JAIRAMBHAI D. CHAUHAN v. ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY
[Citation -1987-LL-0216-4]

Citation 1987-LL-0216-4
Appellant Name JAIRAMBHAI D. CHAUHAN
Respondent Name ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY
Court ITAT
Relevant Act Income-tax
Date of Order 16/02/1987
Judgment View Judgment
Keyword Tags withdrawal of exemption • statutory requirement • wealth-tax assessment • recording of reasons • goodwill of business • appellate controller • assistant controller • date of acquisition • denial of exemption • accountable person • reassessment order • subjective opinion • immovable property • change of opinion • reason to believe • value of goodwill • dissolution deed • fresh assessment • principal value • audit objection • issue of notice • wealth-tax act • valuation cell • expert opinion • estate duty
Bot Summary: The accountable persons were aggrieved by this order of the Assistant Controller dated 1-1-1980 and filed appeal to the Appellate Controller within 2 months of the passing of the above order on 20-3-1980. The Appellate Controller observed as below: Since the Assistant Controller has reopened the assessment under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, and has to complete the estate duty assessment afresh, the appeal filed against the original order has become infructuous and therefore dismissed as such. The allegation of the IAC was that the Assistant Controller had not considered the provisions of sections 2(15), 9 and 27 of the Act and that the Assistant Controller should 'verify' the facts and review the position. If the accountable person relies on the report of Shri Apte and the Assistant Controller examines the same on merits and accepts the same, how can it be said that the accountable person has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts on the specious plea that the assessee should have told the Assistant Controller how to discard them and adopt a higher value In the wealth-tax assessments the concerned assessee may have accepted a modified valuation only because of the small revenue effect. Coming now to the order of the Appellate Controller under appeal, Shri Trivedi submitted that the Appellate Controller may be right in observing that there is no provision in the 1953 Act corresponding to section 148(2) of the 1961 Act requiring recording of reasons, but this does not mean that section 59 can be invoked for effecting wholesale review of the original order and in the process introducing new subjective opinion, and innovation. Although there is no statutory requirement corresponding to section 148(2) of the 1961 Act since the validity of the notice under section 59 of the 1953 Act is subject to challenge in appeal, the state of mind of the Assistant Controller has to be ascertained primarily from the reasons as noted by the Assistant Controller. How could the Assistant Controller have come to such a conclusion The Assistant Controller' reliance on corresponding wealth-tax assessments as they existed on 1-1-1980 cannot be said t o be wrong.


This appeal is filed by accountable person against order of Controller (Appeals) dated 25-2-1986 setting aside order of Assistant Controller dated 22-3-1985 and upholding validity of notice under section 59 of Estate Duty Act, 1953 ('the Act'). grounds of appeal centre primarily round question of validity of section 59 proceedings. grounds also allege that there is in fact no estate escaping assessment from estate duty. 2. Shri. Jairambhai Chauhan expired on 2-8-1978. On 24-7-1979 accountable person filed return showing principal value of estate at Rs. 3,32,619. This was duly scrutinised by Assistant Controller who determined principal value of estate at Rs. 12,59,720. accountable persons were aggrieved by this order of Assistant Controller dated 1-1-1980 and filed appeal to Appellate Controller within 2 months of passing of above order on 20-3-1980. Assistant Controller commenced proceedings under section 59 and obtained return on 25-7-1980 showing principal value at Rs. 6,37,716. When both appeal and reassessments were pending, Assistant Controller requested Appellate Controller to enhance principal value of estate by Rs. 75,000 which according to Assistant Controller was value of goodwill in firm of Byculla Trading Co. which remained to be included. In peculiar order dated 21-7-1984 Appellate Controller dismissed appeal as infructuous, thus shutting out both revenue and taxpayer. Appellate Controller observed as below: "Since Assistant Controller has reopened assessment under section 59 of Estate Duty Act, 1953, and has to complete estate duty assessment afresh, appeal filed against original order has become infructuous and therefore dismissed as such." Possibly, Appellate Controller did not realise implication of his decision which in view of CIT v. A.D. Shroff [1957] 31 ITR 284 (Bom.) and S. Inder Singh Gill v. CIT [1963] 47 ITR 284 (Bom.) would disable revenue and accountable person from agitating points which have been concluded in original assessment in course of appeal against reassessment order, if any. Section 59 of 1953 Act is not on par with section 146 of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the 1961 Act'). Anyway, since both sides have taken Appellate Controller's order dated 21-7-1984 without murmur or protest one need say no more. 3. accountable persons were taken by surprise when notice under section 59 was received by them on 22-3-1980. They desired to know reason for reopening and items which were alleged to have escaped assessment. They wrote letter dated 21-4-1980 on this point but did not get any proper reply. Ultimately, they were allowed to take inspection of records, on 26-7- 1985, but in meanwhile they filed return under protest on 25-7-1980. They noticed that assessment was reopened to assess value of share of deceased in goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. which had allegedly escaped assessment. They also noticed that question had already become subject-matter of full adjudication in original assessment, where goodwill according to super-profits method, was worked out by accountable person at Rs. 75,000, under protest but with contention that there was in fact no goodwill or if it existed for deemed purpose under section 9 of Act, value would be nil. Assistant Controller accepted latter contention with remark in office note that no value of goodwill need be considered as firm was dissolved on 28-7-1978. Shri Trivedi, in course of hearing before us, pointed out that no goodwill was included not merely because of dissolution of firm prior to death (a view confirmed by Bombay High Court on 22-6-1978 in Smt. Urmila v. CED [1980] 122 ITR 958) but also it got reduced to nil on account of dwindling profits, trouble with labour, etc. business was actually closed without partners getting anything in form of surplus above value of assets of firm (goodwill was not shown as asset of firm). dissolution deed and labour retrenchment papers were produced before Assistant Controller. Accordingly, it was represented before Assistant Controller that notice under section 59 is bad in law. There has been no failure on part of accountable person to disclose truly and fully all material facts necessary for assessment. Hence, section 59(a) would not apply. There has also been no information in consequence of which Assistant Controller could have reason to believe that property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment. Hence, section 59(b) would not be applicable. Assistant Controller has not discussed this aspect in his reassessment order but has instead proceeded to frame fresh assessment as if it was original assessment. He observed as below: "Thus assessment has now been reopened as stated above and it is settled law that once assessment is reopened, it is reopened assessments (sic) for all practical purposes and all aspects of assessment are to be considered afresh as if no previous assessment was made taking into consideration this legal position about reopening of assessment in regard to valuation of immovables and valuation of shares, etc., de novo." Shri Trivedi wondered how Assistant Controller could have framed such sweeping legal proposition. Even case law most favourable to taxpayer does not support such sweeping proposition. In Smt. Saraswati Devi Lohia v. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 491 (All.) Desai C.J. did observe that if income is in fact shown to have escaped assessment, question of validity loses all importance. At same time his Lordship observed that ITO should not act on mere suspicion or surmise that income might have escaped assessment or simply with view to re-examine matter and to find whether it has escaped assessment or not. Shri Trivedi contended that in case before us, at original assessment, question of goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. was examined threadbare and Assistant Controller, even after seeing super profit working of goodwill, held (rightly) that there is in fact no goodwill includible in principal value of estate. Even in oft-quoted V. Jaganmohan Rao v. CIT [1970] 75 ITR 373 (SC) their Lordships did not lay down any proposition as canvassed by Assistant Controller and ultimate ratio, as explained in CIT v. Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1977] 106 ITR 24 (Guj.) is that if assessment is validly reopened, it stands even if reason for which it was reopened does not survive but actual reassessment is to be confined to those items for which assessments could have been validly reopened even though such reasons might not have been recorded. But in no case can mere change of opinion on same facts justify reopening of assessment. Shri Trivedi submitted without prejudice that he would show that none of items attempted to be roped in reassessment could in fact have answered condition of reopening assessment. Apart from proposed addition on account of alleged goodwill, which in fact has not been actually made even in account of alleged goodwill, which in fact has not been actually made even in reassessment, revaluation of immovable properties, revaluation of shares of limited companies and withdrawal of exemption granted under section 33(1)(p) of Act in original assessments, have not arisen, as result of information now in possession of Assistant Controller but which was not before him on 1-1-1980 (date of original assessment) and which came before date of issue of notice under section 59 (27-3-1980). 4. Shri Trivedi summed up factual position at time of original assessment as below: "(1) Dissolution deed dated 28-7-1978 of Byculla Trading Co., retrenchment notice and union's reply and working of goodwill of firm without prejudice, on lines proposed by Assistant Controller was furnished. (2) Detailed notes dated 10-12-1979 regarding valuation of various immovable properties were given to Assistant Controller, who scrutinised same before finalisation. (3) actual gold bonds were produced before Assistant Controller to enable him to make sure that bonds had not become subject-matter of exemption earlier and to enable him to stamp document so that next holder would not again get exemption under section 33(1)(p). mode of acquisition, date of acquisition and other dates to show that section 33(1)(p) is applicable, was all before Assistant Controller. (4) balance sheet of limited company was shown." Thus what has been attempted through reassessment amounts to change of opinion on same facts, not permitted under section 59. 5. Shri Trivedi was aware of stand taken by Appellate Controller that action under section 59 would be justified in view of instructions of Dy. Controller. Though not specifically referred to by Appellate Controller reliance is possibly on CIT v. H.H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji [1972] 84 ITR 584 (Delhi). Shri Trivedi whilst admitting that he did not have full access to alleged note of IAC submitted that if gist of same as given by Appellate Controller is correct, IAC has not given any 'information' but has merely directed examination and verification of certain things. allegation of IAC was that (paragraph 5 of Appellate Controller's order) Assistant Controller had not considered provisions of sections 2(15), 9 and 27 of Act and that Assistant Controller should 'verify' facts and review position. Such note cannot constitute information and facts are clearly distinguishable from those in H.H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji's case (supra). Section 59 cannot be invoked for making roving and fishing enquiries in hope of getting some material to allege escape of estate duty. inspection note of IAC, reference by Assistant Controller to valuation cell, Commissioner of Wealth-tax's action under section 25 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 in corresponding wealth-tax assessments, etc., are all subsequent events which are not germane to issue regarding validity of reopening assessment. Even regarding valuation of immovable properties, nothing was kept back as seen from paragraph 1 of original assessment order which indicates that report of expert Shri Apte and report of Mogul Pawar were both given. If accountable person relies on report of Shri Apte and Assistant Controller examines same on merits and accepts same, how can it be said that accountable person has failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts on specious plea that assessee should have told Assistant Controller how to discard them and adopt higher value? In wealth-tax assessments concerned assessee may have accepted modified valuation only because of small revenue effect. valuation of shares was also made on basis of expert opinion which was duly examined by Assistant Controller at time of original assessment. new innovations introduced by Assistant Controller are mere change of opinion on same facts and such change of opinion could not have become basis of section 59. 6. Regarding alleged failure to produce original partnership deed by Byculla Trading Co. Shri Trivedi submitted that this was actually produced before Assistant Controller. fact that only dissolution deed is on record cannot be ground for making such allegation. Even otherwise, deed is not relevant if Assistant Controller was satisfied that whatever be provision in partnership deed, there was in fact no goodwill at relevant time. This is precisely what has happened in this case. Thus, in substance provisions of sections 2(15), 9 and 27 have been fully examined at time of original assessment. 7. At this stage, we may conveniently refer to IAC's note dated 3-3- 1980. IAC has stated that 'there appears to be under-assessment'. IAC obtained copy of will of deceased dated 17-10-1977 where total value of assets left by deceased was Rs. 19,85,083. IAC has not, however, referred to any omission of any dutiable property from estate duty return. He referred to value of one share of J.D. Bytco Cosmetic (P.) Ltd. as declared by executors at Re. 1 per share. Nothing turns on this as value adopted in original assessment is Rs. 622 per share. IAC has next referred to valuation, by executors, of immovable properties at Rs. 8,08,553 by execution. Here again since original assessment takes value at Rs. 10,47,000 as per wealth-tax records, nothing turns on this. IAC has then worked out principal value at Rs. 13,73,285 but it is not clear on which specific items IAC has laid his hands. His main observations are regarding exemption of gold bonds (Rs. 8,73,000) deduction of liabilities (Rs. 6,79,345) goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. (Rs. 75,000). IAC has also observed that dissolution of Byculla Trading Co. does not necessarily mean discontinuation of business and if assets are distributed in specie, as different picture might emerge. We may mention at this stage that according to Shri Trivedi from data given to Assistant Controller, it would be clear that business of Byculla Trading Co. was closed, staff was disbanded, accounts were settled and those arose net debit balance of Rs. 4,65,412 to account of deceased and this has been rightly allowed. 8. IAC has been referred to fact that holding of gold bonds on date of death has not been proved. IAC's surmise is based on account entries which show that Rs. 5 lakhs were sent by Bank of Baroda on 2- 8-1978 date of death whereas deceased is shown to have become owner on 31-7-1978. IAC has directed verification. According to Shri Trivedi there is nothing unusual and/or odd in this. It was explained to Assistant Controller that under instruction from deceased who was on his death bed, Bombay broker was contacted in July 1978. arrangement for registration Bombay broker was contacted in July 1978. arrangement for registration of bond was made on 31-7-1978 though amount was received on 2-8- 1978 by bank drafts which were taken personally by Shri H.J. Chauhan one of accountable person. When original bond itself was produced for purpose of putting stamp of exemption grant and when dates of transfer are clear, according to Shri Trivedi reopening assessment on such flimsy doubts would amount to reopening on suspicion and not 'information'. 9. IAC has been referred to fact that Wealth-tax assessment have been made by WTO, Nasik in slipshood manner and may require revision in respect of valuation of immovable properties. It is, however, admitted that Assistant Controller did examine wealth-tax records and seen assessment order dated 29-5-1979 and till date of issue of notice under section 59 there was no revaluation even in wealth-tax. 10. IAC has then referred to advisability of obtaining valuer's opinion regarding immovable properties. As this is also in nature of new investigation and was taken up after issue of notice under section 59 nothing turn on this issue in favour of revenue. 11. IAC has then doubted whether Assistant Controller had taken proper look at income figures of J.D. Bytco Cosmetic (P.) Ltd. to determine goodwill not appearing in balance sheet. Here again there is no information that figure work of Assistant Controller is not correct. 12. Coming now to order of Appellate Controller under appeal, Shri Trivedi submitted that Appellate Controller may be right in observing that there is no provision in 1953 Act corresponding to section 148(2) of 1961 Act requiring recording of reasons, but this does not mean that section 59 can be invoked for effecting wholesale review of original order and in process introducing new subjective opinion, and innovation. Appellate Controller may also be right in holding that time limit for section 59(a) and 59(b) is same. On this ground, however, Appellate Controller cannot say that reasons for reopening are immaterial. allegation for sustaining section 59(a) is on flimsy material of alleged non-production of partnership deed of Byculla Trading Co. As already pointed out above allegation is baseless. other allegations, viz., immovable property values, goodwill of Byculla Trading Co. revaluation of shares, denial of exemption of gold bonds are also bereft of material even for purpose of section 59(b) leave alone sustaining addition in regular assessment. Appellate Controller therefore, clearly, erred in sustaining action under section 59 and setting aside order once again making accountable person to go through grilling enquiries of roving and fishing nature. revaluation of shares proposed at Rs. 736 is also without any basis without finding any specific fault with Assistant Controller's valuation. 13. Shri Taivedi then briefly referred to case law which accountable person had placed before Appellate Controller reported in paragraph of his order. law on point is so clear that no reference to such elaborate case law is necessary. Nevertheless to make story complete Shri Trivedi referred to Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO [1961] 41 ITR 191 (SC) regarding duty of accountable person to disclose primary facts. In estate duty return goodwill of business was shown as nil. question of showing interest in partnership did not arise as no such partnership existed on 2-8-1978. question of showing disposition which could be deemed to pass on death under section 9 or 10 or 27 of Act did not arise as there was no such thing. assessee has to be considered as having given all facts which according to him are relevant. There can be no failure to disclose something which assessee considered as not touching issue unless revenue shows that assessee was aware of relevance as existence of facts. There is also no question of telling revenue about all possible inferences that could be drawn or to tell how revenue should scrutinise and investigate material. Shri Trivedi then referred to CIT v. Burlop Dealers Ltd. [1971] 79 ITR 609 (SC) in support of his contention that later inference from same facts cannot justify reopening of concluded assessment. Referring to V. Pugalagiri v. ACED [1981] 132 ITR 847 (Mad.) which is directly on estate duty assessment Shri Trivedi contended that even where Assistant Controller is aware of higher value in wealth-tax assessment and adopts different value reopening is not permitted. Reliance was placed on Ramesh Chandrasen Ashar v. K.M. Barshiwala, Addl. First ACED [1984] 148 ITR 1 (Bom.). This is, however, regarding audit objection as information. Reference was then made to G. Ameer v. CED [1984] 150 ITR 443 (Ker.) which again deals with audit opinion and information. Lastly, reference was made to ITO v. Madnani Engg. Works Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 1 (SC) which requires disclosure of material for, belief for holding that income has escaped assessment. In case before us no such material has been brought. In support of his contention that section 59(a) and (b) mark distinct categories without overlapping common area reliance was placed on Kanhaiyalal v. CIT [1982] 136 ITR 243 (Raj.). Shri Trivedi was prepared to argue regarding merits of additions also but we do not propose to go into same as issue does not arise out of order of Appellate Controller. 14. In reply, Shri Roy defended order of Appellate Controller. accountable person is expected to give all primary facts candidly. Whilst giving copy of dissolution deed, accountable person conveniently omitted to give vital partnership document, which had important bearing on question of quantification of goodwill and its deeming to pass on death. accountable person has thus failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts. contention of accountable person that implication of partnership deed were discussed at time of original assessment has not been proved. Shri Roy then relied on detailed note of IAC which we have already referred to earlier. note, according to Shri Roy, does not merely direct examination and verification but gives vital information warranting action under section 59(b) which is supportable in view of H.H. Smt. Chand Kanwarji's case (supra). It is quite clear that goodwill did exist and did pass on death in view of CED v. Mrudula Nareshchandra [1986] 160 ITR 342 (SC). As inference regarding goodwill has not been discussed in order of Assistant Controller dated 1-1-1980, it is clear that there was no application of mind. Regarding other items too, it is clear that there was no application of mind. whole assessment was open once validly reopened as held in V. Jaganamohan Rao's case (supra). Relying on First ITO v. South India Corpn. Agency Ltd. [1983] 6 ITD 200 (Pune), Shri Roy contended that Assistant Controller's failure to comply with CBDT directions regarding reference of valuation as intimated by IAC constitutes information. reassessment may not then be confined to items mentioned by Assistant Controller in his recorded reasons as there is no provision corresponding to section 148(2) in estate duty enactment. Shri Roy wound up his argument with contention that entire note of IAC should be taken as part of reasons which weighed in mind of Assistant Controller. 15. In his rejoinder, Shri Trivedi was emphatic about partnership deed having been shown to Assistant Controller at time of original assessment. There is also nothing to suggest that Assistant Controller put on blinkers to all facts which he was expected to gather from relevant records of income-tax/wealth-tax of deceased and of firms and limited companies. When dissolution deed is shown to be produced, as this deed refers to partnership deed, it would be reasonable to hold that partnership deed did become subject-matter of scrutiny. One has to take note of fact that in course of discussion and hearing several documents, etc., are looked into though they might not have been formally mentioned in assessment order. working of goodwill given at Rs. 75,000 without prejudice is itself clear pointer. As Assistant Controller has not denied contention regarding production of partnership deed statement made by representative of accountable person should be accepted. Shri Trivedi further clarified on factual aspect that business of Byculla Trading Co. came to complete closure and did not devolve on any person after dissolution. closing entries have been rightly taken note by Assistant Controller. Regarding South India Corpn. Agency Ltd.'s case (supra) Shri Trivedi distinguished same as it dealt with conversion rate to be adopted and was substantiative. In case before us alleged failure of Assistant Controller in respect of valuation considered by someone else as referable to valuation cell is no failure at all. There is nothing on record to suggest that conditions for reference to valuation cell are fulfilled, as Assistant Controller had already examined valuation reports of Shri Apte and Shri Mogul Pawar. 16. We have carefully examined various facts and arguments. Although there is no statutory requirement corresponding to section 148(2) of 1961 Act since validity of notice under section 59 of 1953 Act is subject to challenge in appeal, state of mind of Assistant Controller has to be ascertained primarily from reasons as noted by Assistant Controller. It is settled law that mere suspicion or review on same facts is not Controller. It is settled law that mere suspicion or review on same facts is not permitted. Later judgment of High Court or Supreme Court can constitute proper basis but in this case there is no such thing. Assistant Controller, prima facie, acted on footing that goodwill, if any, of Byculla Trading Co. is not includible as to have on death under section 59. There is proper basis for such conclusion. To reverse his finding, it will have to be assumed firstly, without any basis, that there was in fact goodwill at time of dissolution; secondly, that such goodwill was given up without consideration; and thirdly, that it has vested in some one. There is no basis for such assumption. Assistant Controller had examined issue properly before 1-1-1980 and held that there is no such property includible. This conclusion is correct on facts. Although partnership did mention about manner of distribution of goodwill, if any, at time of dissolution, there was in fact no goodwill as seen from dwindling profits, full retrenchment of employees, etc. Besides as held in Smt. Urmila's case (supra) even if this is held to be case of retirement and continuation by others, there is no goodwill includible in terms of section 9 as there is nothing to show absence or inadequacy of consideration, when accounts were settled. Assistant Controller's action in initiating action under section 59 is thus without proper foundation. We see no material to justify allegation of failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. 17. It has been held in corresponding income-tax law in Jamna Lal Kabra v. ITO [1968] 69 ITR 461 (All.) that, it is not open to ITO to refer to reasons other than those recorded by him. Similarly, in C.M. Rajgharia v. ITO [1975] 98 ITR 486 (Pat.), it is observed as below: "... Income-tax Officer may be confined to those recorded reasons to support assumption of jurisdiction ..." (p. 496) In our opinion, in view of fact that assumption of jurisdiction is appealable, above conclusion would apply mutatis mutandis to estate duty also even though estate duty enactment may not have provision corresponding to section 148(2). 18. contention that once assessment is validly reopened Assistant Controller's powers are coterminous with those in original assessment is not acceptable. best that can be said is that as held in Maneklal Harilal Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd.'s case (supra) if assessment is validly reopened, fact that recorded reason for reopening does not survive does not ipso facto oust jurisdiction of Assistant Controller. If at time of reopening there was any information which would have been mentioned but which was in fact not mentioned for purpose of section 59(b) it may be permissible to examine same. In case before us, however, good deal has been left to our imagination about state of mind of Assistant Controller who was allegedly enlightened on basis of 'information' contained in IAC's note date 3-3-1980. We are left with impression that as mentioned by Appellate Controller in paragraph 5 (page 5 of order) IAC's note was primarily for further proper enquiries and not for any definite information. 19. We can now come to IAC's D.O. No. 3-3-1980. note no doubt shows that Assistant Controller could have done better but does not provide 'information' either on facts or law, on which section 59 action could be founded. As already mentioned above, will does not show any omission or understatement of value. IAC's note does refer to partnership deed d te d 25-5-1973 but it is clear that Assistant Controller had already considered same before finalisation of original assessment on 1-1-1980. IAC's note does make anxious enquiries as to whether business of Byculla Trading Co. was discontinued and whether assessments were distributed in specie. It is clear that Assistant Controller did examine this aspect. Again IAC's note does show that he had doubts as to whether deceased did acquire prior title to gold bonds before death. As bonds were produced and bore endorsement of Assistant Controller about grant of exemption, mere fact that payment was made on 2-8-1978 (according to Assistant Controller death took place on night of 2-8-1978) cannot constitute information about incorrectness of exemption under section 33(1)(p). IAC's note then finds fault with Assistant Controller for not referring question of valuation of immovable properties to Departmental Valuation Officer. This allegation of IAC is based on his opinion that corresponding wealth-tax assessment were not made properly. How could Assistant Controller have come to such conclusion? Assistant Controller' reliance on corresponding wealth-tax assessments as they existed on 1-1-1980 cannot, therefore, be said t o be wrong. Any attempted revaluation in wealth-tax assessments cannot be considered sufficient information for sustaining action under section 59. It appears that accountable person had two valuation reports-one of Shri Apte and one of Shri Mogul Pawar. In his order dated 1-1-1980 Assistant Controller has referred to both reports and adopted figure of Rs. 10,47,000 against about Rs. 7,23,000 shown by accountable person. accountable person was aggrieved by this valuation but in view of Appellate Controller's order dated 21-7-1984 accountable person cannot agitate point again because 1953 Act has no provision corresponding to section 152(2) of 1961 Act. On facts, it cannot, therefore, be said that any estate in form of immovable property value has escaped assessment merely because Assistant Controller did not make reference to departmental Valuation Officer. 20. IAC then refers to fact that goodwill of limited company was taken as per version of accountable person without calling for records of company assessed in Bombay. But unless it is shown that Bombay records do show value different from that taken by accountable person and Assistant Controller, it cannot be said that there is any 'information' on point for purpose of section 59. Computation of goodwill is matter of opinion. Unless it is shown clearly that valuation is in violation of established principles, one cannot discover 'information' for section 59 purpose. Lastly, IAC's observations regarding gold bonds were based on records as they went to IAC, i.e., without information regarding actual production of bond with proper date of holding, etc. In view of position now shown IAC's observations regarding gold bonds also cannot constitute information for purpose of section 59. 21. revaluation of shares attempted by Assistant Controller in reassessment adopts all figures in original assessment except deduction of 15 per cent which was allowed in original assessment on account of similar allowance given under rule 1D of Wealth-tax Rules, 1957. It is not clear why Assistant Controller is considered wrong in respect of It is not clear why Assistant Controller is considered wrong in respect of original valuation. It is settled law-CED v. J. Krishna Murthy [1974] 96 ITR 87 (Mys.) - that rule 1D should be applied for estate duty valuation also. This action is thus also change of opinion. 22. We thus find that after taking note of IAC's note dated 3-3-1980 conditions of section 59(a) or 59(b) are not fulfilled. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. *** JAIRAMBHAI D. CHAUHAN v. ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY
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