T.N.C. RANGARAJAN, J.M.: ORDER This appeal is directed against order made under s. 269F (6) of IT Act, 1961, ('the Act'). 2 . Preliminary objection Under s. 269G of Act appeal may be preferred to Tribunal against order made under s. 269F with in period of 45 days from date of such order or period of 30 days from date of service of copy of order, whichever period expires later. order under s. 269F was served on assessee on 6th June, 1985 and period of 30 days expired on 6th July, 1985. order was dt. 25th May, 1985 and period of 45 days expired on 9th July, 1985. Under s. 269G therefore, last date for filing appeal was 9th July, 1985. But appeal was presented on 10th July, 1985. appellant has filed affidavit stating that he was away at Baharain and returned to India only on 4th July, 1985 and it was only on 7th July, 1985, when he came to his father in laws, place in South Kanara district that he become aware of order which was served on his father-in-law who was power of attorney holder of appellant, and thereafter he came to Bangalore on 10th July, 1985, discussed matter with his advocate and filed appeal. It is pleaded that delay of one day should, therefore, be condoned. On other hand, it was pointed out that on behalf of Revenue that under s. 269G (1) proviso, Tribunal may permit appeal to be presented within such further period as may be specified, for sufficient cause, on application made by appellant before expiry of said period of 45 days. It was submitted that since application for condonation of delay has been field after expiry of 45 days, delay cannot be condoned and appeal should not be entertained. In was argued on behalf of assessee in spite of that wording of proviso to s. 269G (1) recourse should be had to provisions of s. 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and delay should be condoned. Reliance was placed on decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of CIT vs. Trilokinath (1984) 34 CTR (MP) 292 : (1984) 147 ITR 613 (MP) where it was held that under similar proviso to s. 269H of Act, High Court may condone delay even though application was filed after expiry of period prescribed. W e find that proviso to s. 269H also States that application should be made before expiry of period of 60 days and yet High Court has held i n case cited on behalf of appellant that proviso could not apply where appellant is unaware of cause which may prevent him from filing n appeal within 60 days and it does not expressly or impliedly exclude application of s. 5. In present case also, we find that appellant was not in position to apply to Tribunal for extension of time before expiry of period, for if that were possible he could have as well filed appeal itself within time prescribed. Further delay is only one day and we find that assessee being out of India and having come to India only few days prior to expiry of period of limitation there was sufficient cause which prevented him from approaching Tribunal in time either to file application for extension of time or for presenting appeal itself. Hence, we deem it fit to condone delay and entertain appeal. 3 . Fact of case By deed dt. 21st Jan., 1980 Alexander D'Souza transferred to appellant before us, Cyril Albert D'Souza plot of land measuring 50 cents in R. S. No. 420 and T. S. No. 255 situated in Codiabail Village, Mangalore City Municipality together with old tiled roof residential house and garden thereon for sum of Rs. 1 lakh. deed itself recited that as approach to Scheduled property was through narrow lane and situation of said property was at distance of about one furlong from main road with bleak prospects of development in near future it was valued at Rs. 1 lakh. When this was registered intimation was given to IAC. He issued preliminary note of hearing on 18th Feb., 1980 calling for information from transferor and transferee before 3rd March, 1980. transferor replied by his letter dt. 27th Feb., 1980. That property was about furlong away from main road, there was no road access to only existing dwelling house built in year 1912 with mud walls and tiled roof whose annual municipal tax was only Rs. 48 and that he will not be able to attend personally to hearing as he was staying in Bombay. power of attorney agent of transferee by his letter dt. 14th March, 1980 furnished copies of document, site plan and particulars of building and other details. He also stated that he was 68 years of age and he may be exempted from appearing in person. IAC thereafter referred matter to valuation cell. Assistant Valuation Officer gave report dt. 20th Sept., 1980 estimated value of property at Rs. 1,57,000. He found that there were two sales of vacant land one of 28 cents in R. S. No. 507/1B at rate of Rs. 4,000 per cent and another of 90 cents in R. S. No. 412 also at Rs. 4,000 per cent in February 1979 and December 1978, respectively. He was of opinion that those two sites being residential properties situated in newly formed layout very near to city and property to be valued being far in interior with approach by very narrow lane of only 3 feet width where vehicular traffic was not possible land could be estimated at Rs. 3,000 per cent. He also found that building was very old structure and in almost dilapiated condition and he took marginal value at Rs. 4,736 and added value of well at Rs. 1,57,000. Thereupon, IAC issued notice under s. 269D (1) of Act on 24th Sept., 1980 stating that he had reason to believe that since market value of property exceeded apparent consideration by more than 15 per