JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by V. Kameswar Rao J.-The present appeal under section 260A of Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act" for short), has been filed by assessee challenging order dated April 8, 2002, in I. T. A. No. 531/Delhi/1995, whereby Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ("the Tribunal" for short) has set aside order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and affirmed finding of Assessing Officer that Rs. 1 lakh received by assessee from B. D. Goenka Foundation is income so as to be taxable. year of assessment with which we are concerned in this appeal is 1991-92. following substantial questions of law fall for our consideration in this appeal: "1. Whether, on facts and in circumstances of case, Income- tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that receipt of Rs. 1 lakh by appellant as award given to him by B. D. Goenka Foundation for his excellence in journalism was in nature of income liable to tax in hands of assessee? 2. Whether, on facts and in circumstances of case, Income- tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that receipt of amount of Rs. 1 lakh by way of award from B. D. Goenka Foundation was taxable as assessee's income as said institution was not covered by section 10(17A) of Income-tax Act?" brief facts are that appellant at relevant time was Editor in Chief of English magazine, i.e., India Today. According to him, he derived income from salary, interest, dividend and property. He filed return for previous year relevant to assessment year 1991-92 declaring income of Rs. 5,47,190. return was accompanied by financial statement of accounts. From assessment order it is observed that while perusing details given in return, Assessing Officer noted, assessee had claimed exemption for sum of Rs. 1 lakh received by him as B. D. Goenka Award for excellence in journalism. During proceedings, assessee counsel's attention was drawn towards section 10(17A) of Act, which provides that if any payment is made in cash or in kind in pursuance to award instituted in public interest by Central Government or any State Government or by any other body approved by Central Government or as reward by Central Government or any State Government then such award/reward is exempted. According to assessee, award was not for any services rendered but in nature of testimonial and expression of recognition by institution of eminence of person in field of journalism. assessee relied upon following judgments in support of his case: (i) S. A. Ramakrishnan v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 253 (Mad); (ii) C. P. Chitrarasu v. CIT [1986] 160 ITR 534 (Mad); (iii) CIT v. M. Balamuralikrishna [1988] 171 ITR 447 (Mad); and (iv) CIT v. Dr. B. M. Sundaravadanam [1984] 148 ITR 333 (Mad). Assessing Officer was of view that award given to assessee was not covered by exemption provisions of section 10(17A) of Act and judgments relied upon by assessee were not applicable to facts of case. He, accordingly, added amount of Rs. 1 lakh to income of assessee. On appeal, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) agreed with appellant-assessee and allowed appeal by holding as under: "I have carefully considered submissions made. I find merit in arguments advanced. award given to appellant was open one, instituted by B. D. Goenka Foundation, independent entity, and there is nothing on record to show that for getting award there has been any rendering of services by appellant to Foundation. It also cannot be inferred that appellant was having expectation of award, much less to say that any regularity in receipt from Foundation was even remotely probable. It is not every receipt that can be held chargeable to tax but in order to be so chargeable it must fall within expression'income' as contemplated in Income-tax Act. On facts and in circumstances of case, I quite agree with learned authorised representative that receipt in question cannot be construed to partake of character of income and, therefore, question whether it is taxable or exempt would not be relevant. To conclude this issue, therefore, I hold that receipt cannot be construed to be income component in hands of appellant and, therefore, its inclusion in total income is not justified and same is, accordingly, deleted from total income as computed in impugned order. appellant will, accordingly, be entitled to consequential relief of Rs. 1 lakh." On appeal by Revenue, Tribunal, vide detailed order, allowed same by holding that initial onus is on assessee to show that particular receipt is exempt from tax. Tribunal held amount of Rs. 1 lakh as income. It was also argument of appellant-assessee that for being income there must be "expectation and regularity". In other words, it was case of appellant-assessee that for receipt to be income, criteria is "expectation and regularity". said argument was rejected by Tribunal relying upon section 10(3) (since repealed) of Act which stipulated even casual and non-recurring receipts where aforesaid two criteria, namely, "expectation and regularity" were absent, to hold that law does not stipulate total exemption but only up to Rs. 5,000 and which was reduced to Rs. 2,500 where receipt represents winnings from races including horse races. Tribunal reversed finding of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and held that sum of Rs. 1 lakh received by assessee from B. D. Goenka Foundation was not exempt under section 10(17A) of Act and added back amount. Learned counsel for appellant-assessee would submit that receipt in question from B. D. Goenka Foundation was in nature of testimonial or personal gift unrelated to any consideration or services. testimonial paid to any professional or any person as token of esteem and regard for his ability or qualities and unconnected with any particular professional act or service is not income. He would further submit that award was given to appellant by said foundation for recognition of appellant's excellence in journalism and was not in nature of income or casual income. As such, aforesaid amount cannot be treated as income. There is no question of claiming exemption under section 10(17A) of Act. Moreover, section 10(3) of Act is also not applicable on facts of instant case to put ceiling of Rs. 5,000. He would applicable on facts of instant case to put ceiling of Rs. 5,000. He would further submit that assumption of Assessing Officer/Tribunal that since award is not recognised as per provisions of section 10(17A) of Act assessee is not entitled to exemption and receipt of amount constituted assessee's income liable to tax is erroneous. In last he would state that receipt in question does not fall within expression "income" as envisaged under section 2(24) of Act. He relied upon following judgments: (i) CIT v. M. Balamuralikrishna [1988] 171 ITR 447 (Mad); (ii) S. A. Ramakrishnan v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 253 (Mad); (iii) Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 532 (SC); and (iv) Siddhartha Publications P. Ltd. v. CIT [1981] 129 ITR 603 (Delhi). On other hand, learned senior standing counsel for Revenue would support judgment of Tribunal inasmuch as provisions of section 10(17A) exempting certain categories of awards/rewards itself provides that those awards/rewards not fulfilling conditions laid down in section 10(17A) will be income liable for tax. He would submit that Supreme Court in case CIT v. G. R. Karthikeyan [1993] 201 ITR 866 (SC) has held that income defined in section 2(24) is inclusive definition. Even if receipt does not fall within ambit of any of subclauses in section 2(24), it may still be income if it partakes of nature of income. idea behind providing inclusive definition in section 2(24) is not to limit its meaning but to widen its net. word "income" is of widest amplitude and that it must be given its natural and grammatical meaning. He would further submit that this court in case CIT v. J. C. Malhotra [1998] 230 ITR 361 (Delhi) following view taken by Patna High Court in CIT v. S. N. Singh, ITO [1991] 192 ITR 306 (Patna) held that reward to assessee, that was given by Central Government directly in connection with voluntary disclosure scheme to Income-tax Officer was income. separate approval of Central Government for purpose of exemption under section 10(17B) of Act was not given. That being position, protection under clause (17B) of section 10 of Act was not attracted and reward was not liable to be excluded from computation of income. Having heard learned counsel for parties, in so far as submission of learned counsel for appellant-assessee on section 10(3) of Act is concerned, suffice would it be to state as admitted by him, section 10(3) of Act relates to exemption in respect of receipt in nature of casual and non- recurring nature. In so far as section 10(17A) is concerned, it is not case of parties that award has been instituted in public interest by Central Government or by State Government. It is also not case of parties that it has been instituted by any other body approved by Central Government. It is to be seen whether award having been given by B. D. Goenka Foundation for excellence in journalism was in nature of income liable to be taxed. Clause (24) of section 2 of Act seeks to define term "income" but does not expressly and particularly define said expression. It only stipulates what would be included in said term. phrase that is used before specific clauses is "income includes". Section 2(24) provides for inclusive definition and is not exhaustive in its scope. Therefore, whatever would be income under law and express stipulations is income. What falls and is covered under different sub-clauses of clause (24) is certainly income, even if said receipts would not be income as understood in law. word "income" has widest and broadest connotation and means what would constitute income in law and otherwise declared as income in different sub-clauses of clause (24) of section 2 of Act. For purpose of present appeal, we would like to refer to some of sub-clauses of clause (24) of section 2 of Act. Sub-clause (i) states that profits and gains would be income; sub-clause (iii) stipulates value of any perquisite or profit in lieu of salary taxable under clauses (2) and (3) of section 17, would be income. Similarly, under sub-clause (iiia) special allowances other than perquisites otherwise included, granted to assessee to meet expenses wholly or necessarily and exclusively for performance of duties of office or employment of profit, is income; and