1 REPORTABLE IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CA NO. 9178 OF 2012 UNION of INDIA & ORS. APPELLANT (s) VERSUS M/S. TATA TEA CO. LTD. & ANR. RESPONDENT(s) WITH CA NO. 9179 OF 2012 M/s GEORGE WILLIAMSON (ASSAM)LTD. APPELLANT (s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS RESPONDENT(s) WITH CA NO. 9180 OF 2012 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. APPELLANT (s) VERSUS M/S. APEEJAY SURRENDRA CORPORATE SERVICE LTD. RESPONDENT(s) JUDGMENT ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NIDHI AHUJA Date: 2017.09.21 18:08:45 IST Reason: constitutional validity of Section 115 O of Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 2 '1961, Act') as inserted by Finance Act, 1997 is in issue in these appeals. Civil Appeal No. 9178 of 2012 and Civil Appeal No. 9180 of 2012 have been filed by Union of India against common judgment dated 28.07.2006 of Calcutta High Court by which judgment although, Calcutta High Court has upheld constitutionality of Section 115 O, but rider has been put that additional income tax to be charged under Section 115 O can only be on 40 per cent of income which is taxable under Income Tax Act. Civil Appeal No. 9179 of 2012 has been filed by writ petitioner who had also challenged constitutional validity of Section 115 O before Gauhati High Court which writ petition has been dismissed vide judgment and order dated 22.06.2007. Gauhati High court had also noted judgment of Calcutta High Court dated 28.07.2006 as referred to above. All appeals have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. facts giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 9178 of 2012 and 9180 of 2012 needs to be briefly noted. 3 Several writ petitions were filed before Calcutta High Court questioning vires of Section 115 O of 1961 Act. petitioner's case in writ petition is that petitioner is Tea Company which cultivate tea in gardens and processes it in its own factory/plants for marketing same. cultivation of tea is agricultural process although, processing of tea in factory is industrial process. agricultural income is within legislative competence of State and not in legislative competence of Parliament. Section 115 O imposes tax on dividend distributed by company which is nothing but imposing tax on agricultural income of writ petitioner. petitioner M/s Tata Tea Company Ltd. and others filed Writ Petition No. 1699 of 2000 where vires of Section 115 0 was challenged. writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide its judgment dated 20.9.2001 against which judgment, appeals were filed before Division Bench of Calcutta High Court. Division Bench 4 vide its judgment dated 28.7.2006 disposed of appeals, setting aside judgment of learned Single Judge. Operative portion of judgment of Division Bench is as follows: We are, however, in agreement with Dr. Pal on limited issue. We are of view that Rs. 50/ as whole could not be taxes at prescribed rate of additional tax. Such additional tax would be levied on Rs. 20/ being 40% of Rs. 50/ . Hence, at end of day company would have to pay income tax at prescribed rate on Rs. 40/ as well as additional income tax at prescribed rate on Rs. 20/ . Result judgment and order of learned Single Judge is set aside. We hold that provision of section 115 O is constitutional and we have given proper interpretation of subject section as observed hereinafter. appeals are disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs. 3. Union of India questioning said judgment has come up in Civil Appeal No. 9178 of 2012 and 5 Civil Appeal No. 9180 of 2012. 4. In Writ Petition(C)No.3827 of 2000, writ petitioner has been carrying on business of growing green tea leaves in its tea gardens and manufacturing black tea out of same and thereafter selling black tea in India and also outside India. writ petitioner challenged constitutional validity of Section 115 O sub clause (1) and sub clause (3) in so far as it purports to levy income tax on profit which is decided to be distributed as dividend thereby imposing additional income tax even on portion of composite income which represents agricultural income and which is also to be made available for distribution of dividend and, therefore, transgresses limits of legislative power. Parliament has no competence to levy income tax on agricultural income. 5. writ petition has been dismissed by Division Bench of Gauhati High Court vide 6 judgment dated 22.06.2007 against which, Civil Appeal No. 9179 of 2012 has been filed by writ petitioner. 6. We have heard, Shri S. Ganesh, learned senior counsel for appellant in Civil Appeal No. 9179 of 2012. Shri Arijit Prasad, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of Union of India. We also heard learned counsel appearing for respondent in Civil Appeal No. 9178 of 2012 and Civil No. 9180 of 2012. parties shall hereinafter be referred to as described in respective writ petitions. 