The above three appeals of assessees, directed against respective orders of CIT(A), Rohtak, all dated 21-8-1998, confirming levy of penalty under section 271D of Income-tax Act, 1961 on assessees for having received loans and deposits in violation of provisions of section 269SS of Act, 1961, had come up for hearing before ITAT, Chandigarh Bench. 2. main ground raised by assessee against levy of penalty was that penalty orders were barred by limitation. ITAT, Chandigarh Bench felt that there was divergence of opinion amongst various Benches of Tribunal in regard to computation of period of limitation. One view was that period of limitation for imposition of penalty under section 271D is to be calculated with reference to notice issued by JCIT after recording his satisfaction. Another view is that period of limitation commences from date of issue of notice by Assessing Officer. Accordingly, constitution of Special Bench was recommended. Hon ble President, ITAT was pleased to constitute Special Bench for purposes of decision in regard to following issue : "Having regard to provisions of sections 271D and 271E and section 275 of Income-tax Act, whether period of limitations for purposes of section 275 of Act is to be reckoned from date when assessment proceedings are completed or from date when penalty proceedings are initiated by JCIT?" 3. It may be pertinent to mention that when matter came up before Special Bench on 25-7-2003, it was found that in case of Shri Naresh Kumar, Assessing Officer had issued intimation under section 143(1)(a) and that had become final as no order under section 143(3) had been passed. In case of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Lalit Mohan, return had been filed by assessee in respect of which assessee did not receive any intimation under section 143(1)(a) or any order under section 143(3). In case of M/s. Dewan Chand Amrit Lal, no information was furnished. Hon ble Members of Special Bench, as then constituted, formed opinion that Special Bench would not be in position to answer reference in view of no assessment orders having been passed in respect of these assessees. matter was forwarded to Hon ble President, ITAT who returned reference made by Hon ble Members of Bench to decide issue for which Special Bench was constituted. Subsequently, matter came up before present constitution of Special Bench. 4. Parties have been heard and record perused. 5. brief facts giving rise to issue involved before us are that search was conducted on 8-9-1993 at premises of Shri Surinder Kumar, son of Shri Basant Lal, Aggarwal Street, Bhatinda. During course of search, receipt dated 1-7-1993 issued by Shri Lalit Mohan, partner of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Lalit Mohan, Rania, Sirsa, was found and seized. As per said receipt, firm had taken loan of Rs. 1,50,000 in cash on 1- 7-1993 from Shri Surinder Kumar, s/o Sh. Basant Lal, Aggarwal Stree, Bhatinda on which interest for three months had also been paid in advance. receipt was executed on letterhead of firm and was duly stamped. Information regarding above-mentioned loan was passed on to ITO, Ward-2, Sirsa. Assessing Officer had made inquiries. report given by Assessing Officer has been reproduced by Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Hissar Range, Hissar in order passed under section 271D which is quoted hereunder : "The Inspector of his office was deputed to collect copy of account of Shri Surinder Kumar, s/o Sh. Basant Lal, Bathinda from books of account of above assessee on 25-1-1995. But above assessee has denied having any account of Sh. Surinder Kumar vide its letter dated 6-2-1995. Subsequently books of account of assessee were also impounded by his predecessor. It is pertinent to submit here that this letter has also been signed by Sh. Lalit Mohan, partner of firm and apparently signatures of Sh. Lalit Mohan are tallying with those put on receipt issued to Sh. Surinder Kumar. I am submitting herewith Income-tax return filed by assessee for assessment year 1994-95. This return of income has also been verified by Sh. Lalit Mohan and these signatures are also apparently tallying with those on receipts. letter was issued to above assessee on 16-1-1 996 and assessee was asked to explain as to why his case should not be referred to DCIT for considering penalty under section 271D of Income-tax Act. assessee was required to submit its reply on or before 29-1-1996. None has attended his office on 29-1-1996 nor any written submission has been filed." Assessing Officer referred matter to DCIT, Hissar on 5-11-1996 for considering provisions related to penalty for default along with copy of receipt. DCIT issued show-cause notice to assessee on 13-5-1996. assessee replied to notice. reply of assessee has been considered in penalty order. We are not at this stage required to consider merits of penalty on basis of claim of assessee and finding of DCIT. We are, however, concerned with objection raised by assessee that order passed by DCIT, Hissar imposing penalty on 5-11-1996 is barred by limitation. issue relating to limitation was also raised before DCIT who has dealt with same in para 6 of his order (which is reproduced hereunder) and dismissed claim of assessee : "From perusal of receipt, it is very clear that assessee-firm had accepted loan of Rs. 1,50,000 in cash. Receipt was issued by Sh. Lalit Mohan partner of firm on letter pad of assessee- firm and rubber stamp of assessee-firm was also used by Sh. Lalit Mohan while signing said receipt on 1-7-1993 on revenue stamp worth of forty paise. Even assessee-firm had paid interest up to 30-9-1993 in cash and in advance. Thus, there is no doubt in my mind that firm had accepted cash loan in violation of provisions of section 269SS. other contentions of assessee that limitation to pass penalty order has expired is also legally not correct. Provisions of section 275(1)(c) clearly provide period of 6 months from end of month in which action for imposition of penalty is intimated in any other case. expression in any other case is case which have not been mentioned in sections 271(1)(a) and 275(1)( b). instant case of assessee relates to imposition of penalty under section 271D for violation of provisions of section 269SS. Thus, case of assessee is case covered under provisions of section 275(1)(c) for which period of clear 6 months is available from end of month in which penalty proceedings under section 271D were initiated. As already stated proceedings under section 271D were initiated by my predecessor by issuing show-cause notice on 13-5-1996. Limitation to pass penalty order is, therefore, to expire on 30-11-1996. This contention of assessee is also rejected." 6. In case of Shri Naresh Kumar, Prop. M/s. Punjab Ram Labh Chand, similar receipt was found and seized from premises of Shri Surinder Kumar in course of search on 8-9-1993, in which it was indicated that sum of Rs. 1 lakh had been received by assessee in cash as loan. Assessing Officer had made inquiries from assessee. report of Assessing Officer has been reproduced by DCIT in para 2 of his order which is quoted hereunder : "On receipt of information necessary enquiry was made and concerned parties were confronted with photo copy of receipt issued by them to Shri Surinder Kumar of Bathinda. assessee as also required to show cause why acceptance of deposit of in cash exceeding Rs. 20,000 should not be treated to be in contravention of provisions of section 269SS of Income-tax Act, 1961. assessee was also required to intimate utilization of said amount and income if any earned therefrom. In response to queries Sh. Naresh Kumar, Prop. attended and his statement was recorded. In his statement Shri Naresh Kumar denied having accepted any loan from Shri Surinder Kumar. When aforesaid receipt was shown to Sh. Naresh Kumar which was on letter pad of M/s. Punjab Ram Labh Chand and also bear signatures of Sh. Naresh Kumar and stamp of M/s. Punjab Ram Labh Chand it was submitted by Sh. Naresh Kumar that letter pad used was of his firm. However, it was intimated that signatures appended on revenue stamps made in name of Shri Naresh Kumar, were not his signatures. He was further asked to state whether he knows any Naresh Kumar which may be relegated to him or had any business connection or otherwise with him, it was replied that he does not know as to who has signed on above-said letter pad. Sh. Naresh Kumar also confirmed that there is no person in name of Shri Naresh Kumar in his relation both business or otherwise. Shri Naresh Kumar was also required to give his signatures in English thrice and on comparison of signatures as available on copy of receipt, it was noticed that both signature tally. Sh. Naresh Kumar, however, stated that these do not tally. Enquiries were also made from PNB, Sirsa, where Sh. Naresh Kumar, Prop. of M/s. Punjab Ram Labh Chand was having current account No. 6843. In account opening form dated 29-9-1989 Sh. Naresh Kumar, Prop. has appended specimen signature. This signature also tallies with signatures appended on receipt dated 1-4-1993 seized from premises of Sh. Surinder Kumar of Bathinda (photo copy of Bank opening form is enclosed for kind reference). In view of above, it may be submitted that there is documentary evidence showing that assessee has accepted cash loan of Rs. 1 lakh on 1-1-1993. plea of picking up of letter seems to be futile attempt to escape provisions of section 269SS. receipt referred to above not only contain signature of Shri Diwan Chand partner but also has affixed with rubber stamp of firm and it is not believable that outsider would pick up both letter pad as well as rubber stamp of firm except with connivance of assessee. In view of above, it is clear that assessee has violated provisions of section 269SS of Income-tax Act, 1961." 7. matter was referred to DCIT, Hissar Range, Hissar along with copy of receipt seized on date of search. Accordingly, show-cause notice dated 18-10-1996 was issued to assessee by DCIT, Hissar Range, Hissar. After considering objections of assessee, DCIT has on same grounds as in case of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Lalit Mohan, imposed penalty of Rs. 1 lakh vide order dated 29-11-1996. 8. In case of M/s. Dewan Chand Amrit Lal also receipt for Rs. 1 lakh on account of cash loan taken by assessee from Shri Surinder Kumar was found on date of search conducted on residential premises on 8-9-1993. information was passed on to concerned Assessing Officer who made inquiry from assessee. report of Assessing Officer has been reproduced by DCIT in para 2 of his penalty order which is quoted hereunder: "On receipt of information necessary enquiry was made and concerned parties were confronted with photo copy of receipt issued by them to Shri Surinder Kumar of Bathinda. assessee as also required to show cause why acceptance of deposit of in cash exceeding Rs. 20,000 should not be treated to be in contravention of provisions of section 269SS of Income-tax Act, 1961. assessee was also required to intimate utilization of said amount and income if any earned therefrom. In response to queries Sh. Dewan Chand attended and his statement was recorded. In his statement Shri Dewan Chand denied knowing Shri Surinder Kumar of Bathinda and also his signature on receipt referred to above. He also stated that no receipt has ever been given by him. When his attention was drawn to fact that receipt had been given on letter pad of firm, it was stated that this paper of their letter pad might have been picked up in his absence and used accordingly. He was also required to put his signature in English thrice and on verification, it was noticed that his signature appended on aforesaid receipt tally with specimen signatures. Enquiries were also made from bank of Rajasthan where firm was having term deposit a/c. On perusal of account opening form which contain signature of Shri Diwan Chand, it is clear that signature of Shri Diwan Chand appended on this account opening form tally with signatures appearing on aforesaid receipt. reference was also made of return filed by firm for assessment year 1994-95. Sh. Diwan Chand has appended his signatures on balance sheet, P&L account, trading account and also on number of other paper filed along with return. perusal of these documents and also signatures appearing on verification made in return, also belies stand taken by assessee. In view of above, it may be submitted that there is documentary evidence showing that assessee has accepted cash loan of Rs. 1 lakh on 1-1-1993. plea of picking up of letter seems to be futile attempt to escape provisions of section 269SS. receipt referred to above not only contain signature of Shri Diwan Chand partner but also has affixed with rubber stamp of firm and it is not believable that outsider would pick up both letter pad as well as rubber stamp of firm except with connivance of assessee. In view of above, it is clear that assessee has violated provisions of section 269SS of Income-tax Act, 1961." 9. assessees had filed appeals to CIT(A) and raised two grounds before him. One of grounds raised before CIT(A) was that order passed by DCIT under section 271D was barred by limitation. CIT(A) vide para 5 of order in case of M/s. Diwan Chand Amrit Lal, reproduced hereunder, rejected contention advanced on behalf of assessee: "5. I have carefully considered conspectus of this matter and facts on record. It is settled law that in taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at language used. Even if there be casus omissus, defect can be remedied only by legislation and not by judicial interpretation. It is duty of adjudicating authority to give effect to words used without scanning wisdom or policy of Legislature and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or inconsistent with such express intent of law-giver. If statute is taxing statute, it has to be assumed that law-making authority does not commit mistake or make omission. To my mind, legislative intent is manifest by plain words used in section 271A, or for that matter, also in section 271D, on one hand and, on other, provisions such as section 271 of Act. While in latter case, penalty is initiable only in course of proceedings under Act, such embargo does not apply to former group of cases. I am fortified in this view by decision rendered by ITAT, Allahabad Bench in Income-tax Appeal No.728 of 1992 - Miri Lal Mulk Raj v. ITO, Ground numbered 2 is, therefore, rejected." appeals of other assessees have also been dismissed on same grounds. 10. As expressed earlier, we are concerned with ground relating to limitation. decision of CIT(A) is contained in para 5 of order which is reproduced above. Before us, written submissions were filed on behalf of assessees by Shri Ravinder Bindlish, sum and substance of which is as under: (i)That limitation under section 275(1)(c) for purposes of section 271D is prescribed to be up to end of financial year in which proceedings in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated are completed or six months from end of month in which action of imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever period expires later. In this case, ITO was in possession of information regarding receipt of money in cash of Rs. 1,50,000 in case of M/s. Bhagwan Dass Lalit Mohan and Rs. 1 lakh each in cases of M/s. Dewan Chand Amrit Lal and Shri Naresh Kumar respectively from Shri Surinder Kumar and accordingly issued notices to respective appellants regarding said loans. (ii)That issue of notice by Assessing Officer in regard to these loans was in accordance with provisions of section 275(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961 and, therefore, limitation starts from date of issue said notices. (iii)That subsequent notices issued by DCIT, according to ld. counsel, are not relevant for determination of time-limit prescribed under section 275(1)(c). It has been pointed out that though ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in case of Asstt. CIT v. Shree Nivas Chemicals [2003] 84 ITD 76, has taken different view, other Benches of Tribunal such as Hyderabad, Delhi and Jodhpur Benches have taken view in favour of assessee. relevant decisions have been cited as under : (i) Dillu Cine Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2002] 8O ITD 484 (Hyd.); (ii) Farrukhabad Investment (I) Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2003] 85 ITD 230 (Delhi); (iii) Hissaria Bros. v. Jt. CIT [2001] 73 TTJ (Jodh.) 1. Reference has also been made to decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of CIT v. M.A. Presstressed Works [1996] 220 ITR 226 in support of contention that limitation for imposition of penalty starts from completion of proceedings in course of which penalty proceedings have been initiated. According to ld. counsel, in these cases, penalty has been first initiated by Assessing Officer and subsequently penalty has been imposed by DCIT. So limitation starts from date of issue of notice by Assessing Officer. 11. ld. counsel for assessee has further contended that it cannot intention of Legislature to allow litigation to continue for indefinite period. Relying upon decision of Patna High Court in case of State of Bihar v. Puran Chandra Mahto 1999 (1) RCR(Civil) 630, ld. Counsel contended that object of limitation cannot be lost sight of and that possibilities of parties being dragged in Courts for indefinite period is to be avoided. Reliance was also placed on decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Smt. Tarawanti v. State of Haryana 1995(1) R.R.R. 110, 1994(3) R.R.R. 247, 1994 P.L.J. 495, in support of contention that rule of limitation is founded on consideration of public and provisions of Act dealing with litigation are required to be interpreted with approach which advances cause of public policy and not otherwise. Reliance has also been placed on decision of Punjab & Haryana High Court in case of Naurang Singh v. State of Punjab 1997(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 660, 1997(1) P.L.R. 363, to support contention that public policy demands that rule of law, justice, equity and good conscience which by now has become legend having got imbibed in jurisprudence by innumerable consistent and persistent pronouncements of Apex Court, principle is that one should not be vexed twice for same cause of action even by articulating or splitting relief or claim, particularly when element of certainty, continuity and to bring end to litigation and determination of rights of parties for all times to come, is one of judicial concern. 12. Shri S.K. Bansal, Advocate, who appeared as intervener, contended that section 271D falls in Chapter XXI and all provisions contained in this Chapter shall have to be read as whole. Relying upon Full Bench decision of Delhi High Court in case of CIT v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. [2002] 256 ITR 11, it was contended that entire statute has to be read as whole and thereafter chapter by chapter and then section by section and ultimately word by word. Reliance was also placed on decision of Karnataka High Court in case of Shanbagh Restaurant v. Dy. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 3932, wherein Hon ble High Court, according to ld. counsel, quashed penalty order as barred by limitation. Reliance was also placed on decision of Delhi Bench of ITAT in case of Farrukhabad Investment (I) Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2003] 80 TTJ (Delhi) 823, to support contention that date of show-cause notice by Assessing Officer has got to be considered as starting point for computing limitation under section 275(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, 1961. Reliance was also placed on decision of Kolkata Bench of ITAT in case of Asstt. CIT v. Birkmyre Export Co. (P) Ltd. [2002] 255 ITR (AT) 72 wherein penalty under section 271B of Income-tax Act, 1961 was held to be barred by limitation as order had not been passed within six months from date of initiation. Reliance was also placed on decision of Hyderabad Bench of ITAT in case of Dillu Cine Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2002] 80 ITD 484, in support of said contention. Reliance was also placed on decision of Rajasthan High Court in case of Nem Kumar Tholia v. Addl. CIT [1992] 194 ITR 371 (FB), wherein it was held that IAC could act only on reference made by ITO and when IAC exercised jurisdiction for imposing penalty, he was in fact exercising jurisdiction conferred on ITO. ld. counsel contended that with deletion of section 274(2) w.e.f. 1-4- 1976, entire jurisdiction in respect of imposition of penalty is now vested in ITO. Reliance was also placed on decision of Supreme Court in case of D.M. Mansvi v. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 557, to support contention that recording of satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceedings is necessary. According to ld. counsel, penalty proceedings are necessarily to be initiated by ITO or by appellate authority. Reliance was also placed on decision of Jodhpur Bench of ITAT in case of Hissaria Bros. v. Jt. CIT [2001] 73 TTJ (Jodh.) 1 in support of contention that penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E are to be initiated in course of assessment proceedings. It was, accordingly, pleaded that penalty orders passed in these cases of appellants may be held as barred by limitation. 13. Shri S.K. Mukhi, Advocate, appeared and sought permission of Bench to assist Court as amicus curiae in regard to issue involved in this appeal. Considering importance of matter, permission was granted. It was contended by Shri Mukhi that interpretation which is canvassed on behalf of revenue would result in hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty. Relying upon decision of Supreme Court in case of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India [2003] 6 SCC 186, it was contended that where literal construction or plain meaning of statute may lead to hardship, futility, absurdity or uncertainty, Court is bound to attach purposive or contextual construction to arrive at more just, reasonable and sensible result. It was contended that if interpretation advanced by revenue is accepted, it would mean that there is no limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings. This would result in uncertainty and hardship. Moreover, it would not be intention of Legislature to leave field for revenue officers wide open for levy of penalty in respect of contraventions such as one under section 271D. Our attention has been specifically invited to paras 17 and 18 of judgment of Supreme Court in case of D. Saibaba (supra), copy of which has been placed on record. It was vehemently argued that view expressed by various Benches in favour of assessee may be preferred to view expressed by some of Benches against assessee. 14. ld. Departmental Representative, on other hand, contended that section 269SS was introduced in order to counter evasion of tax which is generally discovered in course of search. If interpretation advanced on behalf of assessee is accepted, then purpose of incorporation of section 269SS by Legislature would be defeated insofar as in most of cases assessments are already completed in respect of such cases where search takes place. In other words, if during course of search, contravention of provisions of section 269SS are detected, since assessment would have already been completed, there would be no time-limit for imposition of penalty under section 271D or 271E. It was further contended that Legislature in its wisdom has not prescribed any time-limit for initiation of penalty proceedings in certain cases and it is not open to Tribunal or any Court to fill gap left by Legislature. ld. D.R. relied upon decision of Kolkata Bench of Tribunal in case of Tata Tea Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2003] 87 ITD 351 , to support view that job of Tribunal and Court is to interpret law as legislated and no attempt should be made to fill in casus omissus of Legislature. It was further contended that as per provisions of section 271D, Legislature had specifically empowered DCIT to impose penalty under section 271D/271E. Subsequently, JCIT has been empowered to levy penalty. There is no power with Assessing Officer either to initiate penalty proceedings or to impose penalty under aforementioned provisions of Act. ld. D.R. placed reliance on decision of Nagpur Bench of Tribunal in case of ITO v. Ramnivas Agrawal (2004) 89 TTJ (Nag.) 795, wherein it has been held that limitation for imposition of penalty under section 271D/271E is six months from end of month in which DCIT had initiated penalty proceedings. Similar view has been taken by ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in case of Asstt. CIT v. Shree Nivas Chemicals [2003] 84 ITD 76. other decisions cited on behalf of assessee are stated to be distinguishable on facts and in any case, it was contended that with due respects, opinion to contrary is not based on correct interpretation of law. It was further contended that in this case, Assessing Officer cannot assume jurisdiction and condition for recording of satisfaction as in case of penalty under section 271(1)(a), (b) or (c ) is not required to be recorded in respect of penalty under section 271D/271E. Reference was also made to decision of Kerala High Court in case of CIT v. S.M. Syed Mohamed [1995] 216 ITR 3311 (FB), which relates to old law (section 271) when reference was to be made by Assessing Officer in certain cases to IAC for imposition of penalty. According to ld. Departmental Representative, there is distinction between reference to be made by Assessing Officer for imposition of penalty to IAC specifically provided under statute as per old law and provision for imposition of penalty by competent authority under law. ld. Departmental Representative also contended that in interpreting statute, it is not desirable to introduce concept of two views and view favourable to assessee to be adopted. For this, reliance was placed on decision of Supreme Court in case of Escorts Ltd. v. Union of India [1993] 199 ITR 432. It was contended that decision of Court has got to be read in context in which it has been rendered. For this, reliance has been placed on decision of Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Sun Engg. Works (P.) Ltd. [1992] 198 ITR 2973. It was accordingly pleaded that view may be expressed in favour of revenue. 15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to rival contentions. issue involved is relating to penalty under sections 271D and 271E. provisions relating to imposition of penalty are contained in Chapter XXI of Income-tax Act, 1961. There are several provisions of Act under Chapter XXI providing for penalty for various defaults. However, most of litigation and development of law are in regard to provisions of section 271 of Income-tax Act, 1961. It will be relevant to refer to section 271 as well as sections 271D and 271E so as to appreciate distinction in language of aforementioned provisions of Act which, in our view, is essential to be kept in mind in deciding issue before us : "271. (1) If Assessing Officer or Commissioner (Appeals) or Commissioner in course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person (a) omitted by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989 w.e.f. 1-4-1989, (b) has failed to comply with notice under sub-section (2) of section 115WD or under sub-section (2) of section 115WE or under sub-section (1) of section 142 or sub-section (2) of section 143 or fails to comply with direction issued under sub-section (2A) of section 1420, or (c) has concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, following clause (d) shall be inserted after clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 271 by Finance Act, 2005, w.e.f. 1-4-2006 : (d) has concealed particulars of fringe benefits or furnished inaccurate particulars of such fringe benefits, he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty, (i) omitted; (ii) in cases referred to in clause (b), in addition to tax, if any, payable by him, sum of ten thousand rupees for each such failure ; (iii) in cases referred to in clause (c) or clause (d), in addition to tax, if any, payable by him, sum which shall not be less than, but which shall not exceed three times, amount of tax sought to be evaded by reason of concealment of particulars of his income or fringe benefits or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of such income or fringe benefits. Explanation 1 to 7.****** 271D. (1) If person takes or accepts any loan or deposit in contravention of provisions of section 269SS, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, sum equal to amount of loan or deposit so taken or accepted. (2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by Joint Commissioner. 271E. (1) If person repays any loan or deposit referred to in section 269T otherwise than in accordance with provisions of section, he shall be liable to pay, by way of penalty, sum equal to amount of loan or deposit so repaid. (2) Any penalty imposable under sub-section (1) shall be imposed by Joint Commissioner." [Emphasis supplied] Section 274 provides for procedure in imposition of penalty. Section 275 provides for bar of limitation for imposing penalties. Since these sections are also relevant, same are reproduced hereunder : "274. Procedure. (1) No order imposing penalty under this Chapter shall be made unless assessee has been heard, or has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. (2) No order imposing penalty under this Chapter shall be made (a )by Income-tax Officer, where penalty exceeds ten thousand rupees; (b)by Assistant Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, where penalty exceeds twenty thousand rupees, except with prior approval of Joint Commissioner. (3) income-tax authority on making order under this Chapter imposing penalty, unless he is himself Assessing Officer, shall forthwith send copy of such order to Assessing Officer. 275. Bar of limitation for imposing penalties. (1) No order imposing penalty under this Chapter shall be passed (a )in case where relevant assessment or other order is subject-matter of appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246 or section 246A or appeal to Appellate Tribunal under section 253, after expiry of financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from end of month in which order of Commissioner (Appeals) or, as case may be, Appellate Tribunal is received by Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, whichever period expires later : Provided that in case where relevant assessment or other order is subject- matter of appeal to Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246 or section 246A, and Commissioner (Appeals) passes order on or after 1st day of June, 2003 disposing of such appeal, order imposing penalty shall be passed before expiry of financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or within one year from end of financial year in which order of Commissioner (Appeals) is received by Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, whichever is later, (b)in case where relevant assessment or other order is subject-matter of revision under section 263 or section 264, after expiry of six months from end of month in which such order of revision is passed; (c)in any other case, after expiry of financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or six months from end of month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated, whichever period expires later. (2) provisions of this section as they stood immediately before their amendment by Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 (4 of 1988), shall apply to and in relation to any action initiated for imposition of penalty on or before 31st day of March, 1989. Explanation. In computing period of limitation for purposes of section (i )the time taken in giving opportunity to assessee to be reheard under proviso to section 129; (ii)any period during which immunity granted under section 245H remained in force; and (iii)any period during which proceeding under this Chapter for levy of penalty is stayed by order or injunction of any Court, shall be excluded." 16. It hardly needs to be emphasized that controversy before us is in regard to interpretation of provisions of section 275. Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 did not prescribe any period for completion of penalty order. So when there was inordinate delay in imposition of penalty, some Courts held that there was abuse of power and penalty having been imposed after unreasonable lapse of time about 12 years, penalty was quashed. It is unnecessary to refer to such cases at this stage. In Income-tax Act, 1961, section 275 prescribes limitation period for imposition of penalty. As originally enacted section 275 provided that no order imposing penalty under Chapter XXI could be passed after expiration of two years from date of completion of proceedings in course of which proceedings for imposition of penalty had commenced. In year 1970, section 275 was amended so as to obviating difficulties in such cases where assessments were subject- matter of appeals and additions were either deleted or reduced. Under amended provisions of Act, limitation for imposing penalty under Chapter XXI ordinarily was for two years from end of financial year in which proceedings in course of which action for imposition of penalty are initiated, were completed. However, where relevant assessment or other order was subject-matter of appeal, time-limit for completing proceedings was either two years period as referred to earlier or period of six months from end of month in which order of appellate authority was received by Commissioner, whichever period expired later. There were several amendments between 1975 and 1988 with which we are not concerned. However, there was amendment by Direct Tax Laws (2nd Amendment) Act, 1989 by virtue of which clause (c) was incorporated in section 275 w.e.f. 1-4-1989, which is relevant for present controversy. 17. In nutshell, under section 275, penalty order under Chapter XXI was required to be passed within two years from date of completion of proceedings in course of which proceedings for imposition of penalty were commenced. From 1-4-1971 to 31- 3-1989, section 275 divided cases into two categories, namely, (i) where assessment to which proceedings for imposition of penalty relate was subject- matter of appeal to DCIT(A)/AAC, as case may be, CIT(A) or Appellate Tribunal, and (ii) all other cases. period of limitation for cases under category (i) was as under : (i)two years from end of financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated were completed, or (ii)six months from end of month in which order of Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) up to 31-3-1988, Appellate Assistant Commissioner or w.e.f. 10-7-1978 Commissioner (Appeals) or, as case might be, Appellate, Tribunal was received by Chief Commissioner or Commissioner up to 31-3-1988, Commissioner, whichever period expired later. period for limitation for cases under category (ii) was as under : "Two years from end of financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, were completed." From 1-4-1989, section 275 divides cases into three categories, namely, Category-I covers cases where assessment to which proceedings for imposition of penalty relates is subject-matter of appeal to appellate authorities (up to level of Appellate Tribunal); Category-II covers cases where relevant assessment is subject-matter of revision under section 263 and Category-III covers all other cases not falling within Categories-I and II. period of limitation for cases falling under Category-I is as under : -the financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or -six months from end of month in which order of Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) or Commissioner (Appeals) or, as case may be, Appellate Tribunal is received by Chief Commissioner or Commissioner, whichever period expires later. period of limitation for cases falling under Category-II is as under : -six months from end of month in which such order of revision is passed. period of limitation for cases falling under Category-III is as under :- -the financial year in which proceedings, in course of which action for imposition of penalty has been initiated, are completed, or -six months from end of month in which action for imposition of penalty is initiated. Whichever period expires later. It may be noted that in computing period of limitation for purposes of section 275(1), certain period is to be excluded with which we are not concerned for present controversy. Penalties under sections 271D and 271E are for failure to comply with provisions of sections 269SS and 269T respectively. 18. In order to appreciate necessity for incorporation of sections 269SS, 269T, 271D and 271E, it would be relevant to trace legislative intend for incorporation of such provisions of Act. Section 269SS was newly inserted by Finance Act, 1984 (21 of 1984) w.e.f. 1-4-1984. provisions are effective from 1-7-1984. scope and effect of section 269SS and section 276DD have been explained in departmental Circular No. 387, dated 6-7-1984. relevant portion is reproduced hereunder:- "(xxiv) Prohibition against taking or accepting certain loans and deposits in cash. 32.1. Unaccounted cash found in course of searches carried out by Income-tax Department is often explained by taxpayers as representing loans taken from or deposits made by various persons. Unaccounted income is also brought into books of account in form of such loans and deposits, and taxpayers are also able to get confirmatory letters from such persons in support of their explanation. 