These three appeals filed by same assessee raise certain common points for decision. Hence, they are heard together and disposed of by this common order for sake of convenience. assessee is individual having income from business as photographer. original assessments for asst. yrs. 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 were completed on 30th Nov., 1976, 17th Nov., 1977 and 17th Nov., 1977 on incomes of Rs. 2,086, Rs. 4,260 and Rs. 2,710 respectively. It may be stated here that assessment for earlier year 1973-74 was made on 18th March, 1976 and order of AAC for same year was passed on 1st Nov., 1977. In assessment order for year 1973-74 ITO had stated that assessee had withdrawn sum of Rs. 35,000 from his bank account in connection with marriage ceremony of three daughters of assessee. ITO had assessed said sum of Rs. 35,000 as assessee s income from undisclosed sources. On appeal, AAC deleted said addition on ground that marriage ceremonies were not held during previous year relevant to asst. yr. 1973-74, but was held in sub-sequinned years, and also on ground that assessee had explained satisfactorily marriage expenses by withdrawals of Rs. 35,000 from his bank account. Subsequently, ITO issued notices under s. 148 of IT Act, 1961 and served them on assessee on 2nd March, 1978 for asst. yrs. 1974-75, 1975-76 and 1976-77 which are now under consideration. reason for reopening three assessments has been recorded by ITO in order sheet dt. 2nd March, 1978 as below: "Marriage expenses are not shown in accounts and as such income escaped assessment. Issue notice under s. 148." In response to above notices, assessee took stand that he did not suppress any material at time of original assessments inasmuch as expenses incurred by assessee in connection with marriage of his three daughters during three assessment years under consideration were explained to ITO prior to completion of original assessment proceedings. He explained that assessment order for year 1973-74 was made on 18th March, 1976 while original assessment proceedings for three years under consideration were finalised thereafter on 5th Feb., 1977, 17th Nov., 1977 and 17th Nov., 1977 respectively. Thus, assessee urged that in course of original assessment proceedings for three years under consideration, it was brought to notice of ITO that assessee had incurred expenses in connection with marriage of his three daughters. Consequently, there was no suppression of any material facts necessary for completion of theses assessments. Hence, assessee urged that reopening proceedings were without jurisdiction and prayed for dropping same. assessee did not file any return in response to notice under s. 148 but explained above position in course of proceedings under s. 142 (1) of Act, when assessee s representative attended before ITO ad stated as above. It was further urged that assessments could not have been reopened under s. 147 (b) because ITO did not have any fresh information after completion of original assessments. Further, if reopening is assumed to be under s. 147 (b) then, reassessments made on 14th Sept., 1981, 29th July, 1981 and 29th July, 1981 for three years under consideration became time- barred in view of provision of s. 153 (2) (b) of Act inasmuch as above dates are not only beyond expiry of four years from end of assessment year in which income was first assessable but also beyond expiry of one year from date of service of notice under s. 148. ITO held that this is case of reopening under s. 147 (a) as assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts for his assessments. Hence, he held that assessments could be made within four years from end of assessment year in which notice under s. 148 was served as has been done in this case. In other words ITO held that reopening was made under s. 147 (a) and reassessments made were not barred by limitation in view of s. 153 (2) (a). Next, ITO made reassessments on total incomes of Rs. 25,000, Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 20,000 inclusive of incomes assessed in original assessment respectively for three years under consideration. ITO had to state in his orders as to how much of total income assessed by him represented actual marriage expenses as estimated by him and how much of same estimated expenses was regarded by him as explained satisfactorily by withdrawals from bank. However, by implication it is seen that amounts assessed by ITO in reassessments reduced by income assessed in original assessments represented amounts of extra marriage expenses that ITO held as not explained by bank withdrawals and so assessed by him as assessee s income from undisclosed sources apparently under s. 69 C of IT Act. It may be stated in this connection that s. 69C of Act was introduced in Act w. e. f. 1st April, 1976 so that it is applicable to asst. yr. 1976-77 but not applicable to earlier two asst. yrs. 1974-75 and 1975-76. assessee appealed to AAC and challenged reassessments made by ITO broadly on two grounds: Firstly, it was urged that reopening was no justified because assessee did not conceal anything at time of t h e original assessment. AAC did not agree with this contention on ground that assessee failed to show marriage expenses. assessee replied that he ITO had knowledge about these expenses prior to completion of original assessments. In any case there was no query in income-tax return about marriage expenses and so there was no scope for assessee t o declare those expenses in return. Hence, it could not be said that assessee had obligation to disclose those expenses separately. Even thought original assessments were still pending when ITO came to know of those expenses no further query was made by him and so assessee had no scope o r opportunity to explain those expanses. AAC rejected this contention of assessee as unsatisfactory. He also rejected contention of assessee that reassessments were barred by limitation because he held that reassessment were made under s. 147 (a) of Act and so they were within time as per s. 153 (2) (a) of Act. Secondly, it was urged before him that marriage expenses were properly explained by bank withdrawals that nothing was spent over and above same. Here also, AAC did not agree w i t h assessee on ground that assessee did not produce any evidence to contradict estimate made by ITO. In this view of matter AAC confirmed three reassessments as made by ITO. In this further appeals before us, Shri N. K. Poddar, learned In this further appeals before us, Shri N. K. Poddar, learned representative for assessee, urged before us that Revenue authorities erred in their decision. He urged that reopening under s. 147 (a) was without jurisdiction. According to him, assessee had no obligation to disclose marriage expenses in return as there is no query to that effect therein. Again, marriage expenses were not material fact necessary for making original assessments because s. 69 C thereof was not on statute book in first two years and even in third year marriage expenses were properly explained by bank withdrawals, as has been accepted by AAC in his order for asst. yr. 1973-74 and so it could no longer be said to be primary fact which would have any bearing on assessments. He relied on decision in case of Durga Sharan Udho Prasad vs. CIT (1976) 103 ITR 270 (Pat) in support of this contention. In that case at time of original assessment, assessee had declared expenditure of Rs. 7.041 over construction of house subsequently, Income-tax Inspector inspected house and estimated cost of construction at about Rs. 30,000 Thereupon, ITO started proceedings under s. 147 (a) of Act. When matter went to High Court it was held that in this case ITO s reason to believe that there had been under-assessment could not be said to be on account of any omission of failure on part of assessee, to disclose any primary facts. It was merely result of subsequent information given to him by ITO on basis of estimate. At best, therefore, it could be case under s. 147(b) and not case under s. 147(a). In so far as assessment has been reopened under s. 147(a), it was held to be without jurisdiction. It is also held in this case that if law does not impose any obligation upon tax payer to disclose any fact, then, non-disclosure of such fact will not amount to non-disclosure of primary fact, In that case, there was obligation on assessee to disclose primary facts that he had contracted house and spent certain amount thereon. There was no further obligation on assessee to disclose that on estimate Income-tax Inspector might arrive at higher figure. Lastly, it was held in same case that s. 69C merely impose obligation on ITO (and not on assessee) to compute total income for purpose of assessment by including unexplained expenses in income of assessee Further, in absence of s. 69C in Act. recourse to that section could not be taken while assuming jurisdiction under s. 147 of Act. Shri N. K. Poddar, them explained that assessee had already declared marriage expenses in course of assessment for year 1973-74 at which point of time three original assessments for years now under consideration were still open. Hence, it could not be said that assessee failed to disclose any primary facts which were necessary for making assessments. He relied on decision in case of Gemini Leather Stores 1975 CTR (SC) 197: (1975) 100 ITR 1 (SC). In that case, in proceedings for original assessment, thought assessee did not disclose certain transactions, ITO himself discovered those facts but, by oversight he did not bring those amounts to tax. Subsequently, he issued notice under s. 147(a) with view to assess profit arising from transaction. Supreme Court held that, after discovery of primary facts relating to transactions, it was for ITO to make necessary enquiries and draw proper inference. This was not done by him. It was plainly case of oversight by ITO and so it could not be said that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on part of assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts. It was held that ITO cannot take recourse to s. 147(a) to remedy error resulting from his own oversight. Next, Shri poddar referred to decision of Supreme Court in case of ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das 1976 CTR (SC) 220: (1976) 103 ITR 437 (SC). I n that case, it was held that reason for formation of belief contemplated by s. 147(a) of Act must have rational connection or relevant bearing on formation of belief. Rational connection postulates that there must be direct nexus or love link between material on which belief is based and belief itself. In this case, assessee had shown some loans from creditor and loans were accepted as genuine at time of original assessment. Subsequently, ITO got information that creditor has since confessed that he was doing only namelending. ITO reopened assessment under s. 147(a) on ground that income of assessee had escaped assessment in view of above confession of creditor. supreme Court held that there was no direct nexus between confession of creditor in general terms and belief of ITO to effect that income of that particular assessee escaped assessment. In this view of matter, Supreme Court held reopening to be without jurisdiction. Shri Poddar urged that ITO had merely said that marriage expenses were not shown in accounts. Apart from fact that this statement was incorrect, this fact could not lead to belief that assessee had incurred more expenses on marriage than shown by him in books or that assessee must have some secret income from which estimated excess expenses must have come from. He stated that there is no live link between reason recorded by ITO and belief entertained by him from that reason. Finally, Shri Poddar urged that on merit also there is no case for any addition in any of three years. assessee had explained expenses incurred on marriage of daughters to be Rs. 35,000 which came from b n k withdrawals. Those expenses have been considered to be quite satisfactory by AAC and so he had deleted same. It is true that AAC had also observed that expenses were not incurred during previous year relevant to asst. yr. 1973-74. But he book note of fact that expenses were properly explained by bank withdrawals and this fact also persuaded him to knock down addition. ITO had not estimated as to how he considered expenses incurred by assessee and on what basis, Nor did he state in his order as to how much of expenses estimated by him was considered by him to covered by withdrawals from bank. additions made by ITO are thus based on pure surmises and are baseless. Hence, he urged that they deserved to be deleted. Shri S. R. Das, ld. Representative for Department, on other hand, supported orders of Revenue authorities. He emphasised reasons given by them in their orders. He referred to decision in case of Munshi Ram vs. CIT (1980) 126 ITR 663 (P & H) for proposition that golden rule of evidence which was never in dispute was enacted by s. 68 of Act and so mere absence of s. 69C of Act from Statute book would not relieve assessee of necessity to declare expenses incurred by him during previous years under consideration. Next, he referred to decision in case of CIT vs. P. K. Kochammu Amma, Peroke (1980) 19 CTR (SC) 196: (1980) 125 ITR 624 (SC). In that case, it was held that assessee (SC) 196: (1980) 125 ITR 624 (SC). In that case, it was held that assessee had to disclose shares of spouse and minor daughter in return because they were assessable in hands of assessee in view of s. 64 of Act. If this was not declared then there was omission to disclose all primary facts necessary for assessment. Shri N. K. Poddar replied that two decisions relied on by learned Representative for Department had no application to facts of this case. We have considered contentions of both parties as well as facts on record. In our opinion, contentions raised for assessee carry force. We find that ITO already knew about marriage expenses before original assessments were completed as is clear from assessment order for asst. yr. 1973-74. As has been held by Supreme Court in case of Gemini Leather Stores (supra) assessee was no longer under any obligation t o disclose that fact which was already known to ITO. After all, person cannot conceal fact from ITO if that fact is already known to later. It follows that assessee did not conceal anything contemplated in s. 147(a) of Act and so assessee is likely to succeed in these appeals on that ground alone because one of basic conditions for assuming jurisdiction under s. 147(a) has not been fulfilled in present case. There is also force in ground that assessee was not under any obligation to disclose marriage expenses when there is no query to that effect either in return or in any enquiry made by ITO vide decision in case of Durga Sharan Udho Prasad (supra). similarly, in view of decision in case of Lakhmani Mewal Das (supra), we do not see any direct nexus or live link between mere fact that marriage expense were not shown in accounts (apart from fact that this is incorrect statement) and belief formed by ITO to effect that such income escaped assessment. There are so many intermediarystages in this case in between information and belief. marriage expenses even if not shown in accounts might have been made from some other sources. It must be found that expenses actually incurred were much more than what is admitted by assessee and that excess is not explained satisfactorily as having come from any other source. In absence of these vital information, we find force also in this contention raised by assessee. Finally, we are also inclined to agree with assessee on merits of case. ITO has totally ignored withdrawals of Rs. 35,000 from bank towards marriage expenses. He has estimated total income of assessee obviously including amounts assessed as business income in Original assessments. If ITO meant that excess amounts assessed by him in reassessments represented unexplained extra expenses estimated by him, he should have clearly stated so, in which case assessee would have got reasonable opportunity to meet case of Revenue. In absence of any such detailed discussion in assessment orders, and basis for estimate adopted by ITO, we come to conclusion that additions made by ITO are without any basis and so are liable to be deleted. We have considered ground relating to limitation raised by assessee. But we do not find any force in same. In our opinion, ITO has clearly proceeded under s. 147(a) of Act and so reassessment proceedings are within period of limitation as prescribed under s. 153(2)(b) of Act. absence of s. 69C in Act for first two years supports case of assessee and even its presence in third years does not throw any burden on assessee to assume higher estimate by Revenue and to meet that point even when it was not raised by Revenue. For above reasons, we hold that reassessments made by ITO are bad in law and so we cancel same. In result, three appeals are allowed. *** DURGADAS CHATTERJEE v. INCOME TAX OFFICER