JUDGMENT P. R. Ramachandra Menon J.-The Constitutional validity of section 133(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961, to extent words "enquiry or" have been added thereto, also incorporating "second proviso", is under challenge in main case and some of connected cases. In general, grievance is against notices issued by authorities of Incometax Department asking petitioners/co-operative banks to furnish details of cash deposit in "savings bank accounts", aggregating to Rs. 5 lakhs during financial years 2010-11, 2011-12, 2012-13 and also to furnish details of payment of interest exceeding Rs. 10,000 to depositors including in case of fixed deposits. petitioners are co-operative banks registered under relevant provisions of Kerala Co-operatives Societies Act/Rules engaged in banking business and in some cases members/depositors have also joined hands with bank to raise challenge. W. P. (C.) No. 10334 of 2014 is treated as lead case, wherein detailed counter-affidavit has been filed from part of Department and petitioners have filed reply affidavit as well. It is stated that, no factual dispute is involved and contentions raised in lead case from both sides are pressed into service in other cases as well. Mr. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner in W. P. (C.) No. 10334 of 2014, led arguments on behalf of petitioners, supported by other learned lawyers concerned. arguments on behalf of Department/Revenue were led by Sri P. K. R Menon, learned Senior Central Government Counsel (Taxes), supported by Mr. Jose Joseph, learned standing counsel. History runs back to time when steps were taken by respondentIncome-tax Department ("the Department" in short) to collect particulars of deposits made and interest paid by co-operative banks, as part of some project/survey, issuing notice under section 133(6) of Incometax Act, 1961. Several co-operative banks approached this court earlier, challenging said proceedings, mainly contending that provisions did not enable Department to have issued notice to petitioners who were co- operative banks governed by relevant provisions of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules and further that many of them were primary agricultural credit co-operative societies having exemption from operation of relevant provisions of Income-tax Act. In some cases, certificates issued by authorities under Kerala Co-operative Societies Act/Rules were produced, as to nature of society, to have benefit of exemption. In some cases, it was contended that term "any person" under section 133(6) did not relate to petitioners' cooperative banks. It was also contended that, no such notice could have been issued invoking said power, as it was never part of any "enquiry" or "proceeding" under Act and no specific insinuation was made against any individual or society. Yet another contention was raised to effect that, notices were issued by Income-tax Officers or such other authorities who did not have power, jurisdiction or competence to have invoked said power, in view of clear stipulation under "second proviso" to section 133(6), to effect that in case where no proceeding was pending, power could have been invoked only with "prior approval" of Director or Commissioner, as case may be, simultaneously contending that no such prior permission was obtained to have issued notice. After detailed examination of facts and figures, it was held by this court (as per judgment delivered by me in Chala Service Co- operative Bank Ltd. v. ITO [2010] 1 KLT (Sh. N) 77, Case No. 92, that, term "any person" included co-operative bank as well. After meeting all contentions, interference was declined and writ petitions were dismissed. Thereafter, matter came to be considered by Division Bench of this court in another case, wherein interference was declined and ultimately matter reached apex court. apex court declined interference clearly holding that power under section 133(6) could be invoked against co- operative banks as well and that there was nothing wrong, arbitrary or illegal on part of Department in having issued impugned notices. Accordingly, cases before apex court were dismissed as per decision reported in Kathiroor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT (CIB) [2013] 263 CTR (SC) 129; [2014] 360 ITR 243 (SC). On attaining finality, by virtue of verdict passed by apex court, respondent-Department proceeded with further steps in this regard. This made petitioners herein to challenge notices, mainly raising challenge against constitutional validity of amended provisions incorporating words "enquiry or" and second proviso to section 133(6), pointing out that, constitutional validity of provision was never under challenge before apex court and, hence, that court had no need, necessity or occasion to have considered it while passing judgment in Kathiroor case cited supra. Coming back to case in hand, admittedly, petitioners are engaged in field of banking business, accepting deposits and extending loan facilities to members under various heads, which are essentially stated as in relation to agricultural activities. There is contention that petitioner bank is agricultural credit society for purpose of Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and by virtue of section 3, it is excluded from purview of Banking Regulation Act (which will be dealt with in due course). By virtue of section 133(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961, Department has power to call for information in relation to such points or matters which would be useful for, or relevant to any proceeding under Act, from "any person" including "banking company" or "any officer" thereon. Later, amendment was introduced as per Finance Act, 1995, whereby, words "enquiry or" were inserted before word "proceeding" in section 133(6), also adding "second proviso" to said provision, with effect from July 1, 1995. effect of said amendment is that, power to call for information under unamended Act which was confined only in relation to "pending proceeding" came to be widened, and even in case where no proceeding was pending, such information could be called for as part of enquiry, subject to rider that, such power was not to be exercised by any income-tax authority below rank of Director or Commissioner without prior approval of Director or Commissioner, as case may be. said amendment was brought about as measure to tackle tax evasion effectively, as clarified by Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), vide Circular No. 717, dated August 14, 1995. main contention is that, it intrudes into "privacy" of members of petitioner banks and that right of privacy is integral part of article 21 of Constitution of India, which in turn is violated. rights and interest of petitioners to conduct free trade/business as guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) are also stated as infringed. Unbridled power/discretion is vested with authorities of Income-tax Department and that contents of notice clearly reveal that, it has no nexus at all, with object to be achieved under Act as no tax liability could be mulcted upon person having deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs or in respect of person to whom interest has been paid to extent of Rs. 10,000. This, in turn, is cited as clear instance of arbitrariness and patent violation of article 14 of Constitution of India. Learned senior counsel for petitioners submits that State cannot have any unrestricted access to seek information about financial records maintained by petitioner banks without any reliable basis to seek such information. Though right of privacy has not been explicitly incorporated in Constitution or by way of any specific legislation, it has now been incorporated as part of article 21, through various judicial precedents, including Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1975] 2 SCC 148, Mr. "X" v. Hospital "Z" [1998] 8 SCC 296 and People Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union of India [2003] 4 SCC 399. Thus, it is contended that, right to privacy is integral part of fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of Constitution of India and as such attempt made by concerned respondent is liable to be intercepted by this court. Reliance is also sought to be placed on decision rendered by apex court in Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India [2011] 339 ITR 107 (SC); [2011] 8 SCC 1 pointing out that fundamental right to privacy cannot be subverted in attempt to tackle menace of curbing problem of black money, which is cited as motive for drive. Reference is also made to observation of apex court in Ram Jethmalani's case to effect that solution for problem of abrogation of one zone of constitutional values, cannot be creation of another zone of abrogation of other constitutional values. Referring to observation of apex court in Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. [1984] 3 SCC 369 holding that absolute discretion, uncontrolled by guidelines may permit denial of equality before law, which is antithesis of rule of law, learned counsel points out that, there is absolutely no mechanism, as provided under statute, to examine whether wide discretion granted is exercised correctly or not. In absence of any guidelines or criteria for exercise of powers, impugned provisions suffer from wise of arbitrariness, is crux of contention. Various other decisions are also cited across Bar including one rendered by apex court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 1 SCC 248; AIR 1978 SC 597, which will be dealt with later. concept of co-operative movement and setting up of co-operative societies/bank play very important role in providing credit and financial assistance to marginal section including farmers. It is by virtue of very nature of operations and object to be achieved, that petitioners have been kept outside purview of Banking Regulation Act, 1949. It is also pointed out that their activities are governed by provisions of Kerala Co- operative Societies Act/Rules, which are "special statutes" as far as they are concerned and it separately provides detailed procedure for incorporation, registration, functioning, control and regulation with proper power of superintendence by concerned authorities, including power of audit of accounts besides power for enquiry and inspection under section 66A by Vigilance Officer. When various measures are being taken by Central/State Government also in light of approval/recommendations by Reserve Bank of India/NABARD to strengthen co-operative sector, steps being pursued by respondent-Department, on other hand, virtually contribute to undermine same; as furnishing of details of deposit to third parties will clearly violate commercial secrecy that exists between bank/financial institution and its customer. While admitting in ground "T" of writ petition that even though banks and other financial institutions can be required to share information regarding deposits, it is stated that same can be done only when concerned authority shows some reason for suspicion or material based on which they are seeking information. Since section 133(6) of Income-tax Act expressly uses words "for Since section 133(6) of Income-tax Act expressly uses words "for purpose of this Act..." in opening paragraph, it is contented that same must relate to specific taxpayer/assessee; otherwise, it would not serve any purpose and as such, impugned notices are arbitrary and illegal having no nexus to scope and object of Income-tax Act, 1961. averments and allegations raised by petitioners have been rebutted by first respondent by filing detailed counter-affidavit. It is pointed out that there is absolutely no basis for challenge raised by petitioners against validity of provision. With reference to challenge against impugned notice, it is stated that matter has become final, by virtue of law declared by apex court in Kathiroor's case. It is also pointed out that version of petitioners that they are not governed by Banking Regulation Act is not at all correct and that position has undergone substantial change after amendment brought about in statute whereby co-operative banks/co-operative societies have also been included as coming within purview of Banking Regulation Act. As per section 5A of Banking Regulation Act and "non obstante clause" therein provisions of Banking Regulation Act override provisions of bye-laws, agreements, etc., of co-operative societies. Reference is made to various other provisions (amending provisions/amended provisions) as well including sub-section (2) of section 22 of Banking Regulation Act whereby it is stipulated that all co- operative societies carrying out banking business have to apply and procure licence from Reserve Bank of India as well within three months of commencement of banking business. It is also stated that addition of words "enquiry or" and "second proviso" as per amendment brought about by Finance Act, 1995, is only incidental to main provision (which is not under challenge) adding that powers under section 133(6) are in nature of survey and general enquiry to identify persons who are likely to have taxable income and to ascertain whether there is compliance with them with regard to payment of tax. With reference to plea of arbitrariness/alleged harassment, it is stated in paragraph 9 of counter-affidavit that notice to co-operative societies/banks in Kerala, calling for information under section 133(6) was issued to implement "project" conceived and approved by honourable Minister of Finance, to be executed by officers of CBDTthe apex body of tax administration in country, under Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue. As matter of fact, project was initiated in country on June 17, 2013; but it could not be initiated in State because of intervention of court which came to be cleared only on August 27, 2013, i.e., on finalisation of issue as per decision rendered by apex court in Kathiroor's case. It is also pointed out that there is absolutely no basis for apprehension expressed from part of petitioners with regard to steps to be conducted to furnish data in prescribed form, as Department, even as per their first notice under section 133(6) issued to petitioner on September 6, 2013, had conveyed undertaking to assist petitioner co-operative societies/banks also giving telephone number of officer concerned, to be contacted, in case any difficulty was experienced; besides undertaking that Department was ready to depute Inspector of Income-tax to banks/societies to render necessary assistance to enable banks to comply with terms of notices issued under section 133(6) of Act copy of which has been produced as exhibit R4(A). It is further pointed out that as many as 44 seminars/awareness campaigns were organised by Department in various Districts in Kerala for co-operative societies/banks, to educate and equip them to comply with statutory notices issued in this regard thus asserting that there was no threat at all from part of respondents as alleged by petitioners. It is stated that, by virtue of stipulation under second proviso to section 133(6) of Act, prior approval of Director/Commissioner is necessary while seeking for information when no proceeding is pending and as such there is in-built mechanism/control with regard to use of power. objective is to get information for curbing menace of black money and to stabilise economic base of country. Mr. P. K. R. Menon, learned senior counsel for respondents, submits with reference to pleadings on record that attempt of petitioners is only to capitalise passing remarks made by apex court in different decisions rendered at different points of time dealing with particular/different set of facts and circumstances which cannot have any application to set of facts and