assessee is employee of Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur. original assessment in his case was made on 17-3-1977. It appears that subsequent to above, there was search at premises of above company. In this search, department found register of properties sold by company. register showed that company had sold certain plots in colony called Anandpuri of Kanpur. Some of plots were sold to general public while others were sold to assessee's own employees. present assessee had purchased plot No. 80 on 21-6-1973 at rate of Rs. 55 per sq. yard. It was further noticed that similar plot No. 73 of equal area was sold to Dr. Vimla Gupta on 8-8-1973 at rate of Rs. 80 per sq. yard. IAC was, therefore, of view that assessment had been granted concession at rate of Rs. 25 per sq. yard by company. According to him, this concession amounted to 'perquisite' in terms of section 17(2)(iii)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'). According to this section, perquisite includes value of any benefit or amenity granted at concessional rate by employer (including company) to employee whose income under head 'Salaries', exclusive of value of all benefits or amenities not provided for by way of monetary payment, exceeds Rs. 18,000. There was no dispute that income of assessee under above head excluded Rs. 18,000. According to IAC, therefore, assessee was provided with benefit which amounted to perquisite and was, therefore, liable to be assessed as income from salary under section 17(1)(iv). value of concession was worked out by him at Rs. 19,444. Since this amount had not been taxed in original assessment and had also not been shown in return o n disclosed to department, proceedings under section 147(a) of Act were started against assessee. In this connection, ITO specifically referred to decision of House of Lords in Abbot v. Philbin (Inspector of Taxes) [1962] 44 ITR 144. 2. On behalf of assessee, there was two submissions before assessing officer: first submission was that provisions of section 147(a) had no application to case of assessee. It was contended before him that assessee had made full and true disclosure of all material facts necessary for his assessment and, therefore, it could not be said that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment because of any omission or failure on part of assessee. In this connection, it was pointed out that payments for purchase of plot had been made by cheque which were reflected in bank accounts of assessee. It was also submitted that those bank accounts were scrutinised by IAC making original assessment. It was also contended that assessee had shown above plot in his wealth-tax return. These contentions were rejected by IAC. In his opinion, disclosure of plot in wealth-tax return of assessee was of no consequence, nor payment by cheque reflected in his bank account affected application of section 147(a). In this connection, he referred to Explanation 2 to section 147(a). According to this Explanation, production before ITO of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by ITO was not necessarily to amount of disclosure within meaning of section 147(a). 3. Another contention raised before IAC was that there was actually no benefit or concession granted to assessee. It was argued that no right had been conferred on assessee as employee with regard to purchase of plot and, therefore, assessee as employee of company had not received any benefit. This contention was also rejected by IAC as, in his opinion, formulation of scheme by company to sell plots to its officers and members of staff at concessional rate amounted to benefit or amenity in favour of employees. In this connection, IAC heavily relied on decision of House of Lords in Abbot's case (supra). IAC finally computed value of benefit or perquisite at Rs. 19,444 on basis that similar plot had been sold to Dr. Vimla Gupta at rate of Rs. 80 per sq. yard involving concession of Rs. 25 per sq. yard to assessee. 4. assessee was also provided with rent-free accommodation by company. In original assessment, assessee had returned value of t h i s perquisite at Rs. 2,548. In opinion of IAC, this was low. He considered similar question in assessment year 1973-74 and following his finding in that year, he computed value of perquisite in form of rent- free residential accommodation at Rs. 8,135. According to him, it was not necessary to apply provisions of section 147 once again to case, as assessment had already been reopened. He recomputed value of assessment had already been reopened. He recomputed value of perquisite at Rs. 8,135 and included it in assessment in place of Rs. 2,548 originally assessed. 5. assessee appealed to Commissioner (Appeals). Commissioner (Appeals) was of opinion that provisions of section 147(a) did not apply to case as assessee could not foresee that there was any concession in sale of plots to him. He was further of view that assessee had not failed or omitted to disclose any facts necessary for his assessment. According to him, therefore, provisions of section 147(a) were not applicable to assessee's case. He then considered whether assessment could also be reopened under section 147(b) in regard to valuation of perquisite provided in form of rent-free accommodation to assessee. Here, he followed his order in assessment year 1973-74 and held that even section 147(b) had not application to case. He, thus, quashed reassessment made by IAC and allowed appeal. In view he took he did not consider additions on merits. 6. department is now in appeal before us. learned departmental representative mainly challenged quashing of reassessment proceedings initiated by IAC, by Commissioner (Appeals). On behalf of assessee, order of Commissioner (Appeals) was sought to be supported. In this connection, argument placed before IAC was also repeated before us. 7. We have given our careful thought to entire matter. We will first deal with question of selling of plot at concessional rate to assessor also we will first deal with application of section 147(a) to case. In our opinion, above section is clearly attracted. This section applies to case where assessee either omits or fails to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment and ITO by reason of such commissioner failure had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. leading authority on this issue is decision of Supreme Court in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191. It was held in this case that it was assessee's duty to disclose all primary facts, including particular entries in account books, particular portions of documents, and documents and other evidence which could have been discovered by assessing authority, from documents and other evidence disclosed. Court held that duty, however, did not extend beyond full and truthful disclosure of all primary facts. Once all primary facts were before assessing authority, it was for him to decide what inferences of facts could be reasonably drawn and what legal inference had ultimately to be drawn. 8. question for consideration is whether assessee had disclosed primary facts regarding purchase of plot from his employer to ITO. T h e case of assessee here is that he had placed his bank pass book containing payments for purchase before IAC/ITO, who had also examined them. Further, his case is that he had also included above plot in his wealth-tax return. In our opinion, none of these amount to disclosure of any primary facts. As rightly pointed out by IAC in his order, production of account books or other evidence, from which material evidence could with due diligence had been discovered, was not necessarily to amount to disclosure. Production of pass books fell under this category. Inclusion of plot in wealth-tax return was of no consequence as that disclosure was not under Act. We do not agree with finding of Commissioner (Appeals) that assessee could not think that he was provided any benefit or concession by its employer and, therefore, it was not possible for him to disclose such benefit in his return. He has clearly gone wrong in law in this regard. We have already stated above that assessee's duty was to disclose primary facts and not to tell ITO that he had gained any benefit or perquisite as such. Commissioner (Appeals) failed to consider first aspect, i.e., omission or failure on part of assessee to disclose primary facts necessary for his assessment. In our opinion, therefore, assessee failed to disclose primary facts necessary for assessment in regard to purchase of plot and provisions of section 147(a) were clearly attracted and rightly applied to his case. 9. submission was made by learned counsel for assessee that department itself was not sure about its position inasmuch as it had also initiated gift-tax proceedings against employer-company itself. He, however, admitted that subsequently those proceedings had been dropped by GTO. In our opinion, this cannot help assessee. department has to take proper care of its revenue and protective assessments are clearly permitted in law. In care of its revenue and protective assessments are clearly permitted in law. In any case, gift-tax proceedings were not in case of assessee but in case of company, which was different from assessee. We, therefore, find no merit in this contention. 10. next submission of learned counsel for assessee before us was that even if there was any concession, it did not amount to perquisite in terms of section 17(2)(iii)(c). He contended that service contract of assessee did not lay down any such condition that company was bound to provide plot to assessee at concessional rate. According to him, it amounted to normal commercial sale by company to assessee, which did not amount to any perquisite which could be brought to tax as part of assessee's salary. In this connection, he referred to following decisions of Tribunal. A.K. Chellani v. ITO [1983] 3 ITD 194 (Hyd.), M.C. Muthanna v. ITO [1983] 3 ITD 46 (Mad.) and K.P. Pednekar v. ITO [1983] 6 ITD 483 (Bom.). He also referred to sub-clause(vi) of section 17(2), which was added by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984. According to this new clause, concession granted to employee by employer in form of loan was to amount to perquisite. learned counsel submitted that this was only clause applicable from assessment year 1985-86. This clause has been omitted by Finance Act, 1985, with effect from 1-4-1985, which alone extended definition of perquisite to concession granted by employer to employee. According to him, other concessions did not amount to perquisite. 11. On behalf of department, it was submitted that company had formulated regular scheme which was specifically meant for its officers and staff by which concessional rate had been charged from them in sale of plots in Anandpuri colony. contention of learned departmental representative was that concession was incident to employment of assessee and, therefore, it amounted to perquisite in terms of section 17(2)(iii)(c). In this connection, he again referred to decision of House of Lords in Abbot's case (supra). 12. In our opinion, stand of learned departmental representative requires to be accepted. In case of Abbot (Supra), secretary of company was granted option to purchase certain shares in company at concessional rate. In this connection, Court, in words of Lord Radcliffe, made following observations: "...I think that conferring of right of this king as incident of service is profit or perquisite which is taxable as such in year of receipt so long as right itself can fairly be given monetary value..." (p. 163) 13. similar position is available in present case also. As would appear from preamble of scheme formulated by company, there was request from its officers and staff members for some concession in rate as also for payment on deferred basis in regard to sale of plots. company considered request and in pursuance of decision taken by its board of directors in their meeting held on 29-7-1972, it formulated scheme. scheme was applicable to permanent officers/staff members (excluding workers) drawing salary of Rs. 500 per month or more. scheme also lays down detailed procedure for recovery of amounts. There is separate clause for recovery in case of retiring members of staff or those who might have resigned. reading of scheme clearly goes to show that it was incident of service and not offer to employees in true commercial sense. It was, therefore, in nature of perquisite to assessee also and could rightly be evaluated in terms of section 17(2)(iii)(c). 14. We do not think that decisions of Tribunal, relied upon by learned counsel for assessee are of any help. In none of these decisions, to best of our knowledge, above decision of House of Lords was considered. Each one of them emphasised fact that transactions were commercial in character and that they were not part of any service contract. Besides, in fact, these decisions are distinguishable on their own facts. They are also to be distinguished on principle laid down by House of Lords in case of Abbot (supra) in sense that provision of concession in present case clearly was incident of service. We, therefore, hold that if assessee had earned any concession, it was clearly in nature of perquisite under section 17(2)(iii)(c). We do not agree with submission of learned counsel for assessee that merely because of new sub-clause (vi) having been added to that section, that alone laid down different categories of perquisites. Admittedly, that clause related to concessional loan granted to employee and not to any other form of perquisite, as is case here. We, therefore, set aside order of Commissioner (Appeals) on this issue. 15. Since Commissioner (Appeals) has not considered question of quantum of concession, we have no alternative but to direct him to do so now after we have held that reopening of assessment was valid and further, concessions, if any, was perquisite liable to be taxed as part of assessee's salary. 16. We now deal with question of perquisite in form of rent-free accommodation provided to assessee by company. This issue came up for our consideration in assessment year 1973-74. Following our finding in that year, we direct IAC to recomputed value of such perquisites on basis of municipal valuation of property. 17. In result, appeal is partly allowed. *** INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER v. S.R. BHAWSINGHKA