R.V. Easwar, Vice President: short but interesting question which arises in this case is whether assessee is entitled to deduction under s. 24(1)(vi) of IT Act in respect of interest paid to banks while computing income from house property. assessee owned 1.5 per cent share in building known as Choudhary Building in K-Block, Connaught Circus, New Delhi. It was let out to May & Baker for rent. assessee and other co-owners entered into agreement with May & Baker on 9th Nov., 1996 to get property vacated for total consideration of Rs. 1,65,00,000. said company accepted payment of aforesaid amount and surrendered its tenancy rights. In order to make payment assessee had borrowed monies from Karnataka Bank and Lord Krishna Bank in respect of which interest had to be paid. interest was claimed as deduction by assessee while computing income from said building under head "Income from house property". claim was made under s. 24(1)(vi) of Act. It amounted to Rs. 24,25,310. AO held that loan was not taken for acquiring property and, therefore, interest cannot be allowed. assessee s claim was that by making payment of Rs. 1.65 crores to May & Baker he obtained tenancy rights over building which made him full or complete owner of property and in that sense he did acquire property and hence interest was allowable under s. 24(1)(vi). claim having been accepted by CIT(A), Revenue is in appeal before us. contention of learned senior Departmental Representative, Dr. Balwan, is that assessee did not "acquire" property by making payment to May & Baker, that he was owner of property both before and after making payment to May & Baker, that therefore he could not be considered to have "acquired" any property by making payment and therefore, condition prescribed by s. 24(1)(vi) for allowance of interest is not satisfied. argument of learned representative for assessee runs as follows: "Property" is bundle of rights, of which right of occupation or tenancy, is one. This right has been parted with by assessee when he let out property for rent. He had to make payment of Rs. 1.65 crores for acquiring said right back from May & Baker under agreement. assessee thus "acquired" property by making payment, for which he had borrowed money from banks. Therefore, interest on bank borrowing was allowable as deduction under s. 24(1)(vi). difficulty in accepting contention is primarily that word "property" in s. 22 does not stand alone. It is followed by words descriptive of property that is referred to in section. Those words are "consisting of buildings or land appurtenant thereto". Thus property referred to in section is either building or land appurtenant thereto. This does not admit of wide interpretation which otherwise word "property" is susceptible to under general law or even for purposes of WT Act, 1957 or s. 2(14) of IT Act. Sec. 2(14) of IT Act defines "capital asset" as "property of every kind". It was, therefore, possible to hold, in authorities to which our attention was drawn, that any interest in property, including tenancy right, was capital asset and monies received for surrender thereof would amount to capital receipt subject to capital gains tax provided right was acquired at cost in terms of money. Under WT Act, 1957, it was held by Supreme Court in case of Ahmed G.H. Ariff & Ors. vs. CWT (1970) 76 ITR 471 (SC) that words "property of every description" appearing in s. 2(e) of said Act as it stood at material time constitute "a term of widest import and, subject to any limitation which context may require, it signifies every possible interest which person can clearly hold or enjoy" and on that basis went on to hold that there is no reason or justification to give any restricted meaning to word "asset" as defined by s. 2(e) of Act "when language employed shows that it was intended to include property of every description". Now as we have already seen, s. 22 of IT Act makes significant departure from two other provisions referred to above. It does not leave any scope for imagining what property is being referred to. property referred to is physical, viz., buildings or land appurtenant thereto. In very nature of things, it cannot confine itself to interest in property. person, in order to be charged to tax under head "Income from house property" has to be owner of building or land appurtenant thereto and not merely holder of interest therein. If that is meaning to be given to word "property" in s. 22, we cannot obviously ascribe any other meaning to same word appearing in s. 24(1)(vi). What is referred to in this section is "the property" and use of definite article "the" clearly shows that meaning of word "property" in this section has to be same as in s. 22. Thus what is being meant in s. 24(1)(vi) is property in physical form and shape of building or land appurtenant thereto. It is, therefore, not possible to accept claim of assessee that he acquired tenancy right from May & Baker and completed his bundle of rights of ownership by paying amount of Rs. 1.65 crores. Mr. Ganesan laid considerable emphasis on word "owner" appearing in s. 22 and contended that it was only by acquiring tenancy right from May & Baker that assessee became complete owner of property. If this contention were to be accepted, then in case of assessee who owns property and lets out same, thus parting with right of occupation for consideration, he would become somebody less than full owner and cannot be taxed on rental value under s. 22. That would make section unworkable. It would be paradoxical to say that only full owner (who has his entire bundle of rights intact with him) would be taxable in respect of ALV of property and at same breath to say that moment he lets out property (parts with right of occupation) he would cease to be complete or full owner thereof. We cannot accept interpretation that would render charging section meaningless. In our view, section having manifested clearly that property that is being referred to is property consisting of buildings or land appurtenant thereto, assessee would be eligible for deduction under s. 24(1)(vi) in respect of interest paid on amounts borrowed, only if borrowed monies have been utilized for acquiring buildings or land appurtenant thereto and not in respect of monies utilized for paying tenant for handing over possession of property, or in other words, for surrendering tenancy rights in property. CIT(A), with respect, was in error in accepting assessee s claim. Considerable reliance was placed on behalf of assessee upon judgment of Hon ble Delhi High Court in Bawa Shiv Charan Singh vs. CIT (1985) 47 CTR (Del) 12: (1984) 149 ITR 29 (Del). question before Hon ble Court was whether tenancy rights could be considered as "capital asset" within meaning of s. 2(14) of Act and whether amount received for surrender of rights could be subject to capital gains tax where it is not possible to compute "cost of acquisition" of such rights. It was held that tenancy rights constitute "capital asset", that when they are surrendered there is extinguishment of rights which would amount to transfer and therefore, assessee would be liable to capital gains tax under s. 45. It was also held that since tenancy was obtained without any cost in terms of money no capital gains could be computed. It should be appreciated that Hon ble Court was not considering s. 22 of Act or significance or import of word "property consisting of any buildings or lands appurtenant thereto" appearing therein. Their Lordships were considering s. 2(14) as can be seen from their observations at pp. 32-33 of report and since that sub-section defined "capital asset" to mean "property of any kind..." subject to certain exclusions of which leasehold rights were not part, it was held that tenancy right is property. Herein, we are not concerned with s. 2(14) of Act. As already observed, s. 22 in sense consists of definition of property, income from which is subject to tax under head "Income from house property", by saying that property should consist of "buildings or land appurtenant thereto". These words are descriptive of property income from which is being charged. Therefore, there is no scope to place such wide interpretation upon those words as in case of s. 2(14). For same reasons, other authorities to which our attention was drawn in course of arguments, also do not apply. One of points raised on behalf of assessee before us is that rent for property, which was Rs. 2,66,700 per annum, went upto Rs. 1.34 crores per annum after surrender of tenancy rights by May & Baker, which is one indication that assessee acquired complete ownership and control over property. We do not see how this makes any difference to legal position. Obviously May & Baker were paying old rent and new tenant paid rent at rates prevalent when he occupied property. This h s nothing to do with acquisition of property and cannot have any impact upon legal position that assessee did not "acquire" property on surrender of tenancy rights by May & Baker. We, therefore, reverse decision of CIT(A) and restore disallowance of interest. appeal filed by Department is thus allowed. No costs. *** ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. VIRENDER SINGH