circumstances which cannot have any application to challenge raised by petitioners with reference to constitutional validity of provisions. More so when scope of power and authority of Department in having issued notice under section 133(6) stands answered in favour of Revenue, as per Kathiroor case. It is also pointed out that there is absolutely no basis for contention raised by petitioners that there is no procedure under scheme to gather information under section 133(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961. information required to be furnished by petitioners-co-operative banks as per impugned notices issued by respondent-Department, invoking power under section 133(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961, is to following effect: Sl. Information required No. Details of cash deposits in savings bank account aggregating to 1 Rs. 5 lakhs during financial years 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. (Information regarding cash deposits in SB account where aggregate of cash deposit is Rs. 5 lakhs or above for concerned year. While furnishing information, all cash transactions in account are to be reflected date wise and not merely aggregate amount.) Details of payment of interest exceeding Rs. 10,000 paid to 2 depositors including interest on fixed deposits. As mentioned already, said information was sought to be collected by Department to implement project conceived and approved by Minister of Finance, to be executed by officers of CBDT (Central Board of Direct Taxes) apex body of tax administration under Ministry of Finance for curbing menace of black money. challenge raised from part of petitioners and other similarly situated persons stating that they stand on different footing, being governed by relevant provisions of Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules; that they do not come within purview of term "any person" contemplated under section 133(6) of Income-tax Act; that power under section 133(6) cannot be invoked in absence of any pending proceedings; that there was no prior approval/sanction of Director/Commissioner, as case may be (in cases where no proceeding is pending); scope of calling for such information is beyond competence of power and jurisdiction of authorities of Department, etc., no more remain res integra (except question of constitutional validity of provisions) by virtue of law declared by apex court, affirming decision rendered by this court, in Kathiroor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT (CIB) [2013] 263 CTR (SC) 129; [2014] 360 ITR 243 (SC). observation made by apex court in paragraph 17 of said judgment is relevant in context of plea set up by petitioners referring to alleged fishing/roving enquiry, which reads as follows (page 254): "... legislative intention was to give wide powers to officers, of course with permission of Commissioner of Income-tax or Director of Investigation to gather general particulars in nature of survey and store those details in compute so that data so collected can be made use of for checking evasion of tax effectively. assessing authorities are now empowered to issue such notice calling for general information for purpose of any enquiry in both cases: (a) where proceeding is pending and (b) where proceedings is not pending against assessee. However, in latter case, assessing authority must obtain prior approval of Director or Commissioner, as case may be before issuance of such notice. word "enquiry" would thus connote request for information or questions to gather information either before initiation of proceedings or during pendency of proceedings; such information being useful for or relevant to proceedings under Act." From above, it is very clear that enquiry, invoking power under section 133(6) of Act is in form of survey, calling for general information to prepare and maintain sufficient data base to be cross checked with further data to be collected in due course if any incriminating circumstance is noted and to provide measures to check tax evasion. Coming to constitutional validity of provision, it is to be noted at very outset that petitioners have not chosen to challenge entire provision, i.e., section 133(6). grievance is only with regard to incorporation of words "enquiry or" (preceding word "proceedings") and also "second proviso", by way of amendment as per Finance Act, 1995. prayers raised by petitioner in W. P. (C.) No. 10334 of 2014 are extracted for convenience of reference: "(i) issue appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside addition of word'inquiry' in section 133(6) of Income-tax Act, 1961, and two provisos thereto is illegal and unsustainable in law; (ii) issue appropriate writ, order or direction quashing exhibits P1, P3 and P4 notices issued by fifth respondent. (iii) pass any other order in interests of justice, equity and good conscience." provision for calling for information in "pending proceedings" was very much there in statute even before 1995 and said power/ authority is not under challenge in this writ petition. inadequacy of provisions to meet need of hour was felt by law makers in year 1995. It was felt necessary to obtain data by way of enquiry though no proceeding was pending so as to take remedial measures to curb menace of black money and to prevent tax evasion. Even otherwise, if at all effective steps have to be taken against any individual/establishment, collection of preliminary data is very much essential, without which no proceedings can be pursued, as made clear by apex court on many occasion. Data collection is elementary step/course to be completed before proceeding against anybody and such step will be necessitated only in case of person who is not prepared to abide by provisions of law. contention of petitioners that there is absolutely no insinuation against petitioners to have proceeded against is not at all relevant nor is there any significance in this regard. For time being, it is true that there is there any significance in this regard. For time being, it is true that there is no insinuation against petitioners to effect that they are accepting clandestine deposits involving black money or that they are effecting payment of interest enabling petitioners to enjoy same without meeting tax burden. attempt of Department is to see whether any undue benefit is being enjoyed by any of depositors without meeting tax obligation and it is in said context that necessary data has been decided to be collected. version of petitioners that information sought to be collected (i.e., particulars of deposits of Rs. 5 lakhs or more in years 2010-11, 2011- 12 and 2012-13 or payment of interest exceeding Rs. 10,000 to fixed deposits) will not attract any tax liability and as such there is no purpose or nexus with object of Act is rather puerile. This is for reason that petitioners' society may not be aware of transactions being pursued by members/depositors, who may be having similar deposits in some or other scheduled banks or co-operative banks. If such depositor is having similar deposits and is drawing interest from other banks/ co-operative banks, still not satisfying tax on total receipt of income/ interest is person to be proceeded against in terms of relevant provisions of law. Unless requisite data is collected from different banks/ institutions, it may not be possible for respondent-Department to create sufficient data base to be cross-checked, whenever they get sufficient material/information as to instance of tax evasion. Viewed in above perspective, there cannot be any genuine heart burn for petitioners in furnishing data as required by respondents and it cannot cause any prejudice in this regard. Their apprehension that there is chance for withdrawal of deposits by depositors, draining out financial base of society/bank is also devoid of any merit for reason that data is being collected by respondent-banks as part of implementation of project from all available sources and no co-operative bank is exempted or spared in this attempt. Yet another contention raised by petitioners is that for meeting requirement petitioners may have to deploy several employees to furnish information, virtually for no return and thus incurring huge expenses. This court is not much impressed with above contention for reason that petitioners being establishments doing banking business are supposed to maintain all relevant records and there is "public duty" cast upon them as well to see that they are not made instrumental by any unscrupulous individual, who wants to pursue tax evasion, undermining economic backbone of country. plea with regard to hardship in this regard had already come up for consideration before apex court in Sardar Baldev Singh v. CIT [1960] 40 ITR 605 (SC); [1961] AIR 1961 SC 736, wherein it has been categorically held that in case of any enactment preventing evasion of tax, consideration of hardships is irrelevant for deciding questions of legislative competence. With regard to contention of petitioners that there is no nexus for information to be furnished as per impugned notices with purpose sought to be achieved observation made by Division Bench of this court in M. V. Rajendran v. ITO [2003] 260 ITR 442 (Ker); [2003] 180 CTR (Kerala) 369 is very relevant and, hence, extracted below (page 448): "The society by itself cannot have any grievance against notice because notice does not contemplate any action against society. Since it is settled position that, authority empowered to do thing will have auxiliary and necessary power to achieve objective, none can have doubt that income-tax authority whose duty it is to trace tax evaders and to bring them to book and compel them to pay tax can ask for details on deposit. Therefore, survey or investigation conducted to trace black money is absolutely within powers of income-tax authorities and co-operative societies or banks cannot claim any immunity for hoarding black money. Even though not specifically conceded by petitioners, their case is that unless societies enjoy immunity from section 133(6) proceedings and information on deposits and depositors is kept out of reach of Income-tax Department, they will not get deposits, or existing depositors will withdraw deposits leading to liquidity problem for them. I do not think this is ground to resist notice under section 133(6). If co-operative banks and co-operative societies are allowed to maintain deposits beyond scrutiny of Income-tax Department, then societies will become safe havens for hoarding black money in country which is opposed to public policy. Besides this, statutory authority vested which is opposed to public policy. Besides this, statutory authority vested with responsibility to levy tax on income will be prevented from achieving their objective and that will defeat very purpose of Income-tax Act." It is contended by petitioners that "nexus" is not revealed from impugned notices and that there cannot be any tax liability in respect of instance as specified in notice. But it is not for petitioners-banks to contend that respondent-Department should satisfy petitioners as to requirement in respect of taxable event. Section 133(6) does not cast any such obligation to have information extracted from petitioners. On other hand, it casts obligation on part of petitioners to furnish information sought for in tune with requirement of section 133(6). Even otherwise, petitioners cannot dictate terms to Income-tax Department to satisfy them, first, whether there is taxable event, if information sought for is furnished. Further, there is no basis for plea set up in paragraph 12 of writ petition with reference to total figure of Rs. 5 lakhs, to be divided by "three" years and to contend that it will not attract any tax liability. position has been clarified by respondents in paragraph 8 of counter-affidavit that threshold limit of Rs. 5 lakhs has been fixed for each financial year and not for three financial years added together. What should be extent of enquiry to be conducted fixing appropriate ceiling is matter for Income-tax Department to consider taking note of factual scenario in field of tax evasion. It could be said that fixation of ceiling as Rs. 5 lakhs (in case of deposits) and Rs. 10,000 (as interest being paid) while seeking for particulars in this regard is as measure at first step. After getting particulars in this regard and preparing database, it is still open for Income-tax Department to seek for further information to widen net and to prevent possible pilferage, if any, reducing base/ceiling to such appropriate extent. question to be considered is whether such exercise being pursued by Department is having support of law or not which cannot but be answered in positive. It is for Department to work out strategy, device tools and measures and to achieve goal in phased manner, which cannot be deprecated by this court. With regard to alleged infringement of "right to privacy", petitioners place much reliance on observations made by apex court in Ram Jethmalani v. Union of India [2011] 339 ITR 107 (SC); [2011] 8 SCC 1. following are extracts sought to be relied on by petitioners (page 140): "We understand and appreciate fact that situation with respect to unaccounted monies is extremely grave. Nevertheless, as constitutional adjudicators we always have to be mindful of preserving sanctity of constitutional values, and hasty steps that derogate from fundamental rights, whether urged by governments or private citizens, howsoever well meaning they may be, have to be necessarily very carefully scrutinised. solution for problem of abrogation of one zone of constitutional values cannot be creation of another zone of abrogation of constitutional values... revelation of details of bank accounts of individuals, without establishment of prima facie grounds to accuse them of wrongdoing, would be violation of their rights to privacy. Details of bank accounts can be used by those who want to harass, or otherwise cause damage, to individuals. We cannot remain blind to such possibilities, and indeed experience reveals that public dissemination of banking details, or availability to unauthorised persons, has led to abuse. mere fact that citizen has bank account in bank located in particular jurisdiction cannot be ground for revelation of details of his or her account that State has acquired. Innocent citizens, including those actively working towards betterment of society and nation, could fall prey to machinations of those who might wish to damage prospects of smooth functioning of society. Whether State itself can access details of citizens" bank accounts is separate matter. However, State cannot compel citizens to reveal, or itself reveal details of their bank accounts to public at large, either to receive benefits from State or to facilitate investigations, and prosecutions of such individuals, unless State itself has, through properly conducted investigations, within four corners of constitutional permissibility, been able to establish prima facie grounds to accuse individuals of wrongdoing. It is only after State has been able to arrive at prima facie conclusion of wrongdoing, based on material evidence, would right of others in nation to be informed, enter picture." It was case where investigation was sought to be made with regard to unaccounted wealth acquired through unlawful activities by concerned persons in violation of national/international laws. apex court concurred with formation of "high level committee" to act as special investigation team under chairmanship of hon'ble judge of Supreme Court and gave specific directions as to course to be pursued. portion extracted by petitioners itself reveals that apex court was considering request to reveal/divulge particulars of persons/individuals and details of their bank account to public, at large. necessity to collect necessary materials by State through properly conducted investigations to establish prima facie grounds to accuse individuals of wrongdoing was highlighted. This is revealed from observation: "only after State has been able to arrive at prima facie conclusion of wrongdoing, based on material evidence, would right of others in nation to be informed, enter picture." Coming to case in hand, it is only first stage of action that is being pursued by respondent-Department, i.e., as to collection of data/material, before anybody is indicted. In so far as said power is exercised to identify culprits if any, it need not cause any headache to petitioners. That apart, information being collected by Incometax Department cannot be made use of by them for any other purpose and statute itself takes care of such situation, by virtue of mandate under section 138 of Income-tax Act. said provision reads as follows: "138. (1)(a) Board or any other income-tax authority specified by it by general or special order in this behalf may furnish or cause to be furnished to- (i) any officer, authority or body performing any functions under any law relating to imposition of any tax, duty or cess, or to dealings in foreign exchange as defined in clause (n) of section 2 of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (42 of 1999); or (ii) such officer, authority or body performing functions under any other law as Central Government may, if in its opinion it is necessary so to do in public interest, specify by notification in Official Gazette in this behalf, any such information received or obtained by any income-tax authority in performance of his functions under this Act, as may, in opinion of board or other income-tax authority, be necessary for purpose of enabling officer, authority or body to perform his or its functions under that law. (b) Where person makes application to Chief Commissioner or Commissioner in prescribed form for any information relating to any assessee received or obtained by any income-tax authority in performance of his functions under this Act, Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that it is in public interest so to do, furnish or cause to be furnished information asked for and his decision in this behalf shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or any other law for time being in force, Central Government may, having regard to practices and usages customary or any other relevant factors, by order notified in Official Gazette, direct that no information or document shall be furnished or produced by public servant in respect of such matters relating to such class of assessees or except to such authorities as may be specified in order." With regard to contention of petitioners that there is absolutely no mechanism in statute nor is there any guideline to govern proceedings for invoking power under section 133(6) it is to be noted that law makers were vigilant enough to ensure that power is not misused under any circumstance. It was, accordingly, stipulated that, if no proceeding was pending, power shall not be exercised by any Assessing Officer not below rank of Director/Commissioner unless prior approval of Director/Commissioner, as case may be, was obtained. This, of course, acts as check measure to provide transparency in proceedings. It involves various steps for getting "prior approval" of Director/Commissioner. file has to move through different levels till it reaches approving authority who has to be told of situation under which circumstance, enquiry is necessitated. After applying mind, appropriate orders are to be passed by said authority and if approval is granted, there is further downward communication, causing file to be taken through same levels to reach it back enabling concerned officer to proceed with enquiry. This ensures proper invocation of power to see that nobody invokes power based on his own whims and fancies and this acts as in-built mechanism/guideline. Further, procedure in this regard is stipulated as per various notifications/circulars issued by competent authority, copies of which have been produced as exhibits R4 (C), (D) and (E). As it stands so, challenge raised against constitutional validity for alleged absence of guidelines is not liable to be entertained. case set up/moulded by petitioners as above, with reference to unbridled discretion stated as objectionable by apex court as per decision in State of Punjab v. Khan Chand [1974] 1 SCC 549, is also of no avail for reason stated above. decision in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 1 SCC 248 holding that "triple test" stipulated therein (that it must prescribe procedure; that procedure must withstand test of one or more fundamental rights under article 19, which may be applicable in given situation and it must also be liable to be tested with reference to article 14) with reference to infringement of personal liberty does not come to rescue of petitioners. In Maneka Gandhi's case, denial of issuance of passport to petitioner therein was deprecated, highlighting golden rule of personal liberty. But, at same time, enabling provision to have passport impounded was not intercepted by court. fact that petitioners' bank is society registered under Kerala Co-operative Societies Act/Rules and that there is separate procedure for incorporation/registration/functioning/control and regulation including auditing of funds, etc., are not at all germane to course and proceedings to be pursued in terms of section 133(6) of Income-tax Act. provisions of Co- operative Societies Act/Rules may be relevant in so far as day-to-day activities of society are concerned. But scope of enquiry under Income-tax Act is entirely different and so also is object/purpose to be achieved. said enquiry is not in relation to particulars of loans given but in relation to particulars of deposits made by depositors or as to extent of interest received by them to extent it is relevant under provisions of Income-tax Act. In so far as Explanation 2 to section 132 of Income-tax Act dealing with search and seizure, categorically states that word "proceeding" includes future proceeding as well; inclusion of word "enquiry or" under section 133(6) of Act by law makers as per Finance Act, 1995, is having more significance and it is incidental to scope and object to be achieved, which cannot be nullified. petitioners have no dispute with regard to legislative competence of Parliament.The dispute is only with regard to alleged intrusion into right to privacy. petitioners have attempted to equate right to privacy with right to life guaranteed under Constitution of India and have sought to picturise same as part of fundamental right, contending that there is violation of article 19(1)(g). Article 19(1)(g) of Constitution of India stipulates that all citizens shall have right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. In what way impugned notice issued by respondent-Department violates fundamental right of petitioners to conduct business/trade is not discernible; more so when provision of law is applicable not only to petitioners herein but also to all other banking/non- banking financial institutions having bearing on tax liability of depositors. That apart, in words of honourable Supreme Court as per decision in Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1975] 2 SCC 148; AIR 1975 SC 1378, even assuming that right to privacy is itself fundamental right, such fundamental right must be subject to restriction, on basis of compelling "public interest". There is no prohibition on State in gathering information for preventing tax evasion and curb black money. petitioners cannot field wrongdoers, if any, and unless necessary information is furnished, data collection will become impossible and no proceedings can be pursued against wrongdoers to guard economy of country. Constitution Bench of apex court has held in Vivian Joseph Ferreira v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [1972] 1 SCC 70 that taxing statute will become valid, if it is within legislative competence, if it is for public purpose and further, if it does not violate fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of Constitution of India. All said three requirements are satisfied in instant case and as such challenge raised by petitioners cannot be held good; more so when apex court has made it clear in R. K. Garg v. Union of India [1981] 4 SCC 675; [1982] 133 ITR 239 (SC), that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude, than laws touching civil rights, such as freedom of speech or religion, etc. Further, in view of law declared by apex court in Punjab Distilling Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 1 (SC); AIR 1965 SC 1862, constitutional validity of Act can be supported on ground that it was enacted to prevent evasion of tax. amendment brought about as per Finance Act, 1995, adding words "enquiry or" and also "second proviso" is quite incidental to "main provision" and, hence, beyond challenge. In testing validity of statute, particularly fiscal statute, court has to maintain more self-restraint, as held in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi [2008] 4 SCC 720. apprehension expressed from part of petitioners that, if information as sought for is given to respondent-Department, there is chance for misuse/abuse is without any basis. confidentiality of information gathered by Incometax Department is well taken care of by section 138 of Income-tax Act as discussed already. further contention of petitioners that conferring of absolute powers on officers of Government is rather arbitrary is not correct as such. With reference to provisions of KGST Act, particularly section 29A, Division Bench of this court in P. K. Aboobacker v. State of Kerala [1979] 44 STC 250 (Ker) has held that mere possibility of abuse by official on whom power is conferred is not ground to strike down statutory provision. It is well settled that "taxation entry" confers powers upon Legislature to legislate for matters "ancillary or incidental", including provisions for evasion of tax. This has been made clear by Constitution Bench of apex court in Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Ramkishan Shrikishan [1967] 20 STC 453 (SC). This court finds that petitioners have not succeeded in establishing any constitutional infirmity to hold statute/amendment as ultra vires Constitution. Accordingly, interference is declined and all writ petitions are dismissed. *** Pattambi Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Union of India