32.2 With view to countering this device, which enables taxpayers to explain away unaccounted cash or unaccounted deposits, Finance Act, 1984, has inserted new section 269SS in Income-tax Act debarring persons from taking or accepting, after 30- 6-1984, from any other person any loan or deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque or account payee bank draft if amount of such loan or deposit or aggregate amount of such loan and deposit is Rs. 10,000 or more. This prohibition will also apply in cases where on date of taking or accepting such loan or deposit, any loan or deposit taken or accepted earlier by such person from depositor is remaining unpaid (whether repayment has fallen due or not), and amount or aggregate amount remaining unpaid is Rs. 10,000 or more. prohibition will also apply in cases where amount of such loan or deposit, together with aggregate amount remaining unpaid on date on which such loan or deposit is proposed to be taken is Rs. 10,000 or more." Section 269T was also incorporated by Income-tax (Second Amendment Act), 1981 (38 of 1981) w.e.f. 11-7-1981. While explaining objects for incorporation of section 269T, CBDT in Circular No. 345, dated 28-6-1982 indicated as under : "2.1 proliferation of black money poses serious threat to national economy and it was considered necessary to take effective steps to contain and counter this major economic evil. Government have, in recent past, taken several legislative and administrative measures to unearth black money. Income-tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Amending Act) represents another step in same direction. 2.2 It came to Government s notice that substantial amount of black money was deposited by tax evaders with banks, companies, co-operative societies and partnership firms either in their own names or in benami names. Income-tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1981, seeks to counter attempts to circulate black money in this manner." It is evident from explanatory Circulars issued by CBDT that provisions of sections 269SS and 269T were necessitated to counter serious threat to national economy by proliferation of black money and provisions had been incorporated to counter this major economic evil. There is reference in explanatory Circulars of CBDT to black money and unaccounted cash found in course of searches carried out by Income-tax Department. When we look at objective behind incorporation of sections 269SS and 269T, contentions advanced on behalf of assessees that penalty proceedings are neces-sarily to be initiated in course of assessment proceedings loses its lusture. If it were so, then in search cases, where unaccounted cash was sought to be explained with reference to cash loans and deposits would escape levy of penalty under sections 271D and 271E as assessments in most of cases would be completed before date of search. This background, in our considered view, is important for getting us to take pragmatic view in matter of interpretation of section 275. Now, reverting to section 275, as pointed out earlier, there are three categories of cases for which separate limitation has been provided under said section. It is nobody s case that assessees case falls under category-I or category-II, i.e., under clause (a) or clause (b) of section 275. assessees case, admittedly, falls under category-III, i.e., under clause (c) of section 275. We have reproduced section 271 along with other relevant provisions involved of Act elsewhere in this order. It would appear that quoting of section 271 was unnecessary but we purposely quoted same so as to remove impression, or if we may say so, confusion which is created by reference to decided cases relating to provisions of section 271. In order to appreciate distinction between sections 271 and 271D and 271E, it is necessary to keep in mind authority having jurisdiction to impose penalty under respective provisions of Act. Their Lordships of Supreme Court in case of Varkey Chacko v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 8851, had occasion to deal with issue relating to jurisdiction of authority to impose penalty. Their Lordships held that in considering validity of penalty under Income-tax Act, two aspects must be firmly borne in mind, namely, who may impose penalty and in what measure. It will be relevant to point out facts of this case. For assessment year 1968-69, assessee had filed return on 16-4-1970. On 27-3-1972, ITO made order of assessment and initiated penalty proceedings against assessee on basis of finding recorded in assessment order that there was concealment of amount not exceeding Rs. 25,000. On 26-3-1974, ITO imposed penalty of Rs. 10,000. On appeal, AAC set aside penalty and Appellate Tribunal confirmed his order on ground that Assessing Officer had no jurisdiction to impose penalty as per law in force on date return was filed. (A reference was to be made to IAC) On reference, High Court reversed Tribunal s order holding that competence of ITO to impose penalty depended on findings arrived at by him in assessment proceedings as to fact of concealment and law applicable was that was in force on date of assessment order. On appeal, Hon ble Supreme Court held that when ITO reached satisfaction that appellant had concealed his income and made assessment order on 27-3-1972, amended provisions of section 274(2) were in operation and they entitled ITO to impose penalty in cases where amount of income in respect of which particulars had been concealed were less than Rs. 25,000. It was held that since concealed income was less than Rs. 25,000, ITO had jurisdiction to impose penalty and there was no need for him to have referred matter to IAC. Their Lordship further held as under : "Penalty for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income can be imposed only when assessing authority is satisfied that there has been such concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Proceedings for imposition of penalty can, therefore, be initiated only after assessment order has been made which finds such concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. Who, at this point of time has authority is what is relevant. Whoever this authority may be, he is obliged to impose such penalty as was permissible under law in that behalf on date on which offence of concealment was committed, that is to say, on date of offending return. two aspects must be firmly borne in mind, namely, who may impose penalty and in what measure." Similar view has been expressed by their Lordships of Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Dhadi Sahu [1993] 199 ITR 6102. relevant observations are as under : "Held, reversing decision of High Court, that reference of cases was validly made by Income-tax Officer before 1-4-1971, and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner validly acquired jurisdiction to pass orders imposing penalty. amending Act did not make any provision that references validly pending before Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should be returned without any final order being passed. previous operation of section 274(2) as it stood prior to 1-4-1971, and anything done thereunder continued to have effect under section 6(b) of General Clauses Act, 1897, enabling Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to pass orders imposing penalty in pending references. What was material to be seen was as to when reference was initiated. If reference was made before 1-4-1971, it would be governed by section 274(2) as it stood before that date and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner would have jurisdiction to pass order of penalty." 