JUDGMENT This appeal under section 260A of Income-tax Act, 1961 ("the Act"), challenges order dated May 8, 2012, passed by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal ("the Tribunal") for assessment year 2007-08. Revenue has formulated following reframed question of law for our consideration: "Whether, on facts and in circumstances of case and in law, Tribunal is right in placing reliance on judgment in case of Asst. CIT v. Bhaumik Colours Pvt. Ltd. whereas in instant case, assessee is registered and beneficial shareholder of company that has given loans to third company that lent these monies to assessee?" We find that impugned order has upheld order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dated March 28, 2011, holding that issue arising before it was covered by decision of Special Bench of Tribunal in Asst. CIT v. Bhaumik Colour P. Ltd. [2009] 313 ITR (AT) 146 (Mumbai) [SB] read with decision of this court in CIT v. Universal Medicare P. Ltd. [2010] 324 ITR 263 (Bom). It is pertinent to note that in paragraph 6 of impugned order, Tribunal recorded as under: "6. At time of hearing, no one appeared on behalf of assessee in spite of giving notice. However, learned Departmental representative fairly conceded that issue involved is covered in favour of assessee by decision of Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench in case of Bhaumik Colours P. Ltd. (supra). Further, learned Departmental representative referred to decision of hon'ble apex court in case of L. Alagusundaram Chettiar v. CIT [2001] 252 ITR 893 (SC) but when it was pointed out that said decision pertains to section 2(6A)(e) of 1922 Act and whereas decision by Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in case of Bhaumik Colours (supra) is under 1961 Act and similar view has been taken by hon'ble Bombay High Court in case of CIT v. Universal Medicare P. Ltd. [2010] 324 ITR 263 (Bom), learned Departmental representative submitted that she dutifully relies on decision of Assessing Officer." In view of above, we indicated to Mr. Pinto, learned counsel appearing for Revenue, that it appears that Revenue had conceded before Tribunal that issue involved in appeal before it is covered by Special Bench of Tribunal. However, Mr. Pinto submitted that if paragraph 6 is read in its entirety it would be evident that Departmental representative appearing for Revenue had relied upon decision of Assessing Officer and not upon decision referred to earlier. Although we do not agree with above submission as our reading of above paragraph is that Departmental representative placed reliance upon decision of Assessing Officer in support of her submission that decision of Supreme Court in L. Alagusundaram Chettiar v. CIT [2001] 252 ITR 893 (SC) supports case of Revenue. At that time, Tribunal pointed out that same deals with deemed dividend under Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, while decision of this High Court in Universal Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (supra) deals with Act. Be that as it may to avoid needless controversy, we have considered challenge of Revenue to impugned order independently and not shut out Revenue because of concession made by it before Tribunal. undisputed facts are that assessee received loan from one M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. Revenue seeks to tax this loan as deemed dividend. case of Revenue before us is that one M/s. Lafin Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. had advanced money to M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. who in turn advanced money to respondent-assessee. respondent-assessee 50 per cent. shareholder of M/s. Lafin Financial Services Pvt. Ltd. and in view thereof, loan advanced by M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. to respondent-assessee is to be treated as dividend in hands of respondentassessee. It is also admitted position that respondent-assessee is not share holder in M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. Assessing Officer brought to tax amount of loan received by respondent-assessee from M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. as deemed dividend under section 2(22)(e) of Act. On appeal, Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) held that loan given by M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd to respondent-assessee is not payment made by it to its shareholder. Thus, section 2(22)(e) of Act could have no application. Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) further held that section 2(22)(e) of Act creates fiction by bringing to tax amount as dividend when amount so received is otherwise then dividend. Therefore, section 2(22)(e) of Act has to be strictly read. On further appeal to Tribunal by Revenue, impugned order placed reliance upon decisions of this court in Universal Medicare (P.) Ltd. (supra) read with its decision in Bhaumik Colours (P.) Ltd. (supra) and decision of Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Hotel Hilltop [2009] 313 ITR 116 (Raj) to uphold order of Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), thus upholding conclusion that deemed dividend can be assessed only in hands of shareholder of lender company. In this case, respondent- assessee is admittedly not shareholder of M/s. NS Fincon (P) Ltd. This court in case of Universal Medicare (supra), while approving decision of Special Bench of Tribunal in Bhaumik Colours (supra), inter alia observed that (page 268 of 324 ITR): "All payments by way of dividend have to be taxed in hands of recipient of dividend namely, share holder... Consequently, effect of clause (e) of section 2(22) is to broaden ambit of expression'dividend' by including certain payments which company has made by way of loan or advance or payments made on behalf of or for individual benefit of shareholder. definition does not alter legal position that dividend has to be taxed in hands of shareholder." Further, this court in case of CIT v. Impact Containers P. Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 346 (Bom), while dealing with issue of deemed dividend, categorically held that section 2(22)(e) of Act cannot be applied/invoked where assessee is not shareholder of lending company. objective of section 2(22)(e) of Act is only to ensure that company in which public are not substantially interested would not distribute its prosperity amongst shareholders by calling them loan/advances, as tax would be payable if same were distributed as dividend. submission on behalf of Revenue made before us is that one has to look at substance of transaction and that if one looks at substance, then respondent-assessee would be chargeable to tax. This is not acceptable as fiscal statutes have to be interpreted strictly. We can do no better then meet submission of Revenue by inviting attention to decision of Supreme Court in CIT v. Vatika Township P. Ltd. [2014] 367 ITR 466 (SC); [2015] 1 SCC 1 wherein it has been observed as under (page 494 of 367 ITR): "At same time, it is also mandated that there cannot be imposition of any tax without authority of law. Such law has to be unambiguous and should prescribe liability to pay taxes in clear terms. If concerned provision of taxing statute is ambiguous and vague and as susceptible to two interpretations, interpretation which favours subjects, as against Revenue, has to be preferred. This is well established principle of statutory interpretation, to help finding out as to whether particular category of assessee are to pay particular tax or not. No doubt, with application of this principle, courts make endeavour to find out intention of Legislature. At same time, this very principle is based on'fairness' doctrine as it lays down that if it is not very clear from provisions of Act as to whether particular tax is to be levied to particular class of persons or not, subject should not be fastened with any liability to pay tax. This principle also acts as balancing factor between two jurisprudential theories of justice-Libertarian theory on one hand and Kantian theory along with Egalitarian theory propounded by John Rawls on other hand. Tax laws are clearly in derogation of personal rights and property interests and are, therefore, subject to strict construction, and any ambiguity must be resolved against imposition of tax.... Again, as United States v. Merriam 263 US 179, Supreme Court clearly stated at US pages 187.88: 'On behalf of Government it is urged that taxation is practical matter and concerns itself with substance of thing upon which tax is imposed, rather than with legal forms or expressions. But in statutes levying taxes literal meaning of words employed is most important, for such statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond clear impost of language used. If words are doubtful, doubt must be resolved against Government and in favour of taxpayer. Gould v. Gould 245 US 151 L Ed p. 213: Usp 153.' Lord Cairns said many years ago in Partington v. Attorney General [1869] LR 4 HL 100, 122: '... as I understand principle of all fiscal legislation it is this: if person sought to be taxed comes within letter of law he must be taxed, however, great hardship may appear to judicial mind to be. On other hand, if Crown, seeking to recover tax, cannot bring subject within letter of law, subject is free, however, apparently within spirit of law case might otherwise appear to be.' " Thus, on strict interpretation of section 2(22)(e) of Act, unless respondent-assessee is shareholder of company lending him money, no occasion to apply it can arise. In present facts, it is admitted position that respondent-assessee is not shareholder of M/s. NS Fincon Pvt. Ltd. from whom he has received loan. Therefore, no fault can be found with decision of Tribunal in having followed decision of High Court in Universal Medicare (supra). This view has been further reiterated by another Division Bench of this court in Impact Containers (supra) rendered on July 4, 2014. We are of view that as issue raised by Revenue stands concluded by order of this court, no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. Accordingly, appeal dismissed. No order as to costs. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jignesh P. Shah