This miscellaneous application has been filed by assessee applicant with following prayer: [a] Hon'ble Tribunal may be pleased to set aside its order of 24-3- 1982; [b] that Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to modify its order 4-3-1978 in manner prayed for in this petition as well as in petition under section 254[2] of Income-tax 1961 dated 3-12-1980 and allow appeals of petitioner: [c] that in alternative Hon'ble Tribunal be pleased to recall its earlier order of 4-3-1978 and hear matter de nove on merits: [d] Hon'ble Tribunal may pass such other and further orders which may in interest of justice be deemed necessary." 2. Brief facts may be mentioned so as to make narration complete. assessee is partnership firm carrying on business at Tumsar, Tehsil and district Bhandara [Maharashtra]. assessee firm was reassessed under section 147 read with section 144 of Income-tax Act, 1961 ['the Act'] for assessment years 1950-51 to 1958-59 by ITO. For these assessment years penalties were also levied under section 271[1] [c] o f Act. penalty appeals filed by assessee in IT appeal Nos. 304 and 306 to 312 [Nag.] of 1974-75 were disposed of by Tribunal on 4-3-1978 whereby levy of penalty was confirmed. There was corrigendum issued by Tribunal on 11- 12-1979 to order confirming penalty. first miscellaneous application No. 4 [Nag.] of 1981 was filed by assessee on 31-12-1980 and second miscellaneous application No. 24 [Delhi] of 1982 was field by assessee on 16-1-1982. they were rejected by Tribunal vide its consolidated order dated 24-3-1982. present application is third miscellaneous application which has been filed on 23-12-1982. assessee applicant submitted in that application that conclusion of Tribunal in order dated 24-3-1982 that there were no mistakes apparent from record in order dated 4-3-1978 that there were no mistakes apparent from record in order dated 4-3- 1978 that assessee was guilty of concealment of particular of income was vitiated by errors of facts and law apparent from record on following grounds: "1. That incorrect principles of law have been applied on basis of which aforementioned conclusions have been arrived at; 2. that certain vital pleas have been wrongly disregarded andor totally misunderstood; 3. that material evidence on record has been ignored and disregarded andor totally misconstrued; and 4. that entire matter has been approached from incorrect angle." 3. preliminary objection was raised on behalf of department against maintainability of present miscellaneous application and Shri Wazir Singh learned counsel for department argued that there cold be only one rectification application on same point; that present application moved on 23-12-1982 could not seek to rectify original order dated 4-3-1978 passed more than 4 years earlier and that application could not also against order dated 24-3-1982 because that was order passed by Tribunal under section 254[2] of Act. He argued that rectification could be made only of original order in appeal. He also submitted that Tribunal being statutory, it had no inherent powers and that right to review order was not part of any inherent powers. Reliance was placed by him on following decision: Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. STO [1986] 62 STC 104 [MP], Khushal chand B. Daga v. T. K. Surendran, fourth ITO [1972] 85 ITR 48 [Bom.], Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Co. Ltd. v. A. S. Manohar, ITO [1976] 102 ITR 712 [Guj.], ITO v. S. B. Singar Singh and sons [1976] 105 ITR 570 [SC] Bengal Assam Steamship Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1978] 114 ITR 327 [cal.] CIT v. N. J. Dadabai [1978] 115 ITR 317 [AP] and Popular Engg. Co. v. CIT [1983] 140 ITR 398 [MP]. On other hand, Shri Harish Salve, learned counsel for assessee, however, stated that assessee was not asking for review and that assessee was only asking for correction of manifest error. He submitted that order which was passed by Tribunal on 24-3-1982 was in submitted that order which was passed by Tribunal on 24-3-1982 was in fact order passed under section 254[1] though section 254[2] regulates exercise of power. He referred to decision of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in ITO v. S. B. Singar Singh and Sons [1970] 75 ITR 646 and submitted that Tribunal has inherent power to review its order in order to correct wrong done to party. He also referred to decision of Hon'ble Bombay High court in case of Khushal chand B. Daga [supra] and argued that that decision supported assessee and should be followed as it had been given by jurisdictional High court. Alternatively Shri Salve submitted that even the order under section 254[2] could be corrected by Tribunal in exercise of its inherent powers. According to him there was no statutory bar to same. 4. We have considered rival submissions as also decisions referred to above on preliminary objection. We had not heard parties on merits. Section 254[2] provides that Tribunal may, at any time within 4 years from date of order, with view to reactive any mistake apparent from record, amend any order passed by it under subsection [1] and shall make such amendment if mistake is brought to its notice by assessee or ITO. It is, therefore, quite clear that power of rectification of mistakes apparent from record has been conferred by section 254[2] only in respect of orders passed under section 254[1]. It appears to us that further propositions, which follow from sub section [1] and [2] of section 254 , are that limitation for rectification is to be reckoned from date of passing of order under section 254[1] and that in respect of one mistake there can only be one application under section 254[2]. In other words, successive application for rectification of same mistake cannot be moved under section 254[2]. This is for reason that there is no power of review inferred under section 254[2] or for that matter under any other provisions of Act. So far as inherent power is exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. when it is necessary for ends of justice and in order to prevent abuse of process of Court. It is power inherent in court by virtue of its duty to do justice between parties before it. But there are certain well recognized restrictions on exercise of such power. These restrictions are: 1. It cannot be exercised to do that which is prohibited by Act, nor in regard to matters which are excluded from its cognizance: 2. If Act contains specific provision which would meet necessities of case in question, such power cannot be exercised; 3. It is only when there is no clear provision in Act inherent jurisdiction can be invoked. 4. provisions of law of limitation cannot be ignored nor can period of limitation be extended on any grounds of equity or justice; and 5. inherent power cannot be exercised to reconsider or review order. It was not disputed before us that errors sought to be pointed out on behalf of assessee in its successive miscellaneous applications were same. If present miscellaneous application is treated as directed against order 4-3-1978 in penalty appeal, application would be clearly barred by time being beyond period of 4 years specified under section 254[2]. In case instant miscellaneous application is treated as directed against earlier order dated 24-3-1982 under section 254[2] , such application would not be maintainable interims of section 254[2] since application could be directed only against order under section 254[1]. As already pointed out above, no power of review has been conferred under act on Tribunal. So far as question of exercise of inherent powers is concerned, if consideration mentioned above in regard to inherent powers are to be kept in view, it would be clear that Tribunal cannot be said to have any inherent powers to entertain assessee applicant's application having regard to restriction on exercise of inherent powers as extracted above. It is, however necessary to deal with decisions on which reliance has been placed on behalf of assessee in support of its contentions. case of S. B. Singar sing and Sons [supra] was under Excess profits Tax Act, 1940. Section 21 of Act enumerated provisions of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 which were made applic able. However, secton 35 Of Indisan Income-tax Act [dealing with rectification of errors apparent from record] was not included in section 21 of Excess Profit Tax Act. question which arose before Hon'ble Allahabad High court was whether Tribunal had jurisdiction to rehear matter in regard to adjustment of standard profits as same had not been gone into by Tribunal. Hon'ble High court held that Tribunal did have such power notwithstanding non mention of section 35 of Indian Income-tax Act, in section 21 of Excess Profits tax Act. In coming to that conclusion Hon'ble High court noticed that section 19[2] of Excess Profit Tax Act also used following words: "...... 'that Tribunal shall have all such powers in disposing of appeal as it has in respect of appeals preferred to it under Indian income tax Act, 1922' ....... [p. 649]. Therefore though at first sight, this decision appears to support assessee, it is of no avail if we look into peculiar facts which obtained in that case. Here it may be pertinent to point out that this matter had gone up to Supreme court in S. B. Singar Singh and sons case [supra]. supreme court reversed decision of Hon'ble Allahabad High court holding that High court had wrongly assumed that ground relating to adjustment of profits based on aeration of average capital had been urged before Tribunal and that Tribunal had arbitrarily refused to consider it. It was held that it was not fit case for exercise by High court of its special jurisdiction under article 226 of constitution. It was also held that question whether omission to record finding on ground relating to adjustment of profits by Tribunal was due to failure of assessee to urged that ground or due to lapse on part of Tribunal deserving rectification was matter entirely for authorities under taxation statues. However, Supreme court did not find it necessary to decide question whether Tribunal had power under Excess profit tax Act or inherent power to review and rectify mistakes in its orders. In case of Khushalchand B. Daga [supra] Tribunal had dismissed appeal of assessee for assessee's default. In February 1969 Supreme court decided that rule 24 of Income-tax [Appellate Tribunal] Rules, 1963, insofar as it enabled dismissal of appeals for default of appearance, was invalid. Thereafter assessee filed application for restoration of its appeal. Tribunal dimissed application ground that its original order dismissing appeal was not nullity but mistake apparent from record and that application for rectifying mistake was barred by time. assessee and that application for rectifying mistake was barred by time. assessee thereupon filed writ petition before Bombay High court. It was held by Hon'ble Bombay High court that assessee could move, tribunal for rehearing appeal on ground that rule 24 was invalid only after February 1969 when Supreme Court delivered its Judgment of Court was delivered bygment setting at rest conflict of opinion on validity of rule 24. It was held that as petition was filed in June 1969 it was not inordinately delayed. Honble High Court held that decision of Tribunal rendered in 1961 became nullity and supreme court delivered its judgment in 1969 was only mistake apparent on face of record requiring rectification, It was also held that even if decision of Tribunal rendered in 1961 become nullity and Supreme Courty delivered its judgment in 1969 and Tribunal was wrong in holding that htis decision in 1961 was only mistake apparent on face of record requiring rectificatio. It was also held that even if decision of Tribunal redered om 1961 was not nullity but only erroneous order, after decision of Supreme court, Tribunal should have set aside its previous order in exercise of its inherent powers and reheard parties on merits without going into question whether subsequent application was made within time or not, as Tribunal should not allow party to suffer for its own mistake. This decision also although on its face if may appear to be in favour of assessee applicant, does not assist it. decision was rendered with reference to facts mentioned above. In present case appeal was not dismissed ex parte nor did decision of Tribunal become nullity as in above case. Therefore, this decision can also not be taken advantage of by assessee. We are, therefore, of considered view that preliminary objection taken on behalf of department is correct and so present miscellaneous application is not maintainable. 5. Accordingly, application of assessee applicant fails and is rejected. *** RAI BAHADUR SHREERAM DURGAPRASAD & FATECHAND NARSINGDAS (EXPORT FIRM) v. INCOME TAX OFFICER