19. above decisions of Hon ble Supreme Court indicate that it is necessary to find out as to who is authority competent to impose penalty under section 271D. authority for imposition of penalty is DCIT (now JCIT). Assessing Officer under section 271D or 271E is not competent to impose penalty. When Assessing Officer does not have authority to impose penalty, crucial question that arises for consideration is as to whether he could have initiated penalty proceedings. It may be pertinent to mention that section 274(2) provides for financial limit for income-tax authorities for imposition of penalty. In event of penalty imposable being more than amount specified under section 274(2), previous approval of Jt. Commissioner is required. Section 274(2), as it stood before its amendment from 1-4- 1971, provided reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for imposition of penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000. Thus, there was provision for reference by Assessing Officer to IAC for imposition of penalty notwithstanding fact that penalty had to be initiated by Assessing Officer. In other words, whereas competent authority to be satisfied that assessee had committed default was Assessing Officer but authority for imposition of penalty was given to IAC for which reference was required to be made to him. This system has since been withdrawn. As per modified section 274, authority for imposition of penalty is vested with concerned officers. However, where penalty exceeds specified limits, prior approval of Jt. Commissioner is required. 20. Another factor that deserves consideration is requirement of recording of satisfaction in course of any proceedings. When language of provisions of sections 271, is compared with section 271D/ 271E, distinction is prominently visible. Under section 271, recording of satisfaction before initiation of penalty in course of proceedings is condition precedent for imposition of penalty for specified defaults. Under sections 271D and 271E, there is no such requirement of recording of satisfaction in course of any proceedings. Moreover, authority for imposition of penalty under section 271 is Assessing Officer or CIT(A), as case may be. On other hand, authority for imposition of penalty under sections 271D and 271E is Dy. CIT which has later on been substituted by Jt. CIT. With reference to proceedings of section 271, their Lordships of Punjab & Haryana High Court also in case of CIT v. Munish Iron Store [2003] 263 ITR 484, held that jurisdiction to impose penalty under section 271 flows from recording of satisfaction of Assessing Officer regarding concealment of income. Similar view has been taken by Delhi High Court in case of CIT v. Vikas Promoters (P.) Ltd. [2005] 277 ITR 3371 and earlier in some other cases. However, these decisions lose significance when we compare plain language of provisions of sections 271D and 271E vis-a-vis that of section 271. It is evident from language used by Legislature that condition precedent of recording satisfaction as required for defaults specified under section 271 is not intended for purposes of defaults contemplated under sections 271D and 271E. 21. As per law laid down by Hon ble Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Dhadi Sahu [1993] 199 ITR 6102 and in case of Varkey Chacko v. CIT [1993] 203 ITR 8853, validity of penalty proceedings has got to be seen with reference to authority empowered to impose penalty on relevant date. 22. We have quoted sections 271D and 271E elsewhere in order. authority to impose penalty under these provisions is Dy. CIT (now Joint CIT). When Assessing Officer does not have jurisdiction either to initiate or impose penalty under section 271D or 271E, notice issued by him for making inquiries relating to contravention of section 269SS or section 269T cannot be construed to be initiation of penalty proceedings by competent authority. We would like to make it abundantly clear that even if show-cause notice is issued by Assessing Officer for imposition of penalty under section 271D or under section 271E that notice would be without any jurisdiction as Assessing Officer has no authority under law either to initiate or impose penalty under section 271D or under section 271E. We are, therefore, of considered view that in present appeals, at relevant point of time, DCIT had jurisdiction to initiate and impose penalty under section 271D and, therefore, limitation under section 275(1)(c) has got to be computed form date of initiation by DCIT. We may gainfully refer to decision of Karnataka High Court in case of Shanbagh Restaurant v. Dy. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 3934 wherein their Lordships had occasion to consider issue relating to limitation under section 271D. In that case, assessee-firm was carrying on restaurant business. For assessment year 1991-92, for which previous year ended on 31-3-1991, return of income filed by assessee had been taken up for scrutiny by Assessing Officer. In course of scrutiny of accounts, Assessing Officer found that assessee had received loans and deposits in cash in contravention of provisions of section 269SS of Income-tax Act, 1961 and also made payments of loans and deposits in cash. Assessing Officer had completed assessment on 25-2-1994. DCIT issued notice dated 8-6-1994 asking assessee to show cause as to why penalty under sections 271D and 271E may not be imposed. assessee filed reply. DCIT after considering explanation of assessee imposed penalty under sections 271D and 271E vide order dated 28-3-1995. On appeal against imposition of penalty, CIT(A) held that order passed by DCIT was barred by limitation as having been passed after expiry of six months from date of initiation. On appeal, Tribunal reversed order of CIT(A) by holding that penalty orders had been passed by DCIT within financial year after end of financial year in which assessment was made. On further appeal, Hon ble Karnataka High Court held that financial year in respect of assessment order expired on 31-3- 1994. action for imposition of penalty was initiated by issue of notices dated 8-6- 1994 by DCIT. Their Lordships further held that in that event orders imposing penalty should have been passed before 31-12-1994 as six months period from end of June 1994 expired on 31-12-1994. order dated 28-3-1995 imposing penalty was, thus, held to be barred by limitation. Though this decision has been cited on behalf of assessee, we are of considered view that it clearly supports view advanced on behalf of revenue. It has been held by Hon ble High Court that period of six months has got to be computed from date of issue of notice by DCIT. In cases before us, DCIT had issued notices to appellants and penalty orders under section 271D have been passed within six months after expiry of month in which said show-cause notices were issued by DCIT. In case of Bharat Construction Co. v. ITO [1999] 153 CTR 4141, their Lordships of Madhya Pradesh High Court have also expressed view that for purposes of levy of penalty under section 271B, limitation for imposition of penalty is six months from date of initiation by competent authority. 