JUDGMENT Having heard both sides and finding that now substantive appeal has been filed against initial order of Tribunal in appeal, we are of view that no useful purpose would be served by testing and scrutinising legality and validity of order passed in miscellaneous application seeking to correct mistakes in initial order of Tribunal. However, Mr. Sanjiv Shah was at pains to point out that in paragraph 17 passed by Tribunal on December 13, 2013, on miscellaneous applications 234 to 237 of 2013 there are certain adverse remarks not only against assessee but against representative of assessee. representative of assessee is chartered accountant and was only performing his professional duties. That he had argued at length and Tribunal was required to pass detailed order even on miscellaneous application does not justify passing critical remarks. He would, therefore, submit that following observations and remarks from Tribunal's order, particularly in paragraph 17 thereof be deleted, including direction to pay costs by assessee, which reads as under: "... At time of hearing, this position clearly manifest from applications of assessee was confronted to learned counsel for assessee. He, however, still proceeded to make stale and sterile submissions in attempt to somehow support and justify miscellaneous applications filed by assessees. This attempt, in our opinion, clearly amounts to misuse of process of law. filing of these frivolous miscellaneous applications by assessees seeking rectification of order of Tribunal which is clearly beyond scope of section 254(2) and stale and sterile submissions made by learned counsel for assessee in support thereof thus have resulted in wastage of precious time of Tribunal which, in our opinion, justify imposition of cost on assessee. We, therefore, dismiss these miscellaneous applications filed by assessee being devoid of any merit and impose cost of Rs. 5,000 on each of assessee." It is on this limited point, we have heard both counsel. Repeatedly, hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned presiding officer of courts and tribunals from adversely commenting and remarking on conduct of parties or their representatives or pleaders. If these comments and remarks adversely affecting them are not required for decision of case and it could be justly and fairly reached on basis of material produced and arguments canvassed, then, courts and tribunals should refrain from passing any adverse remarks or making harsh comments on conduct of parties. Sobriety and restraint in judicial conduct is of paramount importance. Even if presiding officer, members of Tribunal are agitated by prolong arguments and often needless, still they must not lose patience and to extent as to comment upon conduct of advocates or representatives. That must been avoided as it would be reflection on working of Tribunal as whole. While not making any further reference to judgments of hon'ble Supreme Court, we would only invite attention of members of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to following observations in judgment of hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim reported in AIR 1964 SC 703. These read as under: "If there is one principle of cardinal importance in administration of justice, it is this: proper freedom and independence of judges and magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by any body, even by this court. At same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions judges and magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat very purpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether party whose conduct is in question is before court or has opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for decision of case, as integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." In case of "K" Judicial Officer, In re, reported in AIR 2001 SC 972, hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "9. courts do have power to express opinion, make observations and even offer criticism on conduct of anyone coming within their gaze of judicial review but question is one of impelling need, justification and propriety. following observation by Sulaiman J. in Panchanan Banerji v. Upendra Nath Bhattacharji, AIR 1927 All 193; [1928] 27 Cri LJ 1407 was cited with approval before this court in Niranjan Patnaik v. Sashibhusan Kar [1986] 2 SCC 569; AIR 1986 SC 819; [1986] Cri LJ 911 (paragraphs 22, 23 and 24): 'The High Court, as Supreme Court of revision, must be deemed to have power to see that courts below do not unjustly and without any lawful excuse take away character of party or of witness or of counsel before it'. This court went on to add: 'It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against persons and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before court of law unless it is really necessary for decision of case, as integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold that adverse remarks made against appellant were neither justified nor called for. Having regard to limited controversy in appeal to High Court and hearsay nature of evidence of appellant it was not at all necessary for appellate judge to have animadverted on conduct of appellant for purpose of allowing appeal of first respondent. Even assuming that serious evaluation of evidence of appellant was really called for in appeal remarks of learned appellate judge should be in conformity with settled practice of courts to observe sobriety, moderation and reserve. We need only remind that higher forum and greater powers, greater need for restraint and more mellowed reproach should be'... 12. It was so said by Special Bench of three-judge presided over by Tek Chand J. in Philip William Ravanshawe Hardless v. Gladys Isabel Hardless, AIR 1940 Lahore 82: 'A passage which is not necessary to conclusion of judge nor even necessary to his argument and is likely to militate seriously against party's earning living in his profession should be expunged from judgment.' 13. In A. M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta [1990] 2 SCC 533; AIR 1990 SC 1737, this court sounded note of caution emphasising general principle of highest importance to proper administration of justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for decision of case to animadvert on their conduct and said (at page 1741 of AIR): 'Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to orderly administration of justice as they are to effectiveness of army. duty of restraint, this humility of function should be constant theme of our judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to command respect as to protect independence of judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by judiciary. Respect to those who come before court as well to other co-ordinate branches of State, executive, and Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for judge nor for judicial process.'" In light of above, we delete and expunge all remarks which have been made against representative and parties. Thus, above reproduced passage or lines from order particularly paragraph 17 above shall stand expunged and deleted. This would also include deletion of direction to pay costs. imposition thereof is, accordingly, set aside. Barring this interference and for limited purpose and by clarifying that all contentions on merits of application and of controversy or subject matter thereof are kept open for being considered in pending appeals, we dispose of writ petitions. No order as to costs. *** Madhukar B. Thakoor v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal