JUDGMENT This appeal was admitted on following question of law: "Whether, on true and proper interpretation of provisions of sections 139 and 143 and other relevant provisions of Income -tax Act, 1961, Tribunal was justified in law in holding that issue of intimation under section 143(1) for assessment year 19992000 on August 8, 2000, amounted to completion of assessment within meaning of section 139(5) disabling appellant from filing revised return and that revised return filed on March 31, 2001, was belated and invalid?" order from which question was formulated for adjudication in appeal was dated February 22, 2005, passed by Tribunal relating to assessment year 1999-2000. Mr. Khittan, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of appellant- assessee, submitted return for relevant assessment year was intimated to have been accepted under section 143(1) of Income-tax Act, 1961, on August 8, 2000. According to him, that was not completion of assessment in relation to such return filed. assessee sought to file revised return on March 31, 2001, which was within time provided under section 139(5) of said Act. He submitted intimation issued under section 143(1) of said Act cannot be said to be assessment relying on decision reported in case of Asst. CIT v. Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. [2007] 291 ITR 500 (SC), in particular paragraph 13 thereof. He submitted by that judgment it had been held assessment could not be said to have been completed on issuance of intimation under section 143(1) of said Act. He also drew our attention to judgment in Tarsem Kumar v. ITO [2013] 256 CTR (P&H) 116 rendered following aforesaid judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court. Mrs. Ghutghutia, learned advocate appearing on behalf of Revenue, submitted by intimation dated August 8, 2000, assessee was informed that its original return had been accepted. Refund as raised stood already issued as intimated and, thereafter, Assessing Officer did not resort to seeking any further particulars or evidence from assessee in resorting to provisions of section 143(2) of said Act. In those circumstances, assessment stood completed and accepted by assessee who then had sought to file revised return on last day otherwise possible. According to her, said revised return was not accepted as it could not be in facts and circumstances of case. She submitted order of Tribunal should not be interfered with. Revenue relied on decisions reported in Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills [2002] 3 SCC 496 and State of Orissa v. Md. Illiyas [2006] 1 SCC 275 to submit on point of applicability of precedents in seeking to distinguish judgment relied on by Mr. Khaitan. According to Mrs. Ghutghutia, those judgments were distinguishable on facts. In Rajesh Jhaveri, (supra), according to her, interpretation of assessment if at all given by hon'ble Supreme Court, was in context of reassessment sought to be made on change of opinion. We find Tribunal, while adjudicating first of three grounds raised before it being that learned Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax was not justified, rather, grossly erred in not accepting revised return, treated it as invalid by relying on decision rendered in CIT v. Punjab National Bank [2001] 249 ITR 763 (Delhi), to hold remedy of assessee was to have preferred appeal from intimation, if it was aggrieved thereby. Tribunal held: "The intimation along with refund was decision of acceptance of self- assessment was to reinforce assessee's assessment being final which were to be appealed against or rectified but not revised as per legal interpretation of statute put forth by assessee for consideration of its revised return." rectification which Tribunal found was available to be made if felt necessary by appellant would be confined to rectification of mistake apparent from record. Bereft of revised return record would show original return filed without any indication as to any mistake appearing therein. We find it necessary to quote paragraph 13 from Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers (P.) Ltd. (supra) (page 508 of 291 ITR): "One thing further to be noticed is that intimation under section 143(1)(a) is given without prejudice to provisions of section 143(2). Though technically intimation issued was deemed to be demand notice issued under section 156, that did not per se preclude right of Assessing Officer to proceed under section 143(2). That right is preserved and is not taken away. Between period from 1st April, 1989, to 31st March, 1998, second proviso to section 143(1)(a), required that where adjustments were made under first proviso to section 143(1)(a), intimation had to be sent to assessee notwithstanding that no tax or refund was due from him after making such adjustments. With effect from 1st April, 1998, second proviso to section 143(1)(a) was substituted by Finance Act, 1997, which was operative till 1st June, 1999. requirement was that intimation was to be sent to assessee whether or not any adjustment had been made under first proviso to section 143(1) and notwithstanding that no tax or interest was found due from assessee concerned. Between 1st April, 1998, and 31st May, 1999, sending of intimation under section 143(1)(a) was mandatory. Thus, legislative intent is very clear from use of word 'intimation' as substituted for'assessment' that two different concepts emerged. While making assessment, Assessing Officer is free to make any addition after grant of opportunity to assessee. By making adjustments