JUDGMENT Leave granted. These appeals arise out of common judgment and order passed by High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Income-tax Appeal No. 112 of 2008 and other appeals dated June 22, 2009. By impugned CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat [2009] 317 ITR 342 (MP). judgment and order, High Court has concluded, firstly, that since Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") has recorded finding of fact that respondent herein is public religious trust, in exercise of its powers under section 260A of Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short "the Act") it would not be interfering with such finding of fact and, secondly, that respondent being public religious trust, provisions of section 13(1)(b) would not be applicable to it and, therefore, dismissed appeal filed by Revenue confirming orders passed by Tribunal, dated March 28, 2008. Propter commoditatem, we would refer to conspectus of facts in lead case for disposal of instant batch of appeals. respondent is registered public trust under M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951. respondent had filed application for registration before Commissioner of Income-tax (for short "the Commissioner") as envisaged under section 12A read with section 12AA of Act for availing of exemption under section 11 of Act. Commissioner, after affording opportunity of hearing to applicants, had come to conclusion that respondent is charitable trust and since object and purpose of trust is confined only to particular religious community same would attract provisions of section 13(1)(b) of Act and, therefore, declined prayer made for registration of trust by his order dated September 14, 2007. Aggrieved by order so passed, respondent had carried matter by way of appeal before Tribunal. Tribunal, after going through objects of respondent-trust, has come to conclusion that respondent is public religious trust as objects of trust are wholly religious in nature and, thus, provisions of section 13(1)(b) which are otherwise applicable in case of charitable trust would not be applicable and, therefore, held that respondent-trust is entitled to claim registration under sections 12A and 12AA and, accordingly, allowed appeal and set aside order passed by Commissioner and further directed Commissioner of Income-tax to grant registration under section 12A read with section 12AA of Act to all applicant-trusts. Aggrieved by aforesaid decision passed by Tribunal, Revenue approached High Court under section 260A of Act. court primarily, is of view that decision of Tribunal is rendered purely on factual matrix of case and, therefore, it would be improper to disturb finding of fact so arrived at by Tribunal. Secondly, court Dawoodi Bohra Jamat v. CIT [2009] 317 ITR (AT) 133 (Indore). has observed that provisions of section 13(1)(b) would not be applicable to respondent-trust as trust is not created or established for benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Consequently, court has dismissed appeal filed by Revenue by judgment and order dated June 22, 2009. Disturbed by aforesaid, Revenue is before us in these appeals. We have heard parties to lis and carefully perused judgment and order passed by court. We have also looked into objects and purposes of trust which was subject matter before Commissioner as well as Tribunal. lis herein relates to entitlement of respondent-trust for registration under provisions of section 12A read with section 12AA of Act for claiming benefit of exemption under section 11 and section 12 read with section 13 of Act. Revenue would submit, that, objects of respondent-trust are not wholly religious in nature but are charitable and confined to benefit of particular religious community-the Dawoodi Bohra community and, thus, provisions of section 13(1)(b) of Act would be attracted ousting respondent-trust from ambit of exemption available under section 11 and section 12 of Act and, therefore, findings and conclusion of Tribunal as confirmed by High Court in impugned judgment and order require to be annulled. Au contraire, respondent-trust would adopt stand, that, since it is public religious trust with objects solely religious in nature, section 13(1)(b) would not be attracted and, therefore, finding and conclusion reached by High Court in its judgment and order does not suffer with any debility and instant appeals require to be dismissed. At outset, brief reference to relevant provisions of Act would be apposite. income of charitable or religious trust is exempt from taxation under correlated provisions of sections 11, 12, 12A, 12AA and 13. Section 11 deals with income from trusts for charitable and religious purposes and sets out which income shall be exigible to taxation. Section 11(1) relates to application of income towards objects of trust and exempts income of trusts with objects wholly charitable or religious or parts of income which relate to such objects. Section 11(1A) provides for exemption of capital gains derived by trusts. Section 11(1B), speaks of failure to apply income as per option under Explanation (2) to section 11(1). Section 11(2) relates to setting apart or accumulation of income. Section 11(3) deals with consequences of misapplication of income or improper investment. While section 11(3A) relates to modification of purposes specified in Form No. 10 under section 11(2), sections 11(4) and 11(4A) relate to business income of charitable trusts. Lastly, section 11(5) provides for prescribed modes of investment in regard to said trusts. Section 12 provides that income of trusts which are created wholly for charitable or religious purpose from voluntary contributions would be deemed as income from property held under trust wholly for charitable or religious purpose for purposes of section 11 and section 13 of Act. Section 12A provides for conditions for applicability of sections 11 and 12 of Act. It prescribes two essential conditions which must be satisfied by charitable/religious trust in order to claim exemption under aforesaid sections: firstly, that person in receipt of income has made application for registration of trust on or after June 1, 2007, in prescribed form and manner to Commissioner and such trust is registered under section 12AA and, secondly, where total income of trust exceeds maximum amount which is not chargeable to income-tax in any previous year, accounts of trust must be audited by chartered accountant and person in receipt of income should furnish such audit report in prescribed form along with return of income. Section 12AA lays down procedure to be followed by Commissioner for grant or refusal of application for registration made under section 12A. According to procedure so laid down, Commissioner shall call for documents and information and conduct enquiry to satisfy himself of genuineness of trust and upon reaching satisfaction of charitable or religious nature of objects and authenticity of activities of trust, he would grant registration. If he is not satisfied of aforesaid, request made in application may be declined. Section 13 enacts complete bar to availability of exemption under section 11 in respect of various incomes enumerated therein. Section 11 does not apply when provisions of section 13 are attracted. Section 13(1)(b) is relevant for purpose of this case. same is noticed: "13. Section 11 not to apply in certain cases.-(1) Nothing contained in section 11 or section 12 shall operate so as to exclude from total income of previous year of person in receipt thereof-... (b) in case of trust for charitable purposes or charitable institution created or established after commencement of this Act, any income thereof if trust or institution is created or established for benefit of any particular religious community or caste;" (emphasis supplied) provision conceptualizes that income of charitable trust created or established for benefit of any particular religious community or caste would not be entitled for benefit of section 11 or section 12 of Act. Thus, when read in conjunction, while under section 11 trust which is established for charitable purposes to benefit particular religious community may be valid charitable trust, under section 13(1)(b) such trust would not be entitled to exemption and, consequently, said income would be exigible to tax under Act. Therefore, under scheme of Act, sections 11 and 12 are substantive provisions which provide for exemptions available to religious or charitable trust. Income derived from property held by such public trust as well as voluntary contributions received by said trust are subjectmatter of exemptions from taxation under Act. Sections 12A and 12AA detail procedural requirements for making application to claim exemption under section 11 or section 12 by assessee and grant or rejection of such application by Commissioner. conjoint reading of sections 11, 12, 12A and 12AA makes it clear that registration under sections 12A and 12AA is condition precedent for availing of benefit under sections 11 and 12. Unless institution is registered under aforesaid provisions, it cannot claim benefit of sections 11 and 12. Section 13 enlists circumstances wherein exemption would not be available to religious or charitable trust otherwise falling under section 11 or section 12 and, therefore, requires to be read in conjunction with provisions of sections 11 and 12 towards determination of eligibility of trust to claim exemption under aforesaid provisions. Keeping aforesaid in view, we would now revert back to facts of present case. objects of respondent-trust as mentioned under trust deed are as follows: "a. To arrange for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on religious occasion of birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-eQuiram (SA) and Saints of Dawoodji Bohra community. b. To arrange for lunch and dinner on religious occasions and auspicious days of Dawoodi Bohra community. c. For betterment of Dawoodi Bohra community to give and take Qardan Hasana according to Farma of Qurane Majid. d. To arrange for religious education and to establish Madarsa and such organization. e. To assist/help to needy people for religious activities. f. To carry out all religious activities according to Shariat and direction of Shariat-e-Mohammediyah for prosperity of Dawoodi Bohra community." Tribunal in light of aforementioned objects and on basis of evidence led by both parties has recorded finding that respondent is public religious trust. High Court has framed two issues for consideration, first of two being, that, "whether, in facts and circumstances of case, Tribunal's conclusion that all objects of trust are religious in nature is justified or not". court is of view that question whether respondent-trust is religious or charitable trust is question of fact and since it has been positively answered by last fact finding authority Tribunal, it cannot be interfered in appeal under section 260A of Act. In our view, High Court ought not to have declined to answer aforesaid question on grounds that observations of Tribunal in respect of objects of trust are pure finding of fact and that same having been answered, no question of law would arise for consideration. Normally, finding of fact as decided by last fact finding authority is final and ought not to be lightly interfered by High Court in appeal. exceptions to said rule have been well delineated by this court and for present case do not require to be noticed. appellate courts, however, ought to be cautious while weeding out such questions and should question in examination involve examination of finding of fact, ex cautela abundanti appellate courts would require to examine that whether question involves merely finding of fact or legal effect of such proven facts or documents in appeal. While former would be question of fact which may or may not be interfered with, latter is necessarily question of law which would require consideration. It is often that questions of law and fact are intricately entwined, sometimes to extent of blurring domains in which they ought to be considered and, therefore, require cautious consideration. question where legal effect of proven facts is intrinsically in appeal has to be differentiated from question where finding of fact is only assailed. This principle has been considered by Privy Council in Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh [1930] 57 IA 86, Secretary of State for India in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam [1934] 61 IA 163 and Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal [1949] 76 IA 271 and this court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 28 (SC); 1956 SCR 691. In Wali Mohammad (supra), Sir Benod Mitter has referred to earlier decision of Privy Council in Nafar Chandra Pal v. Shukur [1917-18] 45 IA 183 and observed that no doubt questions of law and fact are often difficult to disentangle, but proposition that proper legal effect of proved fact is essentially question of law is clearly established. However, question whether fact has been proved when evidence for and against has been properly admitted is necessarily pure question of fact and thus cannot be looked into by appellate court. reference to observation of Lord Buckmaster in Nafar Chandra Pal (supra) as reiterated by this court in Sree Meenakshi Mills (supra) at paragraph 19 is apposite (page 48): "Questions of law and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle. proper legal effect of proved fact is essentially question of law, so also is question of admissibility of evidence and question of whether any evidence has been offered on one side or other; but question whether fact has been proved, when evidence for and against has been properly admitted, is necessarily pure question of fact." In Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. (supra) explaining aforesaid observations, this court observed that expression "the proper legal effect of proved fact" is itself indicative that "inferences from facts are not all of them questions of law open to consideration in second appeal but only those which involve application of some legal principle". Thus, it is only inferences from proven facts or documents which would require examination in light of legal principle or application of such legal principle which would be questions of law. To further clarify above proposition, this court had referred to factual position of Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton [1891-93] 19 IA 228 wherein Privy Council has considered question involving determination of legal effects of proven facts and observed thus (page 47): "In Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton, one Daud Rao was sought to he made liable on mortgage to which he was not party on ground that be had knowledge of it and had accepted it. In holding that facts found did not establish any ground of liability, Sir Richard Couch observed: 'A finding that bond shewed that mortgage deed was accepted by defendant, as binding obligation upon him, would be inference of law, inference which, in their Lordships' opinion, is not just one from facts which Commissioner held to be proved. knowledge of mortgage and saying that money due upon it was repayable, do not amount to agreement by him to be bound by it. As mortgage did not purport to be made in any way on behalf of Daud Rao it was not case for ratification. new agreement or obligation was necessary to bind him.'" In Dhanna Mal (supra) tenancy was admitted fact and question for consideration was whether it was permanent or not. Therein, determination of issue rested on legal inference to be drawn from proved facts, or, in other words, legal effect of proved facts, i.e., tenancy. In Dnyaneshwar Ranganath Bhandare v. Sadhu Dadu Shettigar (Shetty) [2011] 10 SCC 433, second appeals challenging judgment and decree of first appellate court was dismissed by High Court holding that finding of fact by lower appellate court that respondents were not gratuitous licensees did not call for interference and, therefore, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. appellants before High Court were before this court in appeals by special leave against aforesaid judgment and order by High Court. This court opined that rejection of appeals at outset by High Court on grounds that case involved no substantial question of law was erroneous and what ought to have been looked into was whether it involved question of fact or legal effect of proven facts or documents which in turn would be question of law requiring adjudication by High Court. This court observed as follows: "11. Normally, this court will not, in exercise of jurisdiction under article 136 of Constitution of India, interfere with finding of facts recorded by first appellate court, which were not disturbed by High Court in second appeal. But what should happen if first appellate court reverses findings of fact recorded by trial court by placing burden of proof wrongly on plaintiffs and then holding that plaintiffs did not discharge such burden; or if its decision is based on evidence which is irrelevant or inadmissible; or if its decision discards material and relevant evidence, or is based on surmises and conjectures; or if it bases its decision on wrong inferences drawn about legal effect of documents exhibited; and if grave injustice occurs in such case on account of High Court missing real substantial question of law arising in appeal and erroneously proceeds on basis that matter does not involve any question of law and summarily dismisses second appeal filed by appellant? 12. In this context we may remember that legal effect of proved facts and documents is question of law (See Dhanna Mal v. Moti Sagar and Gujarat Ginning and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Motilal Hirabhai Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd.) In such cases, if circumstances so warranted, this court may interfere in appeal by special leave under article 136." (emphasis supplied) In our considered view, determination of nature of trust as wholly religious or wholly charitable or both charitable and religious under Act is not question of fact. It is but question which requires examination of legal effects of proven facts and documents, that is, legal implication of objects of respondent-trust as contained in trust deed. It is only objects of trust as declared in trust deed which would govern its right of exemption under section 11 or section 12. It is analysis of these objects in backdrop of fiscal jurisprudence which would illuminate purpose behind creation or establishment of trust for either religious or charitable or both religious and charitable purpose. Therefore, High Court has erred in refusing to interfere with observations of Tribunal in respect of character of trust. Having said so, we would now examine question, whether courts below were justified in coming to conclusion that respondent-trust is public religious trust and, therefore, outside purview of section 13(1)(b) and eligible for exemption under section 11 of Act. objects of respondent-trust are not indicative of wholly religious purpose but are collectively indicative of both charitable and religious purposes. It is expedient to comprehend objects of respondenttrust with reference to construction of expressions "charitable purpose" and "religious purpose." phrase charitable purpose is expansive and inclusive. expression "charitable purpose" is defined in dictionary clause of Act under section 2(15) as follows: "'charitable purpose' includes relief of poor, education, medical relief, preservation of environment (including watersheds, forests and wildlife) and preservation of monuments or places or objects of artistic or historic interest, and advancement of any other object of general public utility: [1926-27] 54 IA 178; AIR 1927 PC 102. [1935-36] 63 IA 140; AIR 1936 PC 77. Provided that advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be charitable purpose, if it involves carrying on of any activity in nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of nature of use or application, or retention, of income from such activity: Provided further that first proviso shall not apply if aggregate value of receipts from activities referred to therein is twenty-five lakh rupees or less in previous year;" According to section 2(15), expression "charitable purpose" has been defined by way of inclusive definition so as to include relief to poor, education, medical relief and advancement of any other object of general public utility. catena of decisions of this court which have interpreted said provision and especially expression "any other object of general public utility" have observed that said expression is of widest connotation. word "general" in said expression means pertaining to whole class (CIT v. Gujarat Maritime Board [2007] 14 SCC 704). Therefore, advancement of any object of benefit to public or section of public as distinguished from benefit to individual or group of individuals would be charitable purpose (CIT v. Ahmedabad Rana Caste Assn.) said expression would prima facie include all objects which promote wellbeing of general public. It cannot be said that purpose would cease to be charitable even when public welfare is intended to be served. Constitution Bench of this court in Addl. CIT v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Assn. has held that if primary purpose and predominant object of trust are to promote welfare of general public purpose would be charitable purpose. If primary or predominant object of institution is charitable, any other object which might not be charitable but which is ancillary or incidental to dominant purpose, would not prevent institution from being valid charitable trust (Thiagarajar Charities v. Addl. CIT [1997] 4 SCC 724). This court in several decisions has reiterated aforesaid test of predominant purpose and held that purposes which would yield to profit or not in general public interest could be separated and trust would only be exigible to tax to extent of charitable purposes under its [2007] 295 ITR 561 (SC). [1980] 121 ITR 1 (SC). [1997] 225 ITR 1010 (SC). objects. In CIT v. Kamla Town Trust [1996] 7 SCC 349, object of trust included construction of houses for workmen in general and in particular for workmen, staff and other employees of settler company. It was held that while provisions relating to workmen in general did constitute charitable object, words "in particular for workmen of company" negative charitable purpose and, therefore, entire trust could not be considered to have been established wholly for charitable purpose. In Abdul Sathar Haji Moosa Sait Dharmastapanam v. Commr. of Agri. Income-tax [1974] 3 SCC 257 at page 259, this court considered question whether appellant therein was public charitable trust within meaning of section 4(b) of Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. three-fourths of income of bequest was primarily earmarked for benefit of near relations of testator only, it cannot be considered as public charitable trust. While rest one-fourth was concluded to form valid charitable trust (Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust v. CIT). In CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce; Ahmedabad Rana Caste Assn. v. CIT#; Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT## and Yogiraj Charity Trust v. CIT### and CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce [1965] 55 ITR 722 (SC), it was observed that objects for service and benefit to general masses would indicate that they are meant for public purpose and, thus, would create public charitable trust. Indubitably, word "charity" connotes altruism in thought and action and involves idea of benefiting others rather than oneself (Andhra Chamber of Commerce (supra)). It also cannot be lost sight of that supreme goal of all religions is philanthropy which could be manifested in various forms. It is held that gifts for religious purposes are prima facie gifts for charitable purposes (Schoales v. Schoales [1930] 2 Ch. 75 (CA); White v. White [1893] 2 Ch. 41 (CA)) Unlike phrase "charitable purpose", "religious purpose" is not defined under Act. According to lexicographers, term "religious" would mean "of or relating to religion". (Merriam Webster Dictionary, Macmillan English Dictionary). Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines term as follows: [1996] 217 ITR 699 (SC). [1973] 91 ITR 5 (SC). [1973] 88 ITR 47 (SC). # [1971] 82 ITR 704 (SC). ## [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC). ### [1976] 103 ITR 777 (SC) "Devoted to religion; exhibiting spiritual or practical effects of religion, following requirements of religion; pious, godly, devout." In Kanga, Palkhivala and Vyas, Law and Practice of Income Tax, Vol. 1, Ed. 9th (at page 544) religious purposes are indicated to include advancement, support or propagation of religion and tenets. Thus, religious purpose would be one relating to particular religion and broadly would encompass objects relating to observance of rituals and ceremonies, propagation of tenets of religion and other allied activities of religious community. example of such would entail activities such as dance performances (Garba) or distribution of food specifically for people on fast during Hindu festivities of Navratri. In certain cases, activities of trust may contain elements of both: religious and charitable and thus, both purposes may be over lapping. More so when religious activity carried on by particular section of people would be charitable activity for or towards other members of community and also public at large. For example, practice of optional charity in form of Khairat or Sadaquah under Mohammadan Law would be covered under both charitable as well as religious purpose. Further, while providing food and fodder to animals especially cow is religious activity for Hindus, it would be charitable in respect to non-Hindus as well. Similarly, service of water to thirsty would find mention as religious activity in sacred texts and at same time would qualify as charitable activity. Tribunal has analysed objects of trust in light of holy scriptures and Quran and recorded its satisfaction as follows: "16... objects of assessee-trust reproduced above clearly refer to religion and are supported by reference made to different pages of Holy Quran. learned counsel for assessee referred to true copies of several pages of Holy Quran written by two of authors referred to above in which giving of food in days of hunger or orphan is considered as highly religious ceremony. Reference is also made that who will give to people or poor then Allah will give them in return and, i.e., who will give loan then Allah will give double to them. Likewise, for helping needy people for religious activities and to carry out religious activities or spend for good, spending wealth in way of Allah, bestowing mercy, teaching were considered to be highly religious activities. On going through several true pages of Holy Quran written by authors referred to above, we are satisfied that learned counsel for assessee was justified in contending See page 143 of 317 ITR (AT). that all objects of assessee-trust are solely religious in nature because each of them refers either to religious occasions, religious education or to religious activities. learned counsel for assessee also explained that words'Shariat-e-Mohammadiyah' means path shown by prophet Mohammed. Therefore, objects of Shariat-e- Mohammadiyah are identical with those of'Dawat-e-Hadiyah'. For Dawoodi Bohras, true path shown by prophet is one indicated and shown by their living guide Dai-al-Mutlaq of time who is living and visible guide for Dawoodi Bohras. It is undisputed fact that for people believing in Islam, writings in Quran are words of Allah for them. directions given in Holy Quran are considered by people of Islamic faith as orders from Allah and people of Islamic faith obey such orders as holy and religious. learned counsel for assessee has been able to demonstrate that all objects of assessee-trust, as noted above, came out from writings in Quran and as such these are orders for them while observing Islamic faith." (emphasis supplied) Unquestionably, objects (c) and (f) which provide for activities completely religious in nature and restricted to specific community of respondent-trust are objects with religious purpose only. However, in respect to other objects, in our view, fact that said objects trace their source to Holy Quran and resolve to abide by path of godliness shown by Allah would not be sufficient to conclude that entire purpose and activities of trust would be purely religious in colour. objects reflect intent of trust as observance of tenets of Islam, but do not restrict activities of trust to religious obligations only and for benefit of members of community. Privy Council in In Re Trustees of Tribune [1939] 7 ITR 415 (PC) has held that in judging whether certain purpose is of public benefit or not, courts must in general apply standards of customary law and common opinion amongst community to which parties interested belong to. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether customary law would restrict charitable disposition of intended activities in objects. provision of food to public on religious days of community as per objects (a) and (b), establishment of Madarsa and organizations for dissemination of religious education under object (d) and rendering assistance to needy and poor for religious activities under object (e) would reflect essence of charity. objects (a) and (b) provide for arrangement for nyaz and majlis (lunch and dinner) on religious occasion of birth anniversary and Urs Mubarak of Awliya-e-Quiram (SA) and Saints of Dawoodji Bohra community and for arrangement of lunch and dinner on religious occasions and auspicious days of Dawoodi Bohra community, respectively. Nyaz refers to food person makes and offers to others on any particular occasion on occasion of death of saint and majhlis implies place of gathering or meeting. activity of providing for food on certain specific occasions and other religious and auspicious events of Dawoodi Bohra community do not restrict benefit to members of community. Neither religious tenets nor objects as expressed limit service of food on said occasions only to members of specific community. Thus, activity of nyaz performed by respondent-trust does not delineate separate class but extends benefit of free service of food to public at large irrespective of their religion, caste or sect and thereby qualifies as charitable purpose which would entail general public utility. Further, establishment of Madarsa or institutions to impart religious education to masses would qualify as charitable purpose qualifying under head of education under provisions of section 2(15) of Act. institutions established to spread religious awareness by means of education though established to promote and further religious thought could not be restricted to religious purposes. House of Lords in Barralet v. IR, 54 TC 446, has observed that "the study and dissemination of ethical principles and cultivation of rational religious sentiment" would fall in category of educational purposes. Madarsa as Mohommedan institution of teaching does not confine instruction to only dissipation of religious teachings but also contributes to holistic education of individual. Therefore, it cannot be said that object (d) would embody restrictive purpose of religious activities only. Similarly, assistance by respondent-trust to needy and poor for religious activities would not divest trust of its altruist character. Therefore, objects of trust exhibit dual tenor of religious and charitable purposes and activities. Section 11 of Act shelters such trust with composite objects to claim exemption from tax as religious and charitable trust subject to provisions of section 13. activities of trust under such objects would therefore be entitled to exemption accordingly. We would now proceed to examine objects under provisions of section 13(1)(b) of Act. It becomes amply clear from language employed in provisions that section 13 is in nature of exemption from applicability of section 11 or section 12 and examination of its applicability would only arise at stage of claim under sections 11 or 12. Thus, where income of trust is eligible for exemption under section 11, eligibility for claiming exemption ought to be tested on touchstone of provisions of section 13. In instant case, it being established that respondent-trust is public charitable and religious trust eligible for claiming exemption under section 11, it becomes relevant to test it on anvil of section 13. Thus, second issue which arises for our consideration and decision is, whether respondent-trust is charitable and religious trust only for purposes of particular community and therefore, not eligible for exemption under section 11 of Act in view of provisions of section 13(1)(b) of Act. In instant case, Tribunal has found on facts after analysing objects of trust that respondent-trust is public religious trust and its objects are solely religious in nature and being of opinion that section 13(1)(b) is solely meant for charitable trust for particular community, negated possibility of applicability of section 13(1)(b) of Act at outset. High Court has also confirmed aforesaid view in appeal and observed that section 13(1)(b) would only be applicable in case of income of trust for charitable purpose established for benefit of particular religious community. In our considered view, said view may not be correct interpretation of provision. From phraseology in clause (b) of section 13(1), it could be inferred that Legislature intended to include only trusts established for charitable purposes. That, however, does not mean that if trust is composite one, that is one for both religious and charitable purposes, then it would not be covered by clause (b). What is intended to be excluded from being eligible for exemption under section 11 is trust for charitable purpose which is established for benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Such trusts with composite objects would not be expelled out of purview of section 13(1)(b) per se. section requires it to be established that such charitable purpose is not for benefit of particular religious community or caste. That is to say, it needs to be examined whether such religious- charitable activity carried on by trust only benefits certain particular religious community or class or serves across communities and for society at large (Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT [1975] 101 ITR 234 (SC)). section of community sought to be benefited must be either sufficiently defined or identifiable by common quality of public or impersonal nature (CIT v. Andhra Chamber of Commerce [1965] 55 ITR 722). This court in CIT v. Palghat Shadi Mahal Trust [2002] 9 SCC 685 muslim residents of Kerala constituted trust "for purpose of constructing and establishing at Palghat-a-Shadi Mahal and other institutions for educational, social and economic advancement of Muslims and for religious and charitable objects recognised by Muslim law..." and later clarified that proceeds would be utilized for benefit for public at large and upon this basis, trust made claim for exemption from tax under section 11. This court held that resolution clarifying object would not validly amend object of trust-deed and since object confined benefit to only muslim community, it would be covered by restriction under section 13(1)(b) of Act even though it functioned for public benefit. Thus, therein object sufficiently defined or expressly stated beneficiary class and restricted activities of trust to specific community. Further, in State of Kerala v. M. P. Shanti Verma Jain [1998] 5 SCC 63 this court has held that propagation of religion and restriction of benefits of activities of trust in its objects to said community would render trust as ineligible for claiming exemption under similar provisions of Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1950. court observed as follows: "... deed of trust and rules run into more than thirty pages out of which six pages of trust deed narrate philosophy of Jain Dharma. objects of trust clearly show that trust is meant for propagation of Jain religion and rendering help to followers of Jain religion. Even medical aid and similar facilities are to be rendered to persons devoted to Jain religion and to non-Jains if suffering from ailments but medical aid could be given to them non-Jains if suffering from ailments but medical aid could be given to them only if any member of families managing trust, shows sympathy and is interested in their treatment. Tribunal, in our opinion, was right in its conclusion that dominant purpose of trust in present case was propagation of Jain religion and to serve its followers and any part of agricultural income of trust spent in State of Kerala also could not be treated as allowable item of expenses." In present case, objects of respondent-trust are based on religious tenets under Quran according to religious faith of Islam. We have already noticed that perusal of objects and purposes of respondent- trust would clearly demonstrate that activities of trust though both charitable and religious are not exclusively meant for [2002] 254 ITR 212 (SC). [1998] 231 ITR 787 (SC). Page 792 of 231 ITR. particular religious community. objects, as explained in preceding paragraphs, do not channel benefits to any community if not Dawoodi Bohra Community and thus, would not fall under provisions of section 13(1)(b) of Act. In that view of matter, we are of considered opinion that respondent-trust is charitable and religious trust which does not benefit any specific religious community and therefore, it cannot be held that section 13(1)(b) of Act would be attracted to respondent-trust and thereby, it would be eligible to claim exemption under section 11 of Act. In result, appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. *** Commissioner of Income-tax v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat