SMT. GOMTI DEVI BANARSI DAS VAID CHARITABLE TRUST v. INCOME TAX OFFICER
[Citation -1985-LL-0701]

Citation 1985-LL-0701
Appellant Name SMT. GOMTI DEVI BANARSI DAS VAID CHARITABLE TRUST
Respondent Name INCOME TAX OFFICER
Court ITAT
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 01/07/1985
Assessment Year 1974-75, 1975-76
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags mercantile system of accounting • opportunity of being heard • cash system of accounting • fixed deposit receipt • method of accounting • payment of interest • second application • service of notice • source of income • statutory period • interest accrued • actual payment • accrual basis • receipt basis • special bench • res judicata • cash basis
Bot Summary: The assessee has now moved a miscellaneous application contending that there was either no service of any notice of hearing or the assessee had actually not received any such notice and the order passed by the Tribunal required to be recalled. At the time of the hearing of the miscellaneous application, it was stated by the learned counsel for the assessee that there was proper service of notice of hearing on the assessee. According to the assessee, conversion of interest into a new fixed deposit receipt amounted to its actual payment to the assessee. In appeal before us the assessee has reiterated the same stand as he took before the authorities below contending that the assessee is following cash system of accounting and not that of mercantile and, as such, the authorities below were erroneous in concluding that the assessee received the impugned interest in the accounting period relevant for the assessment year. On these facts and conduct of the business it can safely be concluded that the assessee is not maintaining the books of account on cash basis; rather presumption is that the assessee is maintaining the books of account on mercantile basis. Shri Markandey Katju, the revenue's standing counsel, appearing along with Smt. Roli Srivastava, the senior departmental representative, raised preliminary objections in writing which can be divided also in two portions as follows: that the Tribunal is not competent to take a view different than the one taken in the assessee's own case, that the Tribunal having passed a valid order on 30-12-1982 rejecting the assessee's Misc. The question as to what method of accounting was being followed by the assessee in respect of a particular source, though earlier decided by the Tribunal against the assessee, could validly be reappraised if new facts were placed on record in a subsequent year and there can be no legal impediment to such a course.


These two appeals before us are restored matters resulting from Tribunal's order dated 13-1-1984 by which assessee's Misc. Application No. 115 (All.) of 1982 came to be accepted and ex parte order dismissing assessee's appeals for 1974-75 and 1975-76 came to be recalled. 2. To have clear picture, we must necessarily state some facts and which are that assessee had filed eight appeals on 29-9-1980, which were consecutively numbered as IT Appeal Nos. 1805 to 1812 (All.) of 1980. said appeals were fixed for hearing on 30-4-1981 in pursuance to notice sent to parties on 13-4-1981, which was served on assessee on 20-4-1981. On 28- 4-1981, assessee sent telegram requesting for adjournment of appeals on ground that all its trustees had gone out of station. Such telegram was received in registry of Tribunal on 30-4-1981, i.e., on date of hearing. Bench on basis of said telegraphic request adjourned appeals to 4-6-1981 and intimation to this effect was sent on 2-5-1981 through ordinary post. 3. When appeals came up for hearing on 4-6-1981, though for revenue, departmental representative was present, there were no arrangements for representation from assessee. Tribunal passed two ex parte orders in relation to eight appeals, but we are concerned with only one, i.e., IT Appeal Nos. 1805, 1806, 1811 and 1812 (All.) of 1980 relating to assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 and another one in respect of other four appeals. 4. On 27-7-1981, assessee moved Misc. Application against order in IT Appeal No. 1805 and others, which was numbered as Misc. Application No. 103 (All.) of 1981, contending that it had not received any notice from Tribunal fixing date of hearing and, therefore, order deserved to be cancelled. hearing on application took place on 17-12- 1982 and vide order dated 30-12-1982, which is being reproduced below, it was rejected: "The order in above appeals was passed by Tribunal on 26-6-1981, appeals were decided ex parte as there was no representation from side of assessee at time of hearing. 2. assessee has now moved miscellaneous application contending that there was either no service of any notice of hearing or assessee had actually not received any such notice and, therefore, order passed by Tribunal required to be recalled. However, at time of hearing of miscellaneous application, it was stated by learned counsel for assessee that there was proper service of notice of hearing on assessee. In view of this fact, there is no case of recalling our order. 3. In result, application is rejected." 5. assessee moved another application on 17-12-1982 which was numbered as Misc. Application No. 115 (All.) of 1982. At time of hearing of this second application, it was urged by assessee's counsel that what he had admitted at time of hearing of earlier application [Misc. Application No. 103 (All.) of 1981] on 17-12-1982, was that notice had been properly served for hearing of cases on 30-4-1981, but fact that adjournment had been granted and cases refixed for hearing on 4-6-1981, was not known to him. burden of submission was that since intimation regarding fixing of appeals on 4-6-1981 had not been communicated to assessee, ex parte hearing of case in IT Appeal Nos. 1805 and others was not justified and order required to be cancelled and recalled. 6. For revenue factual aspects of submission for assessee were not challenged. 7. Tribunal considering peculiar facts allowed assessee's miscellaneous application and recalled Tribunal's order in IT Appeal Nos. 1805 and others by its order of 13-1-1984, paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 of which we are reproducing below: "7. We have carefully considered submissions placed before us. position now boils down to fact that assessee's request for adjournment of case from 30-4-1981 was accepted by Tribunal. There is no misunderstanding about it now. There is also no misunderstanding that Tribunal had adjourned all appeals to 4-6-1981. intimation to this effect was also issued from office of Tribunal on 2-5-1981. However, there is no evidence that this intimation did reach assessee. presumption of service of notice, in our opinion, arises only in case of registered letter and not in case of ordinary post. As assessee did not receive intimation regarding fixation of its appeals on 4-6-1981, it did not make any arrangement for representation before Tribunal on that date. question now is whether non-intimation of date of adjournment is sufficient ground for us to recall our order passed ex parte against assessee. We have gone through decision of Allahabad High Court in case of Auto Sales. legal position is clear that it is duty of assessee to find out as to what orders had been passed on application for adjournment. Strictly legally, therefore, Tribunal could proceed to dispose of appeals ex parte against assessee. However, practice in Tribunal has been to send such intimations practically in all cases unless assessee or its representative was present in office of Tribunal to note date of adjournment. Tribunal has also been treating such non-intimation as valid cause for recalling its orders. In our opinion, in view of such prevailing practice of which we are well aware, assessee should not be made exception and allowed to suffer. We, therefore, in interest of justice, are of opinion that assessee has made out valid ground for recalling our order. In view, we are taking, we do not consider it necessary to decide whether opportunity of being heard by Tribunal requires service of formal notice or mere intimation to assessee, with their respective legal modes of service. 8. As regards alternate contention of learned departmental representative, learned counsel for assessee, in application now under consideration, has not made any request for recalling of orders only in any specific appeals. His request is general for recall of order passed on 5-6- 1981/26-6-1981. We, therefore, recall Tribunal's order dated 5-6-1981/26-6- 1981 in IT Appeal Nos. 1805, 1806, 1811 and 1812 (All.) of 1980 (originally passed in Hindi) and direct that all these appeals be revised for hearing at early date." 8. After recall of orders Allahabad Bench decided to refer 8. After recall of orders Allahabad Bench decided to refer case to Special Bench by making note on 16-6-1984, paragraph Nos. 2 and 3 of which are reproduced below: "2. We are concerned here with appeals for assessment years 1974-75 and 1975-76 in assessee's own case. In these years also, ITO brought to tax interest from Banarsidas Ramgopal on accrual basis rejecting claim of assessee that no such interest was taxable as it had been following cash system of accounting. addition was confirmed by Appellate Assistant Commissioner following order of Tribunal in assessment year 1973-74. 