JUDGMENT This appeal by Revenue challenges order passed by Incometax Appellate Tribunal on June 15, 2012, in Income Tax Appeal No. 4106/ Mum/2011 for assessment year 2006-07. Tribunal was considering challenge to order passed by Commissioner of Income- tax dated March 29, 2011. Commissioner invoked his power under section 263 of Income-tax Act, 1961, to set aside assessment order dated December 15, 2008, as in opinion of Commissioner same is erroneous and in so far as it is prejudicial to interests of Revenue. Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, found that Commissioner's power under section 263 could not have been exercised in given facts and circumstances. exercise of powers was based merely on change of opinion. If Commissioner held particular opinion but on same transaction and same dealing, then that was not enough to enable him to exercise this power, is conclusion reached. Mr. Chhotaray, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Revenue, would submit that this conclusion of Tribunal is vitiated by error of law apparent on face of record. He took us through order of Assessing Officer and that of Commissioner. He showed us relevant dates. He submits that on March 14, 2001, three flats/immovable property are stated to have been acquired by assessee but that is incorrect. There was deed of rectification dated October 9, 2002. There is another date, i.e., October 24, 2002, which is when agreements were registered with authorities for stamp duty purpose. In such circumstances, he submits that assessee is not entitled to claim long-term capital gains if asset was not held for minimal period of 36 months. There is another date and which is date of occupation certificate issued by municipal corporation in this case and that is stated to be January 20, 2003. This only means that flats were not ready for occupation and could never have been in possession of assessee. Tribunal held that this was not relevant consideration at all. If requisite details and pertaining to transaction of purchase and sale of three flats by assessee were placed on record before Assessing Officer, then computation of capital gains by Assessing Officer was possible exercise. Commissioner merely held different opinion. In his opinion, what is relevant for purpose of such inquiry and scrutiny is that agreements should have been referred to in detail with their clauses. If they had been referred to, it would be apparent to Assessing Officer that first agreement dated March 14, 2001, is mere agreement for sale. This means neither property was handed over nor transaction was registered. It contains number of dates regarding payment made or to be received, talks of possession by December 31, 2002. Then there is rectification agreement dated October 9, 2002, and styled as deed of rectification, which not only changes number of flats under agreement but also enhances area. additional consideration of Rs. 32,87,000 was also stated to be paid. Therefore, this is not extension of earlier agreement but fresh agreement. In any event, this does not talk of possession with assessee. There there is another date for registration of agreement for purpose of stamp duty, namely, October 22, 2002. rest of dates are including date of certificate styled as "occupation certificate" issued by municipal corporation. If all these dates are taken together, then property has not been held for stipulated period. This inquiry was crucial and should have been made is submission. Having perused Commissioner's order in its entirety, what we find is that, firstly, Commissioner rendered particular finding. In his opinion, agreement for sale confers no title in immovable property. Commissioner possibly is not aware of nature of transaction and in immovable property in city of Mumbai. This agreement for sale definitely confers rights and which are capable of being enforced. They have been statutorily recognised in legislation styled as Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of Promotion of Construction Sale Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (in short "the MoFA"). Secondly, consideration thereunder had been paid and what remained was rectification or change in flat numbers and area. transaction or deal was, thus, complete but when area increased, additional consideration was paid. If there was no final or concluded contract, then possibly there was no requirement of styling subsequent document or agreement as "rectification deed". mere agreement for sale and without anything more would not require registration. However, for sale and without anything more would not require registration. However, when agreement for sale with rectification deed together were taken as document conveying immovable property that stamp authority or authorities under Bombay Stamp Act, 1958, levy assess and recover stamp duty. registration of agreement is also, therefore, on footing that it is conveyance. In such circumstances, it is not clear as to why Commissioner held another opinion. Apart therefrom only his view and opinion will not enable him to exercise power under section 263 of Income-tax Act, that is not found to be permissible in law by Tribunal. Secondly, we find very strange mode of exercise of power by Commissioner. In six paragraphs, he faults Assessing Officer for not holding any inquiry or doing proper inquiry and collecting relevant information. In paragraph 7, he holds that without prejudice to what has been observed by him earlier, even if assessee's version is to be accepted, Assessing Officer failed to apply proper indexation because separate indexation were needed for two separate sets of agreement, original agreement to sale and deed of rectification, which contained different areas and different negotiated prices. This is also nothing but his view. If his view on same set of facts pertaining to transaction alone have gone into in exercise undertaken by him and for invoking power under section 263 of Act, then we do not find that Tribunal was in error in reversing his order and not upholding his view. Tribunal has considered matter in its entirety and has held that Assessing Officer's order is not erroneous and in so far as it is prejudicial to interests of Revenue but Commissioner proceeded to exercise his power on mere change of opinion. In these circumstances, Tribunal was completely justified in reversing Commissioner's view and allowing assessee's appeal. Such order of Tribunal can hardly be termed as perverse or vitiated by any error of law apparent on face of record. Reliance placed by Mr. Chhotaray on Division Bench judgment of this court in case of CIT v. Smt. Beena K. Jain [1996] 217 ITR 363 (Bom) is completely misplaced. There court upheld order of Tribunal because residential house purchased by assessee could not have been said to be acquired and when full consideration was not paid. relevant date taken by court and, namely, payment of consideration on July 29, 1988, and subsequent date, that is, immediately on next day, assessee was put in possession, which enables it to uphold conclusion of Tribunal. It is, therefore, court dismissed Revenue's application. It is not laying down any principle of law. It is essentially on facts and taken cumulatively that Revenue's appeal/application was dismissed. In such circumstances, we do not find that this judgment can be of any assistance to Revenue. appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ms. Bina Indrakumar