D. V. Mercy v. Income-tax Officer
[Citation -2014-LL-1014-53]

Citation 2014-LL-1014-53
Appellant Name D. V. Mercy
Respondent Name Income-tax Officer
Court HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 14/10/2014
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags opportunity of being heard • reasonable opportunity • sufficient compliance • transfer of property • self-assessment tax • immovable property • natural justice • speaking order • enquiry report • advance tax
Bot Summary: JUDGMENT T. S. Sivagnanam J.-The petitioner initially filed this writ petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to transfer the income-tax files relating to the late Mr. Y. Victor, the husband of the first petitioner and the father of the second petitioner, from the file of the Income-tax Officer, Ward I, Tanjore, to the file of respondents Nos. During the pendency of the writ petition, this court passed an interim order on February 3, 2014, directing the respondents to report the decision of the second respondent on the request made by the petitioner for transferring the income-tax files to respondents Nos. Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the first petitioner was residing with her husband at Tanjore till 2008, after which they moved to Chennai. Further, the learned counsel submitted that all the properties of the petitioner's husband as well as the petitioner are situated at Tanjore District and the petitioner's husband's residence is about 500 metres away from the Income-tax Officer, Tanjore, and the properties sold are at Tanjore and the second son of the first petitioner is also residing at Tanjore and all the details could be collected from the office of the Sub-Registrar and banks at Tanjore. In the light of the above facts, it is submitted that the order passed by the second respondent rejecting the petitioner's request for transfer of the income-tax files is perfectly justified and the power under section 127 of the Income-tax Act to transfer cases vest the Director General or the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner after giving the assessee a reasonable opportunity of hearing in the matter, wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons for doing so the transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers also subordinate to him. The said order was passed on an application made by the petitioner seeking for transfer of the file from a particular Income-tax Officer to some other officer on the ground that the said officer was teasing and harassing the second petitioner as well as the company and the petitioners' apprehended that they would be denied jurisdiction in the hands of the said Income-tax Officer. The Revenue in defence of the impugned order stated that a statute can, in appropriate cases, exclude the principle of natural justice since the assessee has no legal right of being assessed by any particular Assessing Officer; that section 127 of the Income-tax Act restricts the obligation of hearing and passing a speaking order only when the case is to be transferred suo motu; that section 127 of the Income-tax Act excludes by necessary implication an opportunity of hearing when there is refusal to transfer and that, in any case, perusal of the contents of an application made by the petitioner and the enquiry report obtained from the Assessing Officer is sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice.


JUDGMENT T. S. Sivagnanam J.-The petitioner initially filed this writ petition for issuance of writ of mandamus directing second respondent to transfer income-tax files relating to late Mr. Y. Victor, husband of first petitioner and father of second petitioner, from file of Income-tax Officer, Ward I (2), Tanjore, to file of respondents Nos. 3 and 4. During pendency of writ petition, this court passed interim order on February 3, 2014, directing respondents to report decision of second respondent on request made by petitioner for transferring income-tax files to respondents Nos. 3 and 4. second respondent passed order dated February 18, 2014, rejecting petitioner's request. Therefore, petitioner filed M. P. No. 1 of 2014 to amend prayer in writ petition for issuance of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash order dated February 18, 2014, and for consequential direction to second respondent to transfer income-tax files of late Mr. Y. Victor from jurisdiction of first respondent to respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Mrs. Chitra Sampath, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners, submitted that first petitioner was residing with her husband at Tanjore till 2008, after which they moved to Chennai. That petitioner's husband as well as petitioner are income-tax assessees and petitioner's husband died on March 29, 2013, leaving behind petitioners herein and another son and daughter as his legal heirs. first petitioner would state that she is now staying with her elder son at Chennai. It is further submitted that first respondent issued notices to first petitioner and her two sons under section 148 of Income-tax Act on July 29, 2013, calling upon them to produce accounts and documents pertaining to estate of late Mr. Y. Victor from assessment years 2009-10 till 2012 and notice under section 142(1) of Income-tax Act for assessment year 2012-13. Further, learned counsel would