JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by S. C. Dharmadhikari J.-Rule. respondents waive service. By consent of parties, rule made returnable forthwith. By this writ petition under article 226 of Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for issuance of writ of certiorari or writ in nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order to quash and set aside orders passed on March 26, 2013, and May 10, 2013, annexures I and J to writ petition. principal relief is claimed in following factual background: Commission entitled as Income-tax Settlement Commission has its office at Mumbai. second respondent is assessee, who is taxed for its income by Mumbai Income Tax Commissionerate, petitioner before us. It is this second respondent who approached respondent No. 1Commission seeking its intervention and under statutory scheme. This statutory scheme is evolved within framework of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the IT Act"). We shall make reference to this scheme little later. From record, it appears that in assessment year 2010-11, scrutiny assessment was undertaken, in which it was noticed that second respondent (for short "the assessee") had purchased materials/goods from various parties. Some parties, whose names appeared in list, were suspicious. It is alleged that they issued bogus bills. There was no delivery of goods nor was there transaction described and defined as "sale" within meaning of then Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959/Central Sales Tax Act, 1956/Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002. Thus, no transaction of nature referred to in these enactments was reported. names of such suspicious, bogus dealers were put up on website of Maharashtra Sales Tax Department. To verify genuineness of purchase transactions from one such party, namely, M/s. Nutan Metals, information under section 133(6) of Income-tax Act was called for but said notice was returned back. However, on February 12, 2013, one Shri Panchanmal Bokadia, proprietor of M/s. Nutan Metals, made statement before Assessing Officer confirming that said M/s. Nutan Metals issues bills for earning commission without giving delivery of goods. Accordingly, Assessing Officer determined highest credit balance at Rs. 28,09,288 as appearing on December 10, 2009, in ledger account of M/s. Nutan Metals as peak credit and same was thus treated as unexplained expenditure under section 69C of Income-tax Act and this amount was deemed to be income of assessee for relevant assessment year 2010-11. As per information received from Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) dated March 8, 2013, one Shri Mahendra S. Vora was found to have made huge cash deposits during financial year 2009-10. In statement before Income-tax Officer (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation) II, Mumbai, Shri Mahendra S. Vora admitted that deposits in bank account did not pertain to him but to assessee-firm. Further, statement of Shri Rasiklal M. Morakhia, partner in assessee-firm was also recorded on same day and said Shri Rasiklal M. Morakhia admitted that these deposits pertained to assessee- firm and did not pertain to Shri Mahendra S. Vora. Assessing Officer, therefore, held that cash deposits and other deposit as agreed by Shri Mahendra S. Vora and, subsequently, agreed by Shri Rasiklal M. Morakhia totalling Rs. 1,86,48,101 belonged to assessee-firm and same was added as income in hands of assessee-firm. assessment order dated March 18, 2013, for assessment year 2010-11 was not only passed but also sent to assessee-firm through registered speed post on March 18, 2013, itself and necessary entry on computerised system of Department (AST) was also made on March 18, 2013, itself. For assessment year 2011-12, notice under section 148 was issued on March 15, 2013, and it was served on assessee-firm on March 18, 2013. Thus, both, assessment for assessment year 2010-11 and notice under section 148 for assessment year 2011-12 have been deemed to be served/served, respectively, on assessee-firm before assessee filed application before Settlement Commission under section 245C of Income-tax Act. Annexure B is copy of notice issued under section 148 of Income-tax Act dated March 15, 2013, annexure C is copy of reasons recorded for issuance of notice under section 147 of Income-tax Act, annexure D is copy of acknowledgment of service of notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act and annexure E is copy of acknowledgment of assessment order. assessee-firm, knowing fully well that bogus purchases shown by assessee had been detected by Income-tax Department for all years, namely, assessment years 2010-11 to 2012-13 and also that concealed income in form of cash deposits had been detected by Department, filed settlement application for assessment years 201011 to 2012-13 on March 18, 2013, under section 245C of Income-tax Act. In this settlement application, additional income was declared as follows: Assessment year 2010-11 Rs. 1,05,25,216 Assessment year 2011-12 Rs. 8,97,111 Assessment year 2012-13 Rs. 41,72,337 relevant facts, as received from Director of Income-tax (Intelligence and Criminal Investigation), Mumbai, etc., were brought to notice of Settlement Commission on March 21, 2013, itself by letter No. CIT15/ Rasiklal and Co./2013-14/ 1688, dated March 19, 2013. Copy of assessment order for assessment year 2010-11 in case of assessee-firm was also before Settlement Commission on March 21, 2013, itself. Thus, before date of hearing under section 245D(1) of Income-tax Act on March 22, 2013, all relevant facts were before Settlement Commission. Commission was requested to take considered view in matter but all these were simply brushed aside and not even have been commented upon in order of Settlement Commission passed under section 245D(1) of Income-tax Act. settlement application made under section 245C of Income-tax Act was allowed to be proceeded with, vide order dated March 26, 2013, passed by Settlement Commission under section 245D(1) of Income-tax Act, copy of which is annexed as annexure H. copy of said order dated March 26, 2013, was forwarded by Settlement Commission to petitioner asking for report under section 245D(2B) of Income-tax Act. In response to this letter, required report under section 245D(2B) dated May 1, 2013, was submitted to Settlement Commission. In report of petitioner, filed under section 245D(2B) of Income- tax Act, it was brought to notice of Settlement Commission that there was no pending assessment for assessment year 2010-11, as assessment order was already issued before filing of settlement application under section 245C of Income-tax Act. Further, notice under section 148 for assessment year 2011-12 was also served on assessee-firm before assessee filed application before Settlement Commission under section 245C of Income-tax Act. Hence, for both these assessment years, settlement application filed under section 245C of Income-tax Act was invalid. Further still, it was also brought to notice of Settlement Commission that bogus purchases shown by assessee had been detected by Income-tax Department for all years, namely, assessment years 2010-11 to 2012-13 and also that concealed income in form of cash deposits had been detected by Department before filing of said settlement application under section 245C of Income-tax Act which was much more than undisclosed income declared by assessee-firm. It was pointed out to Settlement Commission that even copies of detected bank accounts were not submitted by applicant in application for settlement and, thus, application did not disclose relevant crucial material facts. Hence, assessee-firm had not fulfilled one of main requirements for availing of jurisdiction of Settlement Commission under section 245(1), which was to make full and true disclosure of its income which has not been disclosed before Assessing Officer and to specify manner in which such income has been derived. It is submitted that if at any stage including stage of admission or otherwise, Department could demonstrate that assessee has failed on any of these counts, application as per settled law is liable to be thrown out by Settlement Commission. Settlement Commission did not consider arguments of petitioner and has brushed aside case of petitioner. order of Settlement Commission dated May 10, 2013, not declaring application of assessee-firm as invalid under section 245D(2C) of Income-tax Act is woefully silent on objections raised by petitioner. Settlement Commission, in its order passed under section 245D(2C), in its majority view, merely agreed with assessee-firm by holding that matter had not reached finality as yet and as such it was debatable whether issues and observations made by petitioner would apply in facts and circumstances of case of assessee-firm. dissenting note of Third Member, Shri S. K. Mishra, which was in accordance with law relating to settlement of disputes as envisaged under Incometax Act was erroneously shot down by majority view of Members of Settlement Commission. It is in above facts and circumstances that petitioner impugns orders passed by Settlement Commission. Mr. Chhotaray, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, submitted that matter involves three assessment years, namely, 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. He submits that assessment order was passed for assessment year 2010-11, in which, it was disclosed that assessee-firm is engaged in business of trading in ferrous and non-ferrous metals. It consist of three partners, namely, Sevantilal M. Morakhia, Rasiklal M. Morakhia and Ashok M. Morakhia. Rasiklal M. Morakhia, has 34 per cent. shares in profits and losses of firm, whereas, others two have 33 per cent. each. During year under consideration, assessee earned gross profit of 2.47 per cent. and net profit 0.94 per cent. on turnover of Rs. 7,62,41,888. Mr. Chhotaray submits that during course of scrutiny, assessee submitted details and claimed purchases to tune of Rs. 7,75,62,590 and sales of Rs. 7,62,41,888. major items purchased by assessee include stainless steel, P. bronze and aluminium pipes, tubes, rods, sheets plates, etc. In order to verify genuineness of purchases, notices were issued under section 133(6) of Income-tax Act to two parties, namely, Nutan Metals and Mumbai Metals. Notices were issued on January 9, 2013. Mumbai Metals gave written reply/submission on January 23, 2013, and filed copy of ledger account of M/s. Rasiklal Kantilal and Co. and its own return of income, which was filed for assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11. It stated that there was no transaction with M/s. Rasiklal and Co. for assessment year 2008-09. In respect of Nutan Metals, there was no compliance. On January 2, 2013, Shri Dinesh Joshi, chartered accountant, attended and stated that all details called for were filed but it was noticed that notice under section 133(6) issued to this party was returned back by postal authorities. Therefore, assessee was directed by letter in writing to attend proceedings on February 11, 2013, and that is how assessee's representative attended along with proprietor of M/s. Nutan Metals. summons was issued and served on proprietor of Nutan Metals and Mr. Chhotaray relies upon answers given by this person to some of questions posed during course of assessment proceedings. Mr. Chhotaray relied upon paragraph 5.3 of assessment order to urge that if assessee fails to substantiate any expenditure debited to trading/profit and loss account with adequate supporting evidence and by establishing genuineness of purchases, then it is apparent that adverse inference drawn must be sustained. Settlement Commission failed to notice that if assessment has proceeded and resulted in assessment order, then application for settlement and made to Commission in terms of section 245C of Income-tax Act was not maintainable. There was no pending assessment for assessment year 2010-11, as assessment order was already issued before filing of settlement application under section 245 of Income-tax Act. Further, notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act for assessment year 2011-12 was also served on assessee-firm before assessee filed application. pendency of proceedings under Income-tax Act is sine qua non for admission of application before Commission. Thus, when notice had been served and assessment order has been passed for two assessment years referred to above, Settlement Commission had no jurisdiction to accept application. Mr. Chhotaray criticised approach of Commission and submitted that Commission should have not accepted stand of assessee that he had not received assessment order. In circumstances, Mr. Chhotaray would submit that Commission's order is ex facie erroneous, without jurisdiction and illegal. Mr. Chhotaray relied upon observations of Assessing Officer in assessment order. He also relied upon reasons which have been recorded for issuance of notice under section 144 of Income-tax Act. According to Shri Chhotaray, this would indicate as to how assessee indulged in manipulation of accounts. There was no genuine business activity and alleged purchases were not backed by strong and reliable evidence. These are accommodation entries and as deposed by concerned persons during assessment proceedings. Shri Mahendra S. Vora has admitted fact that details were bogus and were sufficient to accommodate parties like assessee. Mr. Chhotaray then submits that Commission's orders failed to take note of fact that respondent No. 2 was required to make full and true disclosure of income and manner in which same was derived. He should have, in application itself, disclosed as to how conditions precedent for valid application are satisfied. These conditions have to be strictly complied with. Section 245C of Income-tax Act mandates full and true disclosure. Unless these conditions are complied with, application of respondent No. 2 under section 245C of Income-tax Act was not maintainable. Respondent No. 2 has admitted and owned up two undisclosed bank accounts. He had admitted entries reflected in these bank accounts as far as capital and profit from undisclosed trading. He offered amounts to tax. However, copies of accounts did not form part of settlement application. disclosure of undisclosed income for assessment year 2010-11 of Rs. 1,05,25,216, of Rs. 8,97,111 for assessment year 2011-12 and Rs. 41,72,337 for assessment year 201213 was much less than what had already been detected by Department as bogus purchases and concealed income by way of cash deposit. Further, bogus purchases and concealed income by way of cash deposit. Further, inquiry which was made by Directorate of Intelligence and Criminal Investigation, Mumbai, which included recording of statement of both, of assessee-applicant and his accomplice, were not disclosed before Settlement Commission. fact that M/s. Nutan Metals had denied making sales to assessee and that all this was known to Department was also hidden by Respondent No. 2 from Settlement Commission. This entire material was brought before Settlement Commission together with supporting documents. There is also copy of assessment order, wherein partner of respondent No. 2-assessee's admission was recorded on February 1, 2013. This was also not in application filed before Settlement Commission. It is apparent from procedure followed that application before Commission is in two parts. One is open and other is confidential. submissions of Mr. Chhotaray pertain to open part of this application and which, according to him, is silent on aforestated material facts. If application was not truthful and complete, then Commission was not obliged to entertain it is submission of Mr. Chhotaray. In written arguments tendered by Mr. Chhotaray, it is submitted that in report under section 245D(2B) of Commissioner to Settlement Commission, Commissioner had also highlighted that assessee had not made full and true disclosure of its income in settlement application. Along with his communication dated March 19, 2013, Commissioner had also enclosed copy of assessment order dated March 18, 2013, passed by Assessing Officer. above two reports may kindly be perused. Two pre-conditions should be satisfied before proceeding with settlement application. assessee should make full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before Assessing Officer and assessee should also disclose manner in which such income has been derived. Through these two communications of Commissioner to Settlement Commission dated March 19, 2013, and report under section 245D(2B) of Income-tax Act, it was brought to notice of Settlement Commission about assessment made and that assessee had not made full and true disclosure of its income and manner of earning such income. Settlement Commission was apprised of bogus purchases by these two communications of Commissioner to Settlement Commission, namely, communication dated March 19, 2013, and report under section 245D(2B) of Income-tax Act. It was also argued during hearing before Settlement Commission. Therefore, Settlement Commission had material before it to hold that assessee had not made full and true disclosure of income and manner of earning same. Therefore, Settlement Commission should have rejected application on ground that disclosure was not full and true. Thus, assessee had knowledge that Department was aware of its bogus purchases when it made settlement application. Yet, it did not make disclosure of these transactions in settlement application. Settlement Commission also was aware through two captioned reports of Commissioner and at hearing about these bogus purchases before it considered applications for passing orders under sections 245D(1) and 245D(2C). Still it held by majority view that full and true disclosure has been made. As rightly held by third dissenting Member, assessee had not made full and true disclosure of income and manner of earning income. In support of above contentions, Mr. Chhotaray relies upon following decisions: 1. CIT v. B. N. Bhattachargee [1979] 118 ITR 461 (SC); [1979] 4 SCC 121. 2. Rasik Ramji Kamani v. S. K. Tripathi [1993] 203 ITR 848 (Bom). 3. CIT v. Express Newspapers Ltd. [1994] 206 ITR 443 (SC). 4. V. M. Shaik Mohammed Rowther v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) [1999] 236 ITR 581 (Mad). 5. CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala [2001] 252 ITR 1 (SC). 6. Order in Writ Petition No. 3990 of 2013, dated June 13, 2013, passed by Division Bench of this court in case of CIT v. Income Tax Settlement Commission (ITSC) (No. 1), Additional Bench, Mumbai, reported in [2014] 365 ITR 68 (Bom). On other hand, Mr. Mistri, learned senior counsel appearing for original applicant-respondent No. 2-assessee, submits that writ petition has no merit and must be dismissed. This court cannot substitute its views with that of Settlement Commission unless it concludes that order of Settlement Commission is vitiated by arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides. Settlement Commission is wholly empowered to entertain and admit application. While admitting and entertaining it, Commission is not obliged to consider merits or demerits of application or claims raised therein. At stage at which matter has been considered by Commission it is required to express only prima facie opinion. It found that disclosure made was adequate and sufficient for purpose of admitting assessee's application. Such tentative and prima facie view should not be interfered in writ jurisdiction, as that would result in complete failure of settlement mechanism. Mr. Mistri then submitted that entire matter proceeds on misconception that Settlement Commission, while admitting application, is obliged to go into and consider minute details and controversy or issue on merits. In present case, mechanism of settlement is being stalled by Revenue itself. That will never serve larger public interest. learned senior counsel has invited our attention to fact that writ petition is premature. Secondly, it is submitted that it is erroneous to assume that assessee was aware of assessment order under section 143(3) of Income-tax Act. That order was never served on assessee. Thirdly, proceedings before Settlement Commission, by way of application, were initiated unmindful of any assessment order. application was filed on March 18, 2013. circumstances in this regard have been narrated in affidavit-in-reply. It is urged that requisite details have been disclosed in application. declaration is truthful and honest. In any event, Settlement Commission is obliged to decide matter in accordance with law. When matter proceeds further, Revenue can point out to Settlement Commission that on basis of disclosures made, no relief be granted to present respondent No. 2-assessee-applicant. Mr. Mistri, therefore, relies upon stand taken by respondent No. 2 in affidavit and findings of Settlement Commission, to urge that writ petition has no merits and must be dismissed. In rejoinder, Mr. Chhotaray submits that present writ petition questions jurisdiction of Settlement Commission to entertain application and which was not meeting requirements set out in law. If statutory requirements are not complied with, then Settlement Commission must dismiss application at threshold. In present case, Settlement Commission has erred in not noticing fact that assessment order is already passed and served on assessee. Secondly, disclosure as made is not enough and in law for enabling Settlement Commission to entertain application/admit it. In present case, respondent No. 2 did not include bank statements which formed basis and other crucial documents in order to arrive at true and full disclosure of income. candid admission of respondent No. 2 that bank statements were handed over to Commission only on March 25, 2013, confirms that settlement application was not complete at time of filing as vital documents were not incorporated therein. Mr. Mistry has relied upon paragraph 7 of affidavit-in-reply to submit that there is no merit in contentions of petitioner. It is pointed out that between February 4, 2013, and March 15, 2013, respondent No. 2 has paid income-tax in sum of Rs. 66,28,053. break-up of same is given in paragraph 7, at page 94 of paper book. It is specifically stated that till March 15, 2013, no notice was received by respondent No. 2 for either of three assessment years, namely, 2010-11, 2011-12 and 201213. It is stated that on March 15, 2013, second respondent firm paid sum of Rs. 500 as fee prescribed for filing application before Settlement Commission. It is stated that if Assessing Officer claims to have made order under section 143(3) of Income-tax Act for assessment year 2010-11, then respondent No. 2 had no knowledge of same at time of filing of application before Settlement Commission. It is stated that this assessment order was dispatched at 8.49 p.m. (20.49 hours) on March 18, 2013. Relying upon Circular No. 3 of 2008 (see [2008] 299 ITR (St.) 8), dated March 12, 2008, issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), it is urged that service of assessment order is crucial and relevant aspect of matter. Then, there is grievance made as to how Assessing Officer, who was supposed to have acknowledged receipt of application for settlement, sought to force assessee to accept notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act. It has been stated and in this paragraph as to how Commission acted on receipt of application and passed order on May 10, 2013, but this writ petition has been filed after two months of said order and with view to delay further proceedings before Commission. Mr. Mistry submits that there is rejoinder-affidavit but in paragraph 3 thereof, paragraphs 1 to 7 of affidavit-in-reply have been generally dealt with. There is no denial of fact that assessment order was not served on respondent No. 2-assessee. There is only denial about forcing assessee to accept notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act as alleged in affidavit-in-reply. Therefore, Mr. Mistry would submit that this is case where none of submissions and canvassed on behalf of petitioner deserve to be accepted. It is urged that there is no merit in writ petition and it deserves to be dismissed. With assistance of learned counsel appearing for both sides, we have perused writ petition and its all annexures and affidavits placed on record. At outset, it must be indicated that there are limits on this court's jurisdiction under article 226 of Constitution of India, in entertaining writ petition challenging preliminary or prima facie opinion of Settlement Commission. Mr. Chhotaray himself has relied upon judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala reported in [2001] 252 ITR 1. Constitution Bench of hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has analysed entire chapter and held as under (page 14): "It is no doubt true that terminology'settlement' has very wide dictionary meaning and in absence of statutory definition generally word'settlement' in sub-section (4) of section 245D would give Commission sufficient power to arrive at settlement which it deems fit, but when statute qualifies such expression like 'settlement' with mandatory words like'in accordance with provisions of this Act' width of term'settlement' becomes subject to mandate found in that section, which would mean that while Commission has sufficient elbow room in assessing income of applicant under section 245D(4) it cannot make any order with term of settlement which would be in conflict with mandatory provisions of section like in quantum and payment of tax and/or interest. In this view of matter, we are of opinion that assuming that there is any room for interpretation of provisions of Part F of Chapter XVII and Chapter XIX-A, we would hold that it would not in any manner empower Commission to either waive or reduce interest which is statutorily payable under provisions of Part F of Chapter XVII." observations that Mr. Chhotaray relies upon and at page 15 of this report indicate that intention of Legislature in introducing this section is to see that protracted proceedings before authorities or in courts are avoided by resorting to settlement of cases. Further, in earlier decision of this court and of Division Bench in case of CIT v. ITSC reported in [2000] 246 ITR 63 (Bom), this court concluded that it has limited powers and cannot interfere with order of Settlement Commission as if it is appellate court. This court held as under (page 79): "Findings on rival submissions: first question we have to consider is what is scope of writ jurisdiction under article 226 of Constitution of India while examining order of Settlement Commission? Broadly speaking essential feature of writ of certiorari is that control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is not in appellate but supervisory capacity. One consequence of this is that court will not review findings of fact reached by inferior court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. writ of certiorari can be issued to correct error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on face of record. principles are well settled when writ jurisdiction should be exercised. It should be issued in grave cases where subordinate Tribunals, bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or in violation of principles of natural justice or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested in them. There is error apparent on face of record. Whether there is excess exercise of jurisdiction may depend upon existence of some facts in each case. There are cases where jurisdiction of inferior Tribunal depends upon fulfilment of some conditions precedent upon existence of some particular fact. Such fact is collateral to actual matter, which inferior Tribunal has to try and determination. Whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to determination of actual question which inferior Tribunal, has to try. In such case, in certiorari proceedings court can enquire into correctness of decision of inferior Tribunal as to collateral fact and may reverse that decision if it appears to it on material before it to be erroneous. certiorari jurisdiction can also be exercised if conclusions are perverse and, therefore, suffer from patent error on face of record. With aforesaid principles in mind, if we turn to scheme of Chapter XIX-A of Act then it would be clear that said Chapter was inserted by Taxation Law (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976. Provisions more or less similar to it contained in sub-sections (1A) to (1D) of section 34 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, were introduced in 1954. provisions of Chapter XIX-A were, however, qualitatively different and more elaborate than said provisions in 1922 Act. said Chapter thereafter went through number of changes from date of its insertion in Income-tax Act by virtue of amendments from time to time. Under Income-tax Act by virtue of amendments from time to time. Under provisions as they stand today, proceedings under this Chapter commence by application made by assessee as contemplated by section 245C. Section 245D prescribes procedure to be followed by Commission on receipt of application under section 245C and, thereafter, Commission is obliged to follow procedure as provided in sub-sections details of which are already enumerated while taking stock of legislative provisions in this behalf. Section 245L of Act declares that any proceeding under this Chapter before Settlement Commission shall be deemed to be judicial proceeding within meaning of sections 193 and 228 and for purposes of section 196 of Indian Penal Code. When it is declared to be judicial proceeding, prescribed procedure has to be followed." These principles, therefore, would guide us in deciding whether Commission erred in admitting and entertaining application of second respondent. Commission had before it application from second respondent filed on March 18, 2013, for three assessment years. This application was filed under section 245(1) of Income-tax Act. Settlement Commission can be approached with application for settlement of cases. term "case" is defined in section 245A(b) to mean any proceeding for assessment under this Act of any person in respect of any assessment year or assessment years which may be pending before Assessing Officer on date on which application under sub-section (1) of section 245C is made. application for settlement of case is contemplated by section 245(1) and which provides that assessee may, at any stage of case relating to him, make application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and containing full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before Assessing Officer, manner in which such income has been derived, additional amount of income-tax payable on such income and such other particulars as may be prescribed to Settlement Commission to have case settled and any such application shall be disposed of in manner hereinafter provided. proviso to this sub-section states that no such application shall be made unless