7. Learned counsel appearing for writ petitioners submitted that Section 115 O imposes additional tax on dividend distributed by Company which distribution arises out of income received from agriculture, 60 per cent of income is agricultural income which is exempt from tax. Parliament has no legislative competence to tax agricultural income and Section 115 O of 1961 Act transgresses legislative field which is 7 assigned to State Legislature under List II Entry 46 of Seventh Schedule of Constitution. At best, amount of dividend distributed by Company to extent of 40 per cent on which income tax is charged can only be subject to additional tax. Parliament cannot touch agricultural income. 8. above submission has been refuted by learned counsel appearing for Union of India. He submitted that dividend which is decided to be distributed by Company to its shareholders no longer remains agricultural income. Company is being asked to pay additional tax on amount of dividend distributed by it and not on its agricultural income. It is contended that Parliament has full legislative competence to enact Section 115 O. Both, Calcutta High Court and Gauhati High Court have rightly held that provisions of Section 115 O is intra vires. 8 9. We have considered submissions and perused records. 10. Finance Act, 1997 inserted new Chapter XIID in 1961, Act with heading special provisions relating to tax on distributed profits on domestic companies . Section 115 O, sub sections (1), (2) and (3) as it was inserted by Finance Act, 1997 is as follows: 115 O. Tax on distributed profits of domestic companies. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act and subject to provisions of this section, in addition to income tax chargeable in respect of total income of domestic company for any assessment year, any amount declared, distributed or paid by such company by way of dividends (whether interim or otherwise) on or after 1st day of June, 1997, whether out of current or accumulated profits shall be charged to additional income tax (hereafter referred to as tax on distributed profits) at rate of ten per cent. (2) Notwithstanding that no income tax is payable by domestic company on its total income computed in accordance with provisions of this Act, tax on distributed profits under sub section (1) shall be payable by such company. (3) principal officer of domestic company and company shall 9 be liable to pay tax on distributed profits to credit of Central Government within fourteen days from date of (a) declaration of any dividend;or (b) distribution of any dividend;or (c) payment of any dividend, whichever is earliest. 11. vires of above provisions of 1961, Act was challenged before High Court. main plank of attack of learned counsel for writ petitioners is, lack of legislative competence in Parliament to enact Section 115 O so as to impose additional income tax. income out of which dividend is declared, distributed or paid is agricultural income to extent of 60%, tax on which can only be imposed by State legislature. Parliament has transgressed its legislative power in enacting Section 115 O. 12. Part XI of Constitution of India Chapter I contains provisions relating to distribution of legislative powers. Article 246 provides for subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by 10 Legislatures of States. Article 246 of Constitution of India is as follows: 246. Subject matter of laws made by Parliament and by Legislatures of States. (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of matters enumerated in List I in Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as Union List ) (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of matters enumerated in List III in Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as Concurrent List ) (3)Subject to clauses (1) and (2), Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of matters enumerated in List II in Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as 'State List') 11 (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of territory of India not included in State notwithstanding that such matter is matter enumerated in State List. 13. Sub clause (1) of Article 246 begins with non obstante clause that is Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of matters enumerated in List I in Seventh Schedule . State as per clause (3) of Article 246 Subject to clauses (1) and (2) of Article 246 has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of matters enumerated in List II in Seventh Schedule . 14. Entry 82 of List I reads: 82. Taxes on income other than agricultural income. 15. List II that is State List contains Entry 46 which reads: 46.Taxes on agricultural income . 12 16. Agricultural income has been defined in Article 366 of Constitution of India, sub clause (1) of which is to following effect: (1) agricultural income means agricultural income as defined for purposes of enactments relating to Indian income tax; 17. definition of agricultural income was contained in Income tax Act, 1922. In Income tax Act, 1961 agricultural income has now been defined in Section 2(1A). words agricultural income as used in legislative entries, thus, has to be given meaning as contained in Income tax Act, 1961. entries in Seventh Schedule are not powers but fields of legislature. words in respective entries have to be given widest scope of their meaning, each general word should extend to ancillary or subsidiary matter which can be comprehended in it. As per Entry 82, Union/Parliament, thus, has full power to legislate in field of taxes on income . subject excluded from its field are agricultural income. 