state that first petitioner was not aware of dealings and transactions done by her husband nor was she aware of non-filing of returns of her husband from assessment year 2009 onwards. Pursuant to notice, first petitioner appeared through her auditor before first respondent and requested that all future notices may be sent to her Chennai address. petitioner paid sum of Rs. 50,00,000 as advance tax to account of late Mr. Y. Victor. It is further submitted that petitioner sought for transfer of files from Tanjore to Chennai since it would be convenient for first petitioner and her son, second petitioner, who are at Chennai and they have already filed returns at Chennai and after files were transferred from Tanjore to Chennai, assessment would be completed. learned counsel further submitted that impugned order passed by second respondent suffers from errors apparent on face of record and there is no justification for retaining files at Tanjore and without considering fact that no prejudice would be caused to Department, if files are transferred to Chennai. Further, it is submitted that merely because notices were issued at Tanjore and statement of petitioner's son was recorded at Tanjore, it cannot be ground to compel petitioners, who are permanently residing at Chennai to travel from Chennai to Tanjore on each occasion for participating in assessment proceedings. Further, it is submitted that existence of properties of Tanjore alone cannot be ground for retaining files at Tanjore since petitioners-assessees have shifted permanent place of residence to Chennai as early as 2008. Further, it is submitted that except issuing notice under provisions of Act, first respondent has not heard petitioners on returns filed and, therefore, it is incorrect to state that proceedings have progressed and, therefore, ground on which, request made by petitioner was rejected is not sustainable in law. Further, it is stated that late Mr. Y. Victor had not filed returns for assessment year 2007-08 and no notice was received by petitioners for assessment year 2007-08 or for assessment year 2008-09 and, therefore, conclusion of second respondent is totally baseless and rejection of request is solely on ground that petitioner had approached this court for necessary relief. In support of above contentions, reliance was placed on decision of hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Bombay in case of Devidas v. Union of India reported in [1993] 200 ITR 697 (Bom) and decision of High Court of Kerala in case of Benz Corporation v. ITO reported in [1998] 232 ITR 807 (Ker). Mr. T. Pramod Kumar Chopda, learned standing counsel appearing for respondents, sought to sustain impugned proceedings by contending that late Mr. Y. Victor sold immovable property at Tanjore for total consideration of Rs. 5,11,20,000 on April 7, 2011, but no return of income was filed by late Mr. Y. Victor for capital gains arising out of transfer of property assets. Further, it is submitted that during course of enquiry done with brother of second petitioner, it came to notice of Department that late Mr. Y. Victor and first petitioner sold numerous plots over years and have not filed returns of income from assessment year 2007-08 onwards. Further, it is submitted that late Mr. Y. Victor has not made any investment in his name by using sale proceeds for claiming exemption under section 54F of Income-tax Act relating to assessment year 2012-13. Therefore, it is submitted that since income assessed to tax has escaped from assessment both in case of late Mr. Y. Victor as well as first petitioner, notice was issued under section 148 of Income-tax Act for assessment years 2009-10 to 2011-12 and, subsequently, notices were issued for assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-2009 after obtaining prior approval from Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Tanjore. Further, notice was issued under section 142(1) of Income-tax Act in case of late Mr. Y. Victor for assessment year 2012-13. It is submitted that after receipt of notices, petitioners instead of filing return of income before first respondent, who had issued notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act they have manually filed return for assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11 on November 26, 2013, before Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Business Circle III, Chennai, admitting total income of Rs. 13,88,500 and Rs. 18,93,310, respectively. It is further submitted that though in said two returns, petitioners have quantified self-assessment tax for said assessment years, same was paid only on January 31, 2014, in response to letter of Assessing Officer, dated January 16, 2014. Further, it is submitted that fact that petitioners have filed their returns at Chennai, came to knowledge of first respondent only pursuant to letter dated December 16, 2013, from Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax Business Circle-III, Chennai, wherein clarification was sought for pertaining to details of pending proceedings and on question of jurisdiction. Further, it is submitted that first respondent issued summons under section 131 of Income-tax Act calling upon petitioners to appear on November 27, 2013. However, petitioners failed to respond by said summons. Further, learned counsel submitted that all properties of petitioner's