SANJAY ARORA, A.M.: ORDER This is set of two appeals, i.e., for two consecutive assessment years (Asst. yr.), being asst. yrs. 2002-03 and 2003-04, arising out of consolidated order by Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-II, Agra [ CIT(A) for short] dt. 30th March, 2005 passed in its case. 2. grounds raised per respective appeals are identical (except for difference in amounts under reference) and are as under, which we shall take up in seriatim : "1. That learned CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in sustaining action of AO in invoking s. 147/148 without properly appreciating that there has been no escapement of any income. 2. That learned CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in sustaining ex parte assessment under s. 144 without properly appreciating that necessary details required for making assessment had been duly furnished by assessee. 3. That learned CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in reducing assessee s claim of conveyance allowance and additional conveyance allowance from Re. 1 to Rs. 2 without properly appreciating that same is reimbursement of expenditure as certified by LIC after due verification. 4. That learned CIT(A) is not justified in confirming disallowance of exemption of H.R.A. of Rs. 3 without properly appreciating that exemption claimed by assessee under s. 10(13A) is permissible under law on face of fact that landlords do not give rent receipts due to fear of civil litigation over vacation of premises. 5. That learned authorities below have erred in charging interest under ss. 234A, 234B and 234C without properly appreciating facts and circumstances of case. 6. That in any view of case assessment framed under s. 144/147 is invalid, bad in law and that disallowances sustained by CIT(A) are highly unjust, improper and arbitrary." Amount/Asst. yr. 2002-03 2003-04 (1) 2,53,642 1,66,122 (2) 66,000 62,120 (3) 8,554 8,899 3 . facts of case, as gathered from record, are that assessment in first instance for both years stood framed under s. 143(1) of IT Act, 1961 ( Act hereinafter), granting refund to assessee as per its return(s) of income. Subsequently, however, notice under s. 148 of Act stood issued on 1st and 2nd April, 2004 on ground that assessee had wrongly claimed exemption under s. 10(14) of Act in respect of conveyance allowance (CA) and additional conveyance allowance (ACA) that stood allowed to him by its employer, Life Insurance Corporation of India ( LIC ), as its Development Officer citing certain decisions by different High Courts. assessments stood finally framed under s. 144 r/w s. 147 of Act, with Assessing Officer (AO) bringing to tax entire amount of CA and ACA to tax on basis that assessee could not furnish any evidence to show that he had actually incurred expenses on conveyance so as to entitle it to claim exemption under s. 10(14) of Act for entire amount of allowance(s), as allowed to him by his employer. In appeal, learned CIT(A) examined assessee s case in detail. After setting aside assessee s challenge to assessment as framed on ground of invalid assumption of jurisdiction under s. 147 of Act and framing of ex parte assessment under s. 144 thereof, with reference to case law, as in case of Franco John & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 186 CTR (Ker) 760 : (2004) 269 ITR 441 (Ker), holding that circulars of LIC have no statutory force and are not binding on Revenue Department, it was held that matter thus becomes essentially one of fact, so that AO was fully within his powers to verify, and assessee obliged to satisfy him as regards actual incurring of expenditure on conveyance, and both of which could only be with reference to evidence furnished by assessee. assessee s submission that LIC only reimbursed expenses actually incurred by assessee was found by him as baseless, as declaration in respect of expenditure incurred by assessee on conveyance itself showed same to be at Rs. 92,400 for previous year relevant to asst. yr. 2002-03, for which assessee had received total of Rs. 2,53,642 by way of CA and ACA, Further, said employer had in fact treated only part of allowance as exempt under s. 10(14). vouchers evidencing assessee s claim for expenditure incurred on conveyance for asst. yr. 2002-03, which stood claimed at Rs. 2,53,642, were found by him to contain several discrepancies, viz., headlights of car stood replaced on 20th Jan., 2002 and 20th March, 2002 and which surely could not be at such frequent intervals. assessee s declaration aforesaid for said year also included remuneration to chauffeur (at Rs. 2,500 per month) as also meter reading as at beginning and close of year, so that same merits consideration. Further, part of said expenditure would also be towards personal user (of vehicle), so that amount of Rs. 66,000, which stood considered by LIC, as having been actually expended by assessee on conveyance and, thus, exempt under s. 10(14), was found by him to be correct estimate of purported expenditure, and thus representing amount exempt thereunder, being at over Rs. 5,000 per month. Likewise for asst. yr. 2003-04, for which assessee stood allowed exemption at Rs. 62,120 by its employer, even as he found that receipts in respect of salary to driver and for rent for garage, claimed at Rs. 2,500 per month and Rs. 500 per month respectively were not admissible in terms of r. 46A of IT Rules, 1962. Aggrieved, assessee is in appeal. 4 . Before us, learned Authorised Representative did not press assessee s ground Nos. 2 and 5, so that same are dismissed as not pressed. Also, no arguments were advanced by learned Authorised Representative in respect of assessee s ground Nos. 1 and 6, so that it may be inferred that assessee is not seriously pressing matter, even as case law stood duly cited before us per its brief synopsis, placing also copies of same on record. 5.1 In this regard, we would firstly like to mention that assessee has, before us, not made out any case, and which could only be after delineating facts of case; challenge as it appears, being to AO s formation of belief for him to issue notice(s) under s. 148 of Act. second legal aspect of matter, on which proceedings stand challenged, is that assessee s return(s), having been processed in first instance under s. 143(1) of Act, with there being no issue of notice under s. 143(2) within prescribed limit of 12 months from close of month in which return(s) stood filed, notice(s) under s. 148 could not be issued. In this regard, though assessee had also placed on record certain decisions, there was no advertence thereto during course of hearing. law stands amended by co-option with retrospective effect of s. 292BB on statute by Finance Act, 2008. Further, leading decision i.e., Asstt. CIT vs. O.P. Chawla (2006) 8 SOT 242 (Del)(TM), on which reliance stands placed by assessee, is reiteration of law as stated by Hon ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Vipan Khanna vs. CIT (2002) 175 CTR (P&H) 335 : (2002) 255 ITR 220 (P&H), i.e., that s. 143(2) and s. 147 operate in different fields and one could not be used in place of another, so that notice under s. 148 could not be issued in guise of another, or for purpose of making enquiries in matter, which is purported objective of notice under s. 143(2), and in any case no change of opinion is permissible under s. 147 of Act. decision by Tribunal in case of Elegant Chemicals Enterprises (P) Ltd. vs. Asstt. CIT (2004) 85 TTJ (Hyd) 441 : (2004) 271 ITR 56 (Hyd)(AT), stands rendered after duly considering decisions in case of Vipan Khanna (supra) and CIT vs. Kalvinator of India Ltd. (2002) 174 CTR (Del)(FB) 617 : (2002) 256 ITR 1 (Del)(FB) on which reliance also stands placed by assessee. Without disputing said legal proposition, i.e., as laid down by afore-referred two decisions by different High Courts, it stands clarified that same cannot be construed to imply that non-exercise of option under s. 143(2) of Act would preclude AO s power of assessment under s. 147 of Act in any manner. Reference stands also made by Revenue to series of other decisions, as : (i) Pradeep Kumar Har Saran Lal vs. AO (1997) 141 CTR (All) 37 : (1998) 229 ITR 46 (All); (ii) Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. vs. Chairman, CBDT & Anr. (2000) 162 CTR (Del) 554 : (2000) 246 ITR 173 (Del); (iii) CIT vs. Abad Fisheries (2002) 177 CTR (Ker) 532 : (2002) 258 ITR 641 (Ker); (iv) Punjab Tractors Ltd. vs. Jt. CIT (2002) 173 CTR (P&H) 84 : (2002) 254 ITR 242 (P&H); (v) Inder Narayan Jhalani vs. Union of India & Anr. (2002) 174 CTR (MP) 406 : (2002) 254 ITR 663 (MP); (vi) Deepak Kumar Poddar vs. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 224 ITR 95 (Pat); (vii) Jorawar Singh Baid vs. Asstt. CIT & Ors. (1992) 198 ITR 47 (Cal); (viii) A. Pusalal vs. CIT (1987) 65 CTR (AP) 151 : (1988) 169 ITR 215 (AP). 5.2 matter, in our view, thus, is essentially one of fact, and not of law, i.e., whether notice under s. 143(2) stood in fact issued in guise of or for purpose of making inquiries in matter as would emanate from return as furnished, or not, and that it actually follows formation of honest and reasonable belief that there has been escapement of income (which of course can be challenged or explained by assessee in subsequent proceedings); predominant judicial view, as its appears, veering around to view that two sections operate in different fields and for different purposes, and one cannot be, or ought not to be, and thus not permitted to be, used in guise of another. Where, however, there is reason(s) to believe by AO of income having escaped assessment, with there having been no formulation of opinion earlier, he is not barred from reopening return for verification [for which again, notice under s. 143(2) would be required to be issued in due observance of prescribed procedure]. assessee has, as aforesaid not placed before us any material to show that AO had no reason to believe that assessee s income, to stated extent, had not escaped assessment; it having claimed exemption under s. 10(14) for full amount of CA and ACA, as against much lower amount allowed by his employer as exempt thereunder and in view of clear position of law that it is assessee who is required to prove its return and, thus, claims preferred therein, to some of which, as in case of LIC Class-I Officers (Bombay) Association vs. LIC of India & Anr. (1998) 229 ITR 510 (Bom); CIT vs. E.A. Rajendran (1997) 142 CTR (Mad) 244 : (1999) 235 ITR 514 (Mad) and CIT vs. A.K. Ghosh & Ors. (2003) 184 CTR (MP) 420 : (2003) 263 ITR 536 (MP), which rendered in context of s. 10(14), stands made in statement of reasons itself, placed on record (paper book p. 24). 6 . In view of foregoing, we find no basis or merits in assessee s challenge to reopening of assessment under s. 147 of Act, so that assessee s challenge under ground Nos. 1 and 6, fails. 7.1 We next take up ground No. 3. law in matter, as clarified by various Courts, to which matter has travelled, is that allowance is exempt only to extent that stands actually expended by assessee in performance of his official duties (as Development Officer DO for short), and onus to show which is on assessee. In other words, to extent to which assessee could show to have spent on conveyance for purpose : CIT vs. Kiranbhai H. Shelat (1998) 147 CTR (Guj) 43 : (1999) 235 ITR 635 (Guj); R.K. Salhotra vs. ITO (2003) 179 CTR (J&K) 258; LIC of India vs. Union of India (2003) 179 CTR (Raj) 432 : (2003) 260 ITR 41 (Raj); K.K. Kansal vs. CIT (2004) 191 CTR (P&H) 106 : (2004) 270 ITR 375 (P&H); LIC of India vs. CIT (2001) 166 CTR (Mad) 125 : (2000) 245 ITR 224 (Mad); National Federation of Insurance Field Workers of India vs. Union of India & Ors. (2005) 196 CTR (Jharkhand) 469 : (2005) 276 ITR 127 (Jharkhand). This is also interpretation that yields or emanates on plain and harmonious reading of relevant section and relevant rule (r. 2BB), which provisions as they stand for relevant years are as under : "Sec. 10(14) (1) any such special allowance or benefit, not being in nature of perquisite within meaning of cl. (2) of s. 17, specifically granted to meet expenses wholly, necessarily and exclusively incurred in performance of duties of office or employment of profit, as may be prescribed, to extent to which such expenses are actually incurred for that purpose;" "Rule 2BB For purpose of sub-cl. (i) of cl. 14 of s. 10, prescribed allowances, by whatever name called, shall be following, namely, (a)............... (b)............... (c) any allowance granted to meet expenditure incurred on conveyance in performance of duties of office or employment of profit : provided that free conveyance is not provided by employer." (d)........." amended position has been discussed by Hon ble High Court of Madras in LIC of India vs. CIT (supra) in following words : "A Division Bench of Bombay High Court in LIC Class-I Officers (Bombay) Association vs. LIC of India & Anr. (1998) 229 ITR 510 (Bom) while construing r. 2BB of Rules, held that to claim exemption, CA must be necessarily expended for meeting expenses wholly and necessarily incurred or t o be incurred in performance of duties of office. assessee must satisfy two tests, namely, that they are expenses of which it can be said at least that they are wholly and necessarily incurred in performance of duties of office and, secondly, expenses were also expenses which assessee is required, by conditions of his service to incur out of his remuneration." 7.2 As such, there can be no manner of any doubt that very fact that assessee stands allowed CA and ACA by its employer(s), which would definitely be based on some performance based index/uniform across of its employees performing same work, cannot be considered as exempt only for report that it stands so allowed by it. This is rather itself borne out by fact that it (the employer) itself considered only part of allowance(s) as exempt under s. 10(14), treating balance part as salary income chargeable to tax under s. 17, deducting tax thereon [refer : LIC of India Officers Association vs. LIC of India & Anr. (supra)]. It is notable that figure considered exempt by it is even below figure declared by assessee, so that, again, it follows that apparently fixed norms in this regard, standardized across of its employees falling in same class, stand prescribed/formulated, and which cannot be; matter being entirely factual. consideration of uniformity is understandable from employer s stand-point for whom consistency and equity amongst its employees is paramount. But internal guidelines devised or formulated by any employer, even as held in case of Franco John & Ors. vs. Union of India (supra), do not, and cannot, have any statutory force; rather, as presumably seen, they do not even purport to operate as substitute, being meant only to provide operational guidelines for its staff, based on certain assumptions, which though cannot be dismissed outright, i.e., as of no value, as employer is in intimate knowledge of exact nature of duties and what it entails, is necessarily based on some assumptions, and which may not necessarily obtain in given case. 7.3 It is in these circumstances that various Benches of Tribunal, after examining facts obtaining in case under reference delivered their decisions. In case of ITO vs. Satish Kumar Khurana (ITA No. 1218/All/1992), dt. 17th Nov., 2000, Tribunal allowed entire amount claimed exempt by assessee. In Yogesh Kumar Gupta vs. Asstt. CIT (ITA 2 11 /Agra/2006) dt. 30th Aug., 2007, Tribunal allowed 75 per cent of total amount of CA and ACA allowed by employer as exempt. In case of R.K. Sharma vs. Asstt. CIT (ITA No. 213/Agra/2006) dt. 28th Aug., 2007, Tribunal allowed 100 per cent of fixed CA and 80 per cent of ACA as exempt under s. 10(14). In Asstt. CIT vs. Manish Kumar (ITA No. 368/Agra/2004) dt. 13th April, 2007, Tribunal restricted amount of exemption to whole of CA plus 30 per cent of ACA. These decisions form part of Tribunal s record, their copies being on appeal file. Clearly, thus, no standard norm stands prescribed by Tribunal, nor possibly can be laid out, and adjudication has to be with reference to facts and circumstances of case under adjudication. 7.4 factual matrix of present case is as : (Amount in Rs.) Particulars/Asst. 2002-03 2003-04 yr. CA ACA Total CA ACA Total Amount allowed 24,120 2,29,522 2,53,642 24,120 1,66,122 1,90,242 by employer Claimed as exempt by 24,120 2,29,522 2,53,642 24,120 1,66,122 1,90,242 assessee Amount as per assessee s self- 92,400 declaration Treated as exempt by 66,000 62,120 employer 7.5 learned CIT(A) has, considering all aspects of matter, and on correct understanding of law, held amount exempt in assessee s case at amount that stands considered as such by its employer, which, as seen, exceeds Rs. 5,000 per month; also considering aspect of part user of conveyance, and thereby of expenditure incurred, towards personal purpose. He has also considered assessee s self-declaration in matter, which is inclusive of chauffeur s remuneration and also bears reference to mileage of vehicles. Besides, expenditure claimed, especially on repair and maintenance, has been found to be infirm. 7.6 We, however, are of view that amount treated exempt by employer, would not factor into variability that is intrinsic and mandatory in each case. Why, even in assessee s own case there is wide difference in amount claimed as expended on repair and maintenance of vehicle for two years. On other hand, assessee has not been able to meet any of factual and valid objections raised by learned CIT(A), with expenditure on repair and maintenance as claimed itself exceeding total amount considered expended on conveyance and thus exempt by assessee s employer, and whose assessment cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. In fact, apart from expenditure on fuel, which can be reasonably assessed on basis of mileage, and which assessee has not furnished for second year (asst. yr. 2003-04), and thus can only be presumed to be in same range (being even not dependent on actual running or on volume of business transacted), and that on driver/garage being almost constant, variability in expenditure arises principally only on account of repair and maintenance, and which has been found by learned CIT(A) as infirm. 8 . In view of foregoing, we, on conspectus of facts and circumstances of case, consider amount worked out by taking 100 per cent of CA and 30 per cent of ACA to be exempt under s. 10(14) of Act. For this, as aforesaid, though there could possibly be no fixed norms and such ratio, support is derived from decision in case of Asstt. CIT vs. Manish Kumar (supra) of Agra Bench of Tribunal. We decide accordingly. 9. last ground of assessee s appeal relates to confirmation of disallowance of assessee s claim for exemption in respect of House Rent Allowance (HRA) received by assessee from its employer, claimed exemption under s. 10(13A) at Rs. 8,554 and Rs. 8,899 for two consecutive years respectively in view of fact that rent receipts, establishing payment of house rent to landlord, could not be produced by assessee. As apparent, assessee s case is that landlords generally do not issue receipts in respect of house rent for fear of civil litigation that might arise when assessee tenants may be required to vacate premises, and which explains non-submission. learned CIT(A) has upheld AO s action, finding it justified, in view of non-substantiation of its claim by assessee with any evidence, so that assessee is in appeal before us, whose case, albeit, remains same. We are unable to subscribe thereto, being based on generalized pleadings, even as indicated by Bench at time of hearing. In fact, as it appears, no such claim stood admitted even by assessee s own employer by deducting tax at source. This ground, therefore, fails. 10. In result, both assessee s appeals (ITA Nos. 217/Agra/2005 and 218/Agra/2005) are partly allowed. *** ANEG SINGH VERMA v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX