JUDGMENT judgment of court was delivered by Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud C. J.-This reference to Full Bench has been occasioned by referring order of Division Bench of this court dated August 5, 2013, and turns upon interpretation of provisions of section 12AA(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961. questions which have been formulated for decision are as follows: "(i) Whether non-disposal of application for registration, by granting or refusing registration, before expiry of six months as provided under section 12AA(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961, would result in deemed grant of registration; and (ii) Whether Division Bench judgment of this court in case of Society for Promotion of Education, Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment v. CIT [2008] 216 CTC (All) 167; [2015] 372 ITR 222 (All) (Appendix) holding that effect of non-consideration of application for registration within time fixed by section 12AA(2) would be deemed grant of registration, is legally correct." Division Bench has prima facie doubted correctness of earlier judgment of Division Bench in Society for Promotion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment v. CIT (supra). Section 11 of Act provides that certain categories of income of charitable and religious trusts shall not be included in total income of assessee. Section 12A stipulates that sections 11 and 12 of Act shall not apply in relation to income of any trust or institution unless certain conditions are fulfilled. Amongst other conditions in clause (a) of section 12A, conditions are that (i) person in receipt of income has made application for registration of trust or institution in prescribed form and manner to Commissioner within one year of creation of trust or establishment of institution; and (ii) such trust or institution is registered under section 12AA. procedure for registration is enunciated in section 12AA. Section 12AA provides as follows: "12AA. (1) Commissioner, on receipt of application for registration of trust or institution made under clause (a) or clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of section 12A, shall- (a) call for such documents or information from trust or institution as he thinks necessary in order to satisfy himself about genuineness of activities of trust or institution and may also make such inquiries as he may deem necessary in this behalf; and (b) after satisfying himself about objects of trust or institution and genuineness of its activities, he- (i) shall pass order in writing registering trust or institution; (ii) shall, if he is not so satisfied, pass order in writing refusing to register trust or institution, and copy of such order shall be sent to applicant: Provided that no order under sub-clause (ii) shall be passed unless applicant has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. (1A) All applications, pending before Chief Commissioner on which no order has been passed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) before 1st day of June, 1999, shall stand transferred on that day to Commissioner and Commissioner may proceed with such applications under that sub-section from stage at which they were on that day. (2) Every order granting or refusing registration under clause (b) of sub- section (1) shall be passed before expiry of six months from end of month in which application was received under clause (a) or clause (aa) of sub-section (1) of section 12A. (3) Where trust or institution has been granted registration under clause (b) of sub-section (1) or has obtained registration at any time under section 12A, as it stood before its amendment by Finance (No. 2) Act, 1996 (33 of 1996), and subsequently Commissioner is satisfied that activities of such trust or institution are not genuine or are not being carried out in accordance with objects of trust or institution, as case may be, he shall pass order in writing cancelling registration of such trust or institution: Provided that no order under this sub-section shall be passed unless such trust or institution has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard." Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 12AA provides that Commissioner, upon receipt of application for registration of trust or institution, shall call for documents or information in order to satisfy himself about genuineness of activities of trust or institution. Commissioner is also empowered to make such inquiry as he deems necessary. Thereupon, after satisfying himself of objects of trust or institution and genuineness of its activities, Commissioner shall pass order in writing registering trust or institution or, if he is not so satisfied, pass order in writing refusing to register it. Sub-section (2), upon which dispute of interpretation revolves, provides that every order granting or refusing registration "shall be passed before expiry of six months" from end of month in which application was received. order passed by Commissioner under section 12AA is subject to appeal to Appellate Tribunal under section 253(1)(c). Division Bench of this court in Society for Promotion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment (supra) held that where Commissioner fails to consider application for registration within time fixed by section 12AA(2), there would be deemed grant of registration. Division Bench held as follows: "Considering pros and cons of two views, we are of opinion that by far better interpretation would be to hold that effect of non- consideration of application for registration within time fixed by section 12AA(2) would be deemed grant of registration. We do not find any good reason to make assessee suffer merely because Income-tax Department is not able to keep its officers under check and control, so as to take timely decisions in such simple matters such as consideration of applications for registration even within large six month period provided by section 12AA(2) of Act." When this judgment was cited before Division Bench in appeal by Revenue, prima facie, Division Bench doubted correctness of this decision on following grounds: (i) There is nothing in section 12AA(2) which provides for deemed grant of registration, if application for registration is not decided within six months; (ii) In absence of statutory provision stipulating that consequence of non-consideration would be deemed grant of permission, court cannot hold that application would be deemed to be granted after expiry of period; and (iii) Legislature has not contemplated that authority would not be entitled to pass order beyond period six months. On behalf of assessee, learned counsel has submitted that (i) whereas sections 11 and 12 of Act provide for certain incomes of religious and charitable trusts not being included in total income of assessee, pre- condition is registration under section 12AA. Section 12AA provides for procedure for recognition; (ii) procedure for recognition was introduced by Finance Act (No. 2) Act, 1996, and Memorandum Explaining its Provisions indicates that order granting or refusing permission has to be passed within six months from end of month in which application for registration is received; (iii) intention of Legislature was that period of six months is mandatory and must be strictly observed; (vi) Legislature has used expression "may" as well as "shall" in section 12AA(1) which is indicative of fact that expression'shall' was regarded as mandatory wherever it has been used; (v) in other provisions of Act such as sections 250(6A) and 254(2A), Legislature, by using expression "may" has indicated that period within which appeal has to be decided by Commissioner (Appeals) or by Tribunal is directory. In contrast, period which is prescribed in section 12AA(2) must be regarded as mandatory; and (vi) period of six months in section 12AA(2) should be treated as mandatory, otherwise assessee would be subject to grave prejudice by inordinate delay on part of Commissioner in disposing of such applications. Otherwise, period which has been prescribed would be rendered redundant. On other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Revenue has submitted that period of six months is clearly directory and Legislature has not provided any consequence, such as deeming fiction to effect that application would be treated as being granted, if it is not disposed of within six months. learned counsel submitted even if this is regarded as casus omissus, court in pursuance of well settled principles of law has no jurisdiction to supplant it and it must adopt plain and literal meaning of statute. Sections 11 and 12 are substantive provisions under which certain categories of incomes of religious or charitable trusts, incomes derived from property held by trust as well as voluntary contributions are not to be included in total income of assessee. Section 12A and section 12AA lay down procedural requirements before claim under section 11 or section 12 can be made. Registration under section 12AA is made condition precedent for availing of exemption under section 11 and section 12 by virtue of provisions of clause (a) of section 12A(1). This position in law is settled in view of judgment of Supreme Court in CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat [2014] 364 ITR 31 (SC); [2014] 268 CTR (SC) 1 which holds thus (page 41 of 364 ITR): "... under scheme of Act, sections 11 and 12 are substantive provisions which provide for exemptions available to religious or charitable trust. Income derived from property held by such public trust as well as voluntary contributions received by said trust are subject-matter of exemptions from taxation under Act. Sections 12A and 12AA detail procedural requirements for making application to claim exemption under sections 11 and 12 by assessee and grant or rejection of such application by Commissioner of Income-tax. conjoint reading of sections 11, 12, 12A and 12AA makes it clear that registration under sections 12A and 12AA is condition precedent for availing of benefit under sections 11 and 12. Unless institution is registered under aforesaid provisions, it cannot claim benefit of sections 11 and 12. Section 13 enlists circumstances wherein exemption would not be available to religious or charitable trust otherwise falling under section 11 or 12 and therefore, requires to be read in conjunction with provisions of sections 11 and 12 towards determination of eligibility of trust to claim exemption under aforesaid provisions." Section 12AA(1) requires Commissioner to whom application is made for registration of trust or institution to satisfy himself about genuineness of activities of trust or institution as well as about objects of trust or institution. For that purpose, Commissioner has been vested with power to call for documents or information and is empowered to make such inquiries as he may deem necessary in that behalf. Commissioner is thereupon empowered to pass order in writing either registering institution or, if he is not satisfied about objects of trust or institution and of genuineness of its activities, to pass order in writing refusing to register trust or institution. order of refusal has to be preceded by reasonable opportunity of being heard and is subject to appellate remedy under section 253(1)(c). Sub-section (2) of section 12AA requires that every such order granting or refusing permission under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be passed before expiry of six months from end of month in which application was received. use of expression "shall" in sub-section (2) is, by itself, not dispositive of whether period of six months is mandatory. Legislature has not imposed stipulation to effect that after expiry of period of six months, Commissioner would be rendered functus officio or that he would be disabled from exercising his powers. Similarly, Legislature has not made any provision to effect that application for registration should be deemed to have been granted, if it is not disposed of within period of six months with order in writing either allowing registration or refusing to grant it. submission of assessee essentially requires court to read into sub-section (2) fiction by which application for registration should be regarded as deemed to be granted, if it is not disposed of within six months. Providing that application should be disposed of within period of six months is distinct from stipulating consequence of failure to do so. Laying down consequence that application would be deemed to be granted upon expiry of six months can only be by way of legislative fiction or deeming definition which court, in its interpretative capacity, cannot create. That would be to rewrite law and to introduce provision which advisedly Legislature has not adopted. submission which was urged on behalf of assessee was that Memorandum Explaining Provisions of Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1996, indicates that "the order granting or refusing registration has to be passed" within six months from end of month in which application is received by Commissioner. period of six months, it is urged, is mandatory. legislative provision cannot be rewritten by referring to Notes on Clauses which, at highest, would constitute background material to amplify meaning and purport of legislative provision. In present case, what court has been called upon to do is to introduce legislative fiction which would not be permissible. In Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 653, Supreme Court construed provisions of section 313(3) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, under which it was stipulated that within sixty days after receipt of application under sub-section (1), Standing Committee shall either accord sanction to lay-out plan on such conditions as it may think fit or disallow it or ask for further information. proviso to sub- section (5) similarly stipulated that passing of such orders shall not, in any case, be delayed for more than sixty days after Standing Committee had received information which it considers necessary to deal with application. Supreme Court held that neither sub-section (3) nor sub-section (5) provided that application which is not dealt with within prescribed period would be deemed to have been allowed or that sanction would be deemed to have been accorded. observations of Supreme Court in that regard were as follows: "Sub-sections (3) and (5) of section 313 prescribe period within which Standing Committee is expected to deal with application made under sub- section (1). But neither sub-section declares that if Standing Committee does not deal with application within prescribed period of sixty days it will be deemed that sanction has been accorded. statute merely requires Standing Committee to consider application within sixty days. It stops short of indicating what will be result if Standing Committee fails to do so. If it intended that failure of Standing Committee to deal with matter within prescribed period should imply deemed sanction it would have said so. They are two distinct things, failure of Standing Committee to deal with application within sixty days and that failure should give rise to right in applicant to claim that sanction has been accorded. second does not necessarily follow from first. right created by legal fiction is ordinarily product of express legislation. It seems to us that when sub-section (3) declares that Standing Committee shall within sixty days of receipt of application deal with it, and when proviso to sub-section (5) declares that Standing Committee shall not in any case delay passing of orders for more than sixty days statute merely prescribes standard of time within which it expects Standing Committee to dispose of matter. It is standard which statute considers to be reasonable. But non-compliance does not result in deemed sanction to lay-out plan." mere fact that in sub-section (1) of section 12AA, Legislature has used expression "may" while providing that Commissioner may make such inquiry as he may deem necessary to satisfy himself about genuineness of activities of trust or institution, is not by itself reason enough to hold that use of expression "shall" in sub-section (2) must, as necessary consequence or corollary, be regarded as mandatory in nature. In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, AIR 1985 SC 964, Supreme Court held as follows: ".... Obviously where Legislature uses two words'may' and 'shall' in two different parts of same provision prima facie it would appear that Legislature manifested its intention to make one part directory and another mandatory. But that by itself is not decisive. power of court still to ascertain real intention of Legislature by carefully examining scope of statute to find out whether provision is directory or mandatory remains unimpaired even where both words are used in same provision. In Govindlal Chagganlal Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra [1976] 1 SCR 451; AIR 1976 SC 263 Chandrachud C. J., speaking for court, approved following passage in Crawford on Statutory Construction (Edition 1940 article 261, page 516): 1940 article 261, page 516): 'The question as to whether statute is mandatory or directory depends upon intent of Legislature and not upon language in which intent is clothed. meaning and intention of Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from phraseology of provision, but also while considering its nature, its design and consequences which would follow from construing it one way or other.' Applying this well-recognised canon of construction conclusion is inescapable that word'shall' used in provision is directory and not mandatory and must be read as'may'." In that case, Supreme Court was construing provisions of section 11A of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, relating to deposit of rent by tenant in suit for ejectment. Supreme Court observed that expression "shall" must be construed as being directory and not mandatory having due regard to legislative intent. We are unable to accept line of reasoning which weighed with Division Bench of this court in Society for Promotion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment (supra). Division Bench in holding that consequence of non-consideration of application for registration within time fixed by section 12AA(2), would be deemed grant of registration, placed reliance on following considerations: (i) Unlike decision of Supreme Court in Chet Ram Vashist (supra) which dealt with sanctioning of lay-out plan where element of public interest is involved, no such public element or public interest is involved and reading breach of section 12AA(2) as leading to deemed grant of registration may, "at worst", cause some loss of revenue to Department; (ii) On other hand, taking contrary view and, if deemed grant of registration is not read into statute, assessee would be left at mercy of income-tax authorities since no remedy has been provided in Act against failure to decide; (iii) irreversible situation is not created by grant of deemed registration because it is always open to Revenue to cancel registration under sub-section (3) of section 12AA prospectively. only adverse consequence is loss of revenue if deemed registration is cancelled subsequently with prospective effect; and (iv) purposive interpretation of statute should be adopted. We are not inclined to accept this line of reasoning which has found favour with Division Bench. For one thing, it would be inappropriate for court to accept, as first principle of law, proposition that there is no public element involved in collection of revenue as legislated upon by Parliament or by State Legislature. Proper collection of revenues of State is matter of public interest since public revenues are utilised for public purposes. But such general considerations cannot override duty of court to give plain meaning and effect to language used in taxing statute. duty of court first and foremost is to construe words of taxing statute in question as they stand and intention of Legislature has to be construed with reference to language of words used. While interpreting provision, court cannot legislate new provision or introduce deeming fiction where none has been provided. Similarly, even as matter of first principle, casus omissus cannot be supplied by court unless there is case of clear necessity and when reason is found within statute itself (Padmasundara Rao (Dead) v. State of Tamil Nadu [2002] 255 ITR 147 (SC); AIR 2002 SC 1334, paragraphs 8A and 14, Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 2917, paragraph 23 and Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P.) Ltd. v. U. P. Financial Corporation [2003] 113 Comp Cas 374 (SC); [2003] 2 SCC 455, paragraph 14.) similar view to that of Division Bench was adopted in judgment of Delhi Bench of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Bhagwad Swarup Shri Shri Devraha Baba Memorial Shri Hari Parmarth Dham Trust v. CIT [2007] 17 SOT 281 (Delhi) [SB]; [2008] 299 ITR (AT) 161 (Delhi) [SB]. Tribunal, as indeed Division Bench of this court, in earlier decision, observed that on balance and though questions presented some difficulty, it was inclined to take view supporting plea of deemed registration, otherwise assessee would be left without remedy. assessee, in our view, is not without remedy since delay on part of Commissioner to consider application can be remedied by recourse to jurisdiction under article 226 of Constitution. If Commissioner has delayed in passing order on application for registration under section 12AA, recourse to remedy under article 226 is always available to order expeditious decision thereon. considerable amount of reliance was placed on behalf of assessee in present case on judgment of Supreme Court in CIT v. Ajanta Electricals [1995] 215 ITR 114 (SC). In that case, Supreme Court construed provisions of section 139(2) of Act prior to its deletion with effect from 1989. proviso to section 139(2) conferred discretion on Income-tax Officer to extend date for furnishing of return. Revenue had relied upon judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in which it had been held that there was no provision in Act or Rules requiring Income-tax Officer to pass order on application filed by assessee subsequent to time given to him for filing his return pursuant to notice under sub-section (2) of section 139. Supreme Court held that merely because specific provision was absent for authorising Income-tax Officer to entertain application made beyond time, it was not proper to hold that it was not open to assessee to make application under section 139(2) for extension of time, after time allowed had expired. In consequence, Supreme Court held that application made by assessee under section 139(2) for extension of time after expiry of time allowed was maintainable and, therefore valid. That was point which was decided by Supreme Court. This decision would be of no assistance to assessee. We may also note at this stage, that provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12AA of Act have been construed in judgment of Division Bench of Madras High Court in CIT v. Sheela Christian Charitable Trust [2013] 354 ITR 478 (Mad); [2013] 32 taxman.com 242 (Mad). Division Bench in that case has held that Tribunal was not right in holding that failure to pass order in application under section 12AA within stipulated period of six months would automatically result in granting registration to trust. same view has been reiterated by Division Bench of Madras High Court in CIT v. view has been reiterated by Division Bench of Madras High Court in CIT v. Karimangalam Onriya Pengal Semipu Amaipu Ltd. [2013] 354 ITR 483 (Mad); [2013] 32 taxman.com 292 (Mad). There can be no dispute about basic principle of law that where legal fiction has been created, it must be given full force and effect. As Lord Asquith J. observed in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [1951] 2 All ER 587 page 599 B-D; [1952] AC 109 (HL), "where statute says that you must imagine certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs". point, however, in this matter is that section 12AA(2) does not provide for legal fiction at all. Parliament has carefully and advisedly not provided for deeming fiction to effect that application for registration would be deemed to have been granted, if it is not disposed of within six months. Legislative fictions are what they purport to be: acts of legislating body. court cannot create one, where Legislature has not provided deeming fiction. In Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd. [2003] 2 SCC 111, apex court held as follows: "We are not oblivious of law that when public functionary is required to do certain thing within specified time, same is ordinarily directory but it is equally when settled that when consequence for inaction on part of statutory authorities within such specified time is expressly provided, it must be held to be imperative." Significantly, in present case, Parliament has not legislated consequence of failure to decide application within period of six months. In circumstances, we answer questions referred to Full Bench for reference in following terms: (i) non-disposal of application for registration, by granting or refusing registration, before expiry of six months as provided under section 12AA(2) of Income-tax Act, 1961, would not result in deemed grant of registration; and (ii) judgment of Division Bench of this court in Society for Promotion of Education Adventure Sport and Conservation of Environment (supra) does not lay down correct position of law. reference is, accordingly, answered. appeal shall now be placed before regular Bench in accordance with roster for final disposal in terms of questions so answered. There shall be no order as to costs. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Muzafar Nagar Development Authority