JUDGMENT petitioner submitted application under section 10(23C)(vi) of Income-tax Act, 1961 for assessment year 2013-14 on March 19, 2014. notice to show cause was issued to petitioner on April 9, 2014, to explain why its application should not be rejected on ground that it was filed beyond stipulated date of 30th September of relevant assessment year from which exemption was sought. Since petitioner had filed application beyond September 30, 2013, it sought condonation of delay in filing application. Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax, Kanpur, by his impugned order dated April 25, 2014, has declined to entertain application on ground that it was filed beyond stipulated date. relevant proviso in section 10(23C)(vi) of Act provides as follows: "Provided also that in case fund or trust or institution or any university or other educational institution or any hospital or other medical institution referred to in first proviso makes application on or after 1st day of June, 2006, for purposes of grant of exemption or continuance thereof, such application shall be made on or before 30th day of September of relevant assessment year from which exemption is sought:" submission, which has been urged, is that power which has now been conferred upon Chief Commissioner was earlier vested in Central Board of Direct Taxes which, under section 119(2)(b) of Act, has power in cases of genuine hardship to authorise by general or special order any income-tax authority not being Commissioner (Appeals) to admit application or claim after expiry of period specified by Act. Hence, it was submitted that once power under aforesaid proviso has now been vested with Chief Commissioner, he must necessarily have all ancillary and incidental powers including power to condone delay. Act. Legislature has carefully included stipulation that in case of, inter alia, fund, trust, institution, university, educational institution, hospital or other medical institution, application for purposes of grant or continuance of exemption shall be made on or before 30th day of September of relevant assessment year from which exemption is sought. Chief Commissioner, in whom power is vested, is not court within meaning of section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. Even if provisions of section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963, are considered in context of fiscal legislation, principle of law that must govern is as laid down in judgment of three learned judges of Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India P. Ltd. [2009] 315 ITR 449 (SC); [2009] 5 SCC 791. In that context, Supreme Court has held as follows (page 459 of 315 ITR): "Though argument was raised based on section 29 of Limitation Act, even assuming that section 29(2) would be attracted, what we have to determine is whether provisions of this section are expressly excluded in case of reference to High Court. It was contended before us that words'expressly excluded' would mean that there must be express reference made in special or local law to specific provisions of Limitation Act of which operation is to be excluded. In this regard, we have to see scheme of special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. nature of remedy provided therein is such that Legislature intended it to be complete code by itself which alone should govern several matters provided by it. If, on examination of relevant provisions, it is clear that provisions of Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement provisions of Act. In our considered view, that even in case where special law does not exclude provisions of sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act by express reference, it would none less be open to court to examine whether and to what extent, nature of those provisions or nature of subject matter and scheme of special law exclude their operation. In other words, applicability of provisions of Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not from terms of Limitation Act but by provisions of Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference application to High Court. scheme of Central Excise Act, 1944, supports conclusion that time limit prescribed under section 35H(1) to make reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under section 5 of Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is duty of court to respect legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking provisions of section 5 of Act." In view of principle of law which has been laid down in aforesaid decision, there is no basis or foundation in submission that delay in filing decision, there is no basis or foundation in submission that delay in filing application for exemption under section 10(23C)(vi) of Act beyond statutory date of September 30, 2013, should have been condoned. As matter of fact, court is informed that petitioner has already filed application under section 10(23C)(vi), though for assessment year 2014-15. decision of Division Bench of Orissa High Court in Padmashree Krutarth Acharya Institute of Engineering and Technology v. Chief CIT [2009] 309 ITR 13 (Orissa); [2009] 222 CTR 516 (Orissa) merely directed Chief Commissioner to consider application for condonation of delay in filing application. Division Bench had carefully directed that whether delay should be condoned or not, should be decided by Commissioner. Hence, decision will not help case of petitioner. For these reasons, we have come to conclusion that impugned order of Principal Chief Commissioner does not suffer from any error. petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. *** I. D. Education Society v. Principal Chief Commissioner of Income-tax