husband as well as petitioner are situated at Tanjore District and petitioner's husband's residence is about 500 metres away from Income-tax Officer, Tanjore, and properties sold are at Tanjore and second son of first petitioner is also residing at Tanjore and all details could be collected from office of Sub-Registrar and banks at Tanjore. Further, it is stated that there are other properties which are unsold, which are also situated in Tanjore. In light of above facts, it is submitted that order passed by second respondent rejecting petitioner's request for transfer of income-tax files is perfectly justified and power under section 127 of Income-tax Act to transfer cases vest Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner after giving assessee reasonable opportunity of hearing in matter, wherever it is possible to do so and after recording reasons for doing so transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers also subordinate to him. Therefore, it is submitted that petitioner cannot compel Department to transfer files from Tanjore to Chennai merely on ground that it is convenient to first petitioner to attend assessment proceedings at Chennai. It is further submitted that since all properties and transactions were within jurisdiction of first respondent, second respondent rightly rejected request for transfer. Heard learned counsel appearing on either side and perused materials placed on record. Section 127 of Income-tax Act deals with power of transfer of cases and said provision reads as follows: "127. Power to transfer cases.-(1) Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may, after giving assessee reasonable opportunity of being heard in matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from one or more Assessing Officers subordinate to him (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) also subordinate to him. (2) Where Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers from whom case is to be transferred and Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers to whom case is to be transferred are not subordinate to same Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner,- (a) where Directors General or Chief Commissioners or Commissioners, to whom such Assessing Officers are subordinate are in agreement, then Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner from whose jurisdiction case is to be transferred may, after giving assessee reasonable opportunity of being heard in matter, wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, pass order; (b) where Directors General or Chief Commissioners or Commissioners aforesaid are not in agreement, order transferring case may, similarly, be passed by Board or any such Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner as Board may, by notification in Official Gazette, authorise in this behalf. (3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be deemed to require any such opportunity to be given where transfer is from any Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) to any other Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction) and offices of all such officers are situated in same city, locality or place. (4) transfer of case under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) may be made at any stage of proceedings, and shall not render necessary reissue of any notice already issued by Assessing Officer or Assessing Officers from whom case is transferred. Explanation.-In section 120 and this section, word'case', in relation to any person whose name is specified in any order or direction issued thereunder, means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after date of such order or direction in respect of any year." On reading of above provision, it is seen that object for which such provision was enacted is for purpose of administrative convenience. said provision does not empower Assessing Officer to transfer case from his jurisdiction to that of nature and even when Director General or Chief Commissioner or Commissioner exercising such power, can transfer any case after recording his reasons for doing so. For purpose of recording reasons, it is obvious that Commissioner has to consider circumstances involved in each case. Undoubtedly, first respondent has initiated proceedings since returns were to be filed before first respondent since late Mr. Y. Victor as well as first petitioner were residing in Tanjore and transaction from 2007 onwards were done at Tanjore. Admittedly, Commissioner did not exercise jurisdiction under section 127 of Act but it is request made by first petitioner on ground that it would be convenient for her to partake of in assessment proceedings, as she has shifted her permanent residence to Chennai. reason stated for issuing notice under section 148 of Income-tax Act for reopening is on ground that no returns were filed by first petitioner's husband from 2007 onwards. Admittedly, petitioner's husband passed away in 2013. When transactions have taken place within jurisdiction of first respondent and transaction pertained to immovable property, petitioners cannot insist that files should be transferred from Tanjore to Chennai solely on ground that it would be convenient for first petitioner to partake of in assessment proceedings. In case of Autofin Ltd. v. CIT reported in [1977] 106 ITR 638 (AP), writ petition was