether deductions to be made under Section 80IB of Income Tax Act, 1961 were allowable on facts and whether transport subsidies were or were not available together with other incentives. Ultimately High Court after stating in paragraph 2 that two substantial questions of law arose under Section 260A of Income Tax Act went on to answer two questions. first question so framed was answered in negative, that is in favour of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Suman Wadhwa Date: 2015.08.11 16:12:02 IST Reason: Revenue, and against assessee. However, second question was answered in affirmative, in favour of assessee, and against Revenue, and appeal was disposed 2 of in aforesaid terms. Against aforesaid judgment dated 16.09.2010, Review Petition being No. 108/2010 was filed by assessee before very Division Bench. In long judgment dated 08.04.2013, Division Bench recalled its earlier order dated 16.09.2010 in following terms: 125. In present case, since this Court did not formulate substantial questions of law for adjudication before hearing of appeal on merit, there can be no escape from conclusion that hearing of appeal prior to its admission has to be treated as hearing on admission of appeal in order to determine if substantial questions of law, as contended by appellants, had or had not arisen and it was only upon having formulated questions of law, which according to High Court, were substantial questions of law for adjudication in appeal that appeal could or ought to have been heard. 126. As omission, on our part, to formulate substantial questions of law and, then, invite parties to have their say in matter amount to denial of opportunity of effective hearing to parties concerned, particularly, to review petitioners, we must have magnanimity and courage to acknowledge our mistake, recall judgment and order dated 16.09.2010, and, then, decide appeal, on merit, after having formulated substantial questions of law, which this Court may deem necessary for adjudication of appeal. 127. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, these review petitions succeed. impugned judgment and order stand accordingly reviewed and recalled. 3 Mr. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Revenue, assailed aforesaid judgment dated 08.04.2013 stating that it was factually incorrect that no substantial questions of law have been framed and that such questions are to be found in very beginning of judgment dated 16.09.2010 itself. He further argued, referring us to Section 260A (7), that only those provisions of Civil Procedure Code could be looked into for purposes of Section 260A as were relevant to disposal of appeals, and since review provision contained in Code of Civil Procedure is not so referred to, High Court would have no jurisdiction under Section 260A to review such judgment. Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of assessee countered this submission. He pointed out to us that in point of fact question as to whether there were substantial questions of law at all had been argued before very Division Bench which Division Bench had in fact reserved order and then gone on to dispose of appeal on merits without any pronouncement on whether there were substantial questions of law at all. Division Bench, however, went ahead and by its judgment dated 16.09.2010 referred to two questions and went on to answer them. Insofar as second submission of Mr. Radhakrishnan is concerned, Mr. Subramaniam argued that 4 High Court being Court of Record under Art. 215 of Constitution of India, power of review would inhere in it as such. We have heard both parties. We find that as matter of fact what Mr. Subramaniam has argued before us is reiterated by very Division Bench which heard and reserved judgment on 16.09.2010. By review order dated 08.04.2013, Division Bench felt that it should not have gone into matter at all given fact that on earlier occasion, before 16.09.2010, it had reserved judgment on whether substantial questions of law in fact exist at all or not. This being case, in lengthy order very Division Bench has thought it fit to recall its own earlier judgment. In above circumstances, we do not feel inclined to interfere with impugned judgment in view of what has been recorded in impugned judgment dated 08.04.2013. Insofar as second question is concerned, we accept submission of Mr. Subramaniam that High Courts being Courts of Record under Art. 215 of Constitution of India, power of review would in fact inhere in them. This was in fact so decided in slightly different context while dealing with power of review of writ petitions filed under Art.226 by judgment reported in AIR 1963 SC 1909 5 (Shivdeo Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.). This Court said: other contention of Mr. Gopal Singh pertains to second order of Khosla, J., which, in effect, reviews his prior order. Learned counsel contends that Art.226 of Constitution does not confer any power on High Court to review its own order and, therefore, second order of Khosla,J., was without jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that there is nothing in Art. 226 of Constitution to preclude High Court from exercising power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Here previous order of Khosla,J., affected interests of persons who were not made parties to proceeding before him. It was at their instance and for giving them hearing that Khosla,J., entertained second petition. In doing so, he merely did what principles of natural justice required him to do. It is said that respondents before us had no right to apply for review because they were not parties to previous proceedings. As we have already pointed out, it is precisely because they were not made parties to previous proceedings, though their interests were sought to be affected by dthe decision of High Court, that second application was entertained by Khosla,J. We are in respectful agreement with what is stated in aforesaid judgment. Apart from what has been said by us, it is also clear that on cursory reading of Section 260A (7), said Section does not purport in any manner to curtail or restrict application of provisions of 6 Code of Civil Procedure. Section 260A(7) only states that all provisions that would apply qua appeals in Code of Civil Procedure would apply to appeals under Section 260A. That does not in any manner suggest either that other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are necessarily excluded or that High Court's inherent jurisdiction is in any manner affected. We accordingly dispose of all above appeals with no order as to costs. .....................J. (A.K.SIKRI) ......................J. (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN) New Delhi; Date: 5.8.2015. 7 ITEM NO.102 COURT NO.12 SECTION IIIA PH S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 1619/2012 C.I.T. GUWAHATI Appellant(s) VERSUS M/S MEGHALAYA STEELS LTD. Respondent(s) (with appln. (s) for early hearing) WITH C.A. No. 4631/2012 (With Interim Relief and Office Report) C.A. No. 10495/2013 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 11223/2013 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 795/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 1792/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 2410/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 6360/2014 C.A. No. 7727/2014 C.A. No. 7728/2014 (With Office Report) C.A. No. 8592/2014 (With Office Report) Date : 05/08/2015 These appeals were called on for hearing today. CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN For Appellant(s) Mr. K.Radhakrishnan,Sr.Adv. Mr. K.Arijit Prasad,Adv. Mr. S.A.Haseeb,Adv. Mr. Jitin Singhal,Adv. Mrs.Rashmi Malhotra,Adv. Mrs.Gargi Khanna,Adv. Ms. Sadhana Sandhu,Adv. Mrs. Anil Katiyar,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Gopal Subramanian,Sr.Adv. Ms. Kavita Jha,Adv. Ms. Mehak Gupta,Adv. 8 Mr. Ramesh Goenka,Adv. -2- Mr. Sunil Murarka,Adv. Mr. Kunal Chatterji,Adv. Mr. Tavish Bhusan Prasad,Adv. Mr. Saransh Kumar,Adv. Ms. Sadhna Saxena,Adv. UPON hearing counsel Court made following O R D E R appeals are disposed of in terms of signed order. (SUMAN WADHWA) (SUMAN JAIN) AR-cum-PS COURT MASTER Signed order is placed on file. Commnr. Of Income-tax, Guwahati-I v. M/s. Meghalaya Steels Ltd
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