under sub-clause (iv) allowances granted either to meet personal expenses at place whether duties of his office or employment are ordinarily performed, or at place where he ordinarily resides or any compensation that he receives, is income. Winnings by way of lotteries, or any compensation that he receives, is income. Winnings by way of lotteries, including card games or games of any other sort, entertainment programmes on telephone or electronic mode, in which people compete or any other similar game, is also treated as income in terms of sub-clause (ix) of clause (24) of section 2. Sums referred to in clauses (v), (vi), (vii), (viib) and (ix) of subsection (2) of section 56 are income. Thus, certain categories of gifts are treated as income but all gifts are not treated as income. non-specified gifts are not income, being capital in nature. Clause (24) of section 2, therefore, adopts dual approach; "income" means what would be included and is treated as income and in addition certain specific/specified categories of receipts or earnings are to be treated or are deemed to be income. Nevertheless all receipts or incomings are not income and are not exigible to tax. capital receipt is not taxable income. In facts of present case, Revenue does not rely upon subclauses (ii) to (xvii) of clause (24) of section 2. What is relied upon is general scope and ambit of term "income" and term "gains" used in "profits and gains" in sub-clause (i). expression "profits and gains" finds mention under heading D in Chapter IV of Act. said heading reads as "Profits and gains of business or profession". Section 28 under said heading then sets out what would be chargeable to tax under said head. It includes profits and gains of any business or profession carried out by assessee at any time during year and includes under sub-clause (iv) value of any benefit or perquisite, whether convertible into money or not, arising from business or exercise of profession. Clause (36) of section 2 defines term "profession" to include vocation, which is wider term. person can have more than one profession or vocation. Incomes which are not taxable under heads to D are taxable under residuary head "Income from other sources" dealt with under heading F of Chapter IV, i.e., section 56 to section 59 of Act. However, they must partake of nature and character of "income" as understood in law or covered by express sub-clauses of clause (24) of section 2 of Act. In present case, appellant was editor of newspaper and had income by way of salary, interest, dividends and profit. Section 17 of Act, however, has not been invoked in instant case and it is not case of Revenue that prize money received is taxable under head "Income from salary" under Part of Chapter IV of Act. We need not, therefore, examine judgments where discussion is centered on whether amount paid by employer or ex-employer would be taxable as salary or as perquisite or benefit. We, however, note that statute, i.e., Income-tax Act, 1961, has considerably expanded ambit of terms "salary", "benefit" and "perquisites". We will be referring to some of earlier decisions to exposit scope and four corners of term "income", as understood in law. Similarly, it is not case of Revenue that any of sub-clauses of clause (24) of section 2 are applicable. In present case, Revenue has not directly submitted and asserted that appellant was carrying on business or profession or even vocation. appellant has not been taxed for income in form of "profits" and "gains" earned from profession. Assuming that appellant was carrying on vocation as journalist or publisher, issue raised is whether prize money is revenue receipt or capital receipt. other aspect is whether prize money is taxable under head "Income from other sources". In P. Krishna Menon v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 48 (SC), assessee was retired Inspector of Police, had extensively studied Vedantic philosophy and excelled in giving discourses on Vedantic thought. He had number of disciples. On question, whether assessee was carrying on business or profession (including vocation), Supreme Court observed that (page 52): "It is said that in order that activity may be called vocation for purposes of Act, it has to be shown that it was organized activity and that it was indulged in with motive of making profit; that as appellant's activity in teaching Vedanta was neither organised nor performed with view to making profit, he could not be said to be carrying on vocation. It is said that as word'vocation' has been used along with words'business and profession' and object of business and profession is to make profit, only such activities can be included in word'vocation' object of which like-wise is to make profit. We think that these contentions lack substance. We do not appreciate significance of saying that in order to become vocation activity must be organised. If by that continuous, or as was said, systematic activity, is meant we have to point out that it is well-known that single act may amount to carrying on of business or profession. It is unnecessary to discuss this question further as we find no want of system or continuity in activity of appellant. He had gathered large number of disciples around him and was instructing them in Vedanta regularly. Levy came all way from England at regular intervals to obtain such instructions. All this clearly indicates organization and system. Again, it is well established that it is not motive of person doing act which decides, whether act done by him is carrying on of business, profession or vocation. If any business, profession or vocation in fact produces income, that is taxable income and nonetheless because it was carried on without motive of producing any income..." Rejecting contention of assessee that payments were made only on account of esteem and affection, court remarked that disciples had benefit of teachings of Vedanta and following paragraph from judgment in G. N. Herbert v. J. A. McQuade (Surveyor of Taxes) [1902] 4 TC 489 was quoted: "Now, that judgment, whether or not particular facts justified it is certainly affirmation of principle in law that payment may be liable to income tax although it is voluntary on part of persons who made it, and that test is whether, from standpoint of person who receives it, it accrues to him in virtue of his office; if it does it does not matter whether it was voluntary or whether it was compulsory on part of persons who paid it. That seems to me to be test; and if we once get to this-that money has come to or accrued to, person by virtue of his office-it seems to me that liability to income-tax is not negatived merely by reason of fact that there was no legal obligation on part of persons who contributed money, to pay it." Therefore, voluntary payment made because of office or vocation would be taxable, but voluntary payment made for reasons purely personal and unconnected with his office or vocation would not be taxable. court also referred to judgment delivered by Rowlatt J. in Reed v. Seymour [1926] 1 KB 588 wherein Rowlatt J., while explicating difference between personal gifts and remuneration paid, held that former would not be subjected to tax but latter would be. Reference was made to another decision in Cooper (Surveyor of Taxes) v. Blakiston [1908] 5 TC 347 (HL), wherein it was held that what was paid to vicar was given to him due to his office and, hence, formed part of profits accruing by reason of office he held. Reverting back to case in question, i.e., Krishna Menon's case (supra), it was held that imparting of teaching was causa causans of making gift and not merely causa sine qua non. payments were repeatedly and regularly made at certain intervals. Rejecting contention of assessee that payments ought to be treated as casual in nature, it was held that question of exemption does not arise as assessee was unequivocally carrying on vocation. In P. H. Divecha v. CIT [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 222, it was observed that motive and intent of person who pays is not relevant and it is nature of receipt in hands of person who receives same, which determines quality of receipt. However, for this purpose, one may examine intent of person paying/donee. quantum of amount paid may not be decisive. Even nomenclature given to payment under consideration may not be determinative of true nature of receipt. This judgment held that periodicity is not conclusive but term "periodicity" refers to recurring nature of payment and not regular source of payment over certain period of time. In said case, payment was made to partners by third party, which earlier had business relationship with partnership firm. This agreement between third party and firm was terminated. This payment to partners, it was held was not for any service performed or likely to be performed in future. It was not remuneration but was made out of regard for qualities of three partners and their long association. It was payment out of appreciation and gratitude and not as recompense for past service or services to be rendered in futuro. Therefore, payment was held to be not taxable. Though statutory amendments made thereafter would require consideration, in case of similar nature, we have thought it relevant to state said general principle. Some paragraphs of this judgment lucidly elucidate principle in question and, hence, they merit reproduction (page 231): "In determining whether this payment amounts to return for loss of capital asset or is income, profits or gains liable to income-tax, one must have regard to nature and quality of payment. If payment was not received to compensate for loss profits of business, receipt in hands of appellant cannot properly be described as income, profits or gains as commonly understood. To constitute income, profits or gains must be source from which particular receipt has arisen, and connection must exist between quality of receipt and source. If payment is by another person it must be found out why that payment has been made... It may also be stated as general rule that fact that amount involved was large or that it was periodic in character have no decisive bearing upon matter. payment may even be described as 'pay','remuneration', etc., but that does not determine its quality, though name by which it has been called may be relevant in determining its true nature, because this gives indication of how person who paid money and person who received it viewed it in first instance. periodicity of payment does not make payment recurring income because periodicity may be result of convenience and not necessarily result of establishment of source expected to be productive over certain period... Even if it be not regarded as payment for loss of capital it cannot be regarded as payment for any services rendered or likely to be rendered. services in past were amply remunerated. payment does not contemplate that agreement in past had not been sufficiently remunerative to firm. It does not pretended to pay them for past services. minutes do not show that any services in future was expected from these appellants. What remained to be done was to wind up business with regard to agreement of 1938 itself. For this purpose, company agreed to regard to agreement of 1938 itself. For this purpose, company agreed to give all facilities to firm in respect of easily saleable articles and to take over those which required longer duration to sell. only service, if services it can be called, was that firm was to hand over to company list of customers and supplies made to them during past six months. It cannot be said that for this service payment was made. payment was thus not related to any service either in past or in future. Both side have relied upon cases in which certain payments were held to be taxable or not taxable according as facts in those cases suggested that payment was for some services in past or future or was entirely gratuitous. No useful purpose will be served by going over such cases because facts of two very dissimilar cases lead to different principles... It was in no sense remuneration. It was in fact payment made out of regard for qualities of three partners of firm who were long associated with company to its profits and who had built up vast net work of sales organisation of which company would have obtained benefit when it entered on business of selling for itself. This payment need not be given particular name..." question whether said receipt could be treated as income of casual and non-recurring nature was rejected by court, by making observation that (page 237): "The receipt may only be described as receipt of casual and non- recurring nature if it were income, profits or gains." In Mahesh Anantrai Pattani v. CIT [1961] 41 ITR 481 (SC), reference was made to Beynon v. Thorpe [1927-28] 14 TC 1. In said case, question that arose for consideration of court was whether gift was as result of employment or not. court observed that personal gift for personal qualities of assessee and as token of personal esteem is not taxable, even if gift is motivated by some sort of gratitude and moral obligation. court made apposite distinction made between gift simpliciter and payments made for services rendered or to be rendered. In opinion of court, gifts simpliciter would not be taxable, if they are not connected with employment and are purely personal in character. Citing decision in Moorehouse (H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Dooland [1954] 36 TC 1, court went on to postulate three tests. Firstly, litmus test for determining whether voluntary payment would be exigible to tax has to be applied from stand point of recipient, by asking whether what has accrued to him is primarily and fundamentally by virtue of his office or employment; secondly, whether employment or office under consideration normally entails receipt of such voluntary payments; and, lastly, whether said payments were periodic or recurring in character. court, however, held that payments which are quite ostensibly gifts would not be taxable, as they were mere testimonials and were made in recognition of personal qualities of recipient. Supreme Court in Parimisetti Seetharamamma v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 532 (SC), dealt with case where substantial amount by way of cash and jewellery had been gifted by one of members of royal family of Baroda to maid servant/secretary. question that arose for consideration of court was whether said gifts were taxable as income. court held that Act does not make blanket provision whereby any and every receipt is to be treated as income and thereby made exigible to tax. Supreme Court, in instant case, held that testimonials and personal gifts do not fall within ambit of term "income". In all cases, burden lies on Revenue to prove that receipt is income within taxing provision but where receipt is in nature of income, burden to prove that it is exempt is on assessee. In said case, appeal of assessee succeeded on ground that Revenue had proceeded on wrong interpretation of law that assessee had failed to discharge burden of leading evidence that receipt was not income within taxing provision. legal burden was actually on Revenue to prove that receipt was income. decision has covered three aspects: all receipts are not income; testimonials and personal gifts are not income; and burden was on Revenue to show that receipt was income within taxable provisions. In view of factual matrix of said case, majority judgment held that circumstances did not establish that what was paid to assessee was remuneration for services already rendered or to be rendered. court reversed decision of High Court, Tribunal and authorities as Revenue had failed to discharge its burden of proving that receipts were income. Supreme Court in Dr. K. George Thomas v. CIT [1985] 156 ITR 