filed before Andhra Pradesh High Court to quash order passed by Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad, dated October 20, 1972. said order was passed on application made by petitioner seeking for transfer of file from particular Income-tax Officer to some other officer on ground that said officer was teasing and harassing second petitioner as well as company and, therefore, petitioners' apprehended that they would be denied jurisdiction in hands of said Income-tax Officer. Commissioner of Income-tax called for report from Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Incometax and passed order stating that Assistant Commissioner of Incometax and passed order stating that transfer could not be effected at that stage, as arrears assessment are pending, which have to be completed expeditiously and petitioner was requested to co-operate with Income-tax Officer in expeditious completion of assessment and in case of any difficulty, he could contact Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Range-IV, Hyderabad. Challenging said order, petitioners filed writ petition before Andhra Pradesh High Court contending that Commissioner did not deal with petitioner's application for transfer and it is Income-tax Officer that communicated order and power under section 127 of Income-tax Act was not exercised. However, this was found to be wrong submission since files disclosed by Commissioner exercised power under section 127 of Income-tax Act. It was next contended that petitioners were not given opportunity to make their representation before impugned order was passed. court, after taking note of section 127 of Income-tax Act, as amended in 1967, pointed out that sub-section (1) of section 127 provides for giving assessee has reasonable opportunity of being heard in matter, wherever, it is possible to do so, and reasons should be recorded for transfer of case from any Income- tax Officer to any other Income-tax Officer and similar power could be exercised by Board but proviso to sub-section (1) of section 127 of Income-tax Act states that such opportunity need not be given where transfer is from any Income-tax Officer to any other Income-tax Officer and officers of all such Income-tax Officers are situated in same city, locality or place. It was further pointed out that Commissioner in said case did not transfer case and, therefore, question of giving opportunity of being heard or giving reasons in matter as required by section 127(1) of Income-tax Act does not arise. It is further pointed out that assessee also could move either Commissioner or Board for transfer of his case and there is no reason as to why power should be exercised only suo motu and not on application of assessee. It was further held that Commissioner was bound to exercise power of transfer in accordance with section 127 of Income-tax Act if proper grounds are made out. After holding that assessee can also seek for invoking power under section 127 of Income-tax Act it was held that it is for Commissioner or Board to consider and decide whether case is fit one for exercising jurisdiction conferred by section 127 of Income-tax Act. On question as to whether such order could be interfered under article 226 of Constitution, it was pointed out that question whether circumstances warrant transfer or not is matter for consideration and decision by Commissioner and Commissioner on consideration of representation of petitioners and report was satisfied that it is not fit case for transfer and such circumstances, court will be reluctant to interfere under article 226 of Constitution with discretion exercised by Commissioner unless there is patent error of law or error apparent on face of record. Therefore, writ petition came to be dismissed by holding that under article 226 of Constitution, writ court would not normally interfered with discretion exercised by Commissioner under section 127 of Income-tax Act unless order is ex facie perverse or vitiated by any patent error. I am in respectful agreement with view taken by hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh in aforesaid decision. learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners placed reliance on decision of hon'ble High Court of Bombay in case of Devidas v. Union of India, referred to supra, and submitted that total scheme relating to jurisdiction and transfer under sections 120, 124 and 127 of Income-tax Act is proportionate mix of consideration for convenience of assessee and interests of Revenue and it aims at striking balance between private and public interest. question which fell for consideration, in said case, was whether assessee under Income-tax Act was entitled to reasonable opportunity of hearing and reasoned order when his application calling in question jurisdiction of Assessing Officer and for transfer of case to other Assessing Officer is rejected. Revenue in defence of impugned order stated that statute can, in appropriate cases, exclude principle of natural justice since assessee has no legal right of being assessed by any particular Assessing Officer; that section 127 of Income-tax Act restricts obligation of hearing and passing speaking order only when case is to be transferred suo motu; that section 127 of Income-tax Act excludes by necessary implication opportunity of hearing when there is refusal to transfer and that, in any case, perusal of contents of application made by petitioner and enquiry report obtained from Assessing Officer is sufficient compliance with principles of natural justice. After taking note of observations made by Delhi High Court in case of Kanji Mal and Sons v. CIT reported in [1982] 138 ITR 391 (Delhi), Devi Dayal Marwah v. CIT reported in [1964] 52 ITR 829 (AP) and decision in case of Autofin Ltd. v. CIT, referred to supra, it was held that it is true that section 127 of Income-tax Act refers to suo motu jurisdiction but it is settled law that such jurisdiction can be triggered either by assessee or Revenue and power is conferred to remedy any injustice and it is always open to bring to notice any error, illegality or injustice. On examining impugned order which was subject matter of said case, it was held to be vitiated because of absence of hearing and recording of reasons. However, it was held that no hard and fast rule can be laid down about extent and manner of hearing and reasons to be recorded and all depends upon facts and circumstances on each case. Therefore, High Court of Bombay though culled out legal position and observed that there can be no hard and fast rule and extent and manner of hearing and reasons depend on facts and circumstances of each case. On facts of said case, court was satisfied that impugned order therein was vitiated because of absence of hearing and recording of reasons. High Court of Kerala in case of Benz Corporation v. ITO (supra), held that power of transfer under section 127(1) of Incometax Act is quasi-judicial one and such power has to be exercised in fair and reasonable manner and not in arbitrary or mechanical way and passing reasoned order is one of requirements of fairness in action. In said case, Department issued notice proposing to transfer files and called for objections from assessee, who filed his objections and without reference to objections, notification was issued for transfer. Therefore, court interfered with said order and remanded matter to Chief Commissioner to take decision afresh. In case on hand, it is petitioner, who sought for transfer by representation dated February 12, 2014, submitted through assessee's representative in person on date of hearing. second respondent representative in person on date of hearing. second respondent considered representation, called for report from Assessing Officer and contentions raised by representative of assessee was considered and reasoned order has been passed. It is to be noted that as first petitioner- assessee stating that she has permanently shifted her residence to Chennai, on sole ground of her convenience, she seeks for transfer of files. It is to be noted that assessee in default was not only first respondent but also her husband, late Mr. Y. Victor, as well. No returns were filed from assessment year 2007-08 onwards and during relevant period, there were several sale transactions in respect of properties situated at Tanjore which would fall within jurisdiction of first respondent. It is only after notices were issued under sections 148, 142(1) of Income-tax Act returns were filed at Chennai for assessment years 2009-10 and 2010-11, but were not filed before first respondent. Assessing Officer in his report has specifically stated that fact that returns were filed at Chennai came to his knowledge only after letter was received from Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Business Circle-III, Chennai, dated December 16, 2013, to clarify details of pendency and jurisdiction for further action. petitioner did not respond to summons issued by first respondent under section 131 of Income-tax Act and failed to appear before Assessing Officer. Therefore, Assessing Officer opined that assessee was not co-operating with Department and avoiding further enquiry. That apart, younger son of first petitioner was residing permanently at Tanjore, who could very well collect required particulars from banks at Tanjore and Sub-Registrar Office, Tanjore, and other immovable properties, which were retained by family were situated in Tanjore District. Further, statement has also been recorded from first petitioner's younger son under section 131 of Income-tax Act. Therefore, impugned proceedings cannot be stated to be order either arbitrary or erroneous, more so, when second respondent has recorded reasons. Therefore, decisions relied upon by learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners are clearly distinguishable on facts and as held by High Court of Bombay in case of Devidas v. Union of India (supra), there cannot be any hard and fast rule in such matters. Thus, impugned order being reasoned order and nothing has been placed before this court to show that impugned order is either ex facie perverse or vitiated by any patent error and that power under section 127 of Income-tax Act could be exercised in accordance with said section, if proper grounds are made out. In impugned order reasons have been assigned for rejecting request for transfer, which is based on records. In such circumstances, this court is not inclined to interfere with discretion exercised by second respondent in refusing to transfer case from Tanjore to Chennai. In result, writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. *** D. V. Mercy v. Income-tax Officer
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