R.L. SANGANI, J.M. These six appeals relate to asst. yrs. 1968-69 to 1973-74 and arise out of proceedings for imposition of penalty under s. 18(1)(c) of WT Act, 1957. In following table relevant dates of original assessment orders, reassessment orders and penalty orders are given: Date of Assessment Date of Date Original year reassessment of Penalty Assessment 26-3- 31- 1968-69 21-1-1969 1979 3-1981 26-3- 31- 1969-70 8-10-1969 1979 3-1981 26-3- 31- 1970-71 18-1-1972 1979 3-1981 26-3- 31- 1971-72 18-1-1972 1979 3-1981 26-3- 31- 1972-73 19-1-1973 1979 3-1981 26-3- 31- 1973-74 31-10-1973 1979 3-1981. In original assessment orders, valueof flat at "El-Cid" Building at 13, Ridge Road, Bombay-6 including garage was taken at Rs. 1,39,000 for first four assessment years and at Rs. 1,94, 55for remaining two assessment years on basis of valuation made by registered valuer. Subsequently, reassessment proceedings were initiated on 9th Aug, 1974 under s. 17 of W T Act. Valuation of said flat including garage was referred to Departmental Valuation Officer who valued same at Rs. 1,83,000 1,88,000 2,04,000, 2,14,000, 2,34,000 and Rs. 2,51,000 for said six assessment years, respectively. difference between valuation made by registered valuer and that made by Departmental Valuation Officer was added to total wealth of assessee in reassessment orders. Thereafter, notices under s. 18(2) r/w s. 18(1)(c) were issued for all six years. In penalty orders it is mentioned that no explanation was offered on behalf of assessee. Relying o n theExpln.II to s. 18(1), WTO observed that amount added in computing net wealth of assessee was deemed to represent value of asset in respect of which particulars had been concealed for purpose of s. 18(1)(c) of WT Act. He accordingly imposed penalties under said provisions. 2 . orders imposing penalties are identically worded. Only figures have been substituted in hand. In each penalty order, it is mentioned that value of aforesaid flat was shown at particular figure in original return and that after reopening assessment, value of said flat has been assessed at higher figures and as such, difference between finally assessed figure and figures shown in return represented concealment for purpose of s. 18(1)(c) of Act. 3. assessee filed appeals before AAC. Several objections were raised against imposition of penalties. It was pleaded that proper show cause notices had not been issued and that sufficient opportunity had not been given before imposing penalties. It was further pleaded that explanation of assessee given in letter dt. 30th March, 1981 had been completely ignored. It was further pleaded that all facts relating to flat and garage were disclosed by assessee at time of original assessments and that valuation shown in original returns was based on valuation report of registered valuer. It was further pleaded that Board Circular No. 4.P (LXXVI-65) dt. 7th June, 1968 had not been followed and that Explanation to s. 18(1) which came into force w.e.f. 1st April, 1976 had been wrongly applied. Finally it was pleaded that orders imposing penalties were without jurisdiction because WTO had not complied with provisions of s. 18(3) of WT Act which enjoins upon him to refer matter to IAC. 4. AAC considered only last objection raised by assessee. He found that previous approval of IAC was necessary for imposition of penalty under s. 18(3) of Act. However, no such approval had been taken and as such, orders of penalty were without jurisdiction. He, therefore, cancelled penalty orders. Against said cancellation of penalty orders, Department is now in appeals before us. 5 . Two grounds have been raised on behalf of Department. first ground is that non-compliance with provisions of s. 18(3) was merely procedural irregularity and that said irregularity did not invalidate penalty orders passed by WTO under s. 18(1)(c) of Act in view of provisions of s. 42(c) of Act. second ground is that AAC should have set aside orders of penalty for rectifying amount and should not have cancelled same. 6 . We have heard parties. penalty orders indicate that penalties have been imposed for concealment in original returns. We have already given dates of original assessment orders. dates of returns were prior to dates of original assessment orders. Since penalty is sought to be levied in respect of concealment in original returns, law as applicable at time of filing of original returns would govern imposition of penalty. Sec. 18(3) prior to its amendment w.e.f. 1st April, 1976 by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 was as follows: "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (iii) of sub-section (1), if, in case falling under cl. (c) of that sub-section, amount (as determined by WTO on assessment) in respect of which penalty is imposable under cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) exceeds sum of twenty-five thousand rupees, WTO shall refer case to IAC who shall for purpose have all powers conferred under this section for imposition of penalty." After amendment w.e.f. 1st April, 1976, sub-s. (3) reads as follows: "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in cl. (iii) of sub-s (1), if, in case falling under cl. (c) of that sub-section, amount (as determined by WTO on assessment) in respect of which penalty is imposable under cl. (c) aforesaid, exceeds sum of twenty-five thousand rupees, WTO shall not issue any direction under sub-s. (1) for payment by way of penalty without previous approval of IAC". In these proceedings, sub-s. (3) as it stood prior to 1st April, 1976 was applicable because concealment is alleged to have been made in original returns which had been filed prior to 1st April, 1976. Under said provisions, order imposing penalty exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees could have been made only by IAC. In present case, all penalties exceed rupees twenty-five thousand. Consequently, these penalties could not have been imposed by WTO. orders by WTO imposing penalties in these proceedings were without jurisdiction in view of provisions as it stood prior to 1st April, 1976. Consequently, penalty orders were liable to be cancelled. There is no infirmity in orders of AAC cancelling penalty orders. This was not case of curable irregularity as mentioned in grounds of appeal. This was case of absence of jurisdiction and as such, only order which Appellate Authority could have passed was that of cancelling penalty order. 7. In Brij Mohan vs. CIT (1979) 12 CTR (SC) 198 : (1979) 120 ITR 1 (SC), Supreme Court has held that in respect of penalty imposable for concealment or furnishing inaccurate particulars in return, law which was applicable was law operating on date when return was filed. In view of this decision of Supreme Court, provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 18 as they stood prior to 1st April, 1976. were applicable and we have already held that under those provisions, WTO could not have imposed penalty in excess of twenty-five thousand rupees and as such, orders imposing penalties were without jurisdiction. However, for sake of arguments, we shall assume as was contended on behalf of Department that provisions of s. 18(3) as they stood after 1st April, 1976 would be applicable. We have already quoted provisions of s. 18(3) as they now stand after amendment on 1st April, 1976. Under those provisions, order imposing penalty exceeding twenty-five thousand rupees cannot be passed by WTO without previous approval of IAC. In present cases, it is on admitted fact that previous approval of IAC has not been obtained before passing penalty orders. What has happened is that CWT has granted approval for imposing penalty for asst. yrs. 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1973-74. For other three years, namely, 1968- 69, 1969-70 and 1972-73, no approval has been granted even by CWT. 69, 1969-70 and 1972-73, no approval has been granted even by CWT. Consequently, as far as penalties relating to asst. yrs. 1968-69, 1969-70 and 1972-73 are concerned, they are liable to be quashed and orders of AAC cancelling penalties for those assessment years are liable to be confirmed. As regards other three assessment years, namely, 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1973-74, previous approval is that of Commissioner and not that of IAC. It is true that CWT is higher officer vis-a-vis IAC. However, we are concerned with question whether conditions imposed for exercising jurisdiction by statute have been fulfilled. statute, namely, sub-s. (3) of s.18 as it stands after amendment on 1st April, 1976 requires previous approval of IAC and not of CWT. IAC is statutory authority whose approval would confer jurisdiction on WTO. Approval of any authority even though that authority is higher in status to that of statutory authority would no confer jurisdiction on WTO when statutory provision does not require previous approval of Commissioner but specifically requires previous approval of IAC. When statute confers jurisdiction on specified authority for grant of previous approval, that authority alone would have jurisdiction to grant previous approval. duty to grant previous approval can not be abdicated by that authority in favour of any other authority although other authority was superior in rank. Consequently, even if we hold that CWT had granted previous approval for asst. yrs. 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1973-74 and further that provisions of s. 18(3) as they stood after 1st April 1976 were applicable, orders of WTO would still be without jurisdiction because previous approval of IAC as required by sub-s. (3) of s. 18 had not been obtained. Looked from any angle, orders imposing penalties by WTO in present cases, are without jurisdiction and as such, we rightly cancelled by AAC. Since other grounds which had been raised by assessee before AAC were not considered by AAC, we do not express any opinion on those grounds. We confirm orders of AAC cancelling penalties. In result, appeals are dismissed. *** FIFTH WEALTH-TAX OFFICER v. P.D. STORE