3. In our view, view of Tribunal in assessment year 1973-74 requires reconsideration. slender evidence on basis of which Tribunal came to conclusion that assessee had been following mercantile system of accounting was conversion of interest from bank on fixed deposits in fresh deposits. It was claimed before us that issuing of fresh fixed deposit receipt for interest amounted to actual payment of interest to assessee and, therefore, conclusion was that assessee had been following cash system of accounting and had been crediting interest in its books of account on their receipt. According to assessee, conversion of interest into new fixed deposit receipt amounted to its actual payment to assessee. In our opinion, there is considerable force in this argument requiring reconsideration of view taken in assessee's own case in assessment year 1973-74." 9. present appeals, therefore, are result of abovesaid order of 13-1-1984 and common contention is that AAC, Lucknow erred in confirming addition of Rs. 22,171 and Rs. 25,497 added in related assessments for two years. These additions flow from rejection of assessee's claim that it was following cash system of accounting in respect of its interest income. 10. It was accepted before us that question of inclusion of similar interest came up for adjudication before Tribunal in respect of assessment year 1973-74 and decided in favour of revenue vide order dated 20-1-1979 in IT Appeal No. 2163 (All.) of 1977-78. submission, however, was that principle of res judicata being not applicable, Tribunal should have fresh took on facts. 11. For assessment year 1973-74, Tribunal decided appeal against assessee vide its order dated 20-1-1979 in IT Appeal No. 2163 (All.) o f 1977-78 and paragraph Nos. 14 to 19 of order may be brought in close focus: "14. In appeal before us assessee has reiterated same stand as he took before authorities below contending that assessee is following cash system of accounting and not that of mercantile and, as such, authorities below were erroneous in concluding that assessee received impugned interest in accounting period relevant for assessment year. 15. So we have to see that whether system of accounting of assessee is that of cash and if not so, then whether he received interest amount in accounting period relevant for assessment year under consideration. finding of Income-tax Officer is that assessee has not shown that trust keeps its account on cash basis. Dr. R.M. Lall tried to rebut these findings on plea that system of accounting adopted by assessee is that of cash basis. Therefore, he contends that in this situation of matter, finding of Income-tax Officer is erroneous and without any basis. 16. contention of Shri R.M. Lall is not well founded, as he has not supported by his own documentary evidence which is Annexure-D filed along with his letter dated 6-4-1976. In that Annexure, interest on fixed deposit has been shown and there is star mark on amount of Rs. 4,965.27 and Rs. 5,278.49. Against star mark, it is stated as under: These F.D.Rs are made for interest accrued on all above F.D.Rs. 17. assessee has filed revised return showing interest on fixed deposit at Rs. 10,243.70 as against Rs. 4,965.27 shown in original return. In Annexure-D assessee has used word interest accrued and he had no objection for amount to be assessed as such. It is clear to us from it that assessee admitted that impugned amount accrued and same is to be assessed on accrual basis, that is, nothing else than mercantile system of accounting. 18. Besides, amount of Rs. 10,312 deposited with Banarsi Das Ram Gopal has been excluded by him, stating that amount had not been received by him. However, for same source of income (that is from interest) assessee cannot apply two methods of accountancy, one from interest accrued from Commercial Bank of India, as per Annexure-D on accrual basis and another on receipt basis for interest payable on firm. It also proves that assessee has not stuck to any regular method of accountancy. 19. On these facts and conduct of business it can safely be concluded that assessee is not maintaining books of account on cash basis; rather presumption is that assessee is maintaining books of account on mercantile basis." 12. Shri Markandey Katju, revenue's standing counsel, appearing along with Smt. Roli Srivastava, senior departmental representative, raised preliminary objections in writing which can be divided also in two portions as follows: (I) that Tribunal is not competent to take view different than one taken in assessee's own case, (II) that Tribunal having passed valid order on 30-12-1982 rejecting assessee's Misc. Application No. 103 (All.) of 1981, second order in respect of fresh miscellaneous application in relation to same order was nullity. 13. Elaborating his contentions, he submitted that Tribunal's view taken in ex parte order being in conformity and consistent with approach taken for assessment year 1973-74, there can be no occasion to consider assessee's case afresh, facts being admittedly similar. In respect of second objection, he submitted that Tribunal became functus officio, after passing order of 30-12-1982 and gravely erred in recalling order by accepting second miscellaneous application. Shri Katju also pleaded that Tribunal should decide abovesaid preliminary questions before touching appeals on merits. 14. For appellant-assessee, Dr. R.M. Lall, chartered accountant, very k l y opposed stand taken by Shri Katju. He submitted that not only Tribunal can re-appraise given situation, principle of res judicata being not applicable on merits of case, but was legally correct in passing second order in respect of fresh miscellaneous application on 30-1-1984. 15. After giving our thoughtful moments, we have come to conclusion that both preliminary objections must be rejected, which we do. If we are to accept viewpoint canvassed by Shri Katju, then we also must presume that once Tribunal commits mistake or error of judgment on facts or law in given year, it is precluded from correcting its viewpoint in appeals for subsequent year, howsoever grave mistake may be, presumption which we are not prepared to make. Maybe that on same facts Tribunal should not depart from its view taken earlier, unless there is grave provocation and reasons, but if prima facie case is made out that earlier view needs reconsideration, it is only in fitness of things and judicial propriety that matter be reconsidered at least by larger Bench. question as to what method of accounting was being followed by assessee in respect of particular source, though earlier decided by Tribunal against assessee, could validly be reappraised if new facts were placed on record in subsequent year and there can be no legal impediment to such course. We are stating this principle. 16. In present case, however, first preliminary objection of revenue may be of academic nature because we are holding that sufficient case is not made out for departing from view taken earlier. We shall be giving necessary facts and our reasons later in this order. 17. On peculiar facts prevailing in this case, Shri Katju's second preliminary objection is considered as wholly wrong. Within statutory period, as provided under section 254(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'), it is open to parties in appeal before Tribunal to move miscellaneous application and it is precisely what happened in present case. On 17-12-1982 assessee only accepted that hearing notice for 30-4-1980 was duly served and, therefore, contention that it did not receive later intimation of adjournment of appeals to 4-6-1981, cannot be said to be inconsistent approach. We have given related facts and reproduced certain portions of order of Tribunal dated 13-1-1984, with purpose to show that on given fact, any other view than one taken by Tribunal would have been wrong. It must be stated here that we have believed assessee's counsel (Dr. Lall's) version that after appraising himself of fact that first miscellaneous application was made on wrong basis, he thought it advisable and fit to move fresh application and that there was no concession of any kind that there was no grievance against ex parte order passed by Tribunal. It has to be kept in mind and close focus that second miscellaneous application was filed on 17- 12-1982, i.e., on date of hearing of first application. It might have been advisable for assessee to have argued in relation to first application that intimation regarding hearing on 4-6-1981 had not been received but such course not having been adopted, certainly did not preclude assessee/his representative to move fresh application, if statute permitted such course. Therefore, there was no question of Tribunal having become functus officio, because mistake can be looked into under section 254(2) and consequences which follow must be given effect to. Seen in this context action of Tribunal in recalling order is held to be justified. 18. As far as merits of case go, Dr. Lall simply did not have vital facts in his possession, like agreement between assessee-trust and firm. assessee's counsel was also unable to give dates as to when was interest actually received from firm. Dr. Lall, however, accepted that there was agreement between assessee and firm. On such scanty facts, we are not prepared to take view different than one taken in assessee's own case for immediately preceding year. 19. While deciding these appeals, we are conscious that principle of res judicata is not applicable. We do not have to cite any authority to say that each assessment year being independent, if there are additional features, which have not been noticed earlier, same may be pressed into service to ask have not been noticed earlier, same may be pressed into service to ask revenue to accept particular contention and claim, which have been earlier rejected. Therefore, our decision in these years shall not be taken as precedent and it shall be open to assessee in future assessment year/years to contest its claim that it followed particular accounting system. 20. In result, appeals are dismissed. *** SMT. GOMTI DEVI BANARSI DAS VAID CHARITABLE TRUST v. INCOME TAX OFFICER
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