cent and consideration for transfer as agreed between parities had not been truly stated in instrument of transfer, he proposed to acquire property under s. 269C of Act. This was also published in Gazette on 25th Oct., 1980. transferor did not respond. transferee, appellant, before us, wrote letter dt. 21st Oct., 1980 stating as follows : "In this connection we wish to state that situational disadvantages being very many, we earnestly request you to acquire property at earliest. compensation payable is worked out here under : Rs. Purchase consideration 1,00,000 Stamp Duty 9,000 Registration fees 1,065 Stamp papers 27 Cost of construction of compound wall as per 13,614 contractor's bill Renovation of house, cess pit and clearing of 7,000 plot as per contractor's bill 1,30,706 Add : 15 per cent 19,605 1,50,311 or 1,50,000" note sheet shows that on 12th Jan., 1982 case was posted for hearing on 28th Jan., 1982 but no enquiry appears to have been held on that date. next entry is dt. 28th Sept., 1984 when draft proposals to CIT were put up. IAC then forwarded draft order on 29th Sept., 1984 for approval of CIT which was granted on 20th May, 1985.Thereafter he passed impugned order on 25th May, 1985 acquiring property. 4. contentions first objection of appellant is that consent given for acquisition in 1980 cannot authorise acquisition in 1985 since unreasonable delay vitiated authority to make acquisition. second objection is that consent of appellant did not amount to admission of any understatement of consideration and in absence of any evidence to show that consideration was understated acquisition was untenable. On other hand, contention of Revenue was that once consent was given for acquisition it amounted to admission of understatement and IAC was at liberty to acquire property at any time without any further enquiry. 5 . law Under s. 269C where competent authority has reason to believe that property of fair market value exceeding Rs. 1 lakh has been transferred for apparent consideration which is less than fair market value and that consideration for such transfer as agreed to between parties has not been truly stated in instrument of transfer with object of facilitating evasion of tax such property may be acquired for Government. Under sub s. evasion of tax such property may be acquired for Government. Under sub s. (2) of s. 269C where fair market value exceeded apparent consideration by more than 25 per cent it shall be conclusive proof that consideration as agreed to between parties has not been truly stated. Where property transferred for apparent consideration which is less than fair market value it shall be presumed unless contrary is proved that consideration has not been truly stated with object of facilitating evasion of liability to pay tax. proceedings for acquisition of such property have to be initiated within nine months from date of transfer. Under s. 269B of Act no one shall call in question jurisdiction of competent authority after expiry of 30 days from initiation of proceedings. objections are to be called within period of 45 days from publication of notification proposing acquisition. Under s. 269F, after hearing objections if competent authority is satisfied that market value of immovable property exceeded Rs. 1 lakh, that fair market value exceeded apparent consideration by more than 15 per cent and consideration was not truly stated in instrument of transfer, then he may, after obtaining approval of CIT order acquisition of property. appeal has to be disposed of by Tribunal expeditiously and Tribunal shall endeavour to dispose it of within 90 days from date of presentation. Thus, entire Chapter XX-A exudes sense of urgency in disposal of these proceedings though no specific time limit has been prescribed under s. 269F for making order of acquisition after hearing objections of parties. 6. It is in this background of scheme of Act appellant claims that order made on 25th May, 1985 after lapse of five years after appellant agreed for acquisition of property by his letter dt. 21st Oct., 1980 is abuse of discretion and should be annulled. Wades on Administrative Law, Fifth edn. at p. 387 has stated that delay in performing legal duty may also amount to abuse which law will remedy but it will be pertinent to enquire whether there was excessive deferment of authorities of legal duty to detriment of party concerned. Under s. 269F if competent authority is satisfied that fair market value of immovable property exceeds Rs. 1 lakh and fair market value exceeded apparent consideration by more than 15 per cent and consideration for such transfer had not been truly state in instrument of transfer he may make order of acquisition. Upon acquisition transferee is to be paid compensation under s. 269J of Act equal to apparent consideration together with 15 per cent solatium. Now if market value of property was not more than 15 per cent of apparent consideration, it would be natural human conduct to surrender property to receive as compensation apparent consideration and 15 per cent solatium since transferee would not be put to any loss. But if transfer were to receive that amount after lapse of five years, that compensation may not be just compensation having regard to effect of inflation and reduction in purchasing power of money involved as well as development of locality. If he had received compensation as soon as proposal was made, it would be possible for him to purchase another property of equal dimensions. Therefore, any delay in finalisation of proceedings