JUDGMENT JUDGMENT (ORDER OF REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH) D. S. TEWATIA J. (13-7-1984).-The following question which has been referred by Tribunal at instance of Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, for opinion of this court pertains to jurisdiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to decide question of penalty and consequent imposition of penalty of Rs. 58,000 by him, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under section 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act: " Whether Tribunal has been right in law in holding that penalty amounting to Rs. 58,000 imposed by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under section 27 l(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, in pursuance of reference admittedly made under section 274(2) on December 23, 1976, was without jurisdiction in view of fact that sub-section (2) of section 274 had been omitted by section 65 of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976? " Mr. Ashok Bhan, appearing for petitioner, has canvassed that order dated December 13, 1979, of Tribunal holding that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with question of imposition of penalty under section 27 l(1)(c) of Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), on date he passed order imposing penalty, i.e., February 25, 1978, because as result of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as " Amending Act "), which took effect from April 1, 1976, Income-tax Officer alone was competent to deal with question of imposition of penalty and jurisdiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 271 of Act stood abolished as result of deletion of sub-section (2) of section 274 with effect from April 1, 1976, as result of Amending Act, ran counter to Division Bench decisions of this court in CIT v. Raman Industries [1980] 121 ITR 405, CIT v. Sadhu Ram [1981] 127 ITR 517, CIT v. Mela Ram Jagdish Raj & Co. [1981] 132 ITR 897 and Telu Ram Raunqi Ram v. CIT [1984] 146 ITR 401, besides decisions of other High Courts, namely, CIT v. R. Ochhavlal & Co. [1976] 105 ITR 518 (Guj), CIT v. Royal Motor Car Co. [1977] 107 ITR 753 (Guj), Laltaprasad Goenka v. CIT [1983] 143 ITR 924 (Bom), Continental Commercial Corpn. v. ITO [1975] 100 ITR 170 (Mad), CIT v. Eastern Development Corpn. [1982] 135 ITR 516 (Cal), Addl. CIT v. Dr. Khaja Khutabuddinkhan [1978] 114 ITR 905 (AP) and CIT v. Balabhai & Co. [1980] 122 ITR 301 (Guj). Perusal of judgment of Tribunal dated December 13, 1979, would show that Tribunal, inter alia, has based its decision on Allahabad High Court judgment in CIT v. Om Sons [1979] 116 ITR 215, which view has been reiterated by same High Court in judgment in CIT v. Pearey Lal Radhey Raman [1979] 117 ITR 319. Mr. Gupta, appearing for respondent, has added to above list, Karnataka High Court judgment in R. Abdul Azeez v. CIT [1981] 128 ITR 547 and later Allahabad High Court judgments in Ganesh Dass Ram Gopal v. IAC of I.T. [1983] 142 ITR 101 and Mohd. Oais & Co. v. CIT [1983] 142 ITR 104 (All). From above, it is clear that various High Courts have taken contrary view in regard to existence of jurisdiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on date he passed order if before that as result of provision giving him jurisdiction in matter has been amended in way depriving him of jurisdiction to deal with question of imposition of penalty. There is also difference of opinion as to whether relevant date is date on which Income-tax Officer has made reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or date on which he had initiated penalty proceedings on his file for purpose of seeing as to whether on date on which Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed order, he had requisite jurisdiction to deal with matter or not. Mr. Gupta, on behalf of respondent, has questioned basic postulate that right to have cause tried in given forum is not vested interest. Mr. Gupta asserts that what is vested right is right to remedy. forum where right is to be asserted or remedy is to be sought pertains to procedure. Since procedural law is admittedly given retrospective effect in that it applies even to pending cases, forum where right to remedy can be pursued is one which is described in procedural law of day. Mr. Gupta sought support for his above submission from Maria Christine De Souza v. Soddar Maria Zurna Pereiro Pinto, AIR 1979 SC 1352, and drew pointed attention to following observations of their Lordships (p. 1354): " contention that since right of appeal had been conferred by Portuguese Code, forum where it could be lodged was also governed by Portuguese Code cannot be accepted. It is no doubt well-settled that right of appeal is substantive right and it gets vested in litigant no sooner lis is commenced in court of first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal of enactment conferring such right unless repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect thereof. This position has been made clear by clauses (b) and (c) of proviso to section 4 of Central Act XXX of 1965 which substantially corresponds to clauses (c) and (e) of section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897. This position has also been settled by decisions of Privy Council and this court (vide Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1905] AC 369 and Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [1957] SCR 488; AIR 1957 SC 540), but forum where such appeal can be lodged is indubitably procedural matter and, therefore, appeal, right to which has arisen under repealed Act, will have to be lodged in forum provided for by repealing Act. That forum of appeal and also limitation for it, are matters pertaining to procedural law will be clear from following passage appearing at page 462 of Salmond's Jurisprudence (12th edn.): ` Whether I have right to recover certain property is question of substantive law, for determination and protection of such rights are among ends of administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to modes in which courts fulfil their functions.' It is true that under clause (c) of proviso to section 4 of Central Act, XXX of 1965 (which corresponds to section 6(e) of General Clauses Act, 1897), it is provided that remedy or legal proceeding in respect of vested right like right to appeal may be instituted, continued or enforced as if this Act (meaning repealing Act) had not been passed. But this provision merely saves remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such vested right which it is open to litigant to adopt notwithstanding repeal but this provision has nothing to do with forum where remedy or legal proceeding has to be pursued. If repealing Act provides new forum where remedy or legal proceedings in respect of such vested right can be pursued after repeal, forum must be as provided in repealing Act. Mr. Gupta also referred us to Karnataka High Court decision in R. Abdul Azeez's case [1981] 128 ITR 547, which had followed ratio of aforesaid decision of Supreme Court. If there is no vested right to forum for trying case or for hearing appeal or revision, forum being part of procedural law, then we are afraid, decisions relied upon by Mr. Ashok Bhan, including those which have been rendered by this court, do not appear to lay down correct law. Since Division Bench decisions of this court are binding upon us, appropriate course available to us is to refer reference for decision to larger Bench. We, therefore, direct office to place papers of this case before Acting Chief justice for constituting larger Bench. JUDGMENT OF FULL BENCH S. P. GOYAL J.(14-8-1986).-The following question which has been referred by Tribunal at instance of Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, for opinion of this court, pertains to juridiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to decide question of penalty and consequent imposition of penalty of Rs. 58,000 by him, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under section 271(1)(c) of income-tax Act, 1961: " Whether, Tribunal has been right in law in holding that penalty amounting to Rs. 58,000 imposed by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, vide order dated February 25, 1978, under section 271(1)(c) of Income-tax Act, in pursuance of reference admittedly made under section 274(2) on December 23, 1976, was without jurisdiction in view of fact that sub-section (2) of section 274 had been omitted by section 65 of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 w.e.f. April 1, 1976? " respondent is Hindu undivided family with its business head office at Kotkapura and branch at Baja Khana. business is stated to be purchase and sale of petroleum products. Return for assessment year 1973-74 was filed on December 4, 1973, declaring income of Rs. 13,330. case was fixed for hearing before Income-tax Officer on June 27, 1975, on which date assessee filed revised return declaring income at Rs. 21,430. Income-tax Officer, however, completed assessment on March 10, 1976, under section 143(3) of Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as " Act "), on total income of Rs. 48,880. While processing assessment, Income-tax Officer noticed wrong totalling in account books maintained by them in head office and branch office. By wrong totalling, as per Income-tax Officer, assessee concealed its income by Rs. 29,100. In assessment framed, Income-tax Officer recorded charge that assessee had concealed its income to tune of Rs. 29,100 and that penal action was called for. Though sub-section (2) of section 274 of Act was deleted from statute book by Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976, Income-tax Officer issued notice under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) of Act on December 23, 1976, intimating to assessee that case for levy of penalty was being referred to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and that further proceedings with regard to levy of penalty would take place before said officer as provided under sub-section (2) of section 274 of Act. assessee raised preliminary legal objection before Inspecting Assistant Commissioner that after deletion of sub-section (2) of section 274 of Act with effect from April 1, 1976, reference made on December 23, 1976, was not valid and that he had no jurisdiction to proceed in matter. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, however, imposed penalty by stating that return having been filed before April 1, 1976, provisions of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, were not attracted. assessee also contested levy of penalty on merits. Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, however, imposed penalty of Rs. 58,000, vide order dated February 25, 1978, with reference to addition of Rs. 29,100 made in assessment. Tribunal cancelled penalty on preliminary legal objection that both at time when penalty proceedings were referred to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and he assumed jurisdiction and also at time when order was passed, that is, on February 25, 1978, he had no valid jurisdiction in law in view of deletion of subsection (2) of section 274 with effect from April 1, 1976. Finding that question of law arose from order of Tribunal, Commissioner of Income-tax, Jullundur, filed application under section 256(1) of Act, praying that question of law as framed be referred to this court for its opinion. As earlier observed, Tribunal agreed with prayer made by Commissioner and consequently referred question which has been reproduced in earlier part of judgment for our decision. matter came up for hearing before Division Bench of this court. Mr. Ashok Bhan, senior advocate, appearing for Revenue, had canvassed before Bench that order dated December 13, 1979, of Tribunal holding that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to deal with question of imposition of penalty under section 271 (1)(c) of Act on date he passed order imposing penalty, that is, on February 25, 1978, because as result of Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which took effect from April 1, 1976, Incometax Officer alone was competent to deal with question of imposition of penalty the jurisdiction of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner envisaged under sub-section (2) of section 271 of Act stood abolished, as result of deletion of sub-section (2) of section 274 of Act, by Amending Act with effect from April 1, 1976, was patently illegal. In support of his contention, decisions of various High Courts taking one or other view were cited. Finding that there was difference of opinion amongst High Courts as to whether relevant date is date on which Income-tax Officer has made reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or date on which he has initiated penalty proceedings o his file for purpose of seeing as to whether on date on which Inspecting Assistant Commissioner passed order, he had requisite jurisdiction to deal with matter or not. Finding that question posed for decision was of considerable importance, matter was referred to be decided by larger Bench. This is how we are seized of matter. question which needs determination has two facets, viz, as to when can Inspecting Assistant Commissioner be said to have been seized of matter and having once been seized of it would he be divested o same on his jurisdiction having been taken away by subsequent amendment of law. answer to first query depends upon interpretation of provisions of section 271(1)(c) read with section 274(2) of Act. relevant portion of said section provides that if Income-tax Officer or Appellate Assistant Commissioner in course of any proceedings under this Act is satisfied that any person has concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income, he may direct that such person shall pay by way of penalty... Sub-section (2) of section 274 when it was deleted with effect from April 1, 1976, read as under: " Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271, if in case falling under clause (c) of that sub-section, amount of income (as determined by Income-tax Officer on assessment) in respect of which particulars have been concealed or inaccurate particulars have been furnished exceeds sum of twenty-five thousand ruppes, Incometax Officer shall refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who shall, for purpose, have all powers conferred under this Chapter for imposition of penalty. " underlined words in said section were introduced by Taxation Laws(Amendment) Act, 1970, enforced with effect from April 1, 1971, and prior thereto, said sub-section read as under: " Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 271, if in case falling under clause (c) of that sub-section, Here printed in italics. minimum penalty imposable exceeds sum of rupees one thousand, Income-tax Officer shall refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who shall, for purpose, have all powers conferred under this Chapter for imposition of penalty." From combined reading of provisions noticed above, it is evident that first step towards imposition of penalty is recording of satisfaction by Income-tax Officer or Appellate Assistant Commissioner in course of any proceedings that assessee has concealed particulars of his income or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income. moment satisfaction is recorded by Income-tax Officer/Appellate Assistant Commissioner, as case may be, penalty becomes imposable subject to provisions of sections 274(1) and (2). Sub-section (1) of section 274 provides that no order imposing penalty under this Chapter shall be made unless assessee has been heard or has been given reasonable opportunity of being heard. Sub-section (2) prior to April 1, 1971, provides that where minimum penalty imposable exceeds sum of rupees one thousand, Income-tax Officer shall refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, who alone was competent to pass any order. So, proceedings for imposition of penalty were to be initiated by Income-tax Officer even when penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000, and case was to be referred to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner only at stage when Income-tax Officer was of opinion that penalty imposable exceeded said sum. It is not necessary to notice various decisions cited by learned counsel for parties on interpretation of said provision of law because suffice it to refer to authoritative pronouncement of Supreme Court in this regard in D. M. Manasvi v. CIT [1972] 86 ITR 557, wherein law with regard to initiation of penalty proceedings'was settled thus (headnote): "Proceedings for imposition of penalty under section 271 (1) of Income-tax Act, 1961, have necessarily to be initiated by Incometax Officer or by Appellate Assistant Commissioner. fact that Income-tax Officer has to refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner if minimum penalty imposable exceeds Rs. 1,000 in case falling under section 271(1)(c) does not show that proceedings in such case cannot be initiated by Income-tax Officer. It is satisfaction of Income-tax Officer in course of assessment proceedings regarding concealment of income which constitutes basis and foundation of proceedings for levy of penalty. What is contemplated by section 271(1) is that Income-tax Officer should have been satisfied in course of assessment proceedings regarding matters mentioned in clauses of that sub-section. It is not essential that notice to person proceeded against should have also been issued during course of assessment proceedings. Satisfaction, in