R.P. Garg, Vice President: These seven appeals by assessee are directed against orders of CIT(A) for asst. yrs. 1991-92 to 1997-98. All these appeals have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order for sake of convenience. common ground raised in all these appeal is that CIT(A) erred in confirming action of AO in finalizing assessment proceedings under s. 144 of IT Act, 1961 (Act) even though no valid notice was issued and served on assessee and that time-limit for issue of notice had expired as same was issued beyond period of limitation and that no notice under s. 148 of Act was issued on deceased assessee during his life time nor on his legal heir. facts are that, assessee owned certain land bearing survey No. 141 in Village Ganpatpura, Tal. Kalol. It was acquired by Government of Gujarat for construction of main canal of Narmada project during 1990-91. As result of order of District Court dt. 29th Sept., 1998, assessee received additional compensation and solatium along with interest @ 9 per cent for one year on date of acquisition and @ 15 per cent thereafter till April, 2000. interest pertaining to each of year was Rs. 56,674. As this amount was chargeable to income-tax on accrual basis (and) was not offered to tax, as per decision of Supreme Court, AO issued notice under s. 148 of Act and served same on assessee on 17th April, 2006. assessee, vide letter dt. 1st May, 2006, submitted as under: "We are in receipt of your notice under s. 148 of IT Act, 1961, dt. 3rd April, 2006. In this connection please note that said assessee has expired on 13th Oct., 2001, copy of death certificate is enclosed. Please note that as per s. 149(1) of IT Act, 1961, no notice under s. 148 can be issued after four years/six years after end of relevant assessment year and hence notice issued by you is invalid in law. Further income escaped from tax does not exceed rupees one lakh from which basic deduction is to be deducted. Accordingly no proceedings under s. 148 or 147 can be initiated by you in our case. Further assessee has already expired and his legal representatives have no resources to perform any liability, if any, of his late father; notice issued by you under s. 148 may be cancelled." AO, thereafter, issued notice dt. 3rd May, 2006, requiring assessee to appear on 12th May, 2006, but assessee did not put any appearance. As assessee failed to comply in terms of notice under s. 148 of Act, another notice under s. 142(1) was issued on 22nd Aug., 2006 requiring assessee to appear on 25th Aug., 2006 and to file return within ten days of receipt of notice. This notice was also not complied with and consequently, AO made assessment ex parte, determining income of assessee at Rs. 56,674 in each of year under consideration. CIT(A) noted that when notice under s. 148 dt. 3rd April, 2006 was issued, AO had no information that deceased assessee Shri Gopalbhai Ishwarbhai Patel had expired on 13th Oct., 2001 and service of notice on legal heir Shri Arvind Gopalbhai Patel was not disputed. On contrary, legal heir claimed refund of Rs. 69,820 by filing return of income for asst. yr. 2001-02 on 31st March, 2002, wherein signatures of Late Shri Gopalbhai Ishwarbhai Patel were shown to have been hand inscribed. He, therefore, held that notice under s. 148 was issued on legal heir Shri Arvind Gopalbhai Patel AO being not in knowledge of death of Shri Gopalbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, notices were valid. As regards time-limit, he held that notice under s. 143(3) (sic) was not barred by limitation because of order of District Court dt. 29th Sept., 1998 to save period of limitation for serving notice. He further noticed that legal heir himself admitted that only after receipt of assessment order, he requested AO dt. 15th Nov., 2006, to supply him reasons recorded for reopening assessment as same could not be held to be invalid on that ground. Being aggrieved, assessee is in appeal before us. learned counsel for assessee, Shri A.L. Thakkar, submitted that notices issued on dead person, were invalid; and that having issued no notice on legal heir, proceedings initiated were invalid and bad in law. He further submitted that all assessments have become barred by limitation because notices were issued beyond period of limitation of six years as provided in s. 149 of Act. Six years period even of date of last assessment year which is in dispute, expired on 31st March, 2004 i.e., six years from end of asst. yr. 1997-98. learned Departmental Representative, on other hand, supported order of AO as well as of CIT(A) and submitted that proceedings were rightly initiated and assessee himself had claimed refund by filing return for asst. yr. 2001-02 on 31st March, 2002 did not dispute service of notice and participated in proceedings cannot now complain for invalidity of proceedings. As regards limitation, learned Departmental Representative supported orders of Revenue authorities with aid of provisions contained in s. 150 of Act, proceedings being consequent to Court order dt. 29th Sept., 1998 granting interest to assessee in these terms. parties are heard and rival submissions considered. It is not in dispute