23. contention advanced on behalf of appellants that interpretation canvassed on behalf of revenue would lead to uncertainty and ambiguity and is against intention of Legislature requires consideration. As pointed out earlier, under section 271, recording of satisfaction in course of any proceedings is condition precedent for initiation of penalty proceedings. However, there is no time-limit fixed as such for initiation of proceedings except that initiation has got to be in course of any proceedings under Act. Admittedly, there is limitation for completion of assessment proceedings and, therefore, by implication, there is limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings which are initiated in course of assessment proceedings. So, however, it may be relevant to point out that even under section 271, CIT(A) has power to enhance penalty and also additional power to initiate penalty proceedings for concealment of income, etc., in proceedings before him. Though there is limitation for filing of appeals to CIT(A) yet there is no limitation prescribed for CIT(A) to dispose of appeal. Therefore, it is implied that CIT(A) does not have any limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings except that these are to be initiated in course of proceedings before him. In other words, limitation starts from point of initiation. So, however, for initiation of penalty proceedings, in certain cases there is no limitation. 24. In case of Food Corpn. of India v. CST [1998] 109 STC 131 (SC), issue relating to limitation within which penalty order could be passed by appellate authority/Commissioner of Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 arose before Hon ble Supreme Court. Their Lordships explaining similar provisions under M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 as provisions of Income-tax Act relating to penalty, held that when appellate authority/Commissioner has been given additional powers to impose penalty for first time in course of proceedings before him, limitation prescribed for initiation of penalty proceedings by Assessing Officer do not apply for initiation by appellate authority/Commissioner. Under Income-tax Act, 1961, section 271 also gives additional power to CIT(A) to impose penalty. As pointed out earlier, CIT(A) not having any limitation for deciding appeal by implication means that there is no limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings by him. limitation starts from initiation of penalty in course of proceedings before CIT(A). Another example of uncertain period of limitation may be derived from judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Prabhudayal Amichand v. CIT [1999] 237 ITR 4831, wherein penalty order was set aside by Tribunal. When fresh order was passed on direction of Tribunal, question was raised about period of limitation. Their Lordships of Madhya Pradesh High Court held that limitation under section 275 did not apply to set aside proceedings. It is, therefore, evident that uncertainty of period in initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271D or 271E is not solitary. 25. In light of above discussion, it appears that Legislature has not considered it necessary to provide for limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E. It becomes more probable when we consider intention of Legislature behind incorporation of provisions of sections 269SS and 269T. We have referred to legislative intent behind incorporation of sections 269SS, 269T, 271D and 271E in preceding paragraphs. intention behind incorporation of these provisions was to counter proliferation of black money, which when found in course of search is sought to be explained by cash loans from various persons. As it is, there is no time-limit for conducting searches. When in course of search, some information is found about cash loans or deposits or repayment of loans or deposits or such claims are made, necessity for initiating proceedings under section 271D or 271E arises. If one were to compute limitation with reference to assessment proceedings, then in no case, penalty under sections 271D and 271E could be initiated in cases where information is gathered in course of search. That would defeat very purpose of legislating provisions of sections 271 and 271E. Looking from background which gave rise to incorporation of sections 269SS, 269TT, 271D and 271E, we are of considered view that Legislature has consciously not prescribed any limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E. limitation of course has been prescribed for imposition after its initiation by competent authority. 26. Assuming for argument s sake that there is unintended omission by Legislature in not providing limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E, even in that case, it is not for us to provide for casus omissus of Legislature. In case of Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT [2004] 266 ITR 11 at page 9, their Lordships of Supreme Court held, "It is well-settled principle in law that Court cannot read anything into statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. statute is edict of Legislature. language employed in statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. first and primary rule of construction is that intention of legislation must be found in words used by Legislature itself. question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said." It has further been held, "While interpreting provision Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary." Their Lordships further held that statute must be construed with reference to context and other clauses thereof. In present case, considering context in which provisions of sections 269SS and 269T and consequentially incorporation of sections 271D and 271E, we are of considered view that non-prescribing limit for initiation of penalty proceedings is conscious and there is neither any necessity nor are we empowered to prescribe any limitation for initiation of penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E in interpreting provisions. 27. In final analysis, we hold that authority competent to impose penalty under sections 271D and 271E is vested with Dy. CIT (now Joint CIT) and Assessing Officer does not have power either to initiate penalty proceedings or impose same. There is no procedure for reference by Assessing Officer to competent authority for imposition of penalty under section 271D or 271E. Therefore, limitation for completion of penalty proceedings as provided under section 275(1)(c) has got to be computed from date of issue of show-cause notice by competent authority, which in present case, is DCIT (now JCIT). Since respective orders under section 271D have been passed within period of six months from date of initiation by competent authority, penalty orders passed in cases of appellants herein are not barred by limitation. 28. In light of our decision, for detailed reasons given earlier, we hardly need to mention that whereas we agree with view expressed by ITAT, Chandigarh Bench in case of Asstt. CIT v. Shree Nivas Chemicals [2003] 84 ITD 76 and Nagpur Bench of ITAT in case of ITO v. Ramnivas Agrawal [2004] 89 TTJ (Nag.) 795, we do not agree with view expressed by Hyderabad Bench of Tribunal in case of Dillu Cine Enterprises (P.) Ltd. v. Addl. CIT [2002] 80 ITD 484 and Jodhpur Bench of Tribunal in case of Hissaria Bros. v. Jt. CIT [2001] 73 TTJ (Jodh.) 1 and Delhi Bench of ITAT in case of Farrukhabad Investment (I) Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2003] 85 ITD 230. 29. Thus, our conclusion to reference is as under : "Having regard to provisions of sections 271D and 271E of Income-tax Act, 1961, period of limitation for purposes of section 275 of Act is to be reckoned from date when penalty proceedings are initiated by DCIT (JCIT) and not from date assessment proceedings are completed." 30. Registry is directed to take follow up action in appeals of assessees on basis of this decision. *** Dewan Chand Amrit Lal v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Hissar Range