very nature of things, precedes issue of notice and it would not be correct to equate satisfaction of Income-tax Officer with actual issue of notice: " Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1970, enforced with effect from April 1, 1971, brought about very significant and material changes in provisions of sub-section (2) of section 274 inasmuch as under new provision, Income- tax Officer was required to refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner moment he finalised assessment and recorded finding that amount of income in respect of which particulars had been concealed or inaccurate particulars furnished exceeded sum of twenty-five thousand rupees. So, under amended provision, Income-tax-Officer was not to initiate any penalty proceedings or issue any notice in this regard to assessee. case, therefore, would be deemed to have been referred to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner on recording of conclusion by Income-tax Officer that amount of concealed income exceeded Rs. 25,000 and actual reference of case would be only ministerial act to be performed by office. natural corollary to this finding would be that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will be deemed to have been seized of penalty proceedings moment said finding is recorded by Income-tax Officer and that law applicable at that moment has to be applied to determine as to who has jurisdiction to impose penalty. If concealed income is found to be less than Rs. 25,000, Incometax Officer would be entitled to take proceedings for imposition of penalty and if it exceeded said amount, it would be Inspecting Assistant Commissioner only who would be competent to do so. Learned counsel for assessee, however, relying on CIT v. Daropdi Devi [1984] 149 ITR 178 (Delhi), CIT v. Gangadas Topandas [1984] 150 ITR 437 (Bom) and CIT v. S. Sardar Singh [1978] 113 ITR 541 (Gauhati), contended that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner would be seized of matter only when reference is made to him by Income-tax Officer and not when assessment is completed and amount of income concealed is found to be more than twenty-five thousand rupees. In all three decisions relied upon by him, assessments had been completed and penalty proceedings initiated before 1970 Amendment Act, but it was after enforcement of that Act with effect from April 1, 1971, that Income-tax Officer came to be of opinion that penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000 and, therefore, referred case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. By time he took decision to refer case, his jurisdiction had been enlarged and reference could be made only if concealment of income was found to be more than twenty-five thousand rupees. On these facts, it was held that Inspecting Assistant Commissioner gets jurisdiction only when reference is made to him and if by that time Income-tax Officer got jurisdiction to impose penalty, reference was bad in law and so was order passed by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Obviously, these cases have no bearing on cases arising after enforcement of 1970 Act with effect from April 1, 1971, because prior thereto, penalty proceedings were to be initiated in all cases by Income-tax Officer, whether penalty imposable was one thousand rupees and more. It was only when Income-tax Officer, during penalty proceedings, was of opinion that penalty imposable was more penalty proceedings, was of opinion that penalty imposable was more than Rs. 1,000 that he was required to refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. Obviously, according to provision of sub-section (2) of section 274, Inspecting Assistant Commissioner could get jurisdiction only when Income-tax Officer recorded order for making reference. Actual sending of reference even at that time was only ministerial act to be performed by office and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was deemed to have been seized of matter when Income-tax Officer ordered reference to be made. After 1970 Amendment Act, on other hand, Income-tax Officer is duty bound to make reference moment he completes assessment and comes to conclusion that amount of income, particulars of which have been concealed, exceeds sum of Rs. 25,000. He is not to initiate proceedings or to issue any notice in this regard to assessee. reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, therefore, would be deemed to have been made moment finding is recorded that income concealed exceeds Rs. 25,000 and reference is ordered to be made and not when ministerial act of sending of reference by office is actually done. In present case, Income-tax Officer on completion of assessment on March 10, 1976, recorded finding that amount of income concealed was Rs. 29,100. As soon as this finding was recorded, he was bound to order case to be referred to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for taking penalty proceedings. He did not do so and instead ordered notice to be issued to assessee to show cause as to why penalty should not be imposed and referred case thereafter to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or. December 23, 1976. Even on these facts, there is no escape from conclusion that penalty proceedings shall be deemed to have been initiated and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner seized of matter on March 10, 1976. As already stated above, Income-tax Officer had no option but to refer case to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, moment he had completed assessment proceedings and come to conclusion that amount of income, particulars of which had been concealed, was more than twenty-five thousand rupees. reference, therefore, would be deemed to have been made and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner seized of matter on March 10, 1976, and not on December 23, 1976, when reference was actually sent. second facet of question as to whether Inspecting Assistant Commissioner having once been seized of matter of imposition of penalty would be divested of same after amendment of section 271 whereby jurisdiction of assessing authority was enlarged and extended up to Rs. 25,000 does not present much difficulty. law in this regard stands settled by Supreme Court in Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843, in following terms (para 28 at p. 1849): " Before ascertaining effect of enactments aforesaid passed by Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. first is that'while provisions of statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch right in existence at passing of statute are not to be applied retrospectively in absence of express enactment or necessary intendment' (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC, 54 Ind App 421; AIR 1927 PC 242). second is that right of appeal being substantive right, institution of suit carries with it implication that all successive appeals available under law then in force would be preserved to parties to suit throughout rest of career of suit. There are two exceptions to application of this rule, viz., (1) when by competent enactment such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect and (2) when court to which appeal lay at commencement of suit stands abolished (See Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [1957] SCR 488; AIR 1957 SC 540 and Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving [1905] AC 369)." According to this decision, party has right to get decision from Tribunal who had jurisdiction before amendment of law but there are two well-recognized exceptions to this rule, viz., where enactment has expressly or impliedly taken away that right with retrospective effect, (2) where court to which appeal lay at commencement of proceedings stands abolished. Similar was rule laid down in Venugopala Reddiar v. Chidambara Reddiar, AIR 1943 FC 24. Reliance in both these cases was placed on following observation of Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving[1905] AC 369 (at page 372): " To deprive suitor in pending action of appeal to superior Tribunal which belonged to him as of right is very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing appeal altogether and transferring appeal to new tribunal. In either case, there is interference with existing rights contrary to well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless clear intention to that effect is manifested. " matter was further elucidated in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237; [1977] 47 Comp Cas 453 (SC), wherein effect of newly added provisions of Motor Vehicles Act which ousted jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain claims arising out of motor accidents came up for consideration and after discussing various implications of provisions of section 11 of, which ousted jurisdiction of civil courts, it was ruled that suits which had been instituted prior to constitution of Claims Tribunal remained unaffected and had to proceed for disposal in civil courts. Learned counsel for assessee, on other hand, strongly relied on Maria Christine De Souza Soddar v. Maria Zurma Pereira Pinto, AIR 1979 SC 1352. In that case, earlier forum where appeal lay had been abolished. So, it was held that appeal was competent in new forum. observations made in this decision have to be understood in context of situation available here. This case, therefore, cannot be relied upon to contend that in case of change of forum by Amending Act, pending cases would also stand transferred even if earlier forum where proceedings were instituted is still available. other decisions relied upon by him were Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC, AIR 1927 PC 242; Purshotam Singh v. Narain Singh, AIR 1955 Raj 203; K. Eapen Chako v. Provident Investment Company (P.) Ltd., AIR 1976 SC 2610 and Mst. Fazi v. Mohammad Bhat, AIR 1979 J & K 69 [FB]. In Delhi Cloth Mills' case, AIR 1927 PC 242, no right of appeal existed to Privy Council when judgment was rendered by High Court. It was held that later amendment would not confer such right. In K. Eapen Chako's case, AIR 1976 SC 2610, again, there was no question before court similar to one debated here. general observations regarding procedural law are well known and on their basis no support can be sought for proposition canvassed by assessee. In Jammu and Kashmir High Court case, AIR 1979 J & K 69; reliance has been placed on Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcorrin, AIR 1975 SC 1843, but that case does not warrant at all conclusion which was arrived at on its basis by learned judges. In Rajasthan case, AIR 1955 Raj 203, succession to jagir opened in September, 1952, and prior thereto, article VII(3) stood repealed by Constitution of India on January 26, 1950. So, no proceedings were pending when forum was changed and observations made in paragraph 11 are in nature of obiter dicta. Learned counsel for assessee also relied on various High Court decisions in CIT v. Om Sons [1979] 116 ITR 215 (All); CIT v. Pearey Lal Radhey Raman [1979] 117 ITR 319 (All); Ganesh Dass Ram Gopal v. IAC of I.T. [1983] 142 ITR 101 (All); CIT v. Dhadi Saher [1976] 105 ITR 56 (Orissa) and Radheshyam Agarwalla v. CIT [1978] 113 ITR 196 (Orissa). Reliance in all these decisions has been placed on Supreme Court decisions referred to above. As none of Supreme Court decisions supports view that judicial authority, once seized of matter, would be divested of same by later amendment of law taking away its jurisdiction, they all have to be dissented from. For reasons recorded above, question is answered in negative, that is, against assessee and in favour of Revenue. No costs. *** COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. MOHINDER LAL