that interest awarded by Court is assessable on accrual basis in view of Supreme Court decision in case of Smt. Rama Bai vs. CIT (1990) 84 CTR (SC) 164: (1990) 181 ITR 400 (SC) and assessee having not furnished return, there was failure on part of assessee and, therefore, assessment can be reopened. Time-limit within which assessment can be reopened is prescribed under s. 149 of Act. Normally, it is to be reopened within period of four years from end of assessment year as prescribed in cl. (a) of s. 149(1) unless income falls in cl. (b) of provisions of s. 149(1) of Act. Clause (b) provides that such notice can be issued within six years if income chargeable to tax which escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount t o Rs. 1 lakh or more. This is provision which has been introduced by Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 1st June, 2001. Prior to that provision as it stood amended by Direct Tax Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1989, w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, read as under: "(a) If four years have elapsed from end of relevant assessment year, unless case falls under cl. (b); (b) if four years, but not more than seven years, have elapsed from end of relevant assessment year, unless income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment amounts to or is likely to amount to one lakh rupees or more for that year." only difference seems to be that, earlier, normal time limit was four years; it was four to seven years if income escaped was Rs. 50,000 or more; and seven to ten years if income was rupees lakh or more. If assessment had also been completed under s. 143(3)/147 in other cases four years, four to seven years if income exceeding Rs. 25,000 and seven to ten years if income was Rs. 50,000 or more. Sec. 150, however, provides no time-limit for issue of notice in certain circumstances. It reads as under: "Section 150 Provision for cases where assessment is in pursuance of order on appeal, etc. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 149, notice under s. 148 m y be issued at any time for purpose of making assessment or reassessment or recomputation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in order passed by any authority in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference or revision or by Court in any proceeding under any other law. (2) provisions of sub-s. (1) shall not apply in any case where any such assessment, reassessment or recomputation as is referred to in that sub-section relates to assessment year in respect of which assessment, reassessment or recomputation could not have been made at time order which was subject-matter of appeal, reference or revision, as case may be, was made by reason of any other provision limiting time within which any action for assessment, reassessment or recomputation may be taken." On plain reading of this provision, it is apparent that time prescribed under s. 149 is not to apply if reopening is for purpose of making assessment or reassessment or recomputation in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in order passed by any authority in any proceeding under this Act by way of appeal, reference or revision "or by Court in any proceeding under any other law". Originally, provision was restricted to orders under Act. However, scope of s. 150 was extended by inserting Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, w.e.f. 1st April, 1989. Sub-s. (2), however, again provides ban on issuing notice if it had already became barred by limitation on date of order which was subject-matter of appeal, reference or revision and order of District Court dt. 29th Sept., 1998 in this order and limitation has, therefore, to be considered with reference to this order. In other words, if reopening had already barred by limitation as on 29th Sept., 1998, reopening cannot be justified in view of decision of Supreme Court in case of K.M. Sharma vs. ITO (2002) 174 CTR (SC) 210: (2002) 254 ITR 772 (SC). It held: "We do not find above reasoning of High Court is sound. plain language of sub-s. (2) of s. 150 clearly restricts application of sub-s. (1) to enable authority to reopen assessments which have not already become final on expiry of prescribed period of limitation under s. 149. As is sought to be done by High Court, sub-s. (2) of 150 cannot be held applicable only to reassessments based on orders in proceedings under Act and not to orders of Court in proceedings under any other law. Such interpretation would make whole provision under s. 150 discriminatory in its application to assessments sought to be reopened on basis of orders under IT Act and other assessments proposed to be reopened on basis of orders under any other law. Interpretation, which creates such unjust and discriminatory situation, has to be avoided. We do not find that sub-s. (2) of s. 150 has that result. Sub-s. (2) intends to insulate all proceedings of assessments, which have attained finality due to then existing bar of limitation. To achieve desired result it was not necessary to make any amendment in sub-s. (2) corresponding to sub-s. (1), as is reasoning adopted by High Court." As regards reopening on basis of order of any Court, similar matter came up before Delhi High Court in case of K.M. Sharma vs. ITO (1996) 134 CTR (Del) 530: (1996) 221 ITR 202 (Del), wherein land admeasuring 4,200 Bighas was acquired by Government, by notifications of 1966 under Land Acquisition Act. compensation was awarded by Addl. District Judge on 20th May, 1980, in reference application filed under s. 18 of Land Acquisition Act. Addl. District Judge, by order dt. 31st July, 1991, passed award consequent to which assessee became entitled to compensation including interest of Rs. 76,84,829 upto 18th May, 1992. AO issued notices for sixteen years and assessee challenged same by stating that no tax was leviable on interest accruing upto 31st March, 1982, as it had become time-barred. assessee also, thereafter, challenged aforesaid notices by way of writ before Delhi High Court on ground that notices have become time-barred under s. 149 and provisions of s. 150 are not attracted to facts of case because there was no finding of any Court to assess income for said years. Delhi High Court, however, dismissed petition by stating as under: "On closer reading of aforesaid provisions only interpretation that could be given to aforesaid section is that bar of limitation as provided for in s. 149 shall not apply for reopening of assessments to certain periods of limitation, i.e., in case when initiation of reassessment proceedings is in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in appellate order such initiation of reassessment proceedings would be bad if said proceedings are barred by any other provision of Act on date of order which was subject-matter of appeal. It is, however, pertinent to note that aforesaid provision under s. 150(2) which is in nature of proviso to s. 150(1) does not include within its ambit expression any finding or direction contained in order passed by Court in any proceedings under any other law appearing in s. 150(1) which was added to statute w.e.f. 1st April, 1939, and only relates to subject-matter of appeal, reference or revision alone. aforesaid expression any finding or direction contained in order passed by Court in any proceeding under any other law was not added to by legislature to provisions of s. 150(2) of IT Act. order passed in land acquisition proceeding would definitely be included within ambit of expression used any finding or direction contained in order passed by Court in any proceedings under any other law . In present case initiation of reassessment proceedings is based on findings or directions contained in order passed by reference Court in land acquisition proceeding which as is held hereinabove is included within aforesaid expression used in sub-s. (2) of s. 150, of IT Act. In view of our aforesaid understanding of provisions of s. 150 interpretation that could be given thereto is that if there be order of Court including order by reference Court in land acquisition proceedings then bar of limitation is automatically lifted and accordingly, for years in question for which interest was paid to petitioner, although initiation of reassessment proceedings could be barred under provisions of s. 149, same would stand as not barred under provisions of s. 150(1) of Act and consequently, question of limitation would not arise for consideration. provisions of s. 150(2) are not applicable to facts and circumstances of present case as it does not envisage within its ambit any finding or direction contained in order passed by Court in any proceedings under any other law, which in instant case is finding or direction contained in order of award passed by reference Court in land acquisition proceedings under Land Acquisition Act. decisions of Supreme Court relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner are distinguishable as those decisions were rendered prior to amendment of s. 150 of IT Act effective from 1st April, 1989 and do not notice aforesaid amendments in s. 150(1)." matter was carried to Supreme Court by assessee only on point of limitation and Supreme Court allowing claim of assessee, held that notices which have become barred by limitation on date of order in proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, were invalid and were not saved by provisions of s. 150 of Act. It observed at p. 779 of report, reads as under: "On proper construction of provisions of s. 150(1) and effect of its operation from 1st April, 1989, we are clearly of opinion that provisions cannot be given retrospective effect prior to 1st April, 1989, for assessments which have already become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1st April, 1989. Taxing provision imposing liability is governed by normal presumption that it is not retrospective and settled principle of law is that law to be applied is that which is in force in assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. Even procedural provision cannot in absence of clear contrary intendment expressed therein be given greater retrospectivity than is expressly mentioned so as to enable authorities to affect finality of tax assessments or to open up liabilities, which have become barred by lapse of time. Our conclusion, therefore, is that sub-s. (1) of s. 150, as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, does not enable authorities to reopen assessments, which have become final due to bar of limitation prior to 1st April, 1989, and this position is applicable equally to reassessments proposed on basis of orders passed under Act or under any other law." It had also disapproved reasoning of High Court that provisions under s. 150(2) do not save proceedings based on orders of Court passed in any proceedings in any law by observing as under: "Sub-s. (2) aims at putting embargo on reopening assessments, which have attained finality on expiry of prescribed period of limitation. Sub-s. (2) in putting such embargo refers to whole of sub-s. (1) meaning thereby to insulate all assessments, which have become final and may have been found liable to reassessments or recomputation either on basis of orders in proceedings under Act or orders of Courts passed under any other law. High Court, therefore, was in error in not reading whole of amended sub-s. (1) into sub-s. (2) and coming to conclusion that reassessment proposed on basis of order of Court in proceedings under Land Acquisition Act could be commenced even though original assessments for relevant years in question have attained finality on expiry of period of limitation under s. 149 of Act. On combined reading of sub-s. (1) as amended w.e.f. 1st April, 1989, and sub-s. (2) of s. 150 as it stands, in our view fair and just interpretation would be that authority under Act has been empowered only to reopen assessments, which have not already been closed and attained finality due to operation of bar of limitation under s. 149." limitation under s. 149." In present cases, provisions, as were in force at time of issuing notices were those which were introduced by Finance Act, 2001, w.e.f. 1st June, 2001 and under that provision, as aforesaid, notice can be issued only within four years from relevant assessment year unless case falls under cl. (b) of s. 149(1) of Act. Clause (b) is not applicable in these cases because, income in each of years was not Rs. 1 lakh or more. Counting four years time-limit from end of assessment years, proceedings for asst. yr. 1991-92 became barred by limitation on 31st March, 1996 for asst. yr. 1992-93 on 31st March, 1997 and for asst. yr. 1993-94 on 31st March, 1998. These three years became barred by limitation before Court granting interest to assessee on 29th Sept., 1998. notices for reopening are to be held invalid and assessments are to be quashed in view of Supreme Court decision in case of K.M. Sharma (supra). I direct accordingly. Insofar as other asst. yrs. 1994-95 onwards are concerned, four years time-limit did not expire on date of order of District Court dt. 29th Sept., 1998 and, therefore, they cannot be held to be barred by limitation by virtue of s. 150(2), are saved by provisions of s. 150(1) of Act. In these cases, AO was justified in issuing notice under s. 147 of Act and make assessments. These assessments are accordingly upheld. learned counsel for assessee submitted that notices were issued in name of deceased assessees, Shri Gopalbhai Ishwarbhai Patel, who died on 13th Oct., 2001 and no notices were issued to assessee s legal heir and, therefore, notices for other years are also bad on that ground. I do not find merit on this contention of assessee. notice was issued by AO on 17th April, 2006. legal heir of assessee himself had filed return for asst. yr. 2001-02 on 31st March, 2002 under signature of deceased claiming refund on such interest. AO was not aware that assessee had died. In any case, said notices were received by assessee s legal heir and were not disputed except bringing fact on record that said assessee had expired on 13th Oct., 2001. On contrary, he proceeded to defend (sic challenge) reopening on ground of limitation and absence of resources to perform liability of deceased. In any case, AO issued notice under s. 142(1) to file returns of income which were not complied with by assessee. In these circumstances, in my opinion, notices cannot be held to be invalid. Supreme Court, in case of CIT vs. Jai Prakash Singh (1996) 132 CTR (SC) 262: (1996) 219 ITR 737 (SC), held that assessment made on basis of returns filed by one of legal representatives cannot be said to be null and void on ground that notices were not sent to other legal representatives who participated in proceedings and Supreme Court, in case of Estate of Late Rangalal Jajodia vs. CIT (1971) 79 ITR 505 (SC) held that where deceased died after filing return but before assessment, s. 24B applied and assessment on executor for want of notice did not make assessment defective but was mistake liable to be corrected after notice to executor. Accordingly, orders of CIT(A) for asst. yrs. 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 are upheld. In result, assessee s appeals for asst. yrs. 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993- 94 stand allowed and appeals for asst. yrs. 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 stand dismissed. *** LATE GOPALBHAI ISHWARBHAI PATEL v. INCOME TAX OFFICER