under first proviso to section 143(1)(a), no addition which is impermissible by information given in return could be made by Assessing Officer. reason is that under section 143(1)(a) no opportunity is granted to assessee and Assessing Officer proceeds on his opinion on basis of return filed by assessee. very fact that no opportunity of being heard is given under section 143(1)(a) indicates that Assessing Officer has to proceed accepting return and making permissible adjustments only. As result of insertion of Explanation to section 143 by Finance (No. 2) Act of 1991, with effect from 1st October, 1991, and subsequently with effect from 1st June, 1994, by Finance Act, 1994, and ultimately omitted with effect from 1st June, 1999, by Explanation as introduced by Finance (No. 2) Act of 1991 intimation sent to assessee under section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be order for purposes of section 246 between 1st June, 1994 and 31st May, 1999, and under section 264 between 1st October, 1991, and 31st May, 1999. It is to be noted that expressions'intimation' and'assessment order' have been used at different places. contextual difference between two expressions has to be understood in context expressions are used. Assessment is used as meaning sometimes'the computation of income', sometimes 'the determination of amount of tax payable' and sometimes'the whole procedure laid down in Act for imposing liability upon taxpayer'. In scheme of things, as noted above, intimation under section 143(1)(a) cannot be treated to be order of assessment. distinction is also well brought out by statutory provisions as they stood at different points of time. Under section 143(1)(a) as it stood prior to 1st April, 1989, Assessing Officer had to pass assessment order if he decided to accept return, but under amended provision, requirement of passing of assessment order has been dispensed with and instead intimation is required to be sent. Various circulars sent by CBDT spell out intent of Legislature, i.e., to minimise Departmental work to scrutinise each and every return and to concentrate on selective scrutiny of returns. These aspects were highlighted by one of us (D. K. Jain J.) in Apogee International Ltd. v. Union of India [1996] 220 ITR 248 (Delhi). It may be noted above that under first proviso to newly substituted section 143(1), with effect from 1st June, 1999, except as provided in provision itself, acknowledgment of return shall be deemed to be intimation under section 143(1) where (a) either no sum is payable by assessee, or (b) no refund is due to him. It is significant that acknowledgment is not done by any Assessing Officer, but mostly by ministerial staff. Can it be said that any'assessment' is done by them? reply is emphatic'no'. intimation under section 143(1)(a) was deemed to be notice of demand under section 156, for apparent purpose of making machinery provisions relating to recovery of tax applicable. By such application only recovery indicated to be payable in intimation became permissible. And nothing more can be inferred from deeming provision. Therefore, there being no assessment under section 143(1)(a), question of change of opinion, as contended, does not arise." From Rajesh Jhaveri, we find hon'ble Supreme Court had considered effect of section 143 of said Act in discussing its sub-sections as it had undergone change from time to time. Tribunal had relied on case of CIT v. Punjab National Bank (supra) in which also we find discussion is same regarding assessment as provided for under section 143(1) of said Act that it could not be said to be assessment was complete on intimation issued. Section 143(1)(i) of said Act, as it stood in material time, is set out below: "143. (1) Where return has been made under section 139, or in response to notice under sub-section (1) of section 142,- (i) If any tax or interest is found due on basis of such return, after adjustment of any tax deducted at source, any advance tax paid, any tax paid on self-assessment and any amount paid otherwise by way of tax or interest, then, without prejudice to provisions of sub-section (2), intimation shall be sent to assessee specifying sum so payable, and such intimation shall be deemed to be noticed of demand issued under section 156 and all provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly;" We notice said provision contemplates assessment without prejudice to provisions of sub-section (2) of said section whereunder Assessing Officer shall, if he considers it necessary, serve on assessee notice requiring him, on date to be specified therein, to attend his office or to produce or cause to be produced there, any evidence on which assessee may rely in support of return and after taking into account all relevant materials Assessing Officer shall by order in writing make assessment. Thus, we find, provision for assessment to be made for purpose of issuance of intimation under section 143(1) of said Act reserving authority of Assessing Officer to resort to provisions under sub-section (2) thereof, cannot be said to be completion of assessment and, therefore, limit time otherwise available to file revised return. We are fortified in our finding by judgment in Rajesh Jhaveri (supra). In circumstances and in view of reasons aforesaid, we answer question formulated in negative, in favour of assessee and against Revenue. appeal is allowed. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to parties on usual undertakings. *** Tata Metaliks Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax