R.M. MEHTA, A.M. These two appeals have been filed by assessee. As issue involved i s common, same are disposed off by consolidated order. following grounds of appeal have been urged in respect of both years: appellant being aggrieved on order of AAC who dismissed appeal as being incompetent without deciding question, prefers this appeal on following grounds: That ld. AAC has erred in law and on facts stating inter alia that 'An order passed under s. 143(1) is not appealable order and as such both appeals being incompetent are dismissed.' That ld. AAC has erred in interpreting provision of s. 246(1)(c) r/w ground No. 1 of appeal. That ld. AAC erred in dismissing appeal without deciding following legal ground: "That order passed by ld. ITO under s. 143(1) for asst. yr. 1981-82 without any computation of tax which is mandatory duty under s. 143(1) is bad in law and illegal." That it is prayed that order passed by ld. AAC may be set aside and order of ITO may be annulled as being bad in law and illegal. assessee has subsequently forwarded additional ground in respect o f both years vide letters dt. 28th Aug., 1985 and 13th Sept., 1985. additional ground is as under: "That appellant had disclosed in his total income share of profit from R.F. of M/s Dreamland Garments for assessment years 1981-82 and 1982-83. ld. ITO without having power to take share of profit as per assessment order of firm under s. 143(1)(b) passed order under s. 143(1) taking share of appellant as per A.O. of firm which has been upheld by ld. AAC which i s ultra vires and bad in law, for which appellant denies his liability to be assessed and to pay tax which may be cancelled in to." facts of case are that assessment for both years under appeal were completed by ITO on 31st March, 1984 by framing assessment orders under s. 143(1) of IT Act, 1961. In respect of asst. yr. 1981-82 as against returned income of Rs. 15,620 assessment was finalised at figure of Rs. 42,058 whereas for asst. yr. 1982-83 it was finalised at figure of Rs. 51,115 as against returned figure of Rs. 19,210. assessee challenged orders of ITO by filing appeals before AAC. following ground of appeal was urged for both years: "That order passed by ld. ITO under s. 143(1) for asst. yr. 1981-82 and asst. yr. 1982-83 without any computation of tax which is mandatory duty under s. 143(1) is bad in law and illegal." AAC in turn disposed off appeals on following lines: "2. objection common to both years is that order passed by ld. ITO under s. 143(1) for asst. yrs. 1981-82 and asst. yr. 1982-83 without any computation of tax in body of assessment order and is bad in law and illegal. As stated, assessments for both years are completed under s. 143(1). order passed under s. 143(1) is not appealable order and as such both appeals being incompetent are dismissed." It is this action of AAC which is now challenged in appeal before us. ld. counsel for assessee in course of his arguments kly challenged action of ITO in framing assessment order under s. 143(1) of Act whereby he had varied returned figures. It was contended that assessee only had share income from firm namely M/s Dreamland Garments and which he had reflected in his returns. It was contended that ITO instead of taking returned figures had adopted figure as per assessment orders of firm. It was contended that ITO in framing assessment order under s. 143(1) could only carry out adjustments envisaged in sub-cl. (b) of s. 143(1) of IT Act. According to ld. counsel for assessee ITO had gone outside sphere of s. 143(1) and had in process increased returned income. His first contention was that order under s. 143(1) was itself invalid. According to him ITO should have first of all accepted returned figure under s. 143(1) and it was only thereafter that he could rectify order under s. 155(1) of Act even though assessment of firm had been made prior to assessment of partner. According to ld. counsel since order under s. 143(1) itself was invalid ITO could not resort to s. 292-B to regularise same. It was further contended that appeal was competent in respect of orders under s. 143(1) inasmuch as assessee denied his liability to be assessed since tax calculated on assessed income was greater than tax paid by assessee himself. In other words, assessee sought to bring his case under provisions of s. 246(1)(c) of Act. In course of his arguments ld. counsel also referred to provisions of s. 139(9) of Act as also to various case laws which are mentioned in para 15 of his written submissions which have been placed on record. We are not proposing to reproduce decisions referred to by him but we state that we have considered same while disposing of these appeals. ld. Departmental Representative on other hand, kly supported orders of AAC. It was contended that assessee's case did not fall within provisions of s. 246(1)(c) inasmuch as denial mentioned there was complete denial and not partial one. It was argued that assessee in