JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by Dr. Satish Chandra J.-By this writ petition petitioner-assessee has assailed order dated March 25, 2009, passed by Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Allahabad (hereinafter referred as'"the CCIT"), whereby he has refused registration of petitioner-assessee under section 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961. brief facts of case are that petitioner-assessee is registered society registered under Societies Registration Act and is running school, namely, "YMCA Centenary School". society presently has only two objects as per record and same are as under: "1. To control, run and manage educational institutions for imparting education to students right from nursery level to college level. 2. To establish and manage educational institutions and to construct or acquire and run or manage hostels for boys and students of our college for furtherance of their education." petitioner-assessee has applied for registration under section 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act which is as under: "any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit, other than those mentioned in sub-clause (iiiab) or sub-clause (iiiad) and which may be approved by prescribed authority." Chief Commissioner of Income-tax has sought report from Commissioner of Income-tax (hereinafter referred as "the CIT") on April 1, 2008, and same was received on February 11, 2009. On basis of report, respondent No. 1 (Chief Commissioner of Income-tax) has refused registration. Being aggrieved, petitioner-assessee has filed present writ petition. With this background Shri Rakesh Ranjan Agrawal, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Suyash Agrawal, learned counsel submits that petitioner- assessee is trust set up at Allahabad. trust society is running educational institution, which is not for purpose of profit. petitioner has made application in Form 56D read with rule 2CA of Income-tax Rules before Chief Commissioner of Income-tax for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) along with amended copy of memorandum of association, audit report, and other required documents. petitioner is fulfilling all requirements, and necessary documents were submitted but Chief Commissioner of Income-tax has refused exemption for assessment year 2008-09 and onwards though, registration was granted under section 12AA, vide letter dated September 25, 2008, with effect from April 1, 2007. learned counsel further submits that registration form for assessment year 2008-09 was filed in name of society, where it was claimed that activities being carried out by society in name of YMCA Centenary School and same are wholly for education purpose. lease was granted for 99 years in year 1910 and building on said lease land was erected long back as per lease deed. In balancesheet value of building after depreciation reduced to nil. He also submits that it is wrong to say that society is not running educational institution. According to learned counsel, society is providing education and same is not for profit. To support his argument, he relied upon ratio laid down in following cases: "1. American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT [2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC); 2. City Montessori School (Regd.) v. Union of India [2009] 315 ITR 48 (All); 3. Ewing Christian College Society v. Chief CIT [2009] 318 ITR 160 (All); 4. Vanita Vishram Trust v. Chief CIT [2010] 327 ITR 121 (Bom); 5. C. P. Vidya Niketan Inter College Shikshan Society v. Union of India [2013] 359 ITR 322 (All); 6. Vinjane Centre v. Deputy CIT [2002] 258 ITR 191 (Mad); and 7. Simpkins School v. DGIT (Inv.) [2014] 367 ITR 335 (All)." Lastly, learned counsel read out charitable purpose mentioned under section 2(15) of Income-tax Act 1961, and submits that assessee is fulfilling all conditions to avail of exemption. On other hand, learned counsel for Department justified impugned order. He submits that there are various discrepancies, which have been pointed out in impugned order. petitioner has given loan to its employees, which is not fulfilling objects and many of these expenses are not for purpose of education, even though they might have served some other social objects. Surplus income shown by petitioner is increasing and using for activities which are aimed at enhancing income of institution. fee charged from students is on higher side and, in each year, there is element of profit. So, petitioner is not existing solely for educational purpose and its main motive is to make profit by charging higher fee from students. To support his arguments, he relied upon ration laid down in following cases: "1. CIT v. Queen's Educational Society [2009] 319 ITR 160 (Uttarakhand); and 2. CIT v. Sir M. Visveswaraya Educational Trust [2009] 319 ITR 425 (Karn)." We have heard both parties at length and gone through material available on record. From record, it appears that society came into existence in year 1910 and on land, which was taken for 99 years lease, petitioner has constructed building for school. So, it is not correct to say that it is not providing education. Undoubtedly, petitioner is educational institution, who is providing education. No other activity was proved by Department. Moreover, Chief Commissioner of Income-tax has already granted exemption under section 12A/12AA of Income-tax Act with effect from April 1, 2007. Before us, issue is whether assessee-society is engaged in charitable/educational activities or not. expression "charity" or "charitable purpose" do not admit of rigid definition. In order to understand what these expressions legally convey, one can merely enumerate its various aspects and characteristics as they have been recognised by laws of particular country. For construing words "education or charitable purposes", it is necessary to investigate meaning of these words in particular system of jurisprudence that may be followed by assessee. In Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edition, at page 911, "purta" or charitable acts are referred to as acts of construction of tanks, wells with flights of steps, temples, planting of groves, gift of good, dharmasalas (rest houses) and places for supplying drinking water, relief of sick, establishment of processions for honour of deities and so on. Gifts for promotion of education and knowledge were also considered charitable activities specially what is based on meritorious. In facts and circumstances on case specially by nomenclature of assessee, it appears prima facie that it is engaged for "educational activities". From impugned order, it appears that for denying exemption, various reasons have been given. For example, it was stated that petitioner is not having car in its balance-sheet but claiming expenses for repair and maintenance of car. During course of arguments, learned counsel has shown balance-sheet, where Bolero Car has been shown in name of society. Similarly, loan was not given as stated in impugned order but it was advance to employees on various occasions, for which no interest was charged. Regarding accumulation of income, it may be stated that same is permissible as per ratio laid down in case of DIT (Exemption) v. Eternal Science of Man's Society [2007] 290 ITR 535 (Delhi), where it was held that (headnote): "Accumulation of income is permissible for plurality of purposes. respondent-trust had accumulated its income for six different purposes. There was no controversy about five of said objects being charitable in character. criticism about sixth object was that it permitted acquisition of property whether movable or otherwise for achievement of other objects for which trust/society had been established. trust in question had been established in terms of memorandum. It was not case of Revenue that any one of objects out of 22 objects enumerated therein was not charitable object. If that be so, clause (f) permitting acquisition of movable or immovable property for achievement of one of those purposes would necessarily imply that property was acquired for one of charitable purposes stipulated in memorandum." In American Hotel and Lodging Association Educational Institute v. CBDT [2008] 301 ITR 86 (SC), Supreme Court analysed provision and found that second proviso lays down powers and duties of prescribed authority for vetting application for approval and that prescribed authority was empowered to call for documents including annual accounts or information to check genuineness of activities of institution. Under third proviso, prescribed authority, while judging genuineness of activities of applicant, was required to ascertain whether applicant applies its income wholly and exclusively for objects for which it was constituted or established. Supreme Court held that there was difference between stipulation of conditions and compliance therewith. threshold conditions are actual existence of educational institution and approval of prescribed authority. It is only if pre-conditions of actual existence of educational institution is fulfilled that question of compliance with stipulations set out in provisos would arise. Supreme Court held (page 106): "We shall now consider effect of insertion of provisos to section 10(23C)(vi), vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 1998. Section 10(23C)(vi) is analogous to section 10(22). To that extent, judgments of this court as applicable to section 10(22) would equally apply to section 10(23C)(vi). problem arises with insertion of provisos to section 10(23C)(vi). With insertion of provisos to section 10(23C)(vi) applicant who seeks approval has not only to show that it is institution existing solely for educational purposes [which was also requirement under section 10(22)] but it has now to obtain initial approval from prescribed authority, in terms of section 10(23C)(vi) by making application in standardised form as mentioned in first proviso to that section. That condition of obtaining approval from prescribed authority came to be inserted because section 10(22) was abused by some educational institutions/ universities. This proviso was inserted along with other provisos because there was no monitoring mechanism to check abuse of exemption provision. With insertion of first proviso, prescribed authority is required to vet application. This vetting process is stipulated by second proviso. It is important to note that second proviso also indicates powers and duties of prescribed authority. While considering approval application in second proviso, prescribed authority is empowered before giving approval to call for such documents including annual accounts or information from applicant to check genuineness of activities of applicant institution. Earlier that power was not there with prescribed authority. Under third proviso, prescribed authority has to ascertain while judging genuineness of activities of applicant institution as to whether applicant applies its income wholly and exclusively to objects for which it is constituted/established. Under twelfth proviso, prescribed authority is required to examine cases where applicant does not apply its income during year of receipt and accumulates it but makes payment therefrom to any trust or institution registered under section 12AA or to any fund or trust or institution or university or other educational institution and to that extent proviso states that such payment shall not be treated as application of income to objects for which such trust or fund or educational institution is established. idea underlying twelfth proviso is to provide guidance to prescribed authority as to meaning of words 'application of income to objects for which institution is established'. Therefore, twelfth proviso is matter of detail. most relevant proviso for deciding this appeal is thirteenth proviso. Under that proviso, circumstances are given under which prescribed authority is empowered to withdraw approval earlier granted. Under that proviso, if prescribed authority is satisfied that trust, fund, university or other educational institution, etc., has not applied its income in accordance with third proviso or if it finds that such institution, trust or fund, etc., has not invested/deposited its funds in accordance with third proviso or that activities of such fund or institution or trust, etc., are not genuine or that its activities are not being carried out in accordance with conditions subject to which approval is granted then prescribed authority is empowered to withdraw approval earlier granted after complying with procedure mentioned therein." In instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner society is running educational institution. Merely because there are other objects of society does not mean that educational institution is not existing solely for educational purpose. emphasis of word "solely" is in relation to educational institution, which is running not for purpose of making profit and is not in relation to objects of society. In American Hotel and Lodging Association (supra), authority is required to consider nature and genuineness of activities. third proviso only sets out conditions, which must be adhered to by institution and compliance therewith is not to be tested at stage of approval since they require considerations of facts and findings, which takes place in future. requirement mentioned in third proviso can only be tested after end of previous year when income is ascertained and thereafter applied. Further, Supreme Court held that authority is only required to examine that petitioner's institution comes within phrase "exists solely for educational purpose and not for profit". Other conditions like application of income is not to be examined at this stage. authority is only required to examine nature, activities and genuineness of institution. mere existence that there is some profit does not disqualify petitioner if sole purpose of existence was not profit making but educational activities. authority has to find out predominant object of activity and see whether institution exists solely for education and not to earn profit. Merely because some profit arises from its activity will not mean that predominant object of activity is to earn profit and that it is not educational activity. In order to ascertain whether institute is carried on with object of making profit or not it is duty of prescribed authority to ascertain whether balance of income has been prescribed authority to ascertain whether balance of income has been applied wholly and exclusively to object for which institution is not established and in deciding character of recipient it was not necessary to look at profits of each year but to consider nature and activities undertaken. Supreme Court held that threshold conditions are actual existence of educational institution and approval of prescribed authority for which every applicant has to move application in standardised form in terms of first proviso. If pre-requisite conditions of actual existence of educational institution is fulfilled then question of compliance with requirements as spelt out in other provisos would arise. At this stage, such considerations are not required. From record, it also appears that facts were not analysed by authorities below in proper manner. Before us, documents which were produced, it appears prima facie contradictory facts, which need further investigation. In these circumstances, we deem it fit to set aside impugned order and remand matter to Chief Commissioner of Income-tax. Hence, without entering into merits of case, we set aside impugned order and direct competent authority (Chief Commissioner of Income-tax) to reconsider application de novo for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) for assessment year 2008-09 and onwards strictly on merits. petitioner is also directed to submit necessary documentary evidence, if any and co-operate. writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. *** Allahabad Young Men's Christian Association v. Chief Commissioner of Income-tax