JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by Jayant Patel J.-As in all appeals, common questions and common facts are involved, they are being considered simultaneously. Revenue has preferred all appeals against common judgment dated April 29, 2014, passed by Tribunal in respective tax appeals by raising number of questions mentioned at paragraph 2. However, we find that questions (i), (ii) and (iv) can be pressed by Revenue. same read as under: (i) "Whether hon'ble Appellate Tribunal has committed substantial error of law in accepting additional ground of assessee that since name of these assessees are not appearing in authorisation/requisition, proceedings initiated under section 158BC of Act against them are void ab initio without appreciating fact that order under dispute was passed in pursuance of order passed by Tribunal itself? (ii) Whether Tribunal was justified in law in accepting additional grounds of assessee which were raised after lapse of 5 years of filing of second round of appeal and 14 years after search without any justification by assessee for such delay? (iv) Whether hon'ble Tribunal was justified in law in accepting contention raised by assessee at later stage that block assessment failed for want of jurisdiction even though facts of case clearly shows that assessee had responded to notices, filed return, participated in block assessment proceedings and accepted assessment proceedings and further participated in set aside assessment proceedings and suffered assessment as per direction of hon'ble Tribunal, without raising such contention?" As such, broad facts show that initially, there were assessment orders by Assessing Officer for year 1996. Such assessments were carried in appeal before Tribunal since they were block assessment and Tribunal disposed of appeal by sending back matter to Assessing Officer for fresh block assessment and to compute undisclosed income in accordance with provisions of section 158BB. matter was again considered by Assessing Officer and in year 2005, Assessing Officer made block assessment order under section 158BC of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). matters were again carried in appeal before Tribunal. Pending appeal before Tribunal, additional ground was permitted to be raised by Tribunal on point that order passed under section 158BC read with section 254 of Act is bad in law, invalid or untenable since no warrant authorising search was issued in name of assessee, but on basis of warrant issued on joint names as shown in Panchnama as that of Arun Choksi, Sanjay Choksi and family and Jolly Tea (India) Ltd. and Jolly group of companies. Tribunal initially, vide order dated August 17, 2010, found that additional ground being root of matter could be permitted, hence, ground was permitted. It appears that, thereafter, vide order dated November 8, 2012, Tribunal modified reasons recorded and substituted words "Whether or not the'additional grounds' in respect of validity of warrant alleged to be either not issued or issued in joint names and another legal issue of non-issuance of notice under section 143(2) can be raised, is question for which matter was heard". relevant aspect is that part of reasons recorded, vide order dated August 17, 2010, was modified but ultimate additional grounds, which were so permitted, remained unaltered. It further appears that Revenue preferred Special Civil Application No. 9044 of 2013 before this court challenging modification and reasons recorded by Tribunal, vide order dated November 8, 2012, and this court in said petition, vide order dated June 13, 2013, inter alia, observed thus: "Ample opportunity will be given to petitioner to meet with additional ground, which original appellant is permitted to raise. We see no reason to interfere with impugned interim order/ interlocutory order passed by learned Tribunal at this stage. However, it is observed that in case, any order is adverse to petitioner, it will always be open to petitioner to contend and raise ground, which is raised in present special civil application at time of filing of appeal, which shall be considered in accordance with law and on its own merits." It appears that, thereafter, Tribunal heard all appeals and passed common judgment and order, which is impugned in all respective tax appeals. reasons recorded by Tribunal at paragraphs 6 to 8 for ready reference can be reproduced as under: "6. After hearing both parties in respect of preliminary contentions raised by Revenue, we are of considered opinion that these objections should have been raised by Revenue at time of admission of additional ground by hon'ble Tribunal. Since admission of additional ground has been upheld by hon'ble High Court by observing as under: 'However it is observed that in case any order is adverse to petitioner, it will always be open to petitioner to contend and raise ground which is raised in present special civil application at time of filing of appeal which shall be considered in accordance of law and on its merit.' We are refraining ourselves from adjudicating these preliminary objections raised by Revenue. 7. Now, coming to merits of additional ground, after hearing both parties, perusing record and case law relied by both parties, we find that in panchnama (filed along with additional ground) prepared by Revenue at time of search in column'A' following narration is mentioned: 'Warrant in case of: Arun Choksi, Sanjay Choksi and family and Jolly Tea (India) Ltd., and Jolly group of companies.' It is clear from above that none of assessee's name is appearing in above narration. issue to be decided by us in these appeals is whether in absence of names of assessees on warrant authorising search can proceedings under section 158BC be initiated against them or not. To decide issue provisions of section 292CC of Income-tax Act inserted with effect from April 15, 1976, are relevant and for sake of convenience same are reproduced as under: reproduced as under: '292CC. Authorisation and assessment in case of search of requisition.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,- (i) it shall not be necessary to issue authorisation under section 132 or make requisition under section 132A separately in name of each person; (ii) where as authorisation under section 132 has been issued or requisition under section 132A has been made mentioning therein name of more than one person, mention of such names of more than one person on such authorisation or requisition shall not be deemed to construe that it was issued in name of association of persons or body of individuals consisting of such persons. (2) Notwithstanding that authorisation under section 132 has been issued or requisition under section 132A has been made mentioning therein name or more than one person, assessment or reassessment shall be made separately in name of each of persons mentioned in such authorisation or requisition.' 8. It is clear from above that for making assessment under section 158BC of Act, it is not necessary to issue authorisation under section 132 or make requisition under section 132A separately in name of each person. Authorisation or requisition in name of more than one person is permissible. However, assessment or reassessment can be made only if name of person is mentioned in such authorisation or requisition. Since there is no dispute about fact that names of these assessees are not appearing in authorisation/requisition, proceedings initiated under section 158BC of Act against them are void ab initio. In case CIT v. Ms. Pushpa Rani [2004] 136 Taxman 627 (Delhi); [2007] 289 ITR 328 (Delhi) hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held that where no search warrant is issued in name of assessee, proceedings initiated under section. 158BC are ab initio void and without jurisdiction. In case law relied on by Revenue, names of persons assessed were there in authorisation and, therefore, in those cases assessment framed by Assessing Officer were held to be valid. In view of above, additional ground raised by assessee is allowed." aforesaid shows that Tribunal on verification of panchnama prepared by Revenue at time of search, found that warrant is in case of Arun Choksi, Sanjay Choksi and family and Jolly Tea (India) Ltd. and Jolly group of companies and it was not on name of any of assessees, who were appellant before Tribunal. Tribunal found that in absence of name of assessees on warrant authorising search, proceedings under section 158BC cannot be initiated. Tribunal also recorded that there is no dispute about fact that names of assessees are not appearing in authorisation/requisition. Hence, Tribunal found that proceedings under section 158BC of Act against respective assessees, who were appellants before Tribunal, are void ab initio. Consequently, Tribunal has allowed appeals mainly on additional grounds raised by assessee. Mr. Parikh, learned counsel appearing for Revenue contended that in view of order passed by this court in Special Civil Application No. 9049 of 2013, it was required for Tribunal to express its view on permission of additional ground. He submitted that when in earlier round of litigation, at stage of first assessment made by Assessing Officer before Tribunal, when appeals were preferred against first assessment, contention for non- availability of block assessment as per section 158BC was not raised, Tribunal could not have permitted raising of additional grounds by assessee and he further submitted that even if such ground was raised and Tribunal was to consider same, contention raised by Revenue before Tribunal were required to be dealt with. Since such contentions are not dealt with, order can be said as perverse. He alternatively submitted that as observed by this court in its order passed in Special Civil Application Nos. 9044 of 2013 to 9053 of 2013, Revenue is to raise such ground in present appeals, substantial questions of law would arise before this court for consideration and, hence, this court may examine those questions as raised by Revenue. Whereas Mr. Soparkar, learned counsel appearing for assessee, by relying upon two decisions; one of apex court in case of Manish Maheshwari v. Asst. CIT reported in [2007] 289 ITR 341 (SC) and another decision of this court in case of P. V. Doshi v. CIT reported in [1978] 113 ITR 22 (Guj), contended that there is no bar operating on point of law or for challenge to jurisdiction of Assessing Officer and he submitted that for any taxing statute as held by apex court in abovereferred decision in case of Manish Maheshwari (supra), strict interpretation would be called for. If there is no competence and jurisdiction with Assessing Officer to make block assessment, everything would fall to ground and it cannot be said that such ground, which is purely question of law, has been wrongly permitted to be raised by Tribunal. He submitted that as per Revenue, even before Tribunal, it remained undisputed that names of assessees were not there on authorisation/warrant and once condition precedent was not satisfied for block assessment under section 158BC, Tribunal was justified in allowing appeals. He, therefore, submitted that when issues are already covered by statute itself and abovereferred decision of apex court and this court, it cannot be said that any substantial questions of law would arise. Hence, this court may dismiss appeals. We may record that order dated August 17, 2010, copy whereof is produced at annexure E, whereby additional ground, which was permitted to be raised and admitted, remained unchallenged by Revenue. Special Civil Applications Nos. 9044 of 2013 to 9053 of 2013 were directed against order dated November 8, 2012, which was only for rectification of reasons recorded and that too only first part but it was not for rectification of any additional ground or ultimate order for permitting additional ground and admission of such ground. If strict view is taken, one may say that Revenue could not agitate such question on aspects of availability of additional ground before Tribunal, which was so permitted, vide order dated August 17, 2010. But, as this court, vide order dated June 13, 2013, did make abovereferred observations and even if lenient view is taken, at most, it would mean that opportunity would be available to Revenue to meet with additional ground but such opportunity has already been availed of by Revenue. Tribunal has considered panchnama prepared by Revenue. It was for Revenue to controvert said material by any contemporaneous record or otherwise. But, it appears that even as per Revenue, contents of panchnama including that of non-appearance of name in authorisation/requisition of assessee, remained undisputed. Therefore, it cannot be said that Tribunal did not give any opportunity to Revenue to meet with additional ground. Apart from above, even if, it is considered for sake of examination that ground so raised before Tribunal could also be raised before this court in present appeals, then also, we find that it is well settled legal position that there cannot be any estoppel or waiver against statute or law. We may make useful reference to decision of this court in case of P. V. Doshi (supra), wherein question came up before this court for consideration as to whether any point or contention, which was expressly not pressed but if it touches to root of matter based on statutory provisions or law, can be agitated in further proceedings before higher forum or not and this court in said decision, observed thus (page 30 of 113 ITR): "The legal position about waiver of such mandatory provision created in wider public interest to operate as fetter on jurisdiction of authority is well settled that there could never be waiver, for simple reason that in such cases jurisdiction could not be conferred on authority by mere consent, but only on conditions precedent for exercise of jurisdiction being fulfilled. If jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, there would be no question of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel or bar of res judicata being attracted because order in such cases would lack inherent jurisdiction unless conditions precedent are fulfilled and it would be void order or nullity. settled distinction between invalidity and nullity is now well brought out in decision in Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Sudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300, 1304, where their Lordships had gone into this material question as to whether act in breach of mandatory provision is per force nullity. passage in Macnamara on Nullities and Irregularities, referred to in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania [1907] ILR 35 Cal 61 [FB], at page 72, was in terms relied upon as under: '... no hard and fast line can be drawn between nullity and irregularity; but this much is clear, that irregularity is deviation from rule of law which does not take away foundation or authority for proceeding, or apply to its whole operation, whereas nullity is proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it, or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and incapable of being validated.' Thereafter, their Lordships pointed out that whether provision fell under one category or other was not easy of discernment, as in ultimate analysis, it depended upon nature, scope and object of particular provision. Their Lordships in terms approved workable test laid down by Justice Coleridge in Holmes v. Russel [1841] 9 Dowl 487 as under: 'It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between irregularity and nullity; but safest rule to determine what is irregularity and what is nullity is to see whether party can waive objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to irregularity; if he cannot, it is nullity.' Thereafter, it was pointed out that waiver is intentional relinquishment of known right, but obviously objection to jurisdiction could not be waived, for consent could not give court jurisdiction where there was none. Even if there was inherent jurisdiction, certain provisions could not be waived. What can be waived would be only those provisions which are for private benefit and protection of individual in private capacity, which might be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy. This settled legal position was again reiterated in Superintendent of Taxes v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust, AIR 1975 SC 2065, where question had arisen in context of Assam Taxation (on Goods Carried by Road and on Inland Waterways) Act, 1961. assessee had obtained injunction order against State in writ petition challenging validity of Act. assessee had not submitted return under section 7(1) and under section 7(2) notice had to be issued only within two years from end of return period. procedure of best judgment assessment was laid down in section 9(4) and question arose whether, in view of injunction order obtained by assessee, ignoring two years' limit laid down as fetter for issuance of notice under section 7(2), best judgment assessment procedure was permissible. At page 2070, learned Chief Justice first held that if return under section 7(1) was not made, service of notice under section 7(2) of Act was only method for initiation of valid assessment proceeding under Act. period of two years under section 7(2) was fetter on power of authority and was not just bar of time. It was scheme of Act that service do notice within two years from end of return period was imperative requirement for initiation of assessment proceeding as also reassessment proceeding under Act. Further proceeding, at page 2071, their Lordships pointed out settled legal distinction between provisions which conferred jurisdiction and provisions which regulated procedure, because jurisdiction could neither to waived nor treated by consent, while procedural provision could be waived by conduct or agreement. Their Lordships pointed out that in that case assessee could not be said to have waived provisions of stature because there could not be any waiver of statutory requirement or provision which went to jurisdiction of assessment. origin of assessment was either as assessee filing return as contemplated in Act or assessee being called upon to file return as contemplated in Act. respondents challenged Act. order of injunction did not amount to waiver of statutory provisions. issue of notice under provisions of Act related to exercise of jurisdiction under Act in all cases. learned Chief Justice in terms pointed out that revenue statutes are based on public policy. revenue statutes protect public on one hand and confer power on State on other. Therefore, even in context of such revenue statute like taxation measure such fetter on jurisdiction being fetter laid to protect public, on wider ground of public policy, it was held that such provisions which confer jurisdiction on assessment and reassessment could never be waived for simple reason that jurisdiction could neither be waived nor created by consent. In concurring judgment his Lordship, Beg. J., at page 2077, also pointed out that if notice under section 7(2) was condition precedent to exercise of jurisdiction to make best judgment assessment, doctrine of waiver could never confer jurisdiction so as to enable parties to avoid effect of violating mandatory provision on jurisdictional matter even by agreement. This decision completely settles legal position. It makes distinction between provisions which confer jurisdiction and provisions which merely regulate procedure by holding that such provisions which confer jurisdiction or such mandatory provisions which are enacted in public interest on ground of public policy even in such revenue statutes could not be waived, because of underlying principle that jurisdiction could neither be waived nor created by consent." Under circumstances, as on point of estoppel or waiver, point is already covered by decision of this court, we do not find that participation by assessee in earlier round of litigation either before Assessing Officer or before Tribunal or consequently before Assessing Officer can operate as bar to assessee to challenge jurisdictional authority of Assessing Officer under section 158BC of Act. On aspects of applicability and condition precedent for making block assessment under section 158BC, we can usefully refer to observations of apex court in case of Manish Maheshwari (supra). relevant observations are at paragraphs 6 to 13, which read as under (page 346): "Search and seizure is to be made in terms of rule 112 of Income-tax Rules, 1962. For purpose of invoking said provision, special procedure for assessment is laid down in Chapter XIV-B, conditions precedent wherefor as laid down must be satisfied. sections 158BC and 158BD read as under: '158BC. Procedure for block assessment.-Where any search has been conducted under section 132 or books of account, other documents or assets are requisitioned under section 132A, in case of any person, then,- (a) Assessing Officer shall- (i) in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets requisitioned after 30th day of June, 1995, but before 1st day of January, 1997, serve notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such time not being less than fifteen days; (ii) in respect of search initiated or books of account or other documents or any assets requisitioned on or after 1st day of January, 1997, serve notice to such person requiring him to furnish within such time not being less than fifteen days but not more than forty-five days, as may be specified in notice return in prescribed form and verified in same manner as return under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 142, setting forth his total income including undisclosed income for block period: Provided that no notice under section 148 is required to be issued for purpose of proceeding under this Chapter: Provided further that person who has furnished return under this clause shall not be entitled to file revised return; (b) Assessing Officer shall proceed to determine undisclosed income of block period in manner laid down in section 158BB and provisions of section 142, sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 143 and section 144 shall, so far as may be, apply; (c) Assessing Officer, on determination of undisclosed income of block period in accordance with this Chapter, shall pass order of assessment and determine tax payable by him on basis of such assessment; (d) assets seized under section 132 or requisitioned under section 132A shall be retained to extent necessary and provisions of section 132B shall apply subject to such modifications as may be necessary and references to "regular assessment" or "reassessment" in section 132B shall be construed as references to "block assessment".' '158BD. Undisclosed income of any other person.-Where Assessing Officer is satisfied that any undisclosed income belongs to any person, other than person with respect to whom search was made under section 132 or whose books of account or other documents or any assets were requisitioned under section 132A, then, books of account, other documents or assets seized or requisitioned shall be handed over to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and that Assessing Officer shall proceed against such other person and provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly.' condition precedent for invoking block assessment is that search has been conducted under section 132, or documents or assets have been requisitioned under section 132A. said provision would apply in case of any person in respect of whom search has been carried out under section 132A or documents or assets have been requisitioned under section 132A. Section 158BD, however, provides for taking recourse to block assessment in terms of section 158BC in respect of any other person, conditions precedents wherefor are: (i) satisfaction must be recorded by Assessing Officer that any undisclosed income belongs to any person, other than person with respect to whom search was made under section 132 of Act; (ii) books of account or other documents or assets seized or requisitioned had been handed over to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person; and (iii) Assessing Officer has proceeded under section 158BC against such other person. conditions precedent for invoking provisions of section 158BD, thus, are required to be satisfied before provisions of said Chapter are applied in relation to any person other than person whose premises had been searched or whose documents and other assets had been requisitioned under section 132A of Act. taxing statute, as is well-known, must be construed strictly. In Sneh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Customs [2006] 7 RC 531; [2006] 7 SCC 714 it was held: 'While dealing with taxing provision, principle of "strict interpretation" should be applied. court shall not interpret statutory provision in such manner which would create additional fiscal burden on person. It would never be done by invoking provisions of another Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are possible, court ordinarily would interpret provisions in favour of taxpayer and against Revenue.' Yet, again, in J. Srinivasa Rao v. Govt. of A. P. [2006] 13 Scale 27, it was held: 'In case of doubt or dispute, it is well-settled, construction has to be made in favour of taxpayer and against Revenue.' In Ispat Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs [2006] 7 RC 546; [2006] 12 JT 379; [2006] 9 Scale 652, this court opined: 'In our opinion if there are two possible interpretations of rule, one which subserves object of provision in parent statute and other which does not, we have to adopt former because adopting latter will make rule ultra vires Act.' Law in this regard is clear and explicit. only question which arises for our consideration is as to whether notice dated February 6, 1996, satisfies requirements of section 158BD of Act. said notice does not record any satisfaction on part of Assessing Officer. Documents and other assets recovered during search had not been handed over to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction in matter. No proceeding under section 158BC had been initiated. There is, thus, patent non-application of mind. prescribed form had been utilised. Even status of assessee had not been specified. It had only been mentioned that search was conducted in month of November, 1995. No other information had been furnished. provisions contained in Chapter XIV-B are drastic in nature. It has draconian consequences. Such proceeding can be initiated, it would bear repetition to state, only if raid is conducted. When provisions are attracted, legal presumptions are raised against assessee. burden shifts on assessee. Audited accounts for period of ten years may have to be reopened. large number of decisions of various High Courts have been cited at bar. We would, at outset, refer to decision of Gujarat High Court in Khandubhai Vasanji Desai v. Deputy CIT [1999] 236 ITR 73 (Guj). Therein, it was clearly held (page 85): 'This provision indicates that where Assessing Officer, who is seized of 'This provision indicates that where Assessing Officer, who is seized of matter and has jurisdiction over person other than person with respect to whom search was made under section 132 or whose books of account or other documents or any assets were requisitioned under section 132A, he shall proceed against such other person as per provisions of Chapter XIV-B which would mean that on such satisfaction being reached that any undisclosed income belongs to such other person, he must proceed to serve notice to such other person as per provisions of section 158BC of Act. If Assessing Officer who is seized of matter against raided person reaches such satisfaction that any undisclosed income belongs to such other person over whom he has no jurisdiction, then, in that event, he has to transmit material to Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person and in such cases Assessing Officer who has jurisdiction will proceed against such other person by issuing requisite notice contemplated by section 158BC of Act.' similar view has been taken by Gujarat High Court in Rushil Industries Ltd. v. Harsh Prakash [2001] 251 ITR 608 (Guj), Priya Blue Industries P. Ltd. v. Joint CIT [2001] 251 ITR 615 (Guj), Premjibhai and Sons v. Joint CIT [2001] 251 ITR 625 (Guj) and by Kerala High Court in CIT v. Deep Arts [2005] 274 ITR 571 (Ker), CIT v. Don Bosco Card Centre [2006] 205 CTR 500 (Ker); [2007] 289 ITR 329 (Ker) and by Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. Maya Chotrani [2007] 288 ITR 175 (MP)." aforesaid observations go to show that if condition precedent for block assessment under section 158BC is not satisfied, such would go to root of matter and jurisdiction, which has not been expressly conferred by statute, cannot be invested with Assessing Officer for block assessment. On facts, as recorded hereinabove, admittedly, there was no warrant authorisation on name of assessee and, hence, Tribunal has found assessment as ab initio void, which, in our view, calls for no interference, on facts and on law. In view of above, we do not find that any substantial questions of law would arise for consideration as canvassed in present group of appeals. Hence, all appeals are meritless and therefore, dismissed. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jolly Fantasy World Ltd