By this application, assessee seeks to recall order of Tribunal, dt. 24th Sept., 2001, either in its entirety or partially. These were cross-appeals by assessee as well as by Revenue. In assessee s appeal main issue was about taxability of receipts from engineering and ground handling services rendered by assessee to other airlines, either under Act or under art. 8 of Double Tax Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) between India and United Kingdom (UK). Revenue was aggrieved against enhancement of deduction at 30 per cent from gross receipts despite fact that assessee did not produce any evidence regarding actual expenses incurred by it. AO was of view that income of assessee from aforesaid activities accrued and arose in India and was, therefore, taxable. contention of assessee that said income was exempt under art. 8 of DTAA was rejected by AO. assessee had sought to cover its case under expression "any other activity directly connected with such transportation" appearing in art. 8(3) of DTAA. According to CIT(A), this view was not tenable on combined reading of paras 1 and 3 of art. 8. Thus, on taxability aspect, CIT(A) agreed with AO. So far as computation of income was concerned, AO was of view that provisions of s. 44C of IT Act, 1961 (the Act), were attracted. assessee s view was that profit had been computed at very high percentage of 82 per cent of gross receipts ignoring provisions of s. 44BBA and r. 10. CIT(A) rejected this plea of assessee and also observed that AO had not taken into account all activities which if taken into consideration, actual profits would be less. Accordingly, he directed AO to take 70 per cent of gross receipts as profits of assessee. Both parties were aggrieved by order of CIT(A) and approached Tribunal by way of second appeal. Before Tribunal, elaborate arguments were made particularly pressing in service art. 8 of DTAA. Emphasis was laid by assessee on its being member of International Air Transport Association (IATA) and of International Airlines Technical Pool (IATP) through which parties to agreement were to pool and share technical resources, infrastructure facilities and manpower with view to achieve economic savings by reducing costs. Such agreements, according to assessee, were "pool agreements" entered into for providing technical services and facilities on basis of "Standard Ground Handling Agreement" (SGHA). It was stated that assessee had provided engineering and ground handling services at international airport of Delhi to eleven other airlines and at Chennai to five airlines and certain other airlines at Mumbai. According to assessee, similar services had been availed of by assessee from Qantas Airlines and Cathay Pacific Airlines at international airports in Manila and Taipei. On other hand, contention of Department was that there was separate establishment and separate office set up to monitor ground handling services and plea was to effect that various establishments at international airports in India did not form part and parcel of operation of assessee pertaining to operation of aircraft in international traffic and such establishments constituted separate offices. As regards service to its own aircrafts and passengers, AO who was present before CIT(A), accepted that these could be covered under expression "other activities" directly connected with such transportation but when it came to exploiting excess activities for earning revenues by rendering similar services to other airlines, these could not be said to be activities directly connected with such transportation. Tribunal considered lengthy arguments of parties. At outset, Tribunal considered purpose of DTAAs and considered as to what status it should be accorded while interpreting agreements. After hearing arguments of both sides on this issue, Tribunal held that in DTAA there is no legislative intent, no speech of mover of Bill and, therefore, strict interpretation is to be made of terms of agreement and nothing is to be assumed and read into agreement although DTAA can be treated as "special law". Tribunal held that rules of interpretation of statute would not apply and DTAA itself has to be interpreted, but in strict terms. With this approach, Tribunal proceeded to consider various arguments of assessee on merits of issue. In particular, meaning of word "pool" was gone into with great detail. Then Tribunal analyzed provisions of art. 8 with particular emphasis on para 3 thereof as assessee had placed much reliance on expression "any other activity directly connected with such transportation" used therein. Tribunal also considered various judgments referred to on behalf of assessee. Finally, Tribunal decided issue relating to taxability of amount received on account of rendering ground handling /engineering services to other airlines against assessee. With regard to computation of taxable income, Tribunal set aside issue to AO to determine same after giving due opportunity of being heard to assessee. learned counsel for assessee pointed out from various observations of Tribunal made by it in its order dt. July, 2001. focus of learned counsel was on approach Tribunal had adopted while deciding appeal. It was pointed out that Tribunal had rightly observed that taxability of impugned receipts depended on proper interpretation of art. 8 of DTAA. However, it misdirected itself in observing that provisions of DTAA were to be construed strictly. His specific objection was to observation that DTAA was in nature of special law overriding Act and hence there was no scope for any liberal or equitable construction. He also objected to observation that in DTAA there is no legislative intent, no speech of mover of Bill and, therefore, strict interpretation is to be made of terms of agreement and nothing is to be assumed and read into agreement although DTAA can be termed as special law. In other words, prime objection was that though Tribunal observed that rules of interpretation would not apply yet it held that DTAA itself had to be interpreted in strict terms. It was argued that grievance of assessee was in refusal to apply principles of liberal interpretation. If, after applying this principle, income is found to be taxable, it is different question. It is not case of assessee that error is due to non-interpretation in liberal terms but error lies in refusal to apply principle. To support contention that DTAA should always receive liberal interpretation, our attention was drawn to judgment of Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan (2003) 184 CTR (SC) 450: (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC). Our specific attention was drawn to observation made at pp. 742 and 743 of Report. It was contended that it is well established that Supreme Court always explains law and does not lay down any law. To support this contention, reliance was placed on judgment of Madras High Court in case of Dr. Rajah Sir M.A. Muthiah Chettiar (Decd.) vs. CIT (1999) 156 CTR (Mad) 318: (1999) 238 ITR 505 (Mad). Therefore, prayer was that since entire approach in deciding appeal was contrary to law and established practices as well as against principles laid down by highest Court, order of Tribunal suffered from inherent error of law which was apparent on record and should, therefore, be recalled. next aspect on which learned counsel touched upon was judicial propriety attached with order of Tribunal. It was pointed out that matter was heard by Tribunal on 11th and 12th Oct., 2000, and order was passed almost one year later. In this connection, our attention was drawn to judgment of Supreme Court in case of Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318. Our particular attention was drawn to observations of Court on pp. 330 and 331 of Report. observations were to effect that delay in pronouncement of judgment is opposed to principle of law and at t h e most, period may be stretched to six weeks. In any case, pronouncement of judgment in case should not be permitted to go beyond two months. Court observed that where judgment is not pronounced within three months from date reserving it, parties are permitted to file application with prayer for early judgment. It was further observed that where judgment is not pronounced within six months, any of parties to lis shall be entitled to move application with prayer to withdraw said case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh argument. It is open to Court to grant said prayer or to pass any order as it deems fit in circumstances. These observations, it was pointed out, were in criminal case but undoubtedly, they applied to revenue cases also as it was done so by Bombay High Court in case of Devang Rasiklal Vora vs. Union of India 2003 (158) ELT 30. It was also contended that these observations tantamounted to guidelines issued under Art. 142 of Constitution and were binding on all lower Courts. Thus, on this ground also, it was contended that order needs to be recalled and be adjudicated upon afresh. learned counsel then briefly dwelt upon merits of issues involved. learned counsel referred to certain other judgments wherein Court had not agreed with recalling of order but was pointed out that in those cases recall was for reviewing order and not to rectify same. In instant case, recall was prayed for rectification and hence those judgments did not come in way of Tribunal. We have duly considered rival contentions and material on record. There cannot be any quarrel over proposition that while resolving dispute between parties under particular statute, strict rules of interpretation apply while interpreting provisions of relevant statute, more so, in case of taxing statute and even more so when particular income which is thought to be exempt from tax is brought to tax and also when penal provisions are being interpreted. underlying principle is that when particular receipt is brought to tax as income under taxing statute, onus is on State to show that particular receipt is income because it is State who is levying tax on income. Under Constitution, tax cannot be levied on income without authority of law. It is for this reason that onus lies on State to show that particular receipt is income and is liable to tax. Sec. 90 of Act carves out exception to general provisions of Act. It provides that Central Government may enter into agreement with Government of any country outside India to avoid double taxation on particular income. If provisions of s. 90 are carefully seen, it would be evident that agreement entered into between two countries is primarily meant for granting of relief or for avoiding of double taxation on particular income. In other words, undoubtedly, DTAA is alternate tax regime, yet, onus remains on State to first show that particular receipt is income and then proceed to determine whether said receipt is taxable or not under DTAA. Further, though, as mentioned above, DTAA is alternate tax regime, it cannot be accorded status of statute. Therefore, when it comes to interpretation of DTAA, strict rules of interpretation as are applicable while interpreting statute, cannot be made applicable. This is not new principle which is evolved recently but has existed since such agreements started taking place between different countries, i.e., even from time of League of Nations. Second reason as to why strict rules of interpretation cannot be made applicable to DTAA is that s. 90 itself speaks of "relief", "avoidance of double taxation , etc. Therefore, Federal Court in Canada, in case of John N. Gladden vs. Her Majesty, Queen (85 DTC 5188), observed that "we cannot expect to find same nicety or strict definition as in modern documents, such as deeds, or Acts of Parliament; it has never been habit of those engaged in diplomacy to use legal accuracy but rather to adopt more liberal terms". These observations of Canadian Federal Court found approval of our Supreme Court in case of Union of India vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan (supra) at pp. 742 and 742 of ITR 263. There also cannot be quarrel over proposition that established judicial norms and principles have to be followed while resolving dispute between parties. Thus, when dispute between parties is being adjudicated upon under statute, provisions of statute will have to receive strict interpretation except in rare cases where situation demands otherwise. If strict rules of interpretation are not followed, conclusion arrived at is likely to be, in all probabilities, unjust. Similarly, since DTAA is alternate tax regime, interpretation thereof has to be guided by judicial norms which are meant for it. If it is not so done, then unjust conclusion is likely to be arrived at. If unjust conclusion or wrong conclusion is arrived at in spite of applying established judicial norms, then said order cannot be termed as erroneous per se because wrong or unjust conclusion may be on account of error of judgment. Such error cannot be rectified as it would be review under garb of rectification. However, if wrong or unjust conclusion is arrived at by not following judicial norms, that is, when very approach to resolution of dispute is incorrect at very threshold, then certainly, order gets vitiated at very outset even before conclusion is reached. Thus, in principle we accept argument of learned counsel, but let us see what facts are in present case. When order proposed by Hon ble Vice President was placed before t h e learned JM, she wrote separate order agreeing with Hon ble Vice President about taxability of impugned receipts. She also dealt with at length argument relating to approach to be adopted for interpreting DTAA. She did agree with Hon ble Vice President that rules of strict interpretation would apply. However, she also took into consideration argument of learned counsel about liberal construction and held that even on argument of learned counsel about liberal construction and held that even on such construction, activity of ground handling and engineering cannot be considered to be treaty protected. It would be relevant to quote extract from para 42 of her order: "I would start from premises that issue pertaining to interpretation of taxing provisions is fairly settled to extent that generally, rules of strict interpretation would apply. arguments of learned Authorised Representative that liberal construction should be applied to present facts of case have been rejected by my learned Brother. To this, I would merely like to state that even applying rules of liberal construction as is advocated by learned Authorised Representative, activity of ground handling and engineering cannot be considered to be treaty protected either under arts. 8.1, 8.2 or 8.3 of DTAA. Thus, as this activity cannot be considered to be operation of aircraft in international traffic or "pooling activity" as this would seem to suggest bringing together of finances, personnel for profit apportionment amongst members and it also cannot be considered to be any other activity directly connected with such transportation even if liberal construction is applied. Thus, even applying this yardstick, case of assessee fails." In preceding paragraph, we have mentioned that if unjust conclusion or wrong conclusion is arrived at in spite of applying established judicial norms, then said order cannot be termed as erroneous per se because wrong or unjust conclusion may be on account of error of judgment. As we have seen from order of learned JM above, argument relating to liberal interpretation has been considered and even applying that yardstick, same conclusion has been arrived at. Therefore, to now recall order and rehear case would merely amount to review of earlier order. Had yardstick of liberal interpretation not been applied at all, then perhaps, there would have been case for recalling order. But, having applied yardstick of liberal interpretation, if Tribunal has come to particular interpretation, then to recall it for so-called rectification would not be anything short of review. Therefore, we decline to recall order on this ground. We may hasten to add that though there was sort of difference of opinion between two Members, difference was not on above observations of learned JM. difference was only pertaining to directions given to AO for purpose of quantifying taxable amount. According to Hon ble Vice President, observations of learned JM would have prejudiced mind of AO and would have curtailed his independent application of mind while deciding upon quantum of taxable amount. Therefore, disassociation of Hon ble Vice President from observations of learned JM has to be considered in this context only. In fact, he has categorically stated that, "In view of aforesaid I would like to disassociate myself from various observations made by my learned colleague which would fall within broad categories highlighted aforesaid." (underline, italicised in print, by us). Accordingly, order of Third Member has also to be read in this context and observations of learned JM relating to liberal interpretation are not in any way done away with. Thus, order of Tribunal cannot be said to be suffering from any error apparent on record. With regard to argument that order should be recalled on ground of delay in passing order, we are not inclined to accept same. No doubt, learned counsel has advanced elaborate arguments on this aspect. However, though there has been delay, we find that issue has been dealt with at length and all arguments of parties have been considered. manner of dealing with arguments and submissions may not be to liking of parties. But, that by itself does not make order erroneous which can be rectified or recalled. As matter of fact, as suggested by Supreme Court in case of Anil Rai (supra), on which heavy reliance has been placed by learned counsel, assessee could have moved application to Hon ble President for withdrawal of case and to make it over to any other Bench for fresh argument when no order was pronounced within six months. assessee chose not to do so and now having received order which is not in its favour, it cannot plead for recall of order at such late stage. Arguments were also advanced by parties on determination of quantum of income to be taxed. However, in our view, Tribunal has given proper directions in this regard over which we cannot sit in judgment. Therefore, we refrain from dealing with this aspect. In result, application of assessee is dismissed. *** BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC. v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX