Per V.K. Gupta, Accountant Member: assessee is, in appeal, before us, against Order of Learned CIT(A), Mumbai, dated 31-10-2003 for assessment year 2001-02. 2. Ld. Counsel submitted that it has raised following legal issue by way of Additional Ground: 'The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) has erred in law and i n facts in not appreciating that notice issued by Assessing Officer are invalid and hence assessment order under section 143(3)(ii) of Act was bad in law and invalid.' 3. ld. Counsel for assessee stated that this was legal issue and all facts were on record, hence, it may be admitted in view of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 229 ITR 383. 4. Ld. Departmental Representative, on other hand, opposed same. 5. On due consideration of facts and circumstance of case and applicable legal position, we find that this is legal ground and all facts are on record, hence, we admit same for our adjudication. 6. facts, in brief, are that assessee filed Return of Income on 26-9-2001 declaring income at Rs. 2,18,300. case was selected for limited scrutiny under section 143(2)(i) to verify certain claims of assessee. Assessing Officer, thereafter thought this case was fit for regular and thorough scrutiny under provisions of section 143(3)(ii) and, accordingly, Assessing Officer issued Notice under section 143(2)(ii) on 28-7-2003 and passed Order under section 143(3)(ii) on 31-10-2003. assessee has challenged validity of Notice under section 143(2)(ii) as time-barred because, according to assessee, Notice under section 143(2)(ii) could be served only up to 30-9-2002, whereas same was served on 28-7-2003. ld. Counsel for assessee took us through provisions of section 143(2) which at relevant point of time provided for limited scrutiny under section 143(2)(i) read with section 143(3)(i) and for regular scrutiny in accordance with provisions of section 143(2)(ii) read with section 143(3)(ii) and both these proceedings were independent of each other, hence, notices for both proceedings were to be issued separately and that too within time limit specified in provisions of section 143(2) of Act. ld. Counsel, accordingly, contended that Notice issued under section 143(2)(ii) was time- barred, hence, second proceedings were also null and void. ld. Counsel also placed reliance on observation of Tribunal in case of Nayek Paper Converters v. Asstt. CIT [2005] 93 ITD 144 (Kol.) wherein Tribunal had held that there were powers to issue notice under section 143(2)(ii) where Notice under section 143(2)(i) had already been issued, however, Notice under section 143(2)(ii) was to be issued within time provided therefore. Hence, according to assessee, this issue was covered by these observations of Tribunal. 7. ld. Departmental Representative, on other hand, contended that Notice under section 143(2)(i) was issued in time which got merged with Notice under section 143(2)(ii), hence, assessment framed under section 143(3)(ii) was not null and void. 8. We have considered submissions made by both sides, material on record and orders of authorities below. We find that question, before us, is whether limited scrutiny proceedings and regular scrutiny proceedings are independent of each other or not and, therefore, notice issued for limited scrutiny under section 143(2)(i) can enable Assessing Officer to convert limited scrutiny into regular scrutiny where time to issue notice under section 143(2)(ii) has expired or not. We find that Legislature introduced limited scrutiny for limited period and provided for requirement of issue of notice therefore independently wherein Assessing Officer was required to specify specific nature of enquiry whereas provisions of regular scrutiny and time limit to issue notice for that purpose were already on statute. We further find that provisions of section 143(2) provided that no notice under this sub-section could be served on assessee after expiry of 12 months from end of month in which return was furnished and, therefore, as per this proviso, both Notices under section 143(2)(i) or 143(2)(ii) are to be issued within such Notices under section 143(2)(i) or 143(2)(ii) are to be issued within such specified time. We are further of view that provisions of section are clear regarding issuance of notice for both types of scrutinizes independently and limit has also been prescribed for issuance of Notice under section 143(2) for both types of scrutiny proceedings. Hence, we are unable to agree with contention of Revenue that Notice issued under section 143(2)(i) can by- itself extend time for issuance of Notice under section 143(2)(ii), hence, for this reason, we hold that Notice issued under section 143(2)(ii) on 28-7- 2003 is time-barred and consequently, assessment completed under section 143(3)(ii) is also null and void. According, we quash same. Thus, additional ground, filed by assessee, is accepted. 9. Since we have quashed assessment as time-barred, hence, there is no necessity to adjudicate upon merits of issue. 10. In result, appeal, filed by assessee, stands allowed in terms indicated above. *** BHOLANATH R. SHUKLA v. INCOME TAX OFFICER