412 (SC), observed that assessee was carrying on vocation of preaching against atheism, and during course of such vocation he had received donations in furtherance of objects of his vocation. There being proximate and live link between activities of assessee and payments so received, receipts were not casual in nature. As payments partook of recurring character, court declared them to be taxable. We would now like to briefly deal with some judgments of various High Courts. We begin with decision of Calcutta High Court in David Mitchell v. CIT [1956] 30 ITR 701 (Cal). assessee was partner of well known firm of chartered accountants. He had received payments from third party who had engaged services of partnership firm while floating company. said company had paid full fee for services rendered by partnership firm. Subsequently, company, it was claimed, had made unsolicited gift of 2,500 shares to assessee. value of shares, it was observed, could not be taxed as perquisite or profits, as they were not part of salary or wages. It was observed by court that conclusive test to decide whether shares could be said to be profits and gains arising out of profession or vocation would be to ascertain, whether same were gift in form of testimonial in recognition of personal qualities of partners. said test would be applied from stand point of recipient and it had to be first ascertained whether it accrued to him by virtue of his office and if it did, it is irrelevant whether it is voluntarily or compulsorily made on part of payer. If it was found to have any causal connection with exercise of profession or vocation, then it would not be treated as gift arising out of personal admiration; rather same would be treated as payment having correlation with office held. In such case, it would not be treated as one in appreciation of his personality or character. court recognised that money is rarely paid without good reason or some quid pro quo, and it is generally paid in return of property, goods or service or help. Therefore, care and caution has to be exercised when payment is made not by third parties but by parties who had received any benefit of professional services. At this stage, we would also like to refer to Govindlalji Ranchhodlalji (Maharaj Shri) v. CIT [1958] 34 ITR 92 (Bom). assessee therein was direct descendant of original founder of religious faith and had received offerings. It was pleaded that there was no legal obligation for followers to make gifts. argument was rejected holding that gifts were taxable because they were not made because of personal reasons but because recipient was head of particular sect. Another reason was that it was customary to make gifts. Thirdly, assessee held office that induced disciples to make gifts. Thus, even practice of religion would become profession when it has characteristic of steady income. gifts or donations in said case were not personal gifts but were receipts of recurring nature. Referring to contention that donations were voluntary, it was observed that true test to determine whether receipt is income or not, has to be perceived from stand point of recipient and not payer. In said case, it was observed that gifts were not made due to charismatic personality of recipient or to person because of his virtues. gifts were made because he was head of sect. "Unsolicited" donations received by evangelist could, therefore, be taxable. In Dilip Kumar Roy v. CIT [1974] 94 ITR 1 (Bom), Rs. 1 lakh received by assessee to enable him to build temple on account of voluntary payments, was held not to be income. These payments were made keeping in mind personal esteem and venerated position, fact which was not denied by Revenue and accepted by court as true. In Lachhman Dass v. CIT [1980] 124 ITR 706 (Delhi), gifts of land made to assessee out of natural love and affection, as assessee had served in his capacity as general attorney, was held to be not taxable as it was not in nature of remuneration paid, but transaction of gift. Madras High Court in CIT v. Paramanand Uttamchand [1984] 146 ITR 430 (Mad), had to grapple with issue, whether presents worth Rs. 19,242, received at time of Grih Pravesh ceremony from relations, friends and well- wishers would be taxable. issue was decided in favour of assessee by observing that it was not something earned and payments were merely gift and windfall. These were gifts of voluntary or gratuitous nature, without any quid pro quo, which is pre-requisite to qualify anything as gift. Thus, all what comes in is not income and gifts are not income. Gifts, it was observed, were opposite of income as they are wind falls. They are not earned as such. Earned income comes from definite source and it also possesses other characteristic of recurrence. Similarly, in CIT v. Dr. B. M. Sundaravadanam [1984] 148 ITR 333 (Mad), gifts received by professional doctor which was not towards his professional fee, were held to be not income. In C. P. Chitrarasu v. CIT [1986] 160 ITR 534 (Mad), gifts received by member of political party were not treated as income. Again, there are decisions on question whether gifts received by singer, etc., are personal in nature and, hence, exempt; or whether they are receipts in nature of income because recipient carries on vocation or occupation. We are