this case had filed returns and could not contend that he denied his liability to be assessed under Act. It was further contended that s. 246 which mentions "appealable orders" specifically excludes orders under s. 143(1). It was also contended that assessee had alternative remedies which he should have availed to viz., under ss. 154 and 264 as well as s. 143(2)(a) of Act. He also referred to decision of Hon'ble J & K High Court reported in S. Mubarik Shah Naqshbandi vs. CIT 1977 CTR (J&K) 180: (1977) 110 ITR 217 (J&K) to which ld. counsel for assessee had also referred to contend that this did not apply as order involved therein was order under s. 144 of Act. We have examined rival contentions advanced. According to us order of AAC has to be confirmed on ground that order passed under s. 143(1) is not appealable order. According to scheme of s. 143(1) in case where return has been made under s. 143(1) in case where return has been made under s. 139 and ITO is satisfied without requiring has been made under s. 139 and ITO is satisfied without requiring presence of assessee or production by him of any evidence as to correctness and completeness of such return, ITO could assess total income or loss as case may be of assessee and work out tax payable by or refundable to him on basis of such return. Under provisions of section ITO is empowered to carry out adjustments mentioned in sub-s. (b). perusal of adjustments would show that they pertain to some of important provisions of Act viz., depreciation, carry forward losses, claim under s. 80J as well as investment allowance etc. Section 143(2)(a) thereafter deals with situation where assessee objects to order made by ITO under s. 143(1) where by he has to move application within one month of date of service of notice of demand detailing therein his objections to assessment order. First of all we are not in position to accept arguments of ld. counsel to effect that it is only situations mentioned in sub-s. (b) under which application under s. 143(2)(a) can be moved. We say so since adjustments under sub-cl. (b) can legally be made by ITO and powers for which are provided under that Act. Sec. 143(2)(a) comes into picture only when ITO exceeds powers provided under sub-cl. (b). It is only then that application under s. 143(2)(a) objecting to assessment made under s. 143(1) can be filed. It is admitted fact that assessee in this case has not filed any objections for reasons best known to him but has come up in appeal. As rightly pointed out by ld. departmental representative assessee has not availed of remedies provided to him either under s. 143(2)(a) or other provisions of Act namely, ss. 154 and 254. We would also like to state that prior to substitution of s. 143 by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970 w.e.f. 1st April, 1971 if assessee was aggrieved in any way by assessment under s. 143(1) his only remedy was to make application to Commissioner of Income tax under s. 264 for revision of order. But substituted s. 143(2)(a) provided that if assessee was not satisfied with assessment made under s. 143(1) he could move application in Form No. 6A to ITO within one month from date of service of notice of demand. According to us neither was appeal provided prior to amendment and neither is it provided subsequently. Further, "the liability to be assessed" which s. 246(1)(c) speaks of is complete denial and not as sought to be made out in present appeals. According to us, order of AAC has to be upheld. As this is view we are taking question of taking up for consideration additional ground moved by assessee does not arise. We further observe that ground No. 3 in appeals questions action of AAC in dismissing appeals without deciding legal ground. We however do not propose to deal with this issue and it also was pointed out to ld. counsel for assessee during course of hearing that he was free to seek remedy elsewhere. According to us nothing prevents assessee from moving application for rectification (before AAC), in case he is of view that ground of appeal has not been disposed of. Before we part with these appeals we would like to observe that it seems rather strange that assessee has come up to Tribunal in these matters since he could have easily moved applications to ITO who as intimated to us by ld. counsel is also assessing firm. order under s. 143(1) were passed on 31st March, 1984 and it is apparent that on this date assessment orders of firms had been finalised. According to us by this time appeals filed if any in case of firm could have also been finalised since nearly 3 years have passed. All that assessee had to do was to get share from firm rectified and that would have been end of matter. For reasons best known to him, he has chosen to keep matter open by opting to bring it up to Tribunal even when provisions of Act are clear. As result, we uphold orders of AAC and dismiss appeals. *** CHOITHRAM G. ASRANI v. INCOME TAX OFFICER