in case where proceedings for assessment or reassessment for any of assessment years referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153B in case of person referred to in section 153A or section 153C have been initiated, additional amount of income-tax payable on income disclosed in application exceeds fifty lakh rupees, and in case where sub- clauses (A) and (B) of clause (ia) of proviso is attracted or where clause (ii) of proviso is attracted. Upon receipt of this application, Commission has to deal with it in terms of procedure set out in section 245D of Income- tax Act. That section has various sub-sections but we are concerned with subsections (2A), (2B), (2C) and (2D). These sub-sections read as under: "(2A) Where application was made under section 245C before 1st day of June, 2007, but order under provisions of subsection (1) of this section as they stood immediately before their amendment by Finance Act, 2007, has not been made before 1st day of June, 2007, such application shall be deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with if additional tax on income disclosed in such application and interest thereon is paid on or before 31st day of July, 2007. Explanation.-In respect of applications referred to in this subsection, 31st day of July, 2007, shall be deemed to be date of order of rejection or allowing application to be proceeded with under sub-section (1). (2B) Settlement Commission shall,- (i) in respect of application which is allowed to be proceeded with under sub-section (1), within thirty days from date on which application was made; or (ii) in respect of application referred to in sub-section (2A), which is deemed to have been allowed to be proceeded with under that sub-section, on or before 7th day of August, 2007, call for report from Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, and Principal Commissioner or Commissioner shall furnish report within period of thirty days of receipt of communication from Settlement Commission. (2C) Where report of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner called for under sub-section (2B) has been furnished within period specified therein, Settlement Commission may, on basis of report and within period of fifteen days of receipt of report, by order in writing, declare application in question as invalid, and shall sent copy of such order to applicant and Principal Commissioner or Commissioner: Provided that application shall not be declared invalid unless opportunity has been given to applicant of being heard: Provided further that where Principal Commissioner or Commissioner has not furnished report within aforesaid period, Settlement Commission shall proceed further in matter without report of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. (2D) Where application was made under sub-section (1) of section 245C before 1st day of June, 2007, and order under provisions of sub-section (1) of this section, as they stood immediately before their amendment by Finance Act, 2007, allowing application to have been proceeded with, has been passed before 1st day of June, 2007, but order under provisions of sub-section (4), as they stood immediately before their amendment by Finance Act, 2007, was not passed before 1st day of June, 2007, such application shall not be allowed to be further proceeded with unless additional tax on income disclosed in such application and interest thereon, is, notwithstanding any extension of time already granted by Settlement Commission, paid on or before 31st day of July, 2007." We are mindful of fact that Settlement Commission has been set up with laudable and avowed object. That is to promote settlement. It is not as suggested by Mr. Chhotaray to confer right in any taxpayer to be dishonest. We are further mindful of fact that section 245C of Act is meant for those assessees who seek to disclose income not disclosed before Assessing Officer including manner in which such income has been derived, as hon'ble Supreme Court held in case of CIT v. Express Newspapers Ltd. reported in [1994] 206 ITR 443 (SC) that Chapter XIX-A is part of Income-tax Act and must be construed consistent with overall scheme and object. Thus, it is to enable those assessees who want to disclose income not disclosed till then together with manner in which same income is derived and provisions are not meant for such assessees who come after event or who are guilty of fraud perpetrated on Revenue. We are also aware of recommendations made by Wanchoo Committee and we have perused them with assistance of Mr. Chhotaray. Therefore, once Commission has been approached, then it has to deal with application in terms of sections contained in Chapter. We are also aware of and have perused carefully observations of hon'ble Supreme Court in judgment in case of CIT v. B. N. Bhattachargee reported in [1979] 118 ITR 461 (SC); [1979] 4 SCC 121. We are not deviating from principle that Commission has to ensure that Settlement is fair, prompt and independent. It must not enable those who wish to evade taxes or avoid consequences following same as provided by law and particularly by Income-tax Act. It is in that light that we have perused impugned order passed by Settlement Commission. It held that assessee's representative took it through entire application and submitted that technical requirements of admission have been complied with. application so filed before Commission on March 18, 2013, and intimation of filing, in Form B, has been given on same date to Assessing Officer. Commission refers to returns for assessment years in question and finds that for assessment year 2010-11 notice under section 143(2) of Income-tax Act was issued on September 29, 2011. Thus, it found that returns of income for subject assessment years were filed and proceedings are pending from April, 2011, September, 2011, and April, 2012, for respective assessment years. For assessment year 2010-11, notice under section 143(2) was issued as above but assessee's representative pointed out that Assessing Officer passed order on March 18, 2013, and on date on which application before Settlement Commission was filed, copy of order has not been served on applicant-second respondent. Then, Settlement Commission found that reliance has been placed on paragraph 61.2 of Circular No. 3 of 2008, dated August 12, 2008, issued by Central Board of Direct Taxes. Then, reliance was placed upon certain orders of Settlement Commission in case of ABG Shipyard Ltd. and Shivkumar Chaturmal Acharya passed in month of January, 2012, emphasising that though assessment order was claimed to have been passed on March 18, 2013, it cannot be said to have been made in terms of provisions relating to admission of application because it is not served on applicant. Thus, reliance was placed on definition of term "case" as set out in section 245A(b) of Income- tax Act. Thus, it was asserted that proceedings for assessment under Act in respect of assessment years in question are pending. Paragraph 3 of impugned order and passed by majority reads as under: "We have considered above argument of authorised representative. We find that assessment order is signed on March 18, 2013, and has been dispatched by post to applicant on same date in morning. However, it has been returned unserved by postal authorities to Department. On perusal of envelope containing assessment order it has also been noticed that service was refused on March 19, 2013, as well as on March 20, 2013. From above facts it is clear that although dispatch of assessment order has been done on March 18, 2013 (the date on which assessment order was passed), service to applicant was not made by March 18, 2013. If refusal is to be accepted as service then earliest service is on March 19, 2013. Alternate plea of authorised representative that applicant be debarred for making application in circumstances only with effect from March 19, 2013 onwards has also got considerable force. delivery of envelope to postal authorities on 18th cannot be termed as service to applicant on same date in present set of facts." Commission observed that assessment order is signed on March 18, 2013 and has been dispatched by post to applicant-respondent No. 2 before us on same day in morning but it was returned unserved by postal authorities to Department. Commission, therefore, perused necessary records including envelope and found that service was refused but after date on which application for settlement was presented and filed before Commission. It is conclusion of Commission that delivery of envelope to postal authorities cannot be termed as service. We do not find, therefore, any force in contention of Mr. Chhotaray that assessment order having been served, proceedings for assessment year, namely, 2010-11 were not pending. We are not required to consider any larger controversy or effect of any amendments which have been made to definition of term of words "case". As far as assessment year 2011-12 is concerned, Commission found in paragraph 4 of majority order that no notice under section 143(2) of Income-tax Act has been issued to second respondent. However, notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act dated March 15, 2013, has been issued and served on second respondent on March 18, 2013. Commission also, therefore, noted arguments of assessee's representative that effective date of commencement of reassessment proceedings and which would debar second respondent from approaching Settlement Commission needs consideration. He submitted that Explanation for purpose of clause (b) of section 245A(i) refers to proceedings for reassessment and they shall be deemed to have commenced from date on which notice under section 148 is issued. argument before Commission was that word "issued" should be interpreted as "served". After noticing this argument and other contentions, majority concluded that word "issued" in present context will have to be read as "served". Therefore, for assessment year 2011-12 as well, Commission held that proceedings are pending. For assessment year 2012-13, return of income was filed on September 25, 2012, but no notice under section 143(2) has been issued. However, notice under section 148 of Income- tax Act dated March 15, 2013, has been served on assessee on March 18, 2013, which is date of filing application before Commission. Even with regard thereto, assessee's representative argued that there could not have been any reassessment proceedings where time limit to issue notice under section 143(2) still exists and assessment is not barred by limitation. However, for our purpose, we need not dwell on this aspect in further details, as we find that thrust of Mr. Chhotaray's submissions is that even Member who had given dissenting note has held that application submitted under section 245C(1) for assessment years 2010-11 and 2011-12 is not maintainable and same is treated as inadmissible but for assessment year 2012-13, there is inconsistent and contradictory finding by dissenting Member. In paragraph 2 of his note at page 66, Member holds that notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act for assessment year 2011- 12 has been served on March 18, 2013, and, therefore, proceedings for that assessment year are not pending. However, for assessment year 2012-13, he has without referring to paragraph 7 of majority view agreed with it that application is maintainable and can be admitted. Thus, on when same facts he holds that proceedings for assessment year 2011-12 are not maintainable, he ought to have agreed with majority for both years, namely, assessment year 2011-12 and assessment year 2012-13. Therefore, according to dissenting Member, application for assessment year 2012-13 is admissible and can be proceeded with. dissenting Member was in error in holding that for assessment year 2010-11, proceedings for assessment under Act are not pending. He has, to our mind, wrongly concluded that assessment order was issued for that assessment year on March 18, 2013, and same has been dispatched. Such dispatch would mean service. We are not required to go into any wider controversy once again but understanding of dissenting Member of section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897, leaves lot to be desired. While it is true that statement of addressee that notice was not served on him by post may not in every case be enough to rebut presumption but it must be established that where any Central Act or Regulation made after commencement of General Clauses Act, 1897, authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether expression "serve" or either of expressions "give" or "send" or any other expression is used, then unless different intention appears, service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post, letter containing document, and, unless contrary is proved, to have been effected at time at which letter would be delivered in ordinary course of post. act of giving notice is not complete on mere dispatch of notice and further that word "issued" is also used in same sense as "served". All this has been emphasised by hon'ble Supreme Court in several decisions and for illustration, we refer to judgments of hon'ble Supreme Court in cases of K. Narasimhiah v. H. C. Singri Gowda reported in AIR 1966 SC 330, R. K. Upadhyaya v. Shanabhai P. Patel reported in [1987] 166 ITR 163 (SC); AIR 1987 SC 1378, and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu reported in [2005] 124 Comp Cas 1 (SC); AIR 2005 SC 109. Thus, we find that Commission was not inclined to refuse application or not entertain it or admit it only on this ground. Once second respondent-assessee has pointed out course of events and date-wise in paragraph 7 of affidavit-in-reply, to which we do not find any rejoinder, then even qua assessment year 2011-12, proceedings can be said to be pending. It is pointed out as to how notice under section 148 and dated March 15, 2013, is said to have been issued and served on second respondent on March 18, 2013, but reliance is placed on word "issued" and, thereafter, to construe it as "served". There is considerable debate about this and once dissenting Member also has found that application for settlement is partially admissible, then all more we are not inclined to interfere with majority view. majority view as is found to be recorded and accepting assessee's version (paragraph 5 of majority view at page 62), does not require any further debate nor we are deciding any wider controversy. thrust of arguments is that assessee did not make full and true disclosure of his income and, therefore, sub-section (1) of section 245C of Income-tax Act is not complied with. Commission has in majority view found that there were certain bank accounts which have not been disclosed by assessee to Assessing Officer. resultant income worked out on basis of entries in these accounts have been accepted by second respondent and he has set out manner of earning as well as made true and full disclosure of income. In paragraph 11 of order of majority at page 65 of paper book this is what is held: "11. We have carefully considered application as well as submissions made by authorised representative. We find that conditions regarding threshold limit for quantum of tax on additional income, payment of tax and interest thereupon and pendency of proceedings all are fulfilled. applicant has also paid requisite fees of Rs. 500 under section 245C(2) and receipt for same is also enclosed with application. Fling of this application has also been intimated to Assessing Officer on same day. As regards issue of true and full disclosure of income and manner in which such income has been derived, we are of opinion that disclosure of additional income at this stage appears to be prima facie full and true and at present there is no material to reject contention of applicant company. This aspect would require detailed examination in subsequent proceedings before us and, therefore, is left open." However, we do not find that dissenting Member has specifically made any comment on above in his first note dated March 26, 2013 (see page 66 and 67). Mr. Chhotaray would submit that there is no disclosure much less true and full. In oral arguments as also in his detailed note Mr. Chhotaray has urged that second respondent has not made full and true disclosure of its income and manner of earning such income. Mr. Chhotaray's emphasis is that one very important aspect of investigation carried out by Department was bogus purchases made by second respondent from parties who have been identified by Sales Tax Department as suspicious. Their names have been published on website of Sales Tax Department and one of alleged vendors stated that he had not sold any material to second respondent but lent only his name for commission. Mr.Chhotaray heavily relied upon Assessing Officer's observations and findings in assessment order. Though assesseerespondent No. 2 before us has made statement to contrary, yet, Mr. Chhotaray submits that Settlement Commission was apprised of bogus purchases by two communications of Commissioner and in that regard he relies upon annexures G and I of paper book. Settlement Commission has completely ignored, according to Mr. Chhotaray, reports and these communications. If it was so aware, then view recorded and reproduced as above is perverse. Mr. Chhotaray relies upon opinion of dissenting Member and which is to be found at pages 82 to 88 of paper book. Thus, two dissenting opinions are relied upon. When we referred as above and concluded that there is no opinion contrary to majority recorded, we were referring to dissenting note at pages 66 and 67 of paper book. At annexure J is copy of order dated May 10, 2013. This order is passed after settlement application was allowed to be proceeded with and report was called for under section 245D(2B) of Income-tax Act. Thus, it is post-admission order and traceable to section 245(2C) of Income-tax Act. However, from pages 82 and 83, we find that there is reference made to arguments of one Pradeep Sharma, Commissioner of Income-tax-15, Mumbai. These arguments continue up to page 85 and, thereafter, submissions to contrary of assessee's representative have been recorded. In paragraph 7, dissenting Member states that in application, second respondent has not enclosed copy of bank statements of alleged benami bank accounts, which were very basis on which he had made disclosure of its additional income. Member went on and hold further that in absence of these two bank accounts, it is not possible for Commission to quantify additional income. Then, he refers to source of generation of cash which was core issue for making declaration of additional income before Commission. assessee has allegedly not confirmed manner in which additional income was earned. It is in these circumstances that requirement of full and true disclosure is held to be not satisfied and for all three years. We do not find how this could be said to be common conclusion for all three years inasmuch as there is assessment order made for only one assessment year. It is in that order there is reference to bank accounts. It is in that order there is reference to communication addressed to third party and that third party Mahendra S. Vora appearing before Assessing Officer and having his statement recorded. In such circumstances, it could not have been held by dissenting Member that requirement of full and true disclosure and in regard to income and manner in which it is generated is not satisfied or fulfilled by assessee. How that finding can be common for all three assessment years. More so, when for one assessment year findings are that there is already assessment order made and duly served, and, secondly, there is notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act issued and which must be construed as served for assessment year 2011-12. Hence, this contradiction in opinion of Technical Member is enough to reject submissions of Mr. Chhotaray. We are not concerned in this case with merits of disclosures. We find that once majority holds that conditions regarding threshold limits for quantum of tax for additional income, payment of tax and interest thereupon and pendency of proceedings all are fulfilled, then application was not liable to be rejected on any technical ground. majority has taken care while observing that disclosure of additional income at stage at which application was brought before it appears to be prima facie full and true. However, this aspect would require detailed examination in subsequent proceedings and is left open. Thus, Commission was not required to give definite and conclusive finding at threshold. Suffice it to hold that once it has come to above conclusion, then we are not required to go any further. We clarify that all observations by majority, dissenting Member and equally by us are tentative and prima facie. That would not prevent Commission from dealing with application in accordance with law. Suffice it to further hold that view taken by majority cannot be termed as perverse or based on no material. It cannot be said to be arbitrary as well. In these circumstances, just because alternate or other view is possible is not enough for us to interfere in writ jurisdiction. Mr. Chhotaray has made attempt to hand over compilation. One compilation contains application and annexures and second is confidential part. He terms first part as open part and second as confidential part. scrutiny of open part reveals how Assessing Officer having probed matter (page 169), there is reference to bank account in name of Mahendra Shantilal Vora in Dena Bank, Gulalwadi, Mumbai. date of opening and how account was operated by Mahendra Vora for his personal transactions during financial year 2009-10 and when second respondent started utilising this bank account for its own benefits has been set out. dates of opening and closure of bank account are indicated. period during which it was operated is revealed and in what manner as well. There is categoric statement that all transactions undertaken from this account are admitted to be actually belonging to second respondent and are subject matter of offer of additional income before Settlement Commission. detailed modus operandi including manner in which assessee has not disclosed income before Assessing Officer is set out in confidential portion. It is on this basis and such material that majority concluded that requirement of full and true disclosure is satisfied. We are satisfied that Settlement Commission performed its function and upon scrutiny of relevant materials rightly concluded that prima facie disclosure as made is true and complete, it pertains to income not disclosed before Assessing Officer, manner in which it is derived. duty and obligation on Settlement Commission regarding recording preliminary jurisdictional conclusion is duly discharged. Any further probe and inquiry is unwarranted and unnecessary. It is not for us to go into adequacy or sufficiency of these findings and at threshold merely because Mr. Chhotaray wants us to go into reports of Commissioner. We are of view that any exercise of this nature would prejudice case of both sides and it is even otherwise impermissible in our limited jurisdiction. We do not decide disputed questions of fact nor we substitute ourselves as Settlement Commission. For, both courses are not permissible in law and to be carried out in our limited jurisdiction. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in rejecting contentions of Mr. Chhotaray on third aspect of matter. aspect of matter. case law relied upon by Mr. Chhotaray now needs to be noticed. Mr. Chhotaray's heavy reliance is on judgment of Division Bench of this court. In case of CIT v. ITSC (No. 1), Additional Bench, Mumbai in Writ Petition No. 3900 of 2013 [2014] 365 ITR 68 (Bom). There, second respondent filed application on September 17, 2011, before Settlement Commission for five assessment years and disclosed additional income of Rs. 21.27 crores. Commission passed initial order on September 27, 2012, under section 245D(1) of Income-tax Act allowing application to be proceeded with and thereafter Commissioner was called upon to furnish report, inter alia, on validity of application filed for relevant years, correctness and adequacy of additional taxes and interest paid by applicant and on compliance with applicant. That report was submitted on October 15, 2012, and Commission passed order under section 245D(2C) on November 9, 2012. argument was that full and true disclosure of income was not made and manner in which same was earned. Hence, jurisdictional requirement has not been fulfilled by assessee. Revenue relied upon material in its possession and with regard to purchases, etc., by assessee. Commission concluded that it is not in position to hold view that additional income offered in statement is not full and true disclosure. In such circumstances, Division Bench concluded that jurisdictional requirements have to be satisfied, else Commission cannot proceed and in accordance with law. object of setting up Commission and provisions has, therefore, been extensively referred in paragraphs 10 and 11. Division Bench concluded that for application to be maintainable, disclosure must be full and true. Till paragraph 19, provisions of law have been referred and analysed. In paragraph 20, conclusion of Commission has been referred. Commission did not note difference between disclosure being true and full and whether explanation offered in statement of facts on income is not true and full disclosure. Commission took view that it cannot take view that income offered in statement of facts is not true and full disclosure and in same vein it took view that subject of true and full disclosure is open in proceedings under subsection (4) of section 245D of Income-tax Act. Thus, paragraph 20 is heavily relied upon by Mr. Chhotaray. However, distinction lies in fact that in present case, Commission has recorded by majority that disclosure of additional income at this stage appears to be prima facie full and true and at present there is no material to reject contentions of second respondent. However, this would require detailed examination in subsequent proceedings and, therefore, it is left open. We also find that majority has made separate orders and for assessment years 2010-11 to 2012-13. In paras 8 and 9 of its order dated March 26, 2013, Commission has recorded distinct conclusions on this aspect. It noted that there is difference in perception on requirement of true and full disclosure of income. It does not wish to express final opinion on adequacy of disclosure. Thus, disclosure is not termed to be untrue and incomplete. What is held is whether disclosure as made is adequate and complete would require detailed examination. disclosure is termed as true and full but difference in perception of assessee and Revenue has been noted. Equally, Commission did not ignore reports of Commissioner as complained. There is reference to it and contentions of Revenue qua them in order dated May 10, 2013. Thus, all statutory requirements and conditions are complied with. admission of assessee's application for settlement causes no prejudice to Revenue nor does it conclude matter in favour of respondent No. 2. dissenting Member, however, concludes that application is not maintainable for all three assessment years but at same time, finds force in argument of Commissioner that without statement of two bank accounts, it is not possible for Commission to quantify additional income as it has direct bearing on cash deposits made by assessee in bank accounts. His contrary reasoning in paragraph 7 of order at pages 86 and 87 has been noted by us above. It is in these circumstances that we do not find reliance placed by Mr. Chhotaray on judgment of Division Bench to be well placed. placed. We have not deviated in any manner from principles laid down in judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Anjum M. H. Ghaswala (supra). Equally, we have not deviated from principles in case of B. N. Bhattacharjee (supra) or in case of Express Newspapers Ltd. (supra). Mr. Chhotaray submits that case of Rasik Ramji Kamani v. S. K. Tripathi reported in [1993] 203 ITR 848 (Bom) is on all force. We are unable to agree because, in that case, Division Bench noted that all disclosures were found to be incomplete and, therefore, not truthful. Commission called upon appellant before Division Bench to furnish particulars as set out in notice. Commission had directed appellant specifically to satisfy requisitions given by Commission. There was compliance with that direction but not satisfactorily. Commission found most of documents to be heap of irrelevance. Three months' time was given to furnish details in respect of various requirements of Commission as had been indicated to appellant. appellant then left precincts of Settlement Commission, to pursue path of confrontation and contest by other remedies. Settlement Commission, therefore, having waited for three years, indicated inclination to dispose of proceedings before it in view of non-co- operation of appellant. Yet, it gave time to appellant to produce certain documents. That direction was not complied with. That is how Commission disposed of entire matter and with strong comments. In course of such determination and finally of entire matter that Commission made certain observations. It is this final order which was assailed in writ petition and assessee lost. It approached Division Bench. Division Bench also dismissed appeal, but in dismissing that, it emphasised need for assessee or party approaching Settlement Commission to be honest and truthful. We do not find how mere reliance on these observations of Division Bench would assist Mr. Chhotaray. Equally, Madras High Court judgment heavily relied upon by Mr. Chhotaray in case of V. M. Shaik Mohammed Rowther v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT) reported in [1999] 236 ITR 581 (Mad) reveals that there assessee assailed order of Settlement Commission in rejecting order of settlement. assessee's failure to make full and true disclosure being patent, it was not necessary for Commission to proceed with further consideration of application only to pass order of rejection at end of such further proceedings. This view again has been reached in backdrop of peculiar facts. That is how Commission's order was upheld and assessee-petitioner before Madras High Court was termed as dishonest. None of these judgments can be of any assistance to Mr. Chhotaray. In view that we have taken, it is not necessary to make any reference to judgments cited by Mr. Mistri or other judgments outlining ambit and scope of powers of Settlement Commission. Suffice it to hold that we are not inclined to interfere in prima facie conclusions of Settlement Commission as they are not vitiated by perversity, arbitrariness or mala fides. As result of above discussion, we do not find any substance in writ petition. It is dismissed. Rule discharged. There would be no order as to costs. Ad interim orders are vacated forthwith. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Income-tax Settlement Commission