in spite of sense of urgency incorporated in these provisions would necessarily lead to financial loss for transferee which could have been easily avoided, if order has been passed promptly especially when appellant had no objection to order he passed. Moreover, perusal of records does not indicate any reason whatsoever for delay in passing order because file and notes do not show any reason for deferment of action from 25th Oct., 1980 when notification was published in Gazette and on 12th Jan., 1982 when case was posted for hearing on 28th Jan., 1982 and again from that date till 28th Sept., 1984 when draft proposal was sent to CIT for approval. It is therefore, clear from record that there was excessive deferment of action which IAC was bound to take under s. 269F and that inordinate and inexcusable delay is sufficient to vitiate order. 7 . second objection of appellant is also valid. apparent consideration was sum of Rs. 1 lakh not including registration and stamps duty and other expenditure incidental to transfer of property amounting to Rs. 10,000. value fixed by valuer was Rs. 1,57,000. That value was estimate made on basis of sales of two properties which were far away and i n well laid out residential locality as admitted by valuer himself. On otherhand, property in question had great disadvantage that it was unapproachable by vehicular traffic and was quite in interior being nearly furlong from main road. municipal tax was only Rs. 46 and Revenue assessment was only Rs. 6.50. building was dilapidated. document States that property was being sold because vendor was quitting place and shifting to Bombay and purchaser was purchasing it because it was in vicinity of his residence. document itself States that parties have to fix value Rs. 1 lakh considering disabilities of property. There i s nothing to suggest that value fixed mutually between parties is not itself market value of property as it would normally be. estimate of land value at Rs. 3000 per cent is itself quite arbitrary and may not reflect correct market value at all. apparent consideration works out to Rs. 2000 per cent which does not appear to be unreasonable considering value of very well developed plots in residential layouts noticed by valuer. question of allowing suitable deduction for disadvantage of non agricultural land, viz its inaccessibility and its distance from developed residential areas and any habitation as such is matter of opinion and speculation and there is nothing to suggest that rate adopted by parties was in any way mala fide or collusive. Moreover, it is not in dispute that appellant was not given opportunity by valuer before determining that figure and if opportunity had been given perhaps appellant would have been in position to demonstrate that market value was really much less than what was estimated by him. Secondly letter of appellant dt. 21st Oct., 1980 earnestly requesting acquisition of property itself shows that apparent consideration and solatium payable as compensation was not less than actual consideration given by him. It is normal human conduct that one will not give consent to part with any property for sum which is less than what one has paid. Since solatium of 15 per cent is equal to range of 15 per cent prescribed by s. 269F for a acquisition of property it is reasonable to infer that market value itself was only within range of 15 per cent from apparent consideration as, otherwise, appellant would not have consented to acquisition of property. There is nothing in letter dt. 21st Oct., 1980 which specifically States that transferee has paid consideration other than that stated in document. Nor can it be implied from that letter that there was any admission of such understatement of consideration. latter is consistent with stand of appellant that what is stated in document was true consideration and yet to buy peace he was willing to surrender land since he would not be in any way loser. Apart from that latter there is absolutely no scrap of evidence on record to indicate that consideration for transfer as agreed between parties had not been truly stated in instrument of transfer. Here again, Revenue depends only upon presumption to be drawn that because market value has been determined at higher figure apparent consideration was not true consideration. Such presumption can be conclusive only when difference is more than 25 per cent which is not case here since total apparent consideration was Rs. 1 lakh as against correct market value which we may estimate only at Rs. 1, 15 ,000 in circumstances of case. Even if it can be assumed that market value is higher than apparent consideration there is only rebuttable presumption and all that was required to rebut it was denial by appellant that he has not paid anything more than what was stated in document. In circumstances, in absence of any specific evidence of understatement of consideration and in view of undependable estimate of market value made by valuation officer there is no relevant material on record for IAC to be satisfied that either fair market value exceeded apparent consideration by more than 15 per cent or that consideration for such transfer had not been truly stated in instrument of transfer. We are, therefore, convinced that in any view of matter order of acquisition made under s. 269F (6) was untenable and cannot be sustained. We have, therefore, no hesitation in cancelling that order. appeal is allowed. *** CYRIL ALBERT D'SOUZA v. INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER