JUDGMENT A. K. Jayasankaran Nambiar J.-As these writ petitions involve common issue, they are taken up together for consideration and disposed by this common judgment. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central), Cochin, is petitioner in all writ petitions, which impugn common order dated August 5, 2013, of Income-tax Settlement Commission, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as "the Settlement Commission"), accepting settlement applications preferred by (i) Sri P. A. Jose, (ii) Smt. P. P. Alphonsa, (iii) Josco Gold Corporation Pvt. Ltd., and (iv) Josco Jewellers (P.) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the assessees"), and granting said applicants immunity from penalty and prosecution under Income-tax Act, 1961. brief facts, that are necessary for disposal of writ petitions, are as follows: Pursuant to search conducted by income-tax authorities, between March 21, 2012, and July 20, 2012, in premises of assessees, notices under section 153A of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the IT Act"), were issued to them on November 29, 2012. assessees are stated to have filed returns of income for period covered by notices issued to them, on March 15, 2013, by declaring same income as was originally returned by them in course of regular assessment. Immediately thereafter, on March 19, 2013, assessees preferred applications before Settlement Commission offering additional income for purposes of settlement. application was allowed to be proceeded with by Settlement Commission, by order dated March 28, 2013, passed under section 245D(1) of Act. Thereafter, report was called for from Commissioner of Income- tax. Settlement Commission then called for reports in terms of rule 9 of Income-tax Settlement Commission (Procedure) Rules, 1997, on May, 17, 2013. Pursuant to this, Commissioner of Income-tax is stated to have filed reports on June 20, 2013, July 15, 2013, and July 23, 2013. These reports, while giving details of investigation carried out by Department against assessees and their prima facie findings in respect thereof, also contained objections of Department to accepting applications preferred by assessees for purposes of settlement. Settlement Commission, thereafter, heard matter on July 25, 2013, and July 26, 2013, and passed its final order under section 245D(4) of Act on August 5, 2013. grievance of petitioner in writ petitions is essentially against manner in which Settlement Commission proceeded to deal with its objections against accepting applications preferred by assessees for settlement. objections raised before Commission were as follows: assessees, against whom Department had launched investigation and unearthed material to show that there had been undisclosed income had, in applications filed before Settlement Commission, not effected full and true disclosure of their unaccounted income for purposes of settlement. While Department had worked out undisclosed income of assessees under five different heads, namely, (i) undervaluation of closing stock, (ii) unaccounted transaction with gold merchants/manufacturers, (iii) suppression of sales turnover, (iv) difference in purchases, and (v) amount involved in purchase of old gold in violation of provisions of section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act, assessees had disclosed additional income only under head of purchase of old gold in violation of provisions of section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act and even in that they had not effected true disclosure. In case of proprietary concerns of Sri P. A. Jose and Smt. P. P. Alphonsa, Department had collected material to show that these concerns had resorted to undervaluation of closing stock of jewellery by adopting last- in-first-out (LIFO) method of valuation. said method of valuation was not acceptable as per accounting standards and was not in consonance with weighted average cost method that was usually adopted by others engaged in same line of business. Department had gathered evidence that showed that assessees were not accounting all their transactions with goldsmiths/manufacturers in proper manner and quantification of unaccounted income under this head would have been possible, if Department was given some time. assessees had not, however, offered any additional income under this head in their applications for settlement. There was material available with Department to show that assessees had suppressed their sales turnover while returning their taxable income. material seized included data that was in digital format and, given some time, data could have been analysed to quantify extent of sales suppression. assessees had not offered any additional income under this head in their applications for settlement. analysis of digital data that was obtained by Department showed that there was significant difference between amounts shown in returns filed by assessees and that shown in digital data recovered by Department towards purchase of old gold. It was clear, therefore, that assessees had resorted to inflation of purchase price so as to show reduced gross profit for tax purposes. assessees had not offered any additional income under this head in their applications for settlement. Evidence available with Department showed that assessee had understated those transactions where they had purchased old gold from customers without complying with provisions of section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act. undisclosed income that was attributable to said transactions was huge but assessees had shown only small amount towards undisclosed income and offered same as additional income for purposes of settlement. Settlement Commission, while dealing with objections of Department, and deciding to allow applications of assessees by accepting additional amounts offered by them for settlement, found as follows with respect to said objections: As per scheme of settlement under Income-tax Act, decision, as to whether or not any further investigation was required in any particular case, was one that had to be taken by Settlement Commission before which application for settlement had been filed by applicant. search carried out by Department in instant case was spread over four months and, thereafter, Department was seized of matter for almost year, before assessees filed their application for settlement on March 18, 2013. Whatever enquiries or investigations had to be made by Department to find against assessees on undisclosed income, could have been done within that period. That not having been done, Department could not insist on further enquiry or investigation once Settlement Commission was seized of matter. Further, based on material available on record, Commission was of view that further investigation was not required in matter. As regards adoption of LIFO method of accounting, adopted by two of assessees for purposes of valuation of closing stock in their proprietary concerns, said accounting method was followed consistently for many years in past and had been accepted by Department as well. That being case and in view of fact that AS-2 accounting standard did not prohibit LIFO method and further AS-2 accounting standard was not mandatory for purposes of Incometax Act, assessees had not committed any irregularity by following LIFO method. Department has not adduced cogent evidence to substantiate their contentions with regard to alleged unaccounted transactions of assessees with goldsmiths/manufacturers. During search of assessees' premises, there was no instance of unaccounted sales or purchases detected. There was also no difference noticed in quantitative stock in any of branches of assessees. deposition of two employee goldsmiths of assessees would, however, point to possibility of some transactions having been unaccounted. To cover this and to avoid any litigation assessees were required to offer additional amount of Rs. 20,00,00,000 for all years covered by their settlement applications. With regard to alleged sales suppression for period from April 1, 2010, to April 21, 2010, it was seen that, on account of software defect that persisted for said period, there was difference in sales value, including value addition, shown in estimate and in final bill. On account of this rupee value of sales was initially entered incorrectly in books of account. This was, however, rectified subsequently by assessees and income that had not been reflected in books of account was offered for settlement. Commission was of view that disclosure made by assessees under this head was correctly done. As regards alleged difference in figures showing purchase of old gold in returns filed by assessees and data obtained from software that was seized by Department during search discrepancy pointed out by Department was matter of verification to be done by Settlement Commission. This verification was done in office of Commission and Department was also asked to be present at time of verification. Department, however, chose not to be present at time of verification and, further, did not choose to submit any report on said aspect either. Their request for some more time for recovery of relevant data from seized computers did not merit consideration because report submitted by them under rule 9 indicated that recovery of data had already been done using experts. Further, verification done by Commission revealed that there was no discrepancy and this was fortified by fact that there was no difference in stock or cash balance found at time of search of assessees' premises. No additional disclosure from assessees under this head was, therefore, necessitated. amounts shown by Department as representing transactions of purchase of gold where procedure under section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act had not been followed were incorrect. overstatement of these amounts was on account of fact that Department had not taken into account customer advance register maintained in advance soft software maintained at head office. said register contained details of receipt of old gold ornaments for future exchange under old gold advance scheme, as also details of cash advances given by customers under cash advance scheme. Although Department has case that advance soft software was fabricated one and did not really exist, deposition of Sri P. A. Jose did point to existence of scheme. appraisal report of Department also indicates that there was such scheme in existence. There was also possibility of Department not having found software at time of search as there were three other softwares that were not seized and it was not case of Department that they did not exist. analysis of software, however, of Department that they did not exist. analysis of software, however, disclosed that there was no mechanism for linking advance made under old gold advance scheme to corresponding future sale and this was shortcoming in maintenance of supporting records. However, explanation of assessees with regard to non-requirement of mentioning name of customer who deposited gold, when transaction could be linked with purchase bill number where date and time of advance receipt is mentioned was found acceptable by Commission. Commission also noted that Department only had material with regard to alleged violations under this head for assessment years 2011-12 and 2012-13 and for assessment years 200607 to 2010-11, Department had not detected any such violation and further for said years scrutiny assessments had taken place where Department did not find any discrepancy on this count. Having stated that, Commission proceeded to observe that it was possible that Assessing Officer was guided by audit reports while conducting scrutiny assessments and, hence, possibility of there having been violations of section 40A(3) in previous years could not be ruled out. additional income that was required to be offered by assessees under this head for purposes of settlement would be Rs. 20,94,00,000 for assessment years 2006-07 to 2010-11 and Rs. 9,24,00,000 for assessment years 2011-12 and 2012-13. As regards contentions of Department regarding assessees running parallel scheme, along with cash advance scheme, for introducing their own cash by showing bogus customers, there was no evidence to support such allegation. There was no such suggestion in appraisal report or in reports submitted under section 245D or under rule 9. Settlement Commission found assessees entitled for benefit of immunity from penalty and prosecution under Income-tax Act in so far as assessees had effected full and true disclosure and additional amounts offered for settlement were with view to bring quietus to matter and in spirit of settlement. prayer for waiver of interest, however, was rejected. It is these findings of Settlement Commission that are impugned in writ petitions preferred on behalf of Revenue. I have heard Sri P. K. Ravindranath Menon, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Income-tax Department as well as Sri Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of assessees in all writ petitions. submissions of learned senior counsel for Income-tax Department, briefly put are as follows: Settlement Commission erred in not giving opportunity to Department to complete investigation with regard to income that was allegedly suppressed consequent to erroneous basis adopted by two of assessees for valuation of closing stock. This amounted to violation of procedure under Act especially when there were no valid reasons to deny Department opportunity to complete investigation. Department had material with it which would show that system of accounting followed by two of assesses with respect to valuation of closing stock was wrong and not in conformity with provisions in Income- tax Act. It had been established that LIFO method of valuation of closing stock adopted by said assessees was not in conformity with practice adopted by others in same trade. system of accounting followed by assessees did not even conform to accounting practice that was known as LIFO since necessary preconditions for qualifying as LIFO did not exist in instant case. Further, mere fact that assessees were following said practice of accounting consistently would not insulate them from demand of tax if accounting practice followed by assessee was contrary to provisions of Income-tax Act. Under these circumstances, Settlement Commission ought to have noted that assessees had not offered any additional income in applications filed before Settlement Commission and, hence, their application merited rejection on ground that it did not contain full and true disclosure of undisclosed income as contemplated under scheme of settlement under Income-tax Act. Reliance is placed on decisions in Tuticorin Alkali Chemicals and Fertilizers Ltd. v. CIT [1997] 227 ITR 172 (SC) and Minister of National Revenue v. Anaconda American Brass Ltd. [1956] 30 ITR 84 (PC) in support of said contention. In respect of undisclosed income detected by Department under heads of additions under section 68 of Income-tax Act purchases from goldsmiths/manufacturers and disallowances under section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act Settlement Commission had suggested addition of various amounts under these heads, towards undisclosed income and this was accepted by assessees who offered said amounts albeit stating that they were doing it to put end to litigation and in spirit of settlement. Whatever may have been reasons for offering of additional amount by assessees, fact that they offered additional amounts showed that their initial disclosure was not full and true disclosure of their income and, hence, Settlement Commission ceased to have any jurisdiction to proceed with matter. Reliance is placed on decisions of Supreme Court in Ajmera Housing Corporation v. CIT [2010] 326 ITR 642 (SC). Settlement Commission also erred in granting immunity from penalty and prosecution to assessees without even recording their satisfaction with regard to assessees having complied with requirements of full and true disclosure. This was serious jurisdictional error committed by Settlement Commission. When it is found that Settlement Commission had acted in excess of jurisdiction while allowing applications preferred by assessees to be proceeded with and passing orders thereon, this court would be acting in accordance with its powers under article 226 of Constitution of India to quash order of Settlement Commission as one passed in excess of jurisdiction. matter would, accordingly, have to be remanded to settlement commission for considering application afresh, after conducting investigation with regard to actual amount of undisclosed income of assessees. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-assessees would contend as follows: contention of petitioner, based on decision of Supreme Court in Ajmera Housing Corporation's case (supra), that whenever there is offer of additional amounts made by assessee during course of proceedings before Commission, it would necessarily imply that original disclosure made by him was not full and true cannot be legally countenanced. Such interpretation of judgment of Supreme Court would render whole scheme of settlement under Income-tax Act meaningless. decision of Supreme Court in Ajmera Housing Corporation's case (supra) has been interpreted as one that is applicable to facts of that case and not as laying down general proposition that additional amounts cannot be offered by assessee during course of settlement proceedings in order to avoid protracted litigation and in spirit of settlement. decision of Bombay High Court in Director of Income-tax (International Taxation) v. ITSC [2014] 365 ITR 108 (Bom) is cited in support of said contention. As regards objections pointed out by petitioner with regard to method of accounting that was adopted by two of assessees, namely, LIFO method, it was not in dispute that said method of accounting was one that was in vogue and followed by others in same trade. acceptance of said method of accounting for income-tax purposes was recognised in many decisions of High Courts and Income-tax Appellate Tribunals. Further, in terms of sections 145 and 145A of Income-tax Act, LIFO method adopted by assessees could be justified on account of it being consistent method followed by assessees for over 30 years. Settlement Commission was, therefore, justified in not insisting on any additional offer from assessees under this head. As regards income arising from disallowance under section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act, it was relevant to note that cases under section 40A(3) covered two kinds of transactions with regard to purchase of old gold. Firstly, there were purchases of old gold made outright from customer against cash payments. In such cases, where payment to customer exceeded prescribed limit, procedure under section 40A(3) was complied with. In second category of cases, purchase of old gold from customers was under scheme of exchange, whereby customer could deposit his old gold with assessees and purchase gold ornaments of same weight as gold deposited, on later date, irrespective of any upward revision of price of gold in interregnum. In such cases, provisions of section 40A(3) would not get attracted on account of rule 6DD(d) of Income-tax Rules that excluded cases where payment was made by way of adjustment against amount of any liability incurred by payee for any goods supplied or services rendered by assessee to such payee from ambit of section 40A(3) of Incometax Act. existence of exchange scheme was established through evidence that was available with Department and Settlement Commission found that customer advance software that was maintained by assessees at their head office contained details of all such transactions. additional amounts offered by assessees under this head were only towards probability that income that might have escaped assessment on account of shortcoming in software used. additional amounts offered were at suggestion of Settlement Commission and not pursuant to any revision of undisclosed income by assessees. With regard to allegations of petitioners against findings of Settlement Commission under heads of "Differences in purchases" and "Additions under section 68", there is no challenge in writ petition against findings of Settlement Commission on issue of difference in purchases. As regards additions made under section 68 of Income-tax Act, although there is challenge to findings of Settlement Commission under this head in writ petition, no objections were raised before Settlement Commission at appropriate stage of proceedings before that forum. Settlement Commission nevertheless considered these aspects in their order and gave reasons for their decision on these issues. As regards jurisdiction of this court to interfere with orders passed by Settlement Commission under article 226 of Constitution of India reliance is placed on decisions in Jyotendrasinhji v. S. I. Tripathi [1993] 201 ITR 611 (SC); N. Krishnan v. Settlement Commission [1989] 180 ITR 585 (Karn); R. B. Shreeram Durga Prasad and Fatehchand Nursing Das v. Settlement Commission (IT and WT) [1989] 176 ITR 169 (SC); Shriyans Prasad Jain (decd. by legal representative) v. ITO [1993] 204 ITR 616 (SC); Union of India v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 7 GSTR 348 (SC); [2011] 40 VST 1 (SC); [2011] 4 SCC 635 and CIT v. Gopal Gupta [2014] 364 ITR 446 (Delhi) to contend that scheme of settlement contained in Chapter XIX-A of Income-tax Act is in nature of selfcontained code. It is self-contained in that it contemplates finality to issues settled, it is to be done in time bound manner and orders passed thereunder are not subjected to any appellate or revisional remedy. It follows, therefore, that in exercise of powers of judicial review, this court must keep in mind above features of Chapter XIX-A of Act and exercise its power of review only on limited grounds such as violation of statutory provisions by Commission or jurisdictional errors committed by Commission (see Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477). This court would not, in exercise of power of judicial review, assume role of appellate or revisional authority (see Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat [2013] 4 SCC 301 and Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India [2013] 5 SCC 252). On consideration of facts and circumstances of case, as also submissions made across Bar, I am of view that following issues arise for consideration in this case, namely: "(1) Whether this court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of Constitution of India, will interfere with orders passed by Settlement Commission under section 245D of Income-tax Act, 1961, and if so, to what extent? (2) Whether, on account of offer of additional amounts by assessees towards undisclosed income, at instance of Settlement Commission, it could be inferred that assessees had not made full and true disclosure of their income for purposes of settlement and thereby denuded Commission of its jurisdiction to proceed with matter? (3) Whether, in instant case, Settlement Commission was justified in refusing to Department opportunity to conduct further investigation to ascertain exact amount of income that had been allegedly undisclosed by assessees? (4) Whether findings of Settlement Commission with regard to alleged undervaluation of closing stock by two of assessees is liable to be interfered with?" Issue 1 first issue to be considered is nature of jurisdiction that is to be exercised by this court while dealing with writ petition filed under article 226 of Constitution of India challenging orders passed by Settlement Commission under Income-tax Act, 1961. It is trite that this court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of Constitution of India, does not assume role of appellate authority to conduct merit review of orders passed by Settlement Commission. Its role is confined to one of judicial review of orders of Settlement Commission by applying well-settled principles that inform exercise of such jurisdiction. Accordingly, this court would be concerned with decisionmaking process adopted by Commission and not decision itself. It would be apposite to notice some of judgments that clearly indicate that scope of enquiry of this court, in matters involving challenge to orders passed by Settlement Commission is only to see whether order of Commission complies with statutory provisions of Chapter XIX-A of Income-tax Act. Supreme Court in case of Jyotendrasinhji v. S. I. Tripathi [1993] 201 ITR 611 (SC), observed as follows at page 623: "Be that as it may, fact remains that it is open to Commission to accept amount of tax by way of settlement and to prescribe manner in which said amount shall be paid. It may condone defaults and lapses on part of assessee and may waive interest, penalties or prosecution, where it thinks appropriate. Indeed, it would be difficult to predicate reasons and considerations which induce Commission to make particular order, unless Commission itself chooses to give reasons for its order. Even if it gives reasons in given case, scope of enquiry in appeal remains same as indicated above, viz., whether it is contrary to any of provisions of Act. In this context, it is relevant to note that principle of natural justice (audi alteram partem) has been incorporated in section 245D itself. sole overall limitation upon Commission, thus, appears to be that it should act in accordance with provisions of Act. scope of enquiry, whether by High Court under article 226 or by this Court under article 136, is also same-whether order of Commission is contrary to any of provisions of Act and if so, apart from ground of bias, fraud and malice which, of course, constitute separate and independent category, has it prejudiced petitioner-appellant." Karnataka High Court in N. Krishnan v. Settlement Commission [1989] 180 ITR 585 (Karn) observed as follows at page 597 (headnote): "The provision for settlement would show that it is in nature of statutory arbitration to which person may submit himself voluntarily. Hence, many of grounds on which arbitration award could be set aside would not be available in view of nature and jurisdiction of Settlement Commission. decision of Settlement Commission could be interfered with only (i) if grave procedural defects such as violation of mandatory procedural requirements of provisions in Chapter XIX-A of Income-tax Act, 1961, and/or violation of rules of natural justice are made out; or (ii) if it is found that there is no nexus between reasons given and decision taken by Settlement Commission. court cannot interfere either with error of fact or error of law alleged to have been committed by Settlement Commission." More recently, Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. [2011] 7 GSTR 348 (SC); [2011] 40 VST 1 (SC); [2011] 4 SCC 635 observed as follows at page 643 (at page 357 of 7 GSTR): "An order passed by Settlement Commission could be interfered with only if said order is found to be contrary to any provisions of Act. So far as findings of fact recorded by Commission or question of facts are concerned, same is not open for examination either by High Court or by Supreme Court. In present case order of Settlement Commission clearly indicates that said order, particularly, with regard to imposition of simple interest at 10 per cent. per annum was passed in accordance with provisions of rule 14 but High Court wrongly interpreted said rule and thereby arrived at erroneous finding. So far as second issue with respect to interest on Rs. 50 lakhs is concerned, same being factual issue should not have been gone into by High Court exercising writ jurisdiction and High Court should not have substituted its own opinion against opinion of Settlement Commission when same was not challenged on merits." Hence, it is well settled that power of judicial review is not to be exercised to decide issue on facts or on interpretation of documents available before court. It follows, therefore, that in instant case, enquiry by this court can only be with regard to whether or not Settlement Commission exercised jurisdiction that it did not have or, alternatively, if it did have jurisdiction, whether it erred in exercise of that jurisdiction. In latter event, this court would also have to bear in mind nature of jurisdiction exercised by Settlement Commission, which is akin to statutory arbitration. Issues 2 and 3 It is case of Department in writ petitions that offer of additional amounts by assessees, over and above amounts initially disclosed by it as undisclosed income in their applications before Settlement Commission, and pursuant to suggestions of Settlement Commission in course of proceedings before it, rendered original disclosure made by them as one that was not "a full and true disclosure" of income that was not disclosed by it before Assessing Officer or manner in which such income was derived. petitioner relies heavily on decision of Supreme Court in Ajmera Housing Corporation v CIT [2010] 326 ITR 642 (SC) in support of its said contention. Before embarking upon consideration of merits of said contention of petitioner, I feel it would be apposite to notice scheme of Chapter XIX- of Income-tax Act, 1961, that deals with settlement of cases. As observed by Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in CIT v. Anjum M. H. Ghaswala [2001] 252 ITR 1 (SC), Chapter XIX-A of Act was introduced by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976, for purpose of quick settlement of cases, so that tax due to Department is collected at earliest. On perusal of relevant provisions under Act, I note that scheme provides for preferring of application by assessee, that contains full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before Assessing Officer, manner in which such income has been derived and additional amount of income-tax payable on such income. Such application is to be made to Settlement Commission, which is then to proceed with application in manner detailed thereafter. Settlement Commission is required to take preliminary decision, after hearing applicant, as to whether application deserves to be rejected or whether it should allow application to be proceeded with. If it is latter, then Settlement Commission is required to call for report from Commissioner, who has to submit said report within thirty days. On consideration of report of Commissioner, Settlement Commission can, after hearing applicant, declare applications as invalid. If it is not declared invalid, then Settlement Commission proceeds to call for records from Commissioner. On receipt of records from Commissioner and after examining it, if Settlement Commission feels that any further enquiry or investigation is required in matter, it may direct Commissioner to make or cause to be made such further enquiry or investigation and furnish report on matters covered by application and any other matter relating to case. Commissioner has then to furnish said report to Settlement Commission within period of ninety days. Settlement Commission then proceeds to pass final orders in matter, after perusing report of Commissioner, if any, and after giving assessee and Commissioner opportunity of being heard. Settlement Commission can also pass orders granting immunity to applicant from penalty and prosecution under Income-tax Act. Such orders can be passed on Settlement Commission being satisfied that applicant has co- operated with Commission in proceedings before it and has made full and true disclosure of his income and manner in which such income has been derived. orders passed by Settlement Commission are to be conclusive as to matters stated therein in terms of section 245-I of Income- tax Act and will be rendered void only if it is subsequently found by Settlement Commission that orders were obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. It is apparent from perusal of scheme of Chapter XIX-A of Income-tax Act that jurisdictional fact that confers Settlement Commission with jurisdiction to proceed with application is filing by applicant of application that contains full and true disclosure of his income which has not been disclosed before Assessing Officer, manner in which such income has been derived and additional amount of income-tax payable on such income. If, at any stage of proceedings before Settlement Commission, it finds that disclosure made by applicant is not full and true disclosure, then said authority cannot proceed further with application. It gets denuded of its jurisdiction to proceed with matter. It is in backdrop of this fact that I must analyse decision of Supreme Court in case of Ajmera Housing Corporation (supra) that has been relied upon by petitioner. It must, at once be noted that provisions of Chapter XIX-A that were analysed by Supreme Court in that case were slightly different from those under consideration in instant case in that, it was provisions, as they stood prior to amendments introduced by Finance Act, 2007, that were considered by Supreme Court. Moreover, Supreme Court was considering case of assessee who had suo motu revised his declaration, by making offers of additional amounts by way of disclosure of income at various stages of proceedings before Settlement Commission. Under those circumstances, court found that, judging by assessee's own conduct, his original application could not be seen as containing full and true disclosure of his income for purposes of settlement under Act. relevant observations in judgment of Supreme Court are to be found in paragraphs 27, 31, 36 and 39 and are extracted hereunder (page 653 of 326 ITR): "It is clear that disclosure of'full and true' particulars of undisclosed income and'the manner' in which such income had been derived are pre-requisites for valid application under section 245C(1) of Act. Additionally, amount of income-tax payable on such undisclosed income is to be computed and mentioned in application. It needs little emphasis that section 245C(1) of Act mandates'full and true' disclosure of particulars of undisclosed income and'the manner' in which such income was derived and, therefore, unless Settlement Commission records its satisfaction on this aspect, it will not have jurisdiction to pass any order on matter covered by application... It is plain from language of sub-section (4) of section 245D of Act It is plain from language of sub-section (4) of section 245D of Act that jurisdiction of Settlement Commission to pass such orders as it may think fit is confined to matters covered by application and it can extend only to such matters which are referred to in report of Commissioner under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) of said section. A'full and true' disclosure of income, which had not been previously disclosed by assessee, being pre-condition for valid application under section 245(1) of Act, scheme of Chapter XIX-A does not contemplate revision of income so disclosed in application against item No. 11 of Form. Moreover, if assessee is permitted to revise his disclosure, in essence, he would be making fresh application in relation to same case by withdrawing earlier application. In this regard, section 245(3) of Act which prohibits withdrawal of application once made under sub-section (1) of said section is instructive inasmuch as it manifests that assessee cannot be permitted to resile from his stand at any stage during proceedings. Therefore, by revising application, applicant would be achieving something indirectly what he cannot otherwise achieve directly and in process rendering provision of sub-section (3) of section 245C of Act otiose and meaningless. In our opinion, scheme of said Chapter is clear and admits of no ambiguity... We are convinced that, in instant case, disclosure of Rs. 11.41 crores as additional undisclosed income in revised annexure, filed on September 19, 1994, alone was sufficient to establish that application made by assessee on September 30, 1993, under section 245C (1) of Act could not be entertained as it did not contain a'true and full' disclosure of their undisclosed income and'the manner' in which such income had been derived. However, we say nothing more on this aspect of matter as Commissioner, for reasons best known to him, has chosen not to challenge this part of impugned order... Apart from fact, as explained above, revison of annexure is tantamount to revison of application, not contemplated in scheme, withholding of information regarding filing of revised annexure, disclosing undisclosed income of Rs. 11.41 crores as against income of Rs. 1.94 crores, disclosed in annexure forming part of application, deprived Commissioner of his right to object to maintainability of assessee's application on ground that assessee had not made true and full disclosure of their income in previous application, foundational requirement of valid application under section 245C(1) of Act. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in rejecting argument." issue to be considered here is whether observations of Supreme Court in aforementioned judgment are to be taken to mean that in every case where applicant makes offer of additional amounts, even at instance or suggestion of Settlement Commission, it would follow that original declaration made by applicant did not contain full and true disclosure of his income and thereby rendering it invalid and, consequently, denuding Settlement Commission of its jurisdiction to proceed further in matter? In my view, such interpretation would render meaningless scheme of settlement that is envisaged under Income-tax Act. One cannot discount possibility of Settlement Commission finding disclosure of income made by assessee as being full and true and yet requiring minor adjustments to include even those amounts, which though disputed by assessee, would nevertheless be offered by assessee in interests of putting end to litigation and in spirit of settlement. These could be amounts, in respect of which, neither Department nor assessee have sufficient material to substantiate their contentions but assessee is nevertheless willing to give up his claim in interests of finality to litigation. consent by assessee to forgo such amounts, at suggestion of Settlement Commission, cannot have effect of rendering his original disclosure dubious for purposes of settlement under Act. In my opinion, it is only in those cases where assessee resiles from his original declaration of undisclosed income, by suo motu effecting revisions thereto, that he renders his application invalid for purposes of settlement. In cases where additional amounts are offered by assessee, pursuant to relinquishment of his claims with regard to non-taxability of such income, it would not be case where assessee is resiling from his original stand as regards undisclosed income. In latter type of cases, Settlement Commission would be well within its jurisdiction to include such amounts in final amount for which case before it is settled with assessee. In taking said view, I am fortified by decision of Bombay High Court in DIT (International Taxation) v. ITSC [2014] 365 ITR 108 (Bom). I must now turn to proceedings before Settlement Commission in instant case to ascertain circumstances under which suggestion with regard to offer of additional income was made to assessees and reasons therefor. This is to ensure that Settlement Commission acted bona fide and, therefore, within its jurisdiction, while directing assessees to make offer of additional amounts. additional amounts, it will be noted, were offered under heads of (i) "unaccounted transactions of assessees with goldsmiths/manufacturers" and (ii) "transactions of purchase of gold where procedure under section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act had not been followed". As regards (i) above, it is clear from perusal of Settlement Commission's order that Department had not adduced cogent evidence to substantiate their contentions with regard to alleged unaccounted transactions of assessees with goldsmiths/manufacturers. During search of assessees' premises, there was no instance of unaccounted sales or purchases detected. There was also no difference noticed in quantitative stock in any of branches of assessees. There was only uncorroborated deposition of two employee goldsmiths of assessees that pointed to possibility of some transactions having been unaccounted. To cover this, and to avoid any litigation, assessees were required to offer additional amount of Rs. 20,00,00,000 for all years covered by their settlement application. As regards (ii) above, Settlement Commission found that amounts shown by Department, as representing transactions of purchase of gold where procedure under section 40A(3) of Income-tax Act had not been followed were incorrect. overstatement of these amounts was on account of fact that Department had not taken into account customer advance register maintained in advance soft software maintained at head office. said register contained details of receipt of old gold ornaments for future exchange under old gold advance scheme, as also details of cash advances given by customers under cash advance scheme. Although Department had case that advance soft software was fabricated one and did not really exist, deposition of Sri P. A. Jose did point to existence of such scheme. appraisal report of Department also indicated that there was such scheme in existence. There was also possibility of Department not having found software at time of search as there were three other softwares that were not seized and it was not case of Department that they did not exist. Thereafter, Settlement Commission proceeded to verify data contained in software that was not seized by Department with data in software that was seized. This verification was done through officers in Settlement Commission itself. It is significant to note that Department did not choose to participate in said verification process for reasons best known to them. Thereafter, assessee was asked to demonstrate working of software before Assessing Officer in Cochin. This was also done but Department chose not to file any objections with Settlement Commission with regard to data contained in software. It was, thereafter, that Settlement Commission, on analysis of software, found that there was no mechanism for linking advance made under old gold advance scheme to corresponding future sale and this was shortcoming in maintenance of supporting records. However, explanation of assessees with regard to non-requirement of mentioning name of customer who deposited gold, when transaction could be linked with purchase bill number where date and time of advance receipt is mentioned, was found acceptable by Commission. Commission also noted that Department only had material with regard to alleged violations under this head for assessment years 2011-12 and 2012-13 and for assessment years 2006-07 to 2010-11, Department had not detected any such violation and further, for said years scrutiny assessments had taken place where Department did not find any discrepancy on this count. Under said circumstances, Commission proceeded to observe that it was possible that Assessing Officer was guided by audit reports while conducting scrutiny assessments and, hence, possibility of there having been violations of section 40A(3) in previous years could not be ruled out. additional income that was required to be offered by assessees under this head, for purposes of settlement, was fixed at Rs. 20,94,00,000 for assessment years 2006-07 to 2010-11 and Rs. 9,24,00,000 for assessment years 2011-12 and 2012-13. consideration of circumstances under which assessee was called upon to offer additional amounts for purposes of settlement under heads (i) and (ii) above would clearly reveal that offer of additional amounts made by assessees was only to put quietus to litigation with Department and in spirit of settlement. suggestions by Settlement Commission and acceptance of offer of additional amounts from assessees for purposes of settlement cannot be seen as having rendered invalid original declaration made by assessees before Commission either for purposes of settlement of tax liabilities or for grant of immunity from penalty and prosecution under Act especially when Commission finds that assessees had cooperated in proceedings before it. Further, Settlement Commission had examined material available with Department to find that there was no requirement of any further investigation and that verification of material already available would suffice for purposes of determining whether assessees had failed to disclose any income for purposes of settlement. Department, which did not participate in verification proceedings, or raise any timely objection to it before Settlement Commission cannot be heard to complain of any violation of procedure by Settlement Commission at this belated stage. I find order of Settlement Commission to be legal and valid in all respects, including grant of immunity to assessees, and not liable to be interfered with in present proceedings. Issue 4 Lastly, I must deal with issue as to whether findings of Settlement Commission with regard to alleged undervaluation of closing stock by two of assessees is liable to be interfered with. In deciding this issue, I must remind myself of jurisdiction that I am called upon to exercise, as already noted while answering issue 1 above. contention of Department before Settlement Commission was that it had material to show that business concerns of two of assessees had resorted to undervaluation of closing stock of jewellery by adopting last-in-firstout (LIFO) method of valuation. said method of valuation, according to Department, was not acceptable as per accounting standards and was not in consonance with weighted average cost method that was usually adopted by others engaged in same line of business. Settlement Commission found that said accounting method was followed consistently for many years in past and had been accepted by Department as well. That being case, and in view of fact that AS-2 accounting standard did not prohibit LIFO method and further AS-2 accounting standard was not mandatory for purposes of Income-tax Act, assessees had not committed any irregularity by following LIFO method. As matter of fact, it will be seen from perusal of order of Settlement Commission that it has dealt with objections of Department at some length and given reasons as to why it felt that there was no merit in contention of Department that adoption of LIFO method of valuation of closing stock did not have effect of distorting real profits earned by assessees. It was under those circumstances that Commission found that declaration of assessees, vis-a-vis this objection of Department, was full and true disclosure for purposes of settlement. I do not find any valid ground to interfere with said finding of Settlement Commission. Resultantly, writ petitions, in their challenge to final order dated August 5, 2013, of Income-tax Settlement Commission, fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Settlement Commission (IT & WT)