SHAH NAGSI EMPLOYEES WELFARE TRUST v. INCOME TAX OFFICER
[Citation -1986-LL-0725-3]

Citation 1986-LL-0725-3
Appellant Name SHAH NAGSI EMPLOYEES WELFARE TRUST
Respondent Name INCOME TAX OFFICER
Court ITAT
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 25/07/1986
Assessment Year 1981-82, 1982-83
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags specific direction • charitable nature • legal obligation • medical aid • trust deed • trust fund
Bot Summary: The said Trust was intended as a welfare measure for the employees of the firm. 3 of the Trust deed, are: to provide medical aid of all types to the employees of the firm M/s Shah Nanji Nagsi and their family members; to provide educational facilities to the children of the employees of the firm M/s Shah Nanji Nagsi; to provide housing facilities to the employees either by way of rent or part thereof or by providing moneys to construct houses on cooperative basis or otherwise; to provide financial assistance to the employees looking to their needs either by way of loan with or without interest or otherwise; to provide for such other financial assistance as may be necessary for the well being of the employees and their family members. We must take that these payments made by the firm to the Trust were contributions contemplated in cl. Counsel for the assessee, stated at the very forefront of his submissions that the assessee is not a Trust of charitable purpose covered by the provisions in the Trust deed dt. 2(24) which deals with the inclusive definition of income, particularly mentions of voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable purposes, not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust vide cl. Only certain employees who are eligible according to conditions laid down in the Trust deed can go the benefit of the Trust. Having regard to all these factors, we are of the view that the receipts of the Trust cannot be treated as its income to be charged under s. 56(1).


A.V. BALASUBRAMANYAM, J.M. These two appeals by assessee pertain to assessments for 1981-82 and 1982-83. contest in appeals is identical and has same factual background. Shah Nanji Nagsi is firm of partnership engaged in business. This firm formed Trust called Shah Nanji Najsi Employees Welfare Trust (Trust, for brevity sake) by indenture dt. 23rd June, 1980. said Trust was intended as welfare measure for employees of firm. objects, as set out in cl. 3 of Trust deed, are: (i) to provide medical aid of all types to employees of firm M/s Shah Nanji Nagsi and their family members; (ii) to provide educational facilities to children of employees of firm M/s Shah Nanji Nagsi; (iii) to provide housing facilities to employees either by way of rent or part thereof or by providing moneys to construct houses on cooperative basis or otherwise; (iv) to provide financial assistance to employees looking to their needs either by way of loan with or without interest or otherwise; (v) to provide for such other financial assistance as may be necessary for well being of employees and their family members. firm settled sum of Rs. 5,000 initially and further provided Trustees to receive contribution by firm Shah Nanji Nagsi which may be made from time to time vide cl. 2(c) (ii) of Trust deed. It can receive donations or contributions from others also vide cl. 2(c) (iii). Other aspects of Trust dealing with powers of Trustees, their rights in regard to management of Trust affairs and application of Trust fund to benefit of beneficiaries are not material for present purpose. In accounting year relevant to asst. yr. 1981-82 firm contributed Rs. 30,000 to Trust. In next year amount contributed was Rs. 35,000. We must take that these payments made by firm to Trust were contributions contemplated in cl. 2(c) (ii) of Trust deed. In asst. yr. 1981-82, Trust, which is assessee before us, had distributed Rs. 29,500 to its employees. In next year, it had distributed not only Rs. 35,000 received as contribution, but Rs. 250 in excess available to it. Before ITO there was claim for exemption under s. 11 which was refused by him. ITO remarks that Trust is not for charitable or religious purpose and that it had not been registered under s. 12A within 2 years from date of its creation. taxability of amounts received by Trust had also been questioned before ITO. ITO held that payments were susceptible to tax and he accordingly completed assessments. appeals before AAC were disposed of by common order dt. 9th Feb., 1984. Before him, there was two-fold contention. One was that Trust was charitable Trust. other was that receipts being voluntary contributions do not constitute income and dependence had been placed upon order of Delhi Bench of Tribunal in case of Escorts Employees Welfare Trust vs. ITO (1983) 5 ITD 226 (Del). AAC held that purpose of Trust cannot be held to be of charitable nature, and that exemption under s. 11 was not available. first pint, therefore, failed. first appellate authority also held that contributions were not towards corpus of Trust and that (1983) 5 ITD 226 (Del) (supra) had no application. Aggrieved by order, assessee-trust has brought these appeals. Shri Thakar, ld. counsel for assessee, stated at very forefront of his submissions that assessee is not Trust of charitable purpose covered by provisions in Trust deed dt. 23rd June, 1980. This is not Trust for charitable purpose and voluntary contributions by this Trust cannot be treated as income within meaning of s. 2(24)(iia). main thrust of argument was that voluntary contributions made by firm to assessee were gift or donation and that they do not constitute income for being brought to charge. It was his submission that receipt cannot be taxed unless it constitutes income under any of provisions of IT Act. assessing officer has treated these receipts as "income from other sources". "Income from other sources" specified in s. 14F is dealt with in s. 56. Sec. 56(1) reads that income of every kind which is not to be excluded under total income under Act shall be chargeable to income-tax under head "income from other sources". ld. departmental representative contended that receipt of every kind is chargeable under s. 56(1) unless exclusion is permitted by any of provisions in Act. Sec. 56(2) furnishes list of certain items of income which are chargeable under that head without prejudice to generality of provisions of s. 56(1). It is no doubt true that s. 54(1) apparently looks wider in scope. Sec. 2(24) which deals with inclusive definition of "income", particularly mentions of voluntary contributions received by trust created wholly or partly for charitable purposes, not being contributions made with specific direction that they shall form part of corpus of trust vide cl (iia). It is true that s. 2(24) is not exhaustive definition. But it was intention of Parliament to bring into charge voluntary contributions received by trust not for charitable or religious purposes should also be taken as income of that trust then there would have been specific reference to such trust which is not covered by (iia). absence of specific reference to such trust is to some extent significant. We may now turn to Escorts' case reported in (1983) 5 ITD 226 (Del) (supra). That was case of Trust created for welfare of employees of Escorts Ltd. In that case, donations had been made by company to corpus of Trust and that was held to be not its income to be brought to tax. argument of ld. Departmental Representative revolved upon observations in para 23 of order where there is remark that if contribution is received without its being specifically earmarked for "corpus", question of its being treated as "income" might arise for consideration. That question was not considered by Bench since such situation did not exist in that appeal. Revenue distinguished case of Escorts on reason that payments received by assessee were admittedly not for corpus and they should, therefore, be held as revenue receipts. It is clear from record that amounts received by Trust have been spent for meeting objects of Trust and that donations were not for corpus. ld. Judicial Member has in his succinct order passed in Escorts' case pointed out how voluntary contributions do not constitute income in cases of recipients in paras 18 to 22 of order. It appears to be fairly certain that voluntary contributions to Trust is not its income under general law. As rightly pointed out by Shri Thakar, Trust had not right to demand any amount from firm. firm was under no legal obligation to make payment in any year. If made, it was only in its discretion and sweet will. Such payments willingly made by firm without compulsion can only be treated as gratuitous our payment, gift or donation. It is not that all employees of firm are automatically eligible to receive benefit. Only certain employees who are eligible according to conditions laid down in Trust deed can go benefit of Trust. It is only in such cases Trustees have distributed amounts to meet objects of Trust. This is also point which cannot altogether be ignored. Our attention was drawn to following statement of George Lowndes 50 ILR Cal 1343 found extracted in case of CIT vs. R. Johnstons (1934) 2 ITR 390 (Rangoon). It is: "The object of Indian Act is to tax "income" which it does not define. It is expanded, no doubt, into 'income, profits and gains', but expansion is more matter of words that of substance. Income, their Lordships think, in this Act connotes periodical monetary return 'coming in' with some sort of regularity or expected regularity from definite sources. source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is production of definite return, excluding anything in nature of mere windfall. This income has been likened pictorially to fruit of tree, or crop of field". Here Trust may or may not get donation from firm. Donations could also be from source other than firm and Trust is competent to receive donation or contribution from third persons vide cl. 2(c) (iii) of deed. Having regard to all these factors, we are of view that receipts of Trust cannot be treated as its income to be charged under s. 56(1). At time of argument it was stated that firm has claimed (in its assessment) that payments made to Trust as allowable revenue deductions. ITO rejected claim and we were told that firm has succeeded before first appellate authority and that matter is now pending f o r adjudication before Tribunal. Be that as it may, character of receipt in hands of Trust cannot be treated as its real income for it is no more than gift or bounty to which Trust had no right to demand and which firm was not obliged to make in any year, let alone recurring feature. For all these reasons, we are of view that receipts are not taxable and we reverse finding of authorities below in this regard. In result, appeals are allowed. *** SHAH NAGSI EMPLOYEES WELFARE TRUST v. INCOME TAX OFFICER
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