13 word income has also been defined in Income tax Act in Section 2(24) which is to following effect: 2(24) income includes (i) profits and gains; (ii) dividend; xxx xxx xxx xxx 18. definition given in 1961, Act of word 'income' is inclusive definition. pivotal question to be answered in these appeals is as to whether provisions of Section 115 O which contains provision imposing additional tax on dividends which are declared, distributed or paid by company are within fold of legislative field covered by Entry 82 of List I or it relates to legislative field assigned to State legislature under Entry 46 List II that is tax on agricultural income. 19. For answering above, we need to recapitulate principles of statutory interpretation of legislative entries contained 14 in Seventh Schedule of Constitution. Prior to enforcement of Constitution, Government of India Act, 1935 contained Seventh Schedule containing three legislative lists, namely, List I Federal Legislative List, List II Provincial Legislative List and List III Concurrent Legislative List. 20. In A.L.S.P.P.L. Subrahmanyan Chettiar vs. Muttuswami Goundan, AIR 1941 FC 47, Federal Court had considered principles of statutory interpretation of legislative lists contained in Government of India Act, 1935. Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938 was enacted by Madras legislature. 1938 Act applies to debts payable by 'agriculturist' at commencement of Act. Debt was defined as any liability in cash or kind, whether secured or unsecured, due from agriculturist, whether payable under decree or order of civil or revenue court or otherwise. Federal Legislature had exclusive power to legislate with respect to cheques, bills of 15 exchange, promissory notes and other like instruments (List I, No.28). challenge was raised to 1938 Act before Madras High Court by appellant on ground that State legislature has no competence to enact legislation which had effect of discharging debt including debts based on promissory notes. Chief Justice, Gwyer speaking for Court held that, however, carefully and precisely lists of legislative subjects are defined, it is practically impossible to ensure that they never overlap. Laying down principle to be adopted in case where subject in one list, touches also on subject in another list, following was held: "It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with subject in one list, touches also on subject in another list, and different provisions of enactment may be so closely intertwined that blind adherence to strictly verbal interpretation would result in large number of statutes being declared invalid because Legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in forbidden sphere. Hence rule which has been evolved by Judicial Committee whereby impugned statute is examined 16 to ascertain its pith and substance , or its true nature and character , for purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that:(1881) 7 AC 96; (1882) 7 AC 829; (1899) AC 580; 1930 AC 111; 1940 AC 513. In my opinion, this rule of interpretation is equally applicable to Indian Constitution Act. On this point I find myself in agreement with Madras High Court, and I dissent from contrary view which appears to have been taken in recent case by High Court at Patna: 3 FLJ HC 119. It is clear that pith and substance of Madras Act, whatever it maybe, cannot at any rate be said to be legislation with respect to negotiable instruments or promissory notes; and it seems to me quite immaterial that many, or even most, of debts with which it deals are in practice evidenced by or based upon such instruments. That is accidental circumstance which cannot affect question. Suppose that at some later date money lenders were to adopt different method of evidencing debts of those to whom they lend money; how could validity or invalidity of Act vary with money lenders' practice? I am of opinion therefore that Act cannot be challenged as invading forbidden field of List I, for, it was not suggested that it dealt with any item in that List other than No.28. 21. Privy Council in Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee and others vs. Bank of Commerce, Limited Khulna, Vol.74 1946 47 Indian Appeals 23, had considered 17 principles of statutory interpretation and doctrine of pith and substance. vires of Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 came for consideration. It was held that provincial legislature was in pith and substance money lending and money lenders . It held that legislature did not trench legislative field earmarked for Federal legislation. Privy Council referring to observation of Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J. held following: "(2)....No doubt experience of past difficulties has made provisions of Indian Act more exact in some particulars, and existence of Concurrent List has made it easier to distinguish between those matters which are essential in determining to which list particular provisions should be attributed and those which are merely incidental. But overlapping of subject matter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two, or even by arranging for hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap, and where they do question must be asked what in pith and substance is effect of enactment of which complaint is made, and in what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of subjects entrusted to provincial 18 legislation could never effectively be dealt with. (3) Thirdly, extent of invasion by provinces into subjects enumerated in Federal List has to be considered. No doubt it is important matter, not, as their Lordships think, because validity of Act can be determined by discriminating between degrees of invasion, but for purpose of determining what is pith and substance of impugned Act. Its provisions may advance so far into Federal territory as to show that its true nature is not concerned with provincial matters, but question is not, has it trespassed more or less, but is trespass, whatever it be, such as to show that pith and substance of impugned Act is not money lending but promissory notes or banking? Once that question is determined Act falls on one or other side of line and can be seen as valid or invalid according to its true content. This view places precedence accorded to three lists in its proper perspective.... 22. This Court has time and again emphasised that in event of any overlapping is found in two Entries of Seventh Schedule or two legislations, it is duty of Court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine particular legislation in its pith and substance. In Kartar 19 Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1994 (3) SCC 569, paragraphs 59, 60 and 61 following has been held: 59....But before we do so we may briefly indicate principles that are applied for construing entries in legislative lists. It has been laid down that entries must not be construed in narrow and pedantic sense and that widest amplitude must be given to language of these entries. Sometimes entries in different lists or same list may be found to overlap or to be in direct conflict with each other. In that event it is duty of court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine particular legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether it fits in one or other of lists. [See : Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P.; India Cement Ltd. v. State of T.N. 60. This doctrine of pith and substance is applied when legislative competence of legislature with regard to particular enactment is challenged with reference to entries in various lists i.e. law dealing with subject in one list is also touching on subject in another list. In such case, what has to be ascertained is pith and substance of enactment. On scrutiny of Act in question, if found, that 20 legislation is in substance one on matter assigned to legislature enacting that statute, then that Act as whole must be held to be valid notwithstanding any incidental trenching upon matters beyond its competence i.e. on matter included in list belonging to other legislature. To say differently, incidental encroachment is not altogether forbidden. 23. Further in Union of India and others vs. Shah Govedhan L. Kabra Teachers' College, 2002 (8) SCC 228 in paragraph 7 following was laid down: 7. It is further well settled principle that entries in different lists should be read together without giving narrow meaning to any of them. Power of Parliament as well as State Legislature are expressed in precise and definite terms. While entry is to be given its widest meaning but it cannot be so interpreted as to override another entry or make another entry meaningless and in case of apparent conflict between different entries, it is duty of court to reconcile them. When it appears to court that there is apparent overlapping between two entries doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied to find out true nature of legislation and entry within 21 which it would fall. In case of conflict between entries in List I and List II, same has to be decided by application of principle of pith and substance . doctrine of pith and substance means that if enactment substantially falls within powers expressly conferred by Constitution upon legislature which enacted it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. When law is impugned as being ultra vires of legislative competence, what is required to be ascertained is true character of legislation. If on such examination it is found that legislation is in substance one on matter assigned to legislature then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. In order to examine true character of enactment, entire Act, its object, scope and effect, is required to be gone into. question of invasion into territory of another legislation is to be determined not by degree but by substance. doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between powers of two legislatures but in any case where question arises whether legislation is covered by particular legislative power in 22 exercise of which it is purported to be made. 24. As noted above Entry 82 of List I embraces entire field of tax on income . What is excluded is only tax on agricultural income which is contained in Entry 46 of List II. Income as defined in Section 2(24) of 1961, Act is inclusive definition including specifically dividend . Dividend is statutorily regulated and under article of association of companies are required to be paid as per Rules of companies to shareholders. Section 115 O pertains to declaration, distribution or payment of dividend by domestic company and imposition of additional tax on dividend is thus clearly covered by subject as embraced by Entry 82. provisions of Section 115 O cannot be said to be directly included in field of tax on agricultural income. Even if for sake of argument it is considered that provision trenches field covered by Entry 46 of List II, effect is only incidental and legislation cannot be annulled on ground of such incidental 23 trenching in field of State legislature. Looking to nature of provision of Section 115 O and its consequences, pith and substance of legislation is clearly covered by Entry 82 of List I. 25. We, thus, repel argument of learned counsel for writ petitioners that provision of Section 115 O is beyond legislative competence of Parliament. 26. As noticed above, Guahati High Court has dismissed writ petition whereas Calcutta High Court while upholding vires of Section 115 O has put rider that additional tax as levied by Section 115 O on dividend declared, distributed or paid additional tax shall be only to extent of 40% which is taxable income of Tea Co. Learned counsel for writ petitioners has referred to Rule 8 of Income Tax Rules, 1962. Rule 8 deals on subject income from manufacture of tea . Rule 8 is as follows: Income from manufacture of tea. 24 8.(1)Income derived from sale of tea grown and manufactured by seller in India shall be computed as if it were income derived from business, and forty per cent of such income shall be deemed to be income liable to tax. (2)In computing such income allowance shall be made in respect of cost of planting bushes in replacement of bushes that have died or become permanently useless in area already planted, if such area has not previously been abandoned, and for purpose of determining such cost, no deduction shall be made in respect of amount of any subsidy which, under provisions of clause (30)of section 10, is not includible in total income. 27. There cannot be any dispute regarding computation of income of Tea Co., manufacture of tea, as provided in Rule 8. question to be considered is as to when company in its Annual General Meeting declares dividend which is distributed and paid to its shareholders whether on dividend so declared tax liability shall be only upto 40% as has been held by Calcutta High Court ? 28. This Court in Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay vs. 25 Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay,AIR 1955 SC 74, had occasion to consider nature of income in hands of shareholders of company consequent to payment of dividend amount. appellant in above case was paid dividend by two Tea companies of which she was shareholder. income received by appellant was held taxable by Revenue Authority which was also upheld by High Court. In paragraph 2 of judgment question referred to High Court was noticed which was to following effect: 2. question referred by Tribunal to High Court of Judicature at Bombay was stated thus : "Whether 60% of dividend amounting to Rs. 2,750 received by assessee from two Tea companies is agricultural income and as such exempt under section 4(3)(viii) of Act." Chagla, C.J. and Tendolkar J., who heard reference, answered question in negative by two separate but concurring judgments dated 28, March, 1952. 26 29. In paragraph 6 of following was stated by this Court 6. In order, however, that dividend may be held to be agricultural income it will be incumbent upon appellant to show that, within terms of definition, it is rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes. Mr. Kolah, for appellant, contends that it is revenue derived from land because 60% of profits of company out of which dividends are payable are referable to pursuit of agricultural operations on part of company. It is true that agricultural process renders 60% of profits exempt from tax in hands of company from land which is used for agricultural purposes but can it be said that when such company decides to distribute its profits to shareholders and declares dividends to be allocated to them, such dividends in hands of shareholders also partake of character of revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes ? Such position if accepted would extend scope of vital words 'revenue derived from land' beyond its legitimate limits. Agricultural income as defined in Act is obviously intended to refer to revenue received by direct association with land which is used for agricultural purposes and 27 not by indirectly extending it to cases where that revenue or part thereof changes