This appeal relates to assessment year 1971-72. Though as many as 14 grounds of appeal had been preferred, only three points were stressed before us by learned counsel for assessee for adjudication. 2. first grievance of assessee in present appeal arises from nature of assessment order. ITO has described said order as having been passed in terms of section '143(3)/147(a)/253' of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'). original assessment order in present case was passed by ITO on 20-3-1974, on basis of original return filed by assessee on 16- 8-1971. In original assessment ITO held that assessee was doing various businesses in different benami names, such as, Shri S.R. Chetia, Sankarlal Gupta, J.C. Bhuyan, Tankeswar Saikia, etc. aforesaid order of ITO was appealed against by assessee before AAC who confirmed order of ITO. Thereafter, assessee appealed to Tribunal who set aside original assessment order passed by ITO vide their order dated 18- 11-1978 with direction that ITO should reframe assessment after giving opportunity to assessee and after making necessary enquiry and investigation regarding benamidar of assessee. 3. While appeals were pending as above, search was carried out at residential and business premises of assessee at Digboi. As result thereof, fresh material was thrown up indicating that assessee was having extensive business in timber and was also plying buses in his own name as also in names of several benamidars and had made huge investments both in movable and immovable properties. Action under section 147(a) was, therefore, initiated against assessee in respect of assessment year 1970-71 vide notice under section 148 of Act dated 18-3-1977 served on assessee on 22-3-1977. reassessment proceedings, initiated as above, were pending on date. i.e., 18-11-1978, when Tribunal passed its order setting aside original assessment order of ITO, reference to which has been made as above. 4. ITO has passed present order keeping in mind direction of Tribunal while setting aside original assessment as also material which was thrown up in course of search and on basis of which proceedings under section 147 were initiated by him on 22-3-1977. 5. contention of learned counsel for assessee is that two assessment proceedings for same year cannot co-exist simultaneously, and that proceedings initiated under section 147 would automatically lapse when original assessment order was set aside by Tribunal and was sent back to ITO for remaking assessment after doing necessary investigation. 6. On behalf of revenue, aforesaid contention of assessee is resisted and it is pointed out that proceedings under section 147 were valid when they were initiated and, therefore, they cannot lapse simply because subsequently original assessment order in respect of which appeal was pending before higher authorities had been set aside. scope of two proceedings was distinct and different and both could be culminated by passing combined assessment order. There was nothing in law which could be read against above procedure. 7. We have given careful consideration to rival submissions. contention of assessee does not appear to us to have merit. scope of t h e action that could be directed to be taken by appellate authorities in respect of original assessment could not go beyond scope of original assessment. Even AAC could not give any direction to ITO to assess any income from sources, which were neither disclosed by assessee in original return nor were known to ITO and in respect of which ITO had said nothing in original assessment order. scope of powers of enhancement, vested in AAC, has been discussed elaborately by their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Rai Bahadur Hardutory Motilal Chamaria [1967] 66 ITR 443 and their Lordships have made it clear there that power of enhancement under section 31(3) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, is restricted to sources of income which have been subject-matter of consideration by ITO from point of view of taxability... There must be something in assessment order to show that ITO applied his mind to particular subject-matter or particular source of income with view to its taxability or to its non-taxability... AAC has no jurisdiction under section 31(3) to assess source of income which is not disclosed either in returns filed by assessee or in assessment order. That being position, AAC could not have, in present case, directed ITO to undertake investigation with regard to source of income, which was not known to ITO. Tribunal has no power of enhancement and, therefore, setting aside of assessment order by Tribunal can confer no power on ITO to go beyond original assessment order framed by him. Due to this consideration, ITO could not have considered additional information regarding new sources of income thrown up by search at assessee's residential house and business premises, while recompleting assessment as per direction of Tribunal. If ITO wanted to rope in income from such additional sources, he had no option but to initiate proceedings of reassessment under section 147(a) against assessee. There is nothing in any of provisions of Act, which might be interpreted to mean that validly initiated reassessment proceeding under section 147(a) would be rendered nugatory on setting aside of assessment order passed originally by ITO by superior Tribunal giving therein specific direction to ITO with regard to specific points. ITO was, therefore, in our opinion, entirely justified in culminating proceedings under section 147(a) initiated by him on basis of material thrown up by search at assessee's premises. ITO was also under legal obligation to carry out instruction of Tribunal, which was given while setting aside original assessment. There is, again, nothing in law to prevent ITO from passing combined order giving effect to direction of Tribunal and also culminating proceedings under section 147(a) initiated by him on valid ground. order of ITO is entirely correct and we, therefore, reject assessee's contention in this regard. 8 to 15. [These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.] *** SURAJDEO SINGH v. INCOME TAX OFFICER