Union of India v. Agarwal Iron Industries
[Citation -2014-LL-1112-1]

Citation 2014-LL-1112-1
Appellant Name Union of India
Respondent Name Agarwal Iron Industries
Court SUPREME COURT
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 12/11/2014
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags warrant of authorization • authorisation for search • search and seizure • documents seized • reasonable time • search warrant
Bot Summary: JUDGMENT The judgment of the court was delivered by Dipak Misra J.-In these appeals the assail is to the legal tenability of the order dated September 3, 2003, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Writ Petition No. 275 of 2000 whereby the High Court has quashed the search and seizure conducted on February 16, 2000, in the factory premises of the first respondent. During the search of the residential premises, son of the sole proprietor was informed by the Income-tax Officer that the search operations were also being conducted at the factory premises. Assailing the search and the seizure, the first respondent preferred a writ petition before the High Court and contended therein that there was no information in possession of the officer which could have persuaded any reasonable person to form an opinion about the existence of undisclosed assets of the writ petitioner. Section 132(13) says that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to searches and seizure shall apply, so far as may be, to searches and seizures under sections 132(1) and 132(1A). The provision contained in section 132(1) of the Act enables the competent authority to direct for issue of search and seizure on the basis of formation of an opinion which a reasonable and prudent man would form for arriving at a conclusion to issue a warrant. Reasons, needless to say, can be recorded on the file and the court can scrutinize the file and find out whether the authority has appropriately recorded the reasons for forming of an opinion that there are reasons to believe to conduct search and seizure. As is evincible, the High Court has totally misdirected itself in quashing the search and seizure on the basis of the principles of non-traverse.


JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by Dipak Misra J.-In these appeals assail is to legal tenability of order dated September 3, 2003, passed by Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Writ Petition No. 275 of 2000 whereby High Court has quashed search and seizure conducted on February 16, 2000, in factory premises of first respondent. Filtering unnecessary details, facts that constitute filament of controversy is that first respondent is engaged in manufacture of C. I. pipes, fittings and manholes and has obtained licence under Central Excise Act. factory in question has been filing income-tax returns under Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity "the Act"). On February 16, 2000, when sole proprietor of factory Shri Om Prakash Agarwal was absent, officer of Income-tax Department conducted search both at residential as well as business premises. During search of residential premises, son of sole proprietor was informed by Income-tax Officer that search operations were also being conducted at factory premises. Despite such information he was not allowed to leave house. Assailing search and seizure, first respondent preferred writ petition before High Court and contended therein that there was no information in possession of officer which could have persuaded any reasonable person to form opinion about existence of undisclosed assets of writ petitioner. It is further urged that warrant of authorisation was issued mechanically, arbitrarily and there was total non-application of mind and moreover there was no formation of opinion about existence of undisclosed assets as contemplated under section 132(1) of Act. On this foundation, search and seizure were sought to be quashed. counter-affidavit was filed by Revenue asseverating that there was no illegality in initiation of seizure and it had been conducted in accordance with law and Revenue had enough material against first respondent herein for assessee had suppressed vital information pertaining to production and sale and same was also evidenced during search operation. It was contended that productions declared by first respondent in official record was not even one-fifth of actual production revealed by seized documents. It is interesting to note that High Court by its order dated March 29, 2000, appointed Advocate Commissioner to prepare inventory of goods in question in respect of which restraint order was passed. said Advocate Commissioner had submitted report which was taken on record. High Court placed reliance on decisions in CIT v. Vindhya Metal Corporation, Dr. Nand Lal Tahiliani v. CIT, L. R. Gupta v. Union of India and Ajit Jain v. Union of India# and extensively quoting from Dr. Tahiliani's case came to hold as follows##: "At this stage it is relevant to refer to paragraph 40 of writ petition, which is quoted below: 'That in facts and circumstances petitioner bona fidely believes that there was no information in possession of officer issuing warrant of authorisation for search which could lead any reasonable person to form opinion about existence of undisclosed assets with petitioner. warrant of authorisation, even if assumed that there was any, was issued mechanically arbitrarily and without application of mind and without forming opinion about existence of undisclosed assets, as contemplated by sub-section (1) of section 132.' reply of said paragraph has been given by Respondents in paragraph 33 of counter-affidavit, which reads as under: '33. That in reply to paragraph 40 of writ petition, it is denied that warrant of authorization was issued mechanically, arbitrarily and without application of mind.' From aforesaid reply it is clear that there is no specific denial of averments made in paragraph 40 of writ petition. Order 8, rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that every allegation of [1997] 5 SCC 321; [1997] 224 ITR 614 (SC). [1988] 170 ITR 592 (All). [1992] 194 ITR 32 (Delhi). # [2000] 242 ITR 302 (Delhi). ## [2003] 264 ITR 28, 34 (All). fact in plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in pleading of defendant shall be taken to be admitted except against person under disability. In view of this provision in absence of specific denial in counter-affidavit to assertions made in writ petition, it can safely be concluded that there is no denial of facts stated in writ petition. We are aware that Explanation to section 141 of Code of Civil Procedure provides that provisions of Code of Civil Procedure shall not be applicable to writ petition... However, principles as stated in Code of Civil Procedure are also applicable to writ proceedings..." We have no hesitation in opining that reasons ascribed in aforesaid paragraphs, leaves us absolutely unimpressed. We really cannot comprehend how Advocate Commissioner was appointed to take inventory of goods in respect of which restraint order was passed by Revenue under Act. That apart, it is difficult to appreciate how denial in counter affidavit filed by Revenue could be treated as admission by implication to come to conclusion that no reason was ascribed for search and seizure and, therefore, action taken under section 132 of Act was illegal. relevant confidential file, if required and necessary could have been called for and examined. Revenue in counter affidavit was not required to elucidate and reproduce information and details that formed foundation. In this context, we may profitably refer to decision in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), wherein Constitution Bench, while upholding constitutional validity of section 132 of Act, opined thus: "Search and seizure are not new weapon in armoury of those whose duty it is to maintain social security in its broadest sense. process is widely recognized in all civilized countries. Our own criminal law accepted its necessity and usefulness in sections 96 to 103 and section 165 of Criminal Procedure Code. In M. P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra challenge to power of issuing search warrant under section 96(1) as violative of article 19(1)(f) was repelled on ground that power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence overriding power of State for protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. As pointed out in that case search by itself is not restriction on [1974] 1 SCC 345; [1974] 93 ITR 505, 516 (SC). [1954] AIR 1954 SC 300. right to hold and enjoy property though seizure is restriction on right of possession and enjoyment of property seized. That, however, is only temporary and for limited purpose of investigation". Thereafter, proceeding with ratiocination, court ruled that provision has in-built spheres. Proceeding to enumerate spheres and other consequent facets, court ruled: "In first place, it must be noted that power to order search and seizure is vested in highest officers of department. Secondly, exercise of this power can only follow reasonable belief entertained by such officer that any of three conditions mentioned in section 132(1)(a), (b) and (c) exists. In this connection it may be further pointed out that under sub-rule (2) of rule 112, Director of Inspection or Commissioner, as case may be, has to record his reasons before authorisation is issued to officers mentioned in sub-section (1). Thirdly, authorisation for search cannot be in favour of any officer below rank of Income-tax Officer. Fourthly, authorisation is for specific purposes enumerated in (i) to (v) in sub-section (1) all of which are strictly limited to object of search. Fifthly, when money, bullion, etc., is seized Incometax Officer is to make summary enquiry with view to determine how much of what is seized will be retained by him to cover estimated tax liability and how much will have to be returned forthwith. object of enquiry under sub-section (5) is to reduce inconvenience to assessee as much as possible so that within reasonable time what is estimated due to Government may be retained and what should be returned to assessee may be immediately returned to him. Even with regard to books of account and documents seized, their return is guaranteed after reasonable time. In meantime person from whose custody they are seized is permitted to make copies and take extracts. Sixthly, where money, bullion, etc. is seized, it can also be immediately returned to person concerned after he makes appropriate provision for payment of estimated tax dues under sub-section (5) and, lastly, and this is most important, provisions of Criminal Procedure Code relating to search and seizure apply, as far as they may be, to all searches and seizures under section 132. Rule 112 provides for actual search and seizure being made after observing normal decencies of behaviour. person in charge of premises searched is immediately page 518 of 93 ITR. given copy of list of articles seized. One copy is forwarded to authorising officer. Provision for safe custody of articles after seizure is also made in rule 112. In our opinion, safeguards are adequate to render provisions of search and seizure as less onerous and restrictive as is possible under circumstances." In District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, while referring to section 132 of Act, it has been ruled that: "There are safeguards. Section 132 uses words'in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe'. (emphasis supplied) section 132(1A) uses words'in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to suspect'. Section 132(13) says that provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to searches and seizure shall apply, so far as may be, to searches and seizures under sections 132(1) and 132(1A). There are also Rules made under section 132(14). Likewise, section 132A(1) uses words'in consequence of information in his possession, has reason to believe'. (emphasis2 supplied) section 133 which deals with power to call for information from banks and others uses words'for purposes of this Act' and section 133(6) permits requisition to be sent to bank or its officer." provision contained in section 132(1) of Act enables competent authority to direct for issue of search and seizure on basis of formation of opinion which reasonable and prudent man would form for arriving at conclusion to issue warrant. It is done by way of interim measure. search and seizure is not confiscation. articles that are seized are subject of enquiry by competent authority after affording opportunity of being heard to person whose custody it has been seized. terms used are "reason to believe". Whether competent authority had formed opinion on basis of any acceptable material or not, as is clear as crystal, High Court has not even remotely tried to see reasons. Reasons, needless to say, can be recorded on file and court can scrutinize file and find out whether authority has appropriately recorded reasons for forming of opinion that there are reasons to believe to conduct search and seizure. As is evincible, High Court has totally misdirected itself in quashing search and seizure on basis of principles of non-traverse. [2005] 1 SCC 496; [2005] 126 Comp Cas 356, 382 (SC). In our considered opinion, High Court would have been well advised to peruse file to see whether reasons have been recorded or not and whether same meet requirement of law. In view of our foregoing analysis, we allow appeals, set aside impugned order passed by High Court and remand matter to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. Revenue shall produce file before High Court, whereafter High Court shall proceed to adjudicate lis. There shall be no order as to costs. *** Union of India v. Agarwal Iron Industrie
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