http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7 CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2226 of 1997 PETITIONER: PADMAUSUNDARA RAO (DEAD) &ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF T.N. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/2002 BENCH: CJI, R.C. Lahoti, N. Santosh Hegde, Ruma Pal & Arijit Pasayat JUDGMENT: WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 2058/2002 (Arising out of S.L.P. No.12806 of 2000] J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Noticing cleavage in views expressed in several decisions rendered by Benches of three learned Judges, two learned Judges referred matter to Bench of three Judges, and by order dated 30.10.2001 matter was directed to be placed before Constitution Bench, and that is how matter is before us in C.A. No. 2226/1997. Special Leave petition No. 12806/2000 was directed to be heard along with Civil Appeal. Leave granted in SLP No. 12806/2000. controversy involved lies within very narrow compass, that is whether after quashing of Notification under Section 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as Act ) fresh period of one year is available to State Government to issue another Notification under Section 6. In case at hand such Notification issued under Section 6 was questioned before Madras High Court which relied on decision of three-Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka and Ors etc. (1996 (3) SCC 88) and held that same was validly issued. Learned counsel for appellants placed reliance on un-reported decision of this Court in A.S. Naidu and Ors. etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. etc. ( SLP (C) Nos. 11353-11355/1988), wherein Bench of three Judges held that once declaration under Section 6 of Act has been quashed, fresh declaration under Section 6 cannot be issued beyond prescribed period of Notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 4 of Act. It has to be noted that there is another judgment of two learned Judges in Oxford English School vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1995 (5) SCC 206) which takes view similar to that expressed in A.S. Naidu s case (supra). However, in State of Karnataka and Ors. Vs. D.C. Nanjudaiah and Ors. (1996 (10) SCC 619), view in Narasimhaiah s case (supra) was followed and it was held that limitation of 3 years for publication of declaration would start running from date of receipt of order of High Court and not from date on which original publication under Section 4(1) came to be made. http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7 Learned counsel for appellant submitted that bare reading of Section 6 of Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984, leaves no manner of doubt that declaration under Section 6 has to be issued within specified time and merely because Court has quashed concerned declaration extended time period is not to be provided. Explanation 1 (appended to Section) specifically deals with exclusion of periods in certain specified cases. If view expressed in Narasimhaiah s case (supra) is accepted, it would mean reading something into statute which is not there, and in effect would mean legislation by Court whereas it is within absolute domain of legislature. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for State of Tamil Nadu submitted that logic indicated in Narasimhaiah s case (supra) is in line with statutory intent. Placing reliance on decision in Director of Inspection of Income Tax (Investigation) New Delhi and Anr. Vs. Pooran Mal and Sons and Anr. (1975 (2) SCR 104), it was submitted that extension of time limit is permissible. Apart from Pooranmal s case (supra), reliance was placed on two decisions rendered in relation to proceedings under Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short IT Act ), to contend that there is scope for extension of time though there was fixed statutory time prescription. decisions relied on are Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Calcutta vs. National Taj Traders ( 1980 (1) SCC 370) and Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Income Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors. (1980(2) SCC 191). It was, however, frankly conceded that in Grindlays s case (supra), question of limitation was not necessary to be gone into as impugned action was taken within prescribed time limit. It was contended that at most, this can be considered to be case of casus omissus, and deficiency, if any, can be filled up by purposive interpretation, by reading statute as whole, and finding out true legislative intent. Strong reliance was placed on Full Bench decision of Madras High Court in K. Chinnathambi Gounder and Anr. vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Anr. (AIR 1980 Madras 251) to contend that view in said case has held field since long and principles of stare decisis are applicable. Residually, it was submitted that many acquisitions have become final and if matters are directed to be re- opened, in case different view is taken, it would cause hardship. Section 6(1) of Act so far as relevant reads as follows: "Declaration that land is required for public purpose:- Subject to provisions of Part VII of this Act, when Appropriate Government is satisfied after considering report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for public purpose, or for company, declaration shall be made to that effect under signature of Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5-A, sub-section (2): Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by notification under section 4, sub- section (1)- (i) published after commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after expiry of three years from date of publication of notification; or (ii) published after commencement of Land http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7 Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after expiry of one year from date of publication of notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by local authority. [Explanation 1.- In computing any of periods referred to in first proviso, period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by order of Court shall be excluded." As factual scenario shows, in case at hand Notification under Section 4(1) of Act was issued and declaration was made prior to substitution of existing proviso to Section 6(1) by Act 68 of 1984 with effect from 24.8.1984. In other words, Notification under Section 4(1) was issued before commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, but after commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (replaced by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act 1967 (Act 13 of 1967). But substituted proviso was in operation on date of impugned judgment. In terms of proviso, declaration cannot be made under Section 6 in respect of any land covered by Notification under Section 4(1) of Act after expiry of three years or one year from date of its publication, as case may be. proviso deals with two types of situations. It provides for different periods of limitation depending upon question whether (i) notification under Section 4(1) was published prior to commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, or (ii) such notification was issued after Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. In former case, period is three years whereas in latter case it is one year. Undoubtedly, Notification under Section 6(1) was made and published in official gazette within period of three years prescribed under proviso thereto, and undisputedly, same had been quashed by High Court in earlier proceeding. It has to be noted that Explanation 1 appended to Section 6(1) provides that in computing period of three years, period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of Notification under Section 4(1), is stayed by order of Court, shall be excluded. Under Tamil Nadu Act 41 of 1980, w.e.f. 20.1.1967, expression used is "action or proceeding..is held up on account of stay or injunction", which is contextually similar. Learned counsel for respondents referred to some observations in Pooranmal s case (supra), which form foundation for decisions relied upon by him. It has to be noted that Pooranmal s case (supra) was decided on entirely different factual and legal background. Court noticed that assessee who wanted Court to strike down action of Revenue Authorities on ground of limitation had himself conceded to passing of order by authorities. Court, therefore, held that assessee cannot take undue advantage of his own action. Additionally, it was noticed that time limit was to be reckoned with reference to period prescribed in respect of Section 132(5) of IT Act. It was noticed that once order has been made under Section 132(5) within ninety days, aggrieved person has got right to approach notified authority under Section 132(11) within thirty days and that authority can direct Income-Tax Officer to pass fresh order. That is distinctive feature vis--vis Section 6 of Act. Court applied principle of waiver and inter alia held that period of limitation prescribed therein was one intended for http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7 benefit of person whose property has been seized and it was open to that person to waive that benefit. It was further observed that if specified period is held to be mandatory, it would cause more injury to citizens than to Revenue. distinction was made with statutes providing periods of limitation for assessment. It was noticed that Section 132 does not deal with taxation of income. Considered in that background, ratio of decision in Pooranmal s case (supra) has no application to case at hand. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how factual situation fits in with fact situation of decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating words of speech or judgment as though they are words in legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in setting of facts of particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington Vs. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537.Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make world of difference between conclusions in two cases. What appears to have weighed with three-Judge Bench in Narasimhaiah s case (supra) is set out in paragraph 12 of judgment, which reads as under: "Having considered respective contentions, we are of considered view that if construction as put up by learned counsel for appellants is given acceptance i.e., it should be within one year from last of dates of publication under Section 4(1), public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be illustrated thus: In given case where notification under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A and declaration was published within one month and as urgency in opinion of Government was such that it did not brook delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory tactics of interested person and court ultimately finds after two years that exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed Government to give opportunity to interested person and State to conduct enquiry under Section 5-A, then exercise of power pursuant to direction of court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct enquiry. If enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be published within limitation from original date of publication of notification under Section 4(1). valid notification under Section 4(1) become invalid. On other hand, after conducting enquiry as per court order and, if declaration under Section 6 is published within one year from date of receipt of order passed by High Court, notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since action was done pursuant to orders of court and compliance with limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of first proviso to sub-section (1) of Act would be made." It may be pointed out that stipulation regarding urgency in terms of Section 5-A of Act has no role to play when period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. purpose for providing period of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from date of Notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that valuation of land has to be done on date of publication of Notification under Section http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation. It provides that market value of land is to be fixed with reference to date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of Act. prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994 (1) SCC 44), it was held by this Court that though no period was prescribed, action within reasonable time was warranted. said case related to dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After quashing of declaration, same became non-est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned counsel for respondents that there is no bar on issuing fresh declaration after following due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case fresh notification is to be issued, market value has to be determined on basis of fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of Act and it may be costly affair for State. Even if it is so, interest of person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If acquisition sought to be made is done in illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count. rival pleas regarding re-writing of statute and casus omissus need careful consideration. It is well settled principle in law that Court cannot read anything into statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. statute is edict of legislature. language employed in statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. first and primary rule of construction is that intention of Legislation must be found in words used by Legislature itself. question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981). In Dr. R Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. vs. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842) it was observed that Courts must avoid danger of apriori determination of meaning of provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting provision Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. [See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. vs. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd. (2000 (5) SCC 515)]. legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah s case (supra). In Nanjudaiah s case (supra), period was further stretched to have time period run from date of service of High Court s order. Such view cannot be reconciled with language of Section 6(1). If view is accepted it would mean that case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of proviso to Section 6(1), but also by non-prescribed period. Same can never be legislative intent. Two principles of construction one relating to casus omissus and other in regard to reading statute as whole appear to be well settled. Under first principle casus omissus cannot be supplied by Court except in case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in four corners of statute itself but at same time casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all parts of statute or section must be construed together and every clause of section should be construed with reference to context and other clauses thereof so that construction to be put on particular provision makes consistent enactment of whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7 could not have been intended by Legislature. "An intention to produce unreasonable result", said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat obvious intention of legislation and produce wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. I.R.C. (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".] plea relating to applicability of stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to amendment by 1984 Act. If Legislature intended to give new lease of life in those cases where declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. maxim actus curia neminem gravibit highlghted by Full Bench of Madras High Court has no application to fact situation of this case. view expressed in Narasimhaiah s case (supra) and Nanjudaiah s case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S. Naidu s case (supra) and Oxford s case (supra) is affirmed. There is, however, substance in plea that those matters which have obtained finality should not be re-opened. present judgment shall operate prospectively to extent that cases where awards have been made and compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying ratio of present judgment. appeals are accordingly disposed of and subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of Act are quashed. . CJI. ....J. (R.C. LAHOTI) ....J. (N. SANTOSH HEGDE) ....J. (RUMA PAL) .J. (ARIJIT PASAYAT) March 13, 2002 15 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7 Padmausundara Rao (Dead) &ors. v. State of T.N. & Or