hands either by way of distribution of dividends or otherwise. In fact and truth dividends is derived from investment made in shares of company and foundation of it rests on contractual relations between company and shareholder. Dividend is not derived by shareholder by his direct relationship with land. There can be no doubt that initial source which has produced revenue is land used for agricultural purposes but to give to words 'revenue derived from land' unrestricted meaning apart from its direct association or relation with land, would be quite unwarranted. For example, proposition that creditor advancing money on interest to agriculturist and receiving interest out of produce of lands in hands of agriculturist can claim exemption of tax upon ground that it is agricultural income within meaning of section 4, sub section (3) (viii), is hardly statable. policy of Act as gathered from various sub clauses of section 2(1) appears to be to exempt agricultural income from purview of Income tax Act. object appears to be not to subject to tax either actual tiller of soil or any other person getting land cultivated by others for deriving benefit 28 therefrom, but to say that benefit intended to be conferred upon this class of persons should extend to those into whosoever hands that revenue falls, however remote receiver of such revenue may be, is hardly warranted. 30. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta vs. Nalin Behari Lal Singha, etc., 1969 (2) SCC 310, this Court held that dividend distributed by company being share of its profits declared as distributable among shareholders, is not impressed with character of profits from which it reaches hands of shareholder. Following was stated in paragraph 3: "3...Dividend distributed by company being share of its profits declared as distributable among shareholders, is not impressed with character of profits from which it reaches hands of shareholder. 31. Learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court relying on judgment of this Court in Mrs. Bacha F Guzdar (supra) has dismissed writ petition. 29 Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, however, held that Single Judge's decision relying on Mrs. Bacha F Guzdar (supra) was not correct preposition of law. 32. This Court in Mrs. Bacha F Guzdar (supra) was considering nature of dividend income in hands of shareholders. Under Income tax Act, 1961 earlier dividend was taxable at hands of shareholder. By Finance Act, 1997 it was made taxable in hand of company when additional tax was imposed. 33. This Court, however, while considering nature of dividend in above case held that although when initial source which has produced revenue is land used for agricultural purposes but to give to words 'revenue derived from land', apart from its direct association or relation with land, unrestricted meaning shall be unwarranted. Again as noted above Nalin Behari Lal Singha (supra) observation was made that shares of 30 its profits declared as distributable among shareholders is not impressed with character of profit from which it reaches hands of shareholder. We, thus, find substances in submission of learned counsel for Union of India that when dividend is declared to be distributed and paid to company's shareholder it is not impressed with character of source of its income. 34. provisions of Section 115 O are well within competence of Parliament. To put any limitation in said provision as held by Calcutta High Court that additional tax can be levied only on 40% of dividend income shall be altering provision of Section 115 O for which there is no warrant. Calcutta High Court having upheld vires of Section 115 O no further order was necessary in that writ petition. 35. In view of foregoing discussion, Civil Appeal Nos. 9178 and 9180 of 2012 are allowed and 31 Civil Appeal No.9179 of 2012 is dismissed. J. ( A.K. SIKRI ) J. NEW DELHI, ( ASHOK BHUSHAN ) SEPTEMBER 20, 2017. 32 ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.6 SECTION XVI SUPREME COURT OF INDIA RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No. 9178/2012 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS M/S. TATA TEA CO. LTD. & ANR. Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 9179/2012 (XIV) C.A. No. 9180/2012 (XVI) Date : 20-09-2017 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of judgment today. For parties Ms. Manik Karanjawala, AOR Mr. Arijit Prasad, Adv. Ms. Gargi Khanna, Adv. Ms. Anil Katiyar, AOR Mr. B. V. Balaram Das, AOR Mr. S. Sukumaran, Adv. Mr. Anand Sukumar, Adv. Mr. Bhupesh Kumar Pathak, Adv. Ms. Meera Mathur, AOR Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhushan pronounced judgment of Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice A. K. Sikri and His Lordship. Civil Appeal Nos. 9178 and 9180 of 2012 are allowed and Civil Appeal No. 9179 of 2012 is dismissed in terms of signed reportable judgment. Application for deletion of respondent No.2 is allowed at risk of appellants. (NIDHI AHUJA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER [Signed reportable judgment is placed on file.] GeorgeWilliamson(Assam)Ltd. v. UnionOfIndia&Or