D. S. MEENAKSHISUNDARAM, J.M.: appellant is public limited company carrying on business in manufacture of metal alloys, castings and stampings. We are concerned in this appeal with its income-tax assessment for asst. yr. 1981-82 for which previous year ended on 31st March, 1981. first objection in this appeal is in regard to disallowance of appellant s claim for depreciation at higher rate of 15 on its plant and machinery as per r.5 of IT Rules, as amended by income-tax (fourth amendment) Rules 1983 w.e.f. 2-4-1983. In its return of income appellant h d claimed Rs. 4,83,135 as depreciation. Subsequently it filed revised deprecation statement claiming Rs. 7,06,650 by relying on Notification dt. 2nd April, 1983 amending general rate of depreciation on plant and machinery to 15 per cent from earlier 10 per cent. ITO held that appellant seemed to be under erroneous impression that amendment was relating to procedural aspect of law and that said procedure would apply to all pending assessments. He pointed out that depreciation as envisaged in IT Act is normal expenditure allowed for wear and tear of machinery used for purposes of business and as such directly connected to computation of income. He held that as depreciation allowable, mode of computation and rates at which it is to be allowed form integral part of substantive law in s. 32 itself rules that prescribe rates are only extension of s. 32 and as such it is very much part of substantive law and any amendment thereto will have its effect only in year in which income is earned and not in year in which it is computed and quantified for taxation purposes. He, therefore, held that notification relied on by appellant would come into effect only for previous year commencing after 2nd April, 1983 and not for any previous year that ended before that date. He, therefore, rejected assessee s claim for depreciation at higher rate of 15 per cent and allowed such depreciation as per rules prior to notification dt. 2nd April, 1983. On appeal, CIT(A) upheld order of ITO. He pointed out that revised r. 5 came into effect only from 2nd April, 1983 and hence would be applicable only to assessments for 1984-85 onwards. He also relied on letter written by CBDT explaining purport of this modification in their letter dt. 13th June, 1983 in No. 202/25/83 IT (A-11). He further relied on decision of Kerala High Court in case of Periakaormalai Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1980) 14 CTR (Ker) 418: (1980) 124 ITR 899 (Ker) and held that benefits of circular would not be applicable prior to date of its issue unless specifically provided therein. He, therefore, rejected contentions of appellant claiming depreciation at enhanced rates for asst. yr. 1981-82 and that benefits of such rates would not be applicable to assessments prior to 1984-85 ending on date of issue. This is being objected to by appellant in ground Nos. 1 to 4 before us. Smt. Meenakshi Krishnaswamy, ld. counsel for appellant relied on r. 5 of IT Rules, as amended by IT (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 1983 and contended that appellant would be entitled to benefit of enhanced rates of depreciation as per this rule, since assessment for this year was pending at time said rule was brought into force. In support of this submission, ld. counsel relied on following three decisions of Tribunal: Rayalaseema Passenger Goods Transports (P) Ltd. v. IAC (1984) 19 TTJ (Mad) 288: (1984) 7 ITD 111 (Mad), Periakoramalai Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1980) 14 CTR (Ker) 418: (1980) 124 ITR 899 (Ker), South India Road Transport vs. ITO (1983) 4 ITD 176 (Hyd), P. M. Raghavendra Rao ITA No. 2235 (Mds) 83. ld. counsel submitted that third case simply followed same line of reasoning as in first two cases. On behalf of Revenue, Shri R. Seshagiri Rao, ld. Departmental Representative relied on findings of CIT(A) and ITO and contended that appellant would not be entitled to depreciation at higher rate of 15 per cent as amendment was effective only from 2nd April, 1983 and was applicable only from asst. yr. 1984-85 as specified in rule itself. He further argued that tree decisions of Tribunal relied on by ld. counsel were inapplicable to facts of Present case as in those cases notifications specifically stated that amendments made by notification would come into force at once and not on any particular specified date. He also would come into force at once and not on any particular specified date. He also relied on Kerala High Court decision mentioned in order of CIT(A). He argued that orders of Departmental authorities below on this point should be confirmed. On careful consideration of submissions urged on both sides, we are of view that appellant is not entitled to depreciation at higher rate of 15 per cent as claimed by it for assessment year under appeal. IT (Fourth Amendment) Rules, 1983 amending IT Rules were published in Notification No. S.O. 151(E) dt. 28th Feb., 1983. These are published at (1981) 141 ITR, statutes 61. Rule 1(2) of these rules specifically state that they shall come into force on 2nd April, 1983. In contrast to these rules, when we look into IT (Amendment) Rules published pp. At 57,59,60 and 64, it would be noticed that three of amendments came into force on date of their publication in official gazettee, while first amendment came into force from 1st April, 1983. It is, therefore, clear that intention while making this amendment to r. 5 by income-tax, Fourth (Amendment) Rules was that said amendment should apply, only w.e.f. asst. yr. 1984-85 onwards and not for earlier years. In Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. vs. CIT (1982) 135 ITR 804 (Cal) Calcutta High Court held that depreciation must be determined with reference to law prevalent in year of assessment. It is, therefore, clear that Departmental authorities have rightly applied law that was in force during asst. yr. 1982-83. decisions of Tribunal relied on by ld. counsel for appellant are really inapplicable to facts of present case. On contrary, decision in South India Road Transport vs. ITO (1983) 4 ITD 1976 (Hyd) really supports conclusion, which we have reached above. In said case it was held that unlike any other amendment to rules which were almost simultaneously notified, Notification dt. 24th July, 1980 had specifically mentioned words "at once", and that it could not, therefore, be assumed that these words had no significance. Tribunal held there that relief was intended for benefit of transport industry and higher depreciation was considered warranted in view of rapid fall in prices and loesser demand of new vehicles and hence was given immediate effect. Tribunal also held that though general inference is that all notifications imposing liability shall be presumed to be only prospective, if intention to make it retrospective is expressly or impliedly evident, it can well be retrospective. Tribunal further held that though words "at once" do not ordinarily indicate retrospectivity and, therefore, cannot possibly apply to pending assessments, it clearly indicates that it will apply for assessment year under consideration, namely 1980-81, as otherwise aforesaid words would have no meaning. In this view, assessee s claim was held to be allowable. We, respectfully, agree with aforesaid reasoning of our ld. brothers. In present case, notification expressly states that amendment shall take effect only from 2nd April, 1983, there specifically indicating that it would be applicable only from asst. yr. 1984-85 and not for any of earlier years. This position has also been elucidated by Board in their letter dt. 13th June, 1983 quoted by CIT(A) in his order. We, therefore, confirm orders of authorities below on this point and reject this ground. appellant next object to levy of interest of Rs. 1,31,844 under s. 217(1)(a) of IT Act, 1961. There is no discussion in assessment order to show reasons for charging of this interest. When matter went before CIT(A) he upheld action of ITO. He held that in present case it could not be denied that assessee was covered by provisions of s. 209-A of Act, that any claims to contrary that latest completed assessment 1979- 80 did not result in any demand and that return for subsequent year did not result in any positive income, etc would be of no avail and that section merely talked of current income being in excess of limits set by s. 208(2) when automatic liability to file estimate under s. 209-A surfaced. CIT(A), therefore, held that since appellant did not file any estimate, then it would squarely come under s. 217(1)(a) and that levy of interest could not be avoided. This decision of CIT(A) is being challenged before us in ground Nos. 5 to 11 of grounds of appeal. ld. counsel for appellant took us through relevant provisions of Act and submitted that in present case ITO had charged interest under s. 217(1)(a) of Act, that charging of such interest under s. 217(1)(a) would arise only if assessee fall, within mischief of s. 209(1)(a) of Act on or before 15th Sept., 1980 which was crucial date on which first instalment of advance tax would fall due in present case of assessee and that on that date there was no liability on part of assessee to file statement under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act. ld. counsel argued that for purpose of computation and payment of advance tax under s. 209A, one has to look into s. 209(1)(a)(i) and also to s. 209(1)(d)(i) of Act as specified in s. 209A(1)(a) and that when we examine facts of present case in light of said provisions of law there was no liability on part of assessee to file statement under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act. She pointed out that latest completed assessment as on 15th Sept., 1980 was one for year 1979-80 made on 22nd July, 1980 and according to this assessment order, it was case of nil assessment as appellant was declared N. A. for asst. yr. 1979-80 and that, therefore, assessee was not required to file nil statement under s. 209A(1) r/w s. 209(1)(a)(i) of Act. ld. counsel further submitted that assessees return for year 1980-81 was filed on 29th April, 1981 declaring income of Rs. 17,13,098. On which it paid self-assessment tax on that date and that, therefore, assessee s case would not fall within mischief of s. 209(1)(d)(i) of Act also. She, therefore, argued that appellant was not bound in law of file any statements as required by s. 209A(1) of Act on above facts and, therefore, there was no question of any liability to interest arising on part of assessee under s. 217(1)(a) of Act. ld. counsel also submitted that this was not case of new assessee who is required to file estimate under s. 209A(1)(b) of Act. She also relied on decision of Tribunal, Madras Bench-A in assessee s own case for earlier asst. yr. 1980-81 in ITA No. 1148 Mds/83 wherein Tribunal upheld order of CIT(A) deleting charging of interest by ITO against assessee under s. 217(1)(a) of Act for that year and dismissed Revenue s appeal on this ground. Shri Seshagiri Rao, ld. Departmental Representative, submitted to with reference to language of ss. 209A and 210 of Act that there was really distinction in regard to liability of assessee who are liable to pay advance tax under s. 209A(1) of Act which applies to all assessee if their current income exceeds minimum specified in s. 208 of Act. He submitted that CIT(A) had correctly interpreted provisions of ss. 209 and 209(1)(a)(i) and 209(1)(d)(i) of Act and that, therefore, order of CIT(A) should be upheld. argument of Shri Seshagiri Rao is that we should look into provisions of s. 209(1)(a)(i) and (d)(i) only for limited purpose of determining liability of assessee to file statement under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act and that if once it is held that assessee was liable to file statement and if he fails to comply with provisions of s. 209A of Act, liability to charging interest under s. 217(1) would automatically follow, as held by CIT(A). he further sought to distinguish order of Tribunal relied on by assessee as relating to interest levied under s. 217(1A) and hence no applicable for this year. Smt. Meenakshi Krishnaswamy, ld. counsel for assessee in her reply stated that in year under appeal interest has been charged only under s . 217(1)(a) of Act and not under s. 217(1A) of Act as in asst. yr. 1980-81 and that even if it is assumed that interest charged by ITO was one under s. 217(1A) of Act, then it should be case of default under s. 209A(4), but there was no such liability established either under s. 209A(1) or, much less, under s. 209A(4) of Act. She, therefore, argued that reasoning of decision of Tribunal for earlier year 1980-81 would equally hold good for year under appeal. ld. counsel also submitted that findings of CIT(A) relied on by Department were incorrect and opposed to facts and that liability to interest under s. 217(1)(a) would arise only if assessee was liable in law to file statement under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act. She submitted that CIT(A) had mixed up case of present assessee, who is being regularly assessed to tax, with case of new assessee, who has not been previously assessed and who is required to file estimate of advance tax. We have perused order of Tribunal in ITA No. 1148(Mds)/ 83 for t h e asst. yr. 1980-81 of Madras Bench-A, dt. 19th April, 1985 and carefully examined contentions urged on both sides in light of facts relevant for year in appeal. There is no dispute that first instalment of advance tax for year under appeal, namely 1981-82 relevant for previous year ended 31st March, 1981, was due on or before 15th Sept., 1980 and that assessee 31st March, 1981, was due on or before 15th Sept., 1980 and that assessee should have filed statement under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act if there was any liability on its part to pay such advance tax for that year. There is also no dispute that latest completed assessment as on that date was one for that year 1979-80 made on 22nd July, 1980 by which assessee was declared N.A. So, i t is clear that there could be no liability to advance tax on part of assessee under s. 209(1)(a)(1) of Act. It is also clear from order of Tribunal for year 1980-81 that return for year 1980-81 was filed on 29th April, 1981 admitting income of Rs. 17,13,098 on which it paid self- assessment tax of Rs. 10,00,658. This return as well as payment of self- assessment tax for year 1980-81 was for beyond crucial date, namely 15th Sept., 1980 on which date we have to determine assessee s liability to pay advance tax under s. 209A(1)(a) of Act. argument on behalf of Revenue is that we should ignore words "on basis of which tax has been paid by assessee under s. 140A" appearing in s. 209(1)(d)(i) of Act. We are unable to agree. It is not open to either assessee or Department or Court to ignore these words used by Parliament in this provision of law and construe same as if these words do not appear in said provision. Sec. 209(1)(d)(i) clearly postulates filing of return as well as payment of self-assessment tax on basis of that return by assessee on relevant date when first instalment of advance tax falls due from assessee. If there was no such return filed by assessee and self-assessment tax paid by it, provisions of s. 209(1)(d)(i) would not apply to assessee s case. Then we are left only with nil assessment made on 22nd July, 1980 for year 1979-80 on basis of which there would be no liability to advance tax under s. 209(1)(a)(i) r/w s. 209A(1)(a) of Act. assessee, therefore, was not bound to send to send statement under s. 209A(1)(a) and consequently there can be no liability to interest under s. 209(1)(a) of Act. In earlier order dt. 19th April, 1985, while dismissing Revenue s appeal, Tribunal held as follows: "From facts that have been given earlier assessee does not fall in any of category of such persons who are liable to pay advance tax under previous sub-sections. Thus, under sub-s. (1) of this provision, liability to pay advance tax would arise in case of assessee, who has already been assessed to tax only if latest completed assessment has resulted in positive income or income returned for letter assessment year has resulted in payment of self-assessment tax. Neither of these requirements are therefore, it could not come under sub-s. (1) of s. 209A. Sub-s. (2) only provides for filing of estimate in place of statements contemplated under s. 209A(1) by assessee falling within sub-s. (1) if he finds that his current income would be less than earlier assessed income or earlier returned income, as case may be. Therefore, sub-s. (2) also would not apply to case of assessee here. Sub-s. (3) covers case may be. Therefore, sub-s. (2) also would not apply to case of assessee here. Sub-s. (3) covers case of assessee who has filed statement under sub-s. (1) but later finds that his current income would be less. In such event he may file estimate of such current income and take option of paying lower amount of tax assessee would not come under this sub-section also. It, therefore, follows that assessee does not belong to category of person coming within purview of persons coming within purview of sub-s. (4). Therefore, no interest can be levied under s. 217(1A). We would therefore, reject contentions of Revenue in these grounds." We respect fully agree with aforesaid reasoning and conclusion of our ld. brother and hold that same reasoning would hold good even for year under appeal. We would, therefore, accept contention of ld. counsel for assessee and hold that appellant is not liable to pay any interest under s. 217(1)(a) of Act and accordingly delete interest of Rs. 1,31,844 charged by ITO under s. 217(1)(a) of Act. If it is to be held that interest has been charged by Department not under s. 271(1)(a) but really s. 217(1A) of Act, even then assessee is entitled to succeed in view of earlier order of Tribunal referred to above. ld. counsel did not press ground No. 12 relating to levy of interest under s. 139(B) of Act. In result, appeal is partly allowed. *** MADRAS FORGINGS & ALLIED INDUSTRIES (OBE) LTD. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER