JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by Jayant Patel J.-The facts of case appears to be that on January 25, 2015, company in name and style of Hirak Biotech Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the company") was incorporated. Initially, there were three directors. Thereafter, directors were added. petitioner also remained as director of company for some time. On October 11, 2013, show-cause notice was issued under section 179 of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") calling upon petitioner to show cause as to why outstanding tax dues of company should not be recovered from petitioner in capacity as director of company. petitioner submitted reply on October 17, 2013, and as per petitioner, another show-cause notice was issued dated September 4, 2014, calling upon petitioner to pay dues, failing which, coercive steps were to be taken. petitioner replied to show- cause notice and as per petitioner, when present proceeding was going on before officer concerned, present petition was filed. As per petitioner, this court on September 16, 2014, had entertained petition and had granted interim stay so far as coercive actions are concerned. It appears that pending petition, petitioner received copy of order dated November 19, 2013, already passed by officer concerned. petitioner contends that though order is dated November 19, 2013, it was never served to him and pending petition since order is received by him, petition was amended challenging said order dated November 19, 2013. It is under these circumstances, present matter comes up for final disposal before this court. We have heard learned counsel Mr. Soparkar, appearing for petitioner and Mr. Manish Bhatt, learned counsel for respondent. As such, it is undisputed position that company is limited company and, therefore, can be termed as public limited since it is not private limited company. language of section 179 provides for taking action for recovery of outstanding tax of private limited company from directors if Revenue finds that in spite of sincere attempts, it is not possible to recover outstanding tax amount from private limited company. However, Mr. Manish Bhatt, learned counsel appearing for Revenue by relying upon decision of this court in case of Pravinbhai M. Kheni v. Asst. CIT reported in [2013] 353 ITR 585 (Guj), contended that it is not that no action can be taken against directors of public limited company by lifting corporate veil. He submitted that if conditions are satisfied for lifting of corporate veil as observed in aforesaid decision of this court, such is permissible. Therefore, he submitted that order may not be quashed on such ground but Mr. Bhatt could not point out to this court as to whether at any point of time, petitioner was put to notice on aspects of lifting of corporate veil and thereby to treat director of public limited company at par with directors of private limited company as provided under section 179 of Act. Mr. Soparkar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner, contended that basic ingredients for lifting of corporate veil could not be said as satisfied and in impugned order, there is not whisper about lifting of such corporate veil and in his submission, facts stated in affidavit-in-reply cannot be considered for supplementing order for which there is complete silence. We may record that in abovereferred decision of this court in case of Pravinbhai M. Kheni (supra), while considering case under section 179 of Act itself, this court at page 23 had concluded thus (page 621 of 353 ITR): "(1) respondent authorities did establish that it was not possible to recover tax dues from company. (2) petitioner neither pleaded nor succeeded in establishing that such non-recovery was not attributable to any gross neglect, misfeasance or failure in discharging duty on his part in connection with affairs of company. (3) Being public company, ordinarily, provisions of section 179(1) of Act cannot be applied. However, if factors noted by Assistant Commissioner in his impugned order dated April 15, 2002, and highlighted by us in this judgment are duly established, it would certainly be fit case where invocation of principle of lifting of corporate veil would be justified. (4) We, however, hold that Assistant Commissioner proceeded to record such findings without giving sufficient opportunity of hearing to petitioner and without disclosing necessary materials for coming to such conclusion. (5) impugned orders dated April 15, 2002, and revisional order dated April 9, 2003, are quashed. (6) proceedings are, however, placed back before Assistant Commissioner for proceeding further in accordance with law after giving notice to petitioner indicating his tentative grounds why he desires to invoke concept of lifting of corporate veil, giving sufficient opportunity to petitioner to meet with such allegations. After giving opportunity of hearing to petitioner and following principles of natural justice it would be open for Assistant Commissioner to pass fresh orders in accordance with law as may be found appropriate on basis of material on record." There is considerable force in contention of learned counsel for petitioner that impugned order is silent on aspect of lifting of corporate veil but at same time, in view of aforesaid decision of this court, it cannot be said that lifting of corporate veil is impermissible if facts are so demonstrated and competent officer is satisfied for such purpose. But, in any case, as per abovereferred conclusion No. 6, person concerned is required to be put to notice by formulation of tentative ground as to why concept of lifting of corporate veil should not be invoked. director of company may show justifiable ground to satisfy authority that no case is made out for lifting of corporate veil and, thereafter, competent officer may form opinion whether to lift corporate veil or not. But, in any case, as neither has happened in present case, it can be said that order passed based on lifting of corporate veil even if it is, would be in breach of principles of natural justice and, hence, cannot be sustained. In view of aforesaid observations and discussions, impugned order dated November 19, 2013, at exhibit 1 is quashed and set aside but with observations that it would be open to respondent-competent officer to formulate ground and, thereafter, to give notice for treating company as private limited company by lifting of corporate veil and, thereafter, to take steps, if any, available in accordance with law under section 179 of Act. At that stage, petitioner may show cause by resisting ground for contending that it is genuinely public limited company and corporate veil should not be lifted. Suffice it to observe that at that stage, rights and contentions of both sides shall remain open. petition is partly allowed to aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute. Considering aforesaid facts and circumstances, no order as to costs. *** Ajay S. Patel v. Income-tax Officer