1 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Santosh IN HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA WRIT PETITION NO.94 OF 2002 1. Travel & Tourism Association of Goa, having its registered office at 404, Raiyu Chambers, Dr. Atmaram Borkar Road, Panaji, through its Vice President, Shri Gaurish Manohar Dhond, major in age, residing at Manoshanti Complex, D. V. Road, Panaji Goa. 2. Mandovi Hotels Pvt. Ltd., company duly registered under Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Panaji Goa, through its Director, Shri Ramnath V. Keny, residing at Dona Paula, Goa. 3. Shri Ramnath Vaman Keny, Citizen of India, shareholder and Director, Mandovi Hotels Pvt. Ltd., residing at Dona Paula, Goa. . Petitioners. Versus 1. Union of India (through Standing Counsel for Union of India ) 2. Commissioner of Income Tax, having his office at Aayakar Bhavan, Pato, Panaji Goa. 3. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, 2 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 (Assessment), Special Range, Panaji, Aayakar Bhavan, Pato, Panaji Goa. ... Respondents. Mr. H. D. Naik, Advocates for Petitioners. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.21 OF 2010 Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd, Company incorporated under provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered Office at Cidade De Goa Beach Resort, Vainguinim Beach, Goa 403 004 through its Secretary Mr. I.B. Muchandi. .... Appellant. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Circle, Panjim having his address at Panjim, Goa. .... Respondent Mr. Rafiq Dada, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nishant Thakkar, Ms. Jasmin Amalsadvala and Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.32/2006 Fomento Resorts and Hotels Ltd, Company incorporated under provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered Office at 3 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Cidade De Goa Beach Resort, Vainguinim Beach, Goa 403 004. .... Appellant. V/s. 1. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Panaji Bench, Panaji. (Respondent no.1 deleted from cause title as per Order dated 13/3/2007 in MCA 29/07. 2. Joint Commissioner of Income-Tax, (Assessment), Special Range, Panaji, having his address at Panaji, Goa. .... Respondents Mr. Rafiq Dada, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nishant Thakkar, Ms. Jasmin Amalsadvala and Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.53 OF 2007 Averina International Resorts Ltd., Garden View Bldg., Phase II, Margao Goa. Appellant Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Circle 1, Margao - Goa. .... Respondent Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar with Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. 4 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 WITH TAX APPEAL NO.54 OF 2007 Averina International Resorts Ltd., Garden View Bldg., Phase II, Margao, Goa. .... Appellant. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Circle 1, Margao - Goa. .... Respondent Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar with Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.55 OF 2007 Averina International Resorts Ltd., Garden View Bldg., Phase II, Margao, Goa. .... Appellant. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Circle 1, Margao - Goa. .... Respondent Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar with Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.64 OF 2007 Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd, 5 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Company incorporated under provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered Office at Cidade De Goa Beach Resort, Vainguinim Beach, Goa 403 004 through its Secretary Mr. I.B. Muchandi. .... Appellant. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Circle, Panjim having his address at Panjim, Goa. .... Respondent Mr. Rafiq Dada, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nishant Thakkar, Ms. Jasmin Amalsadvala and Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. WITH TAX APPEAL NO.69 OF 2007 Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd, Company incorporated under provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered Office at Cidade De Goa Beach Resort, Vainguinim Beach, Goa 403 004 through its Secretary Mr. I.B. Muchandi. .... Appellant. Versus Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax, Central Circle, Panjim having his address at Panjim, Goa. .... Respondent 6 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Mr. Rafiq Dada, Senior Advocate with Mr. Nishant Thakkar, Ms. Jasmin Amalsadvala and Ms. Vinita Palyekar, Advocates for Appellant. Ms. Susan Linhares, Standing Counsel for Respondent. Coram : M.S. Sonak & Nutan D. Sardessai, JJ. Reserved on : 2 nd August, 2019. Pronounced on : 30th August, 2019. J U D G M E N T : (Per M.S. SONAK, J.) Heard Mr. Rafiq Dada, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Nishant Thakkar and Ms. Vinita Palyekar for Appellants in Tax Appeals No.21/2009, 32/2006, 64/2007 and 69/2007. 2. Heard Mr. H.D. Naik for Petitioners in Writ Petition No.94/2002. 3. Heard Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar with Ms. Vinita Palyekar for Appellant in Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007. 4. Heard Ms. Susan Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for Respondents in Appeals, as well as Writ Petition. 5. In all these appeals and writ petition,the common issue relates to interpretation of provisions in Section 3(1) of 7 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Expenditure Tax Act, 1987 (said Act). In Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007, there is additional issue raised in context of proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act. learned Counsel for parties request that Tax Appeal No.32 of 2006 be treated as lead matter in respect of common issue and Tax Appeal No.53 of 2007, in respect of additional issue. We do so accordingly. 6. Tax Appeal No.32/2006 came to be admitted by this Court vide order dated 21 August 2006, on following substantial questions of law. " Whether in view of express provisions of section 3 of Expenditure-tax Act, Hon'ble Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ought to have held that in case (like Appellant) where room charges were less than Rs.1,200/- per day per individual, no expenditure tax would be chargeable at all ? " 7. Judgment and Order of Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) dated 4.4.2006, which is subject-matter of challenge in this Appeal, relates to Assessment Years 1995-96 and 1996-97. This means that impugned Judgment and Order dated 4.4.2006 made by ITAT, is common Judgment and Order in relation to Assessment Years 1995-96 and 1996-97. 8. In so far as Assessment Year 1995-96 is concerned, 8 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 ITAT had, in fact, allowed Appellant s Appeal and set aside notice of reopening of assessment on ground that Assessing Officer, despite demand, had failed to furnish reasons for reopening of assessment. This part of ITAT s order was questioned by Respondent by instituting Tax Appeal No.71/2006, which came to be dismissed vide Order dated 27.11.2006. Respondent s Special Leave Petition, against this Court s order dated 27.11.2006, also came to be dismissed on 16.7.2007. Therefore, though challenge in this Appeal, is to common Judgment and Order made by ITAT on 4.4.2006, it is clarified that in this Appeal, we are only concerned with assessment for Assessment Year 1996-97. 9. brief facts, in which aforesaid substantial question of law arises for determination in this Appeal, are as follows : (A) For Assessment Year 1996-97, Appellants filed return of taxable expenditure at rupees Nil. (B) Appellants were, however, required by Assessing Officer to file statement of receipts, which were chargeable to expenditure tax as per ratio of decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation vs. Union of India and ors1 (HPTDC). 1 (238 ITR 38) 9 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 (C) Assessing Officer, after rejecting contention of Appellants that Himachal Pradesh High Court s decision was inapplicable to them, by assessment order dated 27.2.2007, brought to charge taxable expenditure of 9,70,53,682/-. (D) Appellants, aggrieved by assessment order dated 27.2.2001, appealed to Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) at Belgaum, which appeal came to be dismissed by CIT (Appeals) vide order dated 20.2.2002; (E) Appellants, thereupon appealed to Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) which appeal, again, came to be dismissed vide common Judgment and Order dated 4.4.2006. (F) Hence, present Appeal which, as indicated earlier, is restricted to Assessment Year 1996-97. 10. Mr Dada, learned Senior Advocate for Appellant, submits that assessing authorities erred in placing blind reliance upon decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in HPTDC (supra) when, in fact, same was distinguishable on facts. He submits that in said case, room tariff was fixed under statute. Further, Himachal Pradesh High Court did not have benefit of amendment to said Act, which came into force with effect from 1/6/2002. He submits that, based upon these two distinguishing features, decision in HPTDC (supra) was not at all applicable to 10 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 fact situation in present matters and assessing authorities erred in placing blind reliance upon same. 11. Mr. Dada submits that in any case, decision in HPTDC (supra) completely ignores expression per individual , appearing in Section 3(1) of said Act. He submits that interpretation placed upon Section 3(1) of said Act by Himachal Pradesh High Court is contrary to literal reading of provisions and also renders words per individual , otiose and redundant. He relies upon Mohammad Ali Khan vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax2 to submit that interpretation, which renders words in statute otiose, is unacceptable. Mr. Dada submits that in present matters, fact that tariff charged for rooms on 'double occupancy basis' is not at all disputed by Respondents. He submits that once this basic fact is not disputed, it is apparent that tariff for unit of residential accommodation is less than 1200 per day, per individual. He submits that contrary interpretation adopted by authorities is ex facie unlawful and ultra vires. 12. Mr. Dada submits that in such matters, burden is always on Revenue to demonstrate that assessee falls within 2 224 ITR 672 (SC) 11 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 strict letter of charging provision. He submits that in present case, from material produced on record by Appellant which, in fact, was not even disputed by Respondent, it is apparent that Appellant does not fall within charging provisions. Yet, assessing authorities, without discharging burden which is otherwise cast on them, have purported to drag Appellant into tax net, which is, ex facie, impermissible. Mr. Dada relies on Dilip Kumar Roy vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 3 in support of proposition that burden is always on Revenue to demonstrate that Assessee indeed falls within charging provision. 13. Mr. Dada submits that in present case, assessing authorities have virtually chosen to tax Appellant by implication. He submits that in interpretation of taxing statute, strict construction is what has to be adopted. Taxing statute has to be essentially interpreted on basis of language used therein and not de hors same. It is impermissible to add any words or to ignore any words. which appear in statute. assessing authorities are required to construe fiscal statutes in fair and reasonable manner, without leaning to one side or other or stretching interpretation wide to cover assessee who, otherwise, does not 3 [94 ITR 1 (Bom)] 12 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 even fall within ambit of charging section. In support of these propositions, Mr. Dada relies on Orissa State Warehousing Corporation vs. Commissioner of Income Tax4; Vikrant Tyres Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer5; Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. Ellis Bridge Gymkhana, etc.etc.6; Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Kasturi & Sons Ltd.7 and Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce & Industry & ors. etc. etc. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & ors8. 14. Mr. Dada submits that Parliament, on realisation that expression per individual in Section 3(1) of said Act will essentially require room tariff to be split into two, in case of double occupancy or split into three, in case of triple occupancy has, with effect from 1.6.2002, done away with expression per individual in Section 3(1) of said Act. amendment is expressly made prospective in nature. Mr. Dada submits that from this it is apparent that law prior to 1.6.2002 very clearly requires acceptance of interpretation now proposed by Appellant, as opposed to interpretation made by Himachal Pradesh High Court in HPTDC (supra). Mr. Dada submits that Himachal 4 [237 ITR 589 (SC)] 5 [247 ITR 821 (SC)] 6 [229 ITR 1 (SC)] 7 [237 ITR 24 (SC) ] 8 [247 ITR 36 (SC)] 13 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Pradesh High Court did not have benefit of this amendment which came into force only on 1.6.2002. He, therefore, submits that this is additional reason why interpretation now proposed by Appellant, deserves acceptance over interpretation of Himachal Pradesh High Court in case of HPTDC (supra). 15. Finally, Mr. Dada submits that even if it is assumed that prior to amendment which came into effect from 1.6.2002, there was ambiguity in provisions of Section 3(1) of said Act, then, ambiguity is required to be resolved in favour of Assessee and against Revenue. Mr. Dada submits that it is settled law that in taxing statute when two views are possible, view which favour assessee must be adopted in preference to view which supports Revenue. In respect of this proposition, Mr. Dada relies on Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Podar Cement (P) Ltd. etc.9 16. For all aforesaid reasons, Mr. Dada submits that substantial question of law, as framed, is required to be answered in favour of Assesse and against Revenue. 17. Mr. H. D. Naik, learned Counsel for Petitioners in Writ 9 [226 ITR 625 (SC)] 14 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Petition No.94/2002 adopts submissions made by Mr. Dada, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Appellants in aforesaid Appeals. 18. Mr. Mihir Naniwadekar, learned Counsel for Appellants in Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007 also adopts submissions of Mr. Dada on common issue relating to interpretation of provisions in Section 3(1) of said Act. 19. Ms. Susan Linhares, learned Standing Counsel for Respondents defends impugned Judgments and Orders on basis of reasonings reflected therein. She places strong reliance upon HPTDC (supra) and submits that even challenge to said decision before Hon'ble Supreme Court failed or, in any case, was not pursued. She submits that there is no flaw in view taken by Himachal Pradesh High Court and it is incorrect to allege that High Court has failed to take note of expression per individual as it appears in Section 3(1) of said Act. She, therefore, submits that there was nothing wrong in assessing authorities in placing reliance upon case of HPTDC (supra). She points out with much vehemence that in fact, Appellant had conceded position that issue was covered against them in view of HPTDC (supra). She submits that in view of such 15 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 categorical concession, which has been recorded in impugned Judgments and Orders, it is really not open for Appellant to urge same contention before this Court. She submits that in such situation, principle of estoppel clearly applies. 20. Ms. Linhares, without prejudice to aforesaid, submits that interpretation proposed by Appellant is neither consistent with literal interpretation of Section 3(1) of said Act, nor will same forward objective of said Act. She submits that constitutional validity of said Act has been already upheld by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India, etc. vs. Union of India and others 10. She submits that said Act was, therefore, to be permitted to operate fully and its provision cannot be so interpreted, as to truncate its scope or ambit. She further submits that in these matters there are concurrent findings of fact that room charges for any unit of residential accommodation was in excess of 1200 per day per individual. She submits that charging section advisably makes no reference to room charges per day or even per occupant. She submits that it is appellants who seek to read some words in statute, which is clearly impermissible, even according to decision relied upon by Appellants themselves. 10 1989 3 SCC 634 16 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 21. Ms. Linhares relies on Federation of Hotel & Restaurant (supra); HPTDC (supra); Syed Hasan Rasul Numa and ors. vs. Union of India and ors.11; Commissioner of Income Tax, Chennai vs. M/s. Breeze Hotels Pvt. Ltd, Chennai12 and Income-Tax Officer vs. Mahadeo Lal Tulsian13 in support of contentions. 22. For all aforesaid reasons, Ms. Linhares submits that substantial questions of law so framed are required to be answered against Appellants and in favour of Revenue, and on this basis, present Appeals are liable to be dismissed. 23. Tax Appeal No.53 of 2007 was admitted by order dated 14.8.2007, on following additional substantial question of law : Whether on facts and in circumstances of case, Appellate Tribunal is right in rejecting claim for exemption under Section 4 of Expenditure Act, 1987 ? 24. Mr. Naniwadekar relies upon proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act to contend that nothing in charging section will apply in case of hotel referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 11 1990 2 Scale 1007 12 2012 0 Supreme (Mad) 4143 13 1976 0 Supreme (Cal) 335 17 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 80-IA of Income Tax Act during period beginning on 1st day of April, 1991 and ending on 31st day of March, 2001. 25. Mr. Naniwadekar submits that in Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007, Appellant is hotel referred to in clause (ii) of sub-Section (5) of Section 80-IA and, therefore, was exempted from applicability of provisions relating to payment or collection of expenditure tax under said Act. He submits that there is no dispute that Appellant's hotel business is located at place which Central Government, having regard to need for development of infrastructure for tourism, as specified for purposes of Section 80-IA of Income Tax Act. He submits that Appeals concern Assessment Years 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95 and, therefore, are covered within period prescribed in proviso. He submits that even though approval as contemplated by Section 80-IA5(ii) of Income Tax Act may have been issued by prescribed authority only on 28.7.1994, relevant to assessment year 1995-96, that, by itself, does not mean that Appellant's hotel was not hotel referred to in clause (ii) of sub-Section (5) of Section 80-IA of Income Tax Act, before date of such approval. He submits that approval merely recognizes and affirms position that Appellant's hotel was indeed hotel referred to in clause (ii), sub- Section (5) of Section 80-IA of Income Tax Act. He, therefore, 18 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 submits that contrary view taken by assessing authorities is improper and requires reversal. He submits that this is additional ground in support of Appellant in Tax Appeals No. 53, 54 and 55 of 2007 . 26. Ms. Linhares resists contentions of Mr. Naniwadekar by pointing out that Appellant who he represents had expressly conceded that its case was fully covered by decision in HPTDC (supra) and further that Appellant was not entitled to benefit under proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act for any assessment year, prior to 1995-96. She submits that thereafter, rectification applications were taken out by Appellant to contend that there was no concession. However, rectification applications were rejected. She, therefore, submits that Appellants in Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007 may not be permitted to raise contentions which they now seek to raise in these appeals. 27. In any case, Ms. Linhares submits that Appellants obtained approval, as contemplated by clause (ii), sub-Section (5) of Section 80-IA of Income Tax Act only on 28.7.1994, relevant to year 1995-96. Therefore, upon plain reading of proviso, Appellants were not entitled to benefit of exemption prior to Assessment Year 1995-96. 19 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 28. For aforesaid reasons, Ms. Linhares submits that Tax Appeals No.53, 54, and 55 of 2007 are liable to be dismissed. 29. Rival contentions now fall for our determination. 30. In order to appreciate and evaluate rival contentions, it is necessary to advert to scheme of said Act, in first place. 31. said Act was enacted to provide for levy of tax on expenditure incurred in certain hotels or restaurants and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. With effect from 1 st October, 1991, reference to restaurant stands deleted. challenge to constitutional validity of said Act, both, on ground of legislative competence, as well as alleged violation of Articles 14 and 19 (1)(g) of Constitution of India was repelled by Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India, etc . (supra). 32. said Act defines term 'assessee' in Section 2(1) of said Act to mean person responsible for collecting expenditure tax payable under provisions of said Act. Thus, it 20 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 is clear that expenditure tax is imposed upon individual who incurs expenditure in certain hotels. However, responsibility of collection of this tax from such individual is placed upon hotel and, therefore, term 'assessee' has been defined to mean person responsible for collection of expenditure tax payable under provisions of said Act. Section 2(6) defines hotel , to include building or part of building where residential accommodation is, by way of business, provided for monetary consideration. 33. Section 2(8) of said Act defines expression 'person responsible for collecting' to mean person who is required to collect tax under said Act or is required to pay any other sum of money under said Act, and includes every person in respect of whom any proceedings under said Act have been taken, and every person who is deemed to be assessee-in-default under any provision of said Act. 34. Section 2(10), defines expression 'room charges', to mean charges for unit of residential accommodation in hotel and includes charges for (a) furniture, air-conditioner, refrigerator, radio, music, telephone, television; and (b) such other services as are normally included by hotel in room rent and it does not include charges for food, drinks, and any services other than 21 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 those referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Expression 'chargeable expenditure' is defined to mean expenditure referred to in Section 5 of said Act. 35. Section 3 of said Act is most important provision, in so far as issues raised in present Appeal are concerned and same reads thus : 3. Application of Act. This Act shall apply in relation to any chargeable expenditure-- (1) incurred in hotel wherein room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at time of incurring of such expenditure are [one thousand two hundred rupees] or more per day per individual and where,-- (a) composite charge is payable in respect of such unit and food, room charges included therein shall be determined in prescribed manner; (b) (i) composite charge is payable in respect of such unit, food, drinks and other services, or any of them, and case is not covered by provisions of sub-clause (a), or (ii) it appears to Assessing Officer that charges for such unit, food, drinks or other services are so arranged that room charges are understated and other charges are overstated, Assessing Officer shall, for purposes of this clause determine room charges on such reasonable basis as he may deem fit; and 22 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 (2) incurred in restaurant [before 1st day of June, 1992. 36. Section 4 of said Act, is charging section and provides that subject to provisions of said Act, there shall be charged on and from commencement of said Act, tax at rate of 10 per cent of chargeable expenditure incurred in hotel referred to in clause (1) of section 3. Proviso to this Section provides that nothing in this clause shall apply in case of hotel referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 80-IA of Income-tax Act during period beginning on 1st day of April, 1991 and ending on 31st day of March, 2001. 37. Section 5 provides for meaning of expression 'chargeable expenditure' for purposes of said Act. This section, amongst other matters, provides that chargeable expenditure in relation to hotel referred to in clause (1) of Section 3, means any expenditure incurred in, or payments made to, hotel in connection with provision of any accommodation, residential or otherwise; or food or drink by hotel, whether at hotel or outside, or by any other person at hotel; or any accommodation in such hotel on hire or lease; or any other services at hotel, either by hotel or by any other person, by way of beauty parlour, health club, swimming pool or other services. 23 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 However, there are some exceptions made as regards expenditure incurred in foreign exchange, with which we are not concerned. 38. Sections 6 and 24 of said Act envisages and provides for authorities to administer said Act and enforcement of machinery of said Act for purposes of implementation of provisions of said Act. 39. Section 7 provides deals with collection and recovery of tax. This section, inter alia, provides that where any chargeable expenditure is incurred in restaurant referred to in clause (1) of section 3 of said Act, if expenditure relates to services specified in sub-clauses (a) to (d) of clause (1) of Section 5 provided by hotel, person who carries on business of such hotel, expenditure so collected shall be at rate specified in clause 4(a) of said Act. 40. Section 7(3) of said Act provides that tax so collected by person who carries on business of hotel, during any calendar month in accordance with provisions of sub- section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be paid to credit of Central Government by 10th of month immediately following said calendar month. 24 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 41. Section 7(4) of said Act provides that any person responsible for collecting tax, who fails to collect tax in accordance with provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall, notwithstanding such failure, be liable to pay tax to credit of Central Government in accordance with provisions of sub-section (3) of said Act. 42. Section 8 provides for person responsible for collecting tax to furnish prescribed return. Section 9 provides for assessment. Section 10 makes provision for best judgment assessment. Section 11 makes provision for chargeable expenditure escaping assessment. Section 12 makes provision for rectification of mistakes. Section 13 provides for time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment. Section 14 relates to interest on delayed payment of expenditure tax. Sections 15 to 19 relate to penalties. Section 20 relates to notice of demand. Section 21 relates to revision of orders by Commissioner. Section 22 relates to appeals to Commissioner (Appeals). Section 23 provides for appeals to Appellate Tribunal. Section 24 provides for application of provisions of Income-tax Act to said Act. Section 25 deals with willful attempt to evade tax, etc. Section 26 deals with failure to furnish prescribed returns. Section 27 deals with false statement in verification, etc. Section 28 deals with abetment of false return, etc. 25 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Section 29 provides that certain offences to be non-cognizable. Section 30 provides for institution of proceedings and composition of offences. Section 31 confers power upon Board to make rules and Section 32 confers power upon Central Government to remove difficulties. 43. Thus, scheme of Act is that expenditure tax, is tax payable by individual in relation to any chargeable expenditure incurred by such individual in hotel wherein room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at time of incurring of such expenditure are 1200 or more, per day, per individual. charge of such expenditure tax shall be at rate of 10 % of chargeable expenditure in hotel referred to in Section 3(1) of said Act. Though, expenditure tax is tax on individual incurring chargeable expenditure as aforesaid, such tax has to be collected by hotel or person carrying on business of hotel, where such expenditure relates to services specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of said Act. If such hotel or person carrying on business of hotel, fails to collect and credit tax, then notwithstanding such failure, it is hotel or person carrying on business of hotel who shall be liable to pay tax to credit of Central Government. 44. From scheme, it is absolutely clear that 26 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 expenditure tax is basically tax on individual who incurs chargeable expenditure in hotel specified in Section 3(1) of said Act. This is not tax on hotel itself, or on person carrying on business of hotel. Such hotel or person carrying on business of hotel is only made responsible for collection of tax and crediting of same to Central Government. Only in case of failure on part of hotel, or person carrying on business of hotel to collect and credit such expenditure tax from individual incurring chargeable expenditure at hotel, does hotel or person carrying on business of hotel, become liable to pay such tax to Central Government. Therefore, basic premise necessary to be noted is that expenditure tax is tax on individual incurring chargeable expenditure and not upon hotel or person carrying on business of hotel where such individual incurs chargeable expenditure. 45. Now, none of these Appeals have been instituted by individual primarily responsible for payment of expenditure tax. These Appeals have been instituted by hotels or persons carrying on business of hotel, because they were responsible for collection of such expenditure tax from individuals, and having failed to do so, were held liable to pay such tax to credit of Central Government. 27 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 46. Appellants, i.e. hotels or persons carrying on business of hotels, contend that said Act does not apply to them because room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at their hotels are fixed on 'double occupancy basis'. Therefore, though room charges per se may appear to exceed 1200 per day, having due regard to expression 'per individual' appearing in Section 3(1) of said Act, such room charges are required to be 'divided into two'. Upon such division, they contend that room charges do not exceed 1200 and, therefore, said Act does not apply to them. Appellants contend that any other interpretation will render expression 'per individual' appearing in Section 3(1) of said Act, redundant or otiose. They contend that since this is impermissible, interpretation proposed by them, deserves acceptance. 47. aforesaid contention on behalf of Appellants will have to be examined by keeping in mind basic premise that expenditure tax, is tax on individual who incurs chargeable expenditure in specified hotel. This is not tax on hotel itself or on person carrying on carrying on business of hotel. So construed, it is clear that Section 3(1) of said Act is, not strictly speaking charging section. In fact, in case of Federation of Hotel & Restaurant Association of India, etc. (supra), Hon'be 28 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Supreme Court has referred to Section 4 of said Act, as charging section. 48. scheme of said Act is also very clear in sense that incidence of tax is on persons who incur chargeable expenditure in class of hotel to which act applies. hotels or persons who carry on business of hotel, are only charged with responsibility of collection of this expenditure tax. It is only in case of failure to collect, that hotel or person carrying on business of hotel, are made liable to pay such tax to credit of Central Government. Therefore, contentions raised by Appellants will have to be evaluated by keeping in mind this basic scheme and this basic postulates in relation to said Act. 49. analysis of Section 3(1) of said Act indicates that this provision relates to applicability of said Act. In its opening portion, this section states that it shall apply 'in relation to any chargeable expenditure'. This means that Section 3(1), at least in its opening part, does not make reference to application of said Act to any hotel as such, but rather it refers to application in relation to 'any chargeable expenditure'. This is in consonance with basic scheme of said Act that expenditure tax is not tax on any hotel or on any person carrying on business of hotel, but rather expenditure tax is tax on chargeable expenditure incurred 29 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 by individual at hotel specified in Section 3(1) of said Act. 50. Further, Section 3(1) of said Act proceeds to state that said Act shall apply in relation to any chargeable expenditure incurred in hotel wherein 'room charges' for 'any unit of residential accommodation' at time of incurring of such expenditure are 1200 or more 'per day' 'per individual'. Rest of section deals with determination of room charges where composite charges are payable in respect of such unit meaning unit of residential accommodation and food. With this later part of section we are presently not concerned in these Appeals. 51. Now, it is correctly case of Appellants that each of expressions, which will include above referred italicized expressions in Section 3(1) of said Act have to be given some meaning and cannot be ignored while considering scope and import of section. Even Respondents do not and perhaps cannot dispute this proposition. 52. expression room charges in Section 3(1) of said Act poses no difficulty in interpreting, because such expression is defined in Section 2(1) of said Act. Significantly, this definition refers to charges for 'a unit of residential accommodation in hotel' and then proceeds to state that it includes charges for furniture, 30 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 air-conditioner, refrigerator, radio, music, telephone, television and such other services as are normally included by hotel in room rent., but does not include charges for food, drinks and any services other than those referred to in sub-clauses (a) and (b). 53. At least, from clear and exhaustive definition of expression 'room charges' in Section 2(10) of said Act, there is no scope to introduce concepts like 'double occupancy' or 'triple occupancy' or 'quad occupancy'. statutory definition, upon plain and literal interpretation, does not refer to these concepts and even legislative intent does not suggest any such construction. Emphasis in statutory definition, which is quite exhaustive, is on 'a unit of residential accommodation'. There is no reference to determination of 'room charges', 'per bed' or 'per occupant' or some such factors in support of concept of dividing room charges on occupancy basis. Besides, reference to charges for 'furniture' in statutory definition itself would obviously include charges towards beds, dressing tables, wardrobe, etc., though such charges almost never or rarely are separately charged. legislative intent was to define this expression quite exhaustively, so that its width and scope is not unduly restricted by attempting to split such charges for accommodation per se and charges for furniture, air-conditioner, refrigerator, etc. At least statutory definition of expression 31 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 'room charges' in Section 2(10) of said Act does not, in our opinion, support concept of splitting of room charges on basis of occupancy position, as is contended by Appellants. 54. expression 'any unit of residential accommodation in hotel' is not statutorily defined in said Act, or for that matter, in Income Tax Act. Therefore, we will have to assign to this expression its natural meaning, keeping in mind context and perspective of said Act. So construed, expression means room in hotel for residential accommodation. This expression will have to be read and construed along with definition of expression 'room charges' in Section 2(10) of said Act. From such conjoint reading, it is quite clear that expression 'any unit of residential accommodation' refers to hotel room, along with all its furnishings, as indicated in substantial details in Section 2(10) of said Act. Again, this expression, per se does not support construction that 'a unit' must be determined on basis of 'beds' or 'occupancy'. In fact, any such construction might amount to stretching expression beyond its natural meaning or even beyond setting in which it is placed. 55. expression 'per day' in Section 3(1) of said Act poses no difficulty and in fact, none was raised by learned Counsel for either parties. expression is quite clear and self 32 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 evident and needs no further analysis. 56. crucial expression for purposes of present Appeals is expression 'per individual'. This expression is not statutorily defined in said Act. There is no doubt that this expression will not only have to be assigned some meaning, but further this expression is also required to be taken into account for purposes of interpreting Section 3(1) of said Act. This is in consonance with law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Ali Khan (supra) that it is not open to Court to ignore expression in statute or to interpret statute in manner which renders words in statute redundant or otiose. To same effect are rulings in Orissa State Warehousing Corporation (supra), Vikrant Tyres Ltd. (supra) Ellis Bridge Gymkhana, etc.etc. (supra); and Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chambers of Commerce & Industry & ors. etc. etc. (supra). 57. According to us, Section 3(1) of said Act will have to be interpreted, having regard to provisions therein, in their entirety and not merely by focusing upon various expressions used therein disjunctively. Further, for interpreting provision in its entirety, interpretation which harmonizes all such expressions, will have to be preferred over interpretation which ignores or leaves out any expressions found in statute. Further, attempt 33 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 will have to be to harmonize provision in Section 3(1) of said Act with other provisions in said Act as well as basic scheme of said Act. In doing so, due regard will have to be had to principles of interpretation of statutes, including, in particular, principles relating to interpretation of taxing statutes. 58. As held in various decisions, referred to by Mr. Dada, first principle in such matters is that words of statute are to be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are to be construed according to their general meaning, unless that leads to some some ambiguity or unless there is something in context or objects of statute to suggest contrary. Secondly, in taxing statutes, regard must be had to strict letter of law and if Revenue satisfies Court that case falls strictly in provisions of law, subject can be taxed. Further, as held in Dilip Kumar Roy (supra), burden is always upon Revenue to show that Assessee comes with charging provision. Thirdly, fiscal statute will have to be interpreted only on basis of language therein and not de hors same. No words can be added or ignored, only language used in statute is to be considered for ascertaining proper meaning and intent of legislation. This means that intention of legislation must be gathered from language used in statute. Fourth principle is 34 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 that Courts, whilst construing taxing statute, have to give fair and reasonable construction to language of statute, without leaning to one side or other, meaning thereby that no tax or levy can be imposed on subject when words of statue show clear intention. This means that so called equitable construction of words of statute is not permissible. This is also expressed in principle that before taxing any person, Revenue must show that such person falls within ambit of charging section by clear words used in section. No person can be taxed only by implication. charging section has to be strictly construed and if person is not brought with ambit of charging section by clear words, he cannot be taxed at all. Finally, fifth principle, relevant for our purposes is that even when two views are possible in taxing statute, view which favours assessee must be adopted, as held in Podar Cement (P) Ltd. etc. (supra). Therefore, provision in Section 3(1) of said Act will have to be interpreted in light of these principles of statutory interpretations of taxing statute. 59. On plain reading of provisions in Section 3(1) of said Act, we are unable to accept interpretation proposed by Appellants on basis of occupancy position in units of residential accommodation at their hotel. expression 'per individual' appearing in Section 3(1) of said Act will have to be 35 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 construed in reasonable manner, having regard to scheme of said Act. As noted earlier, expenditure tax is basically tax on individual who incurs chargeable expenditure at specified hotel. expenditure tax is not tax on hotel itself or on person carrying on business of hotel. Once this basic scheme is understood and accepted, it is apparent that expression 'per individual' refers to individual incurring chargeable expenditure and consequently, primarily liable for payment of expenditure tax. expression 'per individual' does not refer to individual, actually occupying unit of residential accommodation in hotel. There is nothing in this expression which would permit import of concepts of double or triple or quad occupancy for purposes of determining room charges in respect of any unit of residential accommodation in hotel. Neither literal interpretation of expression, nor by reference to legislative intent can such concepts be imported in Section 3(1) of said Act, or to construe determination of 'room charges' under Section 2(10) of said Act. 60. As noted earlier, provisions in Section 3(1) of said Act or for that matter, other provisions in said Act, make no reference whatsoever to aspects like 'occupancy', 'number of beds', 'room charges per bed' or 'room charges per occupant'. 36 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Therefore, interpretation proposed by Appellants would amount to reading words in Section 3(1) of said Act or for that matter, in said Act itself, which is impermissible. In any case, such interpretation would amount to introducing concepts in said Act which find no place either in express words of statute, or even by reference to legislative intent. This means that neither principle of literal interpretation, nor principle purposive interpretation, supports construction proposed. Rather, interpretation adopted by Revenue is quite consistent with text of statute and co-incidentally furthers legislative intent of said Act. Therefore, such interpretation deserves acceptance over interpretation proposed by Appellants. 61. Section 3(1) of said Act merely provides that said Act shall apply in relation to any chargeable expenditure incurred . Section 3(1) does not say that it will apply to any hotel as such. Section then proceeds to specify kind of hotels in which individual will have to incur chargeable expenditure, in order that said Act applies in relation to such chargeable expenditure. Section 3(1) then provides that such chargeable expenditure must be incurred by individual in hotel wherein room charges for any unit of residential accommodation, at time of incurring such 37 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 expenditure, are more than 1200 per day. Reading of Section 3(1), in this manner, neither ignores expression per individual appearing in Section 3(1), nor does it downplay expression room charges for any unit of residential accommodation as it appears in very same section. In fact, such reading of two expressions, harmonises two expressions and, does not render either of expressions otiose or redundant. Such reading would, therefore, be in consonance with law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in several decisions relied upon by Mr. Dada himself in these Appeals. 62. If interpretation suggested by Appellants is to be accepted, then, entire emphasis will be on expression per individual without regard or at least sufficient regard to equally important expression room charges for any unit of residential accommodation appearing in Section 3(1) of said Act. This is impermissible and, therefore, effort must be to harmonize two expressions. If interpretation adopted by Revenue is accepted, then, both these important expressions will be harmonized and together interpretation will be in consonance with legislative scheme. 63. interpretation proposed by Appellants would amount to reading words into provisions or at least introducing concepts in provisions, based upon determination 38 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 of room tariff, not on basis of any unit of residential accommodation , but on basis of double occupancy , triple occupancy etc. when neither letter nor intent supports any such construction. literal interpretation, in present case, does not support interpretation proposed by Appellants. Incidentally, interpretation proposed by Revenue is not only consistent with literal interpretation, but also furthers intent and, therefore, same deserves preference. 64. definition of expression 'room charges' in Section 2(10) of said Act, as noted earlier, also does not admit of any concept of determination of room charges on basis of double, triple or quad occupancy. Rather, emphasis in statutory definition is on unit of residential accommodation. Since this is taxing statute, neither Revenue, nor Assessee can propose any construction based only on legislative intent. In fact, it is case of Appellants themselves that there can be no question of reference to 'intent' and if subject subject falls within clear words of statute, then, subject becomes liable to pay tax, irrespective of any hardships that may be involved in process. Even otherwise, there is nothing in said Act or in scheme of said Act to suggest that legislative intent supports construction proposed by Appellants. 39 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 65. For instance, Appellants say that in respect of unit of residential accommodation where room charges are fixed on double occupancy basis , expression per individual must necessary imply that such room charges be split or divided by two. same logic is sought to be extended to cases where room charges are fixed on triple occupancy basis or quadruplicate occupancy basis where it is suggested that room charges must be so split or so divided by number of beds or number of occupants. said Act refers to room charges for unit of residential accommodation in terms of definition in Section 2(10) of said Act. There is no further distinction made in said Act on basis of double occupancy or triple occupancy or quad occupancy when it comes to determination of room charges. Such distinction is some unilateral act by hotel concerned and same cannot govern statutory construction, particularly when provisions of statute are quite clear. 66. It is not even case of Appellants that where room charges are determined on double occupancy basis and room is occupied by only 'single occupant' charges are split or divided into two and such occupant is made to pay such split or divided charges. It is also not case of Appellants that where two 40 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 occupants occupy room on double occupancy basis, invariably the expenditure is separately or independently incurred by two occupants towards room charges, by splitting same or dividing same into two. All that Appellants contend is that they have fixed room charges on double occupancy basis and, therefore, room charges are required to be split or divided by two since fraction does not exceed 1200, said Act is inapplicable. Such contention, according to us, does not deserve acceptance. 67. Though it is true that burden of establishing that Assessee indeed falls within tax net or charging provision of taxing statute, is always on Revenue, in present case, it cannot be said that Revenue has failed to discharge this burden. From plain reading of provisions of Section 3(1), as also Section 4 of said Act, it is clear that Appellants are included in tax net, having failed to collect expenditure tax from individuals, liable to pay expenditure tax in first instance. It is Appellants, who by contending that their room charges were fixed on double occupancy basis, seek to exempt themselves from applicability of provisions of said Act. In these circumstances, it was for Appellants to have placed all relevant material before assessing authorities to make good their case for exemption. Merely stating that room charges were fixed on double occupancy 41 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 basis, was certainly not sufficient to exempt Appellants from applicability of said Act. In fact, plain reading of provisions of said Act makes it clear that said Act was indeed applicable to Appellants, since room charges per residential unit were in excess of 1200 per day. 68. Appellants submit that Revenue has no where disputed that room charges were fixed by them on double occupancy basis . This may or may not be so. However, even assuming that this was so, admittedly, it was not even case of Appellants that more than one individuals incur chargeable expenditure in hotel wherein room charges or for any unit of residential accommodation, exceed 1200 per day. It was not even case of Appellants that individual invariably or in particular cases split up chargeable expenditure or incur chargeable expenditure independent of one another when room charges are fixed on double occupancy basis or triple occupancy basis . 69. Based upon some artificial ambiguity, when, in fact there exists none, assessee cannot claim benefit of principle that such ambiguities in fiscal statue deserve to be resolved in favour of assessee. principle that ambiguities in fiscal statute have to be resolved in favour of assessee, applies in case of 42 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 genuine ambiguities and not to ambiguities created by overemphasizing upon one of expressions in statute and ignoring or downplaying other expression in same statute. Therefore, principles in case of Podar Cement (P) Ltd. etc. (supra) will clearly not apply to present appeals. 70. In HPTDC (supra), Himachal Pradesh High Cour4t rejected connection now being raised by Appellants, by observing thus : 15. plea on behalf of petitioner-corporation as to mode and manner of computing room charges for any unit of residential accommodation at time of incurring of such expenditure, viz., four hundred or one thousand two hundred rupees or more per day per individual, may be taken up for consideration first. stand taken by learned counsel for petitioner-corporation is that even in case when charges for any unit of residential accommodation is four hundred or one thousand two hundred rupees or above, as case may be, as per approved tariff, depending upon number of persons who occupied and who were charged at given time or number of beds permitted to be used, tariff rates have to be further divided per day per head and only when same is found to satisfy minimum bench mark rate stipulated in section 3(1), hotel concerned should be considered to answer description for application of Act. We are unable to appreciate and 43 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 accept such stand. Annexure P-1, which is said to be rate list approved by Commissioner of Tourism in respect of various groups of hotels of petitioner-corporation under provisions of Himachal Pradesh Registration of Hotels and Travel Agents Act, 1969, and rules made thereunder, indicate that unit is identified with room and rate fixed is with reference to room as unit, be it single bed, double bedor triple bed, except in cases of dormitories. Consequently, even if single person occupies any one of such rooms treated as one unit with more than one bed, except in case of dormitories, having regard to normal and accepted method of charging of such dormitories or rooms in any hotel it should be taken as whole and there is no justification to divide charges or tariff further with number of beds to find out or decide about applicability or otherwise of Act, as envisaged under section 3(1) of Act. This is obvious, also for reason that no two strangers, except in case of dormitories, will or be allowed to share room and, therefore, expenditure incurred for room charges from main or one person who hires room cannot further be allowed to be divided by number of persons who really occupied, as claimed for petitioners in adjudging applicability of Act. 71. basis for attempting to distinguish Judgment in HPTDC (supra) does not appeal to us. In paragraph 15 of said Judgment, there is reference to rate list approved by 44 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Commissioner of Tourism in respect of various groups of hotels of petitioner-corporation under provisions of Himachal Pradesh Registration of Hotels and Travel Agents Act, 1969, and rules made thereunder. Such approval by Commissioner of Tourism in respect of Government Corporation, according to us, makes no difference to principle involved. instance referred to in said Judgment or observations that no two strangers except in case of dormitories, will be allowed to share room, has to be understood in context or in proper perspective. As noted earlier, expenditure tax is tax on expenditure incurred by individual. It is not even case of present Appellants that in case of room whose tariff is fixed on double occupancy basis, two occupants incur expenditure separately or individually. Ultimately, from material placed on record, it is apparent that it is only single individual who is incurring expenditure, inter alia, in respect room charges, even where room charges are determined on 'double occupancy basis'. Admittedly, decision in HPTDC (supra), was not interfered with by Hon'ble Supreme Court, though there is some doubt as to whether such non- interference was because appeal against same was withdrawn or appeal against same was disposed of, taking into consideration tax effect. It is pertinent to note that hearing in these Appeals was adjourned on several occasions, on behalf of 45 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 Appellants by stating that hearing of these Appeals must wait outcome of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in appeal against HPTDC (supra) decision. 72. circumstance that Expenditure Tax Act came to be amended with effect from 1.6.2002, also does not lead to inference that law prior to amendment entitled hotel or person carrying on business of hotel to divide room charges as defined under Section 2(10) of said Act by number of beds in such room or number of occupants in such room. As noted earlier, plain reading of provisions of Section 3(1) of said Act prior to its amendment, does not support any such construction. There is no presumption that legislature, in every case, amends law, only because there was some ambiguity in existing law. legislature may amend law for variety of reasons. One of reasons for amending law may, as well be to set at rest, some contentions, which, though not tenable, are repeatedly raised to avoid payment of tax. In any case, assessing authorities had to interpret provisions as they stood on date when assessment was made. This is what assessing authorities have precisely done in these matters. Appellants had, in fact, conceded before ITAT that issue was concluded against them in terms of decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court 46 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 in HPTDC (supra). only contention which was raised, was that decision in HPTDC (supra) was not delivered by jurisdictional High Court. In absence of any contrary decision, there was nothing illegal in assessing authorities relying upon decision in HPTDC (supra). 73. Writ Petition No.94/2002, as filed, raises very same issue, as is raised in Appeals. In fact, Mr. H.D. Naik, learned Counsel for Petitioners merely adopted submissions made by Mr. Dada support of Appellants. 74. For all aforesaid reasons, substantial question of law relating to interpretation of provision in Section 3(1) of said Act is required to be answered against Appellants and in favour of Revenue. 75. In so far as Tax Appeals No.53, 54 and 55 of 2007 are concerned, we note that Appellants had virtually conceded before ITAT that benefit under proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act would be inapplicable to Appellants for any assessment years, prior to 1995-96, because approval of Director General, (Exemption) was obtained only on 28/7/1994, relevant to Assessment Year 1995-96. Even application for rectification contending that no such concession was ever made, was rejected by 47 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 ITAT. However, we do not propose to non-suit Appellants on this basis, accepting contentions of Mr. Naniwadekar that orders made on rectification application had made it clear that concession will not preclude Appellants from raising further challenges and that there can be no estoppel against law. 76. proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act makes very specific mention to hotel referred to in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 80-IA of Income-tax Act. There is no reference to clause (iii) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA of Income-tax Act. Admittedly, approval in terms of clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 80-IA of Income-tax Act was obtained only on 28.7.1994 relevant to Assessment Year 1995-96. Thus, upon plain reading of proviso to Section 4(a), no exemption can be extended to Appellants for any assessment year prior to 1995-96. To accept Mr. Naniwadekar's contention and to grant exemption to Appellants, would mean reading of some provision in proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act, which provision, admittedly, finds no place in text of proviso to Section 4(a) of said Act. 77. In fact, Mr. Naniwadekar, without saying as much, proposes that expression clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of section 80-IA be substituted with expression clause (iii) of sub-section (4) of section 80-IA . exemption is, thus, sought to be claimed 48 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 on basis of some sort of implication. This, according to us, is impermissible. No such violence can be done to statutory text and that too in determining whether Assessee falls within exemption clause. On plain reading of provisions in proviso to Section 4(a) i.e. on interpretation of provision on its own merits, we are satisfied that Appellant has made out no case for extension of exemption for any assessment year, prior to 1995-96. 78. Accordingly, we see no error in view taken by ITAT and additional substantial question of law, framed in these appeals, is also required to be answered against Appellant and in favour of Revenue. 79. For all aforesaid reasons, all these Tax Appeals fail and are, hereby dismissed. 80. Writ Petition No.94/2002 also fails and is, hereby, dismissed. 81. In facts and circumstances of present case, there shall be no order as to costs. Nutan D. Sardessai, J. M.S. Sonak, J. 49 wp94-02-txas21-10ors dt. 30.08.19 82. At stage of pronouncement of this judgment, Ms. Vinita Palyekar applied for continuation of interim relief for period of eight weeks and we also granted such continuation on basis that interim relief was already in operation. 83. Ms. V. Palyekar, however, now mentions matter at 1.25 p.m. to point out that there was no interim relief, in operation, in any of appeals. Accordingly, there is no question of grant of any interim relief in appeals. Nutan D. Sardessai, J. M.S. Sonak, J. Travel & Tourism Association of Goa / Mandovi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. / Ramnath Vaman Keny v. Union of India / Commissioner of Income-tax, Panaji / Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, (Assessment), Panaji