not required to decide question regarding vocation or hobby as such but would accept that term "income" would include payments of recurring and periodical nature which are made from time to time. When this happens it would be plausible and right to infer that recipient is carrying on vocation and receipts relate and have causal connection with said activity. It has ceased to be mere hobby. Such payments, therefore, have periodicity and regularity and they disclose some sort of obligation, which may be even moral, social or customary. It may be unwritten and overtly voluntary but gifts or payments received as norm and convention, are taxable income. Periodicity is good indicator of what may be income as it can denote and manifest causa causans between "act" of assessee and earning. However, periodicity is not determinative in all cases, for one solitary instance of receipt can be income. Similarly, expectation of reward even when there is no obligation would be income, but if person performs action unaware that other person would reward him, receipt may not be towards or for service rendered, unless there is element of quid pro quo. aforesaid ratios do indicate distinction drawn between "capital receipt" and "revenue receipt"; for income as taxable term is revenue receipt. Income by way of capital gain is deemed to be income under clause (vi), provided it is chargeable under section 45. Capital receipts which are not chargeable under section 45 are not incomes. Thus, capital receipt could be taxable in view of amendments and statutory provisions which now cover and apply to particular situations. Albeit, every capital receipt is still not income. decision of this court in J. C. Malhotra (supra) is in consonance with our reasoning, for assessee in said case was Income-tax Officer and on account of services rendered/performed by him, he had received reward. In that case, it was established that his vocation was causa causans for award. Reference can be made now to widely acclaimed and often cited decision of Supreme Court in CIT v. G. R. Karthikeyan [1993] 201 ITR 866 (SC), where assessee had income from various sources including salary and business. Earnings in nature of prize money, etc., for winning were held to be income. It was observed (page 873): "The idea behind providing inclusive definition in section 2(24) is not to limit its meaning but to widen its net. This court has repeatedly said that word'income' is of widest amplitude, and that it must be given its natural and grammatical meaning. Judging from above standpoint, receipt concerned herein is also income. May be it is casual in nature but it is income nevertheless. That even casual income is'income' is evident from section 10(3). Section 10 seeks to exempt certain'incomes' from being included in the'total income'. casual receipt-which should mean, in context, casual income-is liable to be included in total income, if it is in excess of Rs. 1,000, by virtue of clause (3) of section 10. Even though it is clause exempting particular receipt/income to limited extent, it is yet relevant on meaning of expression'income'. In our respectful opinion, High Court, having found that receipt in question does not fall within sub-clause (ix) of section 2(24), erred in concluding that it does not constitute income. High Court has read several subclauses in section 2(24) as exhaustive of definition of income when in fact it is not so. In this connection it is relevant to notice finding of Tribunal. It found that receipt in question was casual in nature but-it opined-it was nevertheless not income receipt and fell outside provision of section 10(3) of Act. We have found it difficult to follow logic behind argument." Nature of and accordingly tax treatment given to receipts by way of endorsements; prize money received in tournament or match or even gifts received by sportspersons have undergone change over period of time. Earlier decisions in case of Reed v. Seymour [1926] 1 KB 588 and Moore v. Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) [1972] 3 All ER 399 (Ch.D) pronounced in 1927 and 1972 respectively, may not be of contemporary relevance and have limited applicability today because sports have now become profession or occupation and such prizes as well as gifts are now norm and not just once in lifetime occasion. Even amateur athletes, who perform well, receive awards, prizes and gifts. expectation for said rewards and acknowledgment exists. It is subterranean and covert in nature but sufficiently self- evident and distinctively demonstrative and accepted standard. It is unwritten code and rule. Element of gratis is missing, and when "gift", "prize", etc., relate to and are connected with activities rendered by sportsperson, they would be assessed as income even if no employer-employee or contractual relationship exists or even when payments are not compulsory in nature or legally enforceable. payments received in such cases are means of livelihood. Whatever be motive of payer, intention of recipient is to take advantage and cash in on source, i.e., his vocation or occupation. However, mere hobby resulting in sudden and unexpected testimonial would not be income. aforesaid principles should obviously be subject to specific sub- clauses in section 2(24) of Act, which treats income or earnings from card games or games of any other sort as income. When we apply aforesaid test to present receipt, it has to be held that said amount would be capital receipt, being purely in nature of testimonial. causa causans in present case is not directly relatable to carrying on of vocation as journalist or as publisher. It is directly connected and linked with personal achievements and personality of person, i.e., appellant. Further, it is to be noted that payment in this case was not of periodical or repetitive nature. payment was also not made by employer; or by person associated with "vocation" being carried on by appellant; or by client of his. prize money has in instant case been paid by third person, who was not concerned with activities or associated with "vocation" of appellant. It being payment of personal nature, it should be treated as capital payment, being akin to or like gift, which does not have any element of quid pro quo. aforesaid prize money was paid to assessee on voluntary basis and was purely gratis. On concluding note we would like to deal with alternative submission of counsel for Revenue that all prizes or awards in cash or kind would be income except those specifically covered and exempted under clause (17A) of section 10 of Act. In view of pronouncement of Supreme Court in P. H. Divecha (supra), answer to abovementioned submission of Revenue has to be in negative and, accordingly, against Revenue. In said case, argument raised on behalf of Revenue was that receipt in question was not exempt under clause (3) of section 10, and, therefore, would be taxable income. Supreme Court in quoted portion (see paragraph 23) has clearly and categorically held that question of exemption would not arise where receipt itself does not fall within ambit of income. question whether or not income is exempted and, thus, non- taxable would only arise when receipt itself is income. question of exemption is distinct and separate and would arise at secondary stage. In considered opinion of this court, correct legal position is that section 10 exclusively deals with exempt income not exigible to tax and should not per se be relied upon to ascertain whether receipt would be revenue receipt, i.e., income chargeable to tax under clause (24) of section 2 read with charging provisions. question of exemption under section 10 would only arise if at first instance, receipt is found to be revenue receipt. It would be incorrect to first examine whether particular receipt has been exempted and then on said reasoning and ratio proceed to decipher and hold that amount/receipt is income for purposes of Act, i.e., Income-tax Act. In International Instruments P. Ltd. v. CIT [1982] 133 i.e., Income-tax Act. In International Instruments P. Ltd. v. CIT [1982] 133 ITR 283 (Karn), it has been held that "A receipt may not be'income' at all within proper connotation of that term and yet may come within express exemption in this section, due to over- anxiety of draftsman to make fact of non-taxability clear beyond possibility of doubt". Just because certain receipt is not exempt under section 10, it does not follow that it is revenue receipt and, hence, income. Relevant in this regard would be to also quote Dilip Kumar Roy (supra), wherein it was held (page 5 of 94 ITR): "It is well settled that by sections 3 and 4 of Act, Act imposes general liability to tax upon all income, but Act does not provide that whatever is received by person must be regarded as income liable to tax. In all cases in which receipt is sought to be taxed as income, burden lies upon Department to prove that it is within taxing provision. Where, however, receipt is of nature of income, burden of proving that it is not taxable, because it falls within exemption provided by Act, lies upon assessee. Where case of assessee is that receipt did not fall within taxing provision, source of receipt is disclosed by assessee and there is no dispute about truth of that disclosure, income-tax authorities are not entitled to raise inference that receipt is assessable to income-tax on ground that assessee has failed to lead all evidence in support of his contention that it is not within taxing provision." In G. R. Karthikeyan (supra), Supreme Court has made observation that when particular "income" or "receipt" is exempt to limited extent, it may be relevant factor for determining meaning of expression "income". However, this statement should not be read in isolation, bereft of context in which it was made. entire paragraph quoted above (see paragraph 39 above) clearly illustrates that main thrust there was on highlighting that term "income" is of widest amplitude and should be given natural and grammatical meaning. Casual "income" is income. Once it is settled, that receipt is income, partial exemption would necessarily indicate that non- exempt part is taxable. In view of aforesaid discussion, substantial questions of law mentioned above, are answered in favour of appellant-assessee and against Revenue. Rs. 1 lakh received by appellant-assessee as award from B. D. Goenka Trust for excellence in journalism would be capital receipt and, hence, not income taxable under Act, i.e., Income-tax Act, 1961. There shall be no order as to costs. *** Aroon Purie v. Commissioner of Income-tax