Both appeals are by assessee. They pertain to asst. yrs. 1979-80 and 1980-81. assessee is non-resident company incorporated in United States of America. accounting year is calendar year. There is limitation issue in first appeal which we take up first. assessment (1979-80) was completed under provisions of s. 143(3) r/w 144B. draft assessment order was made by ITO on 8th March, 1982. This was received by assessee on 23rd March, 1982. assesse s written objections were filed. After s. 144B proceeding, IAC 's directions were received by ITO on 3rd Sep 1982 (sic). final assessment was completed on 2nd July, 1982. normal time for completing assessment is two years as per s. 153(1)(Iii) and this assessment should have been completed before 1st April, 1982. final assessment made on 2nd July, 1982 is prima facie out of time. But this is subject to exclusion of ht period between forwarding of draft order by ITO under s. 144B(1) to assessee and date on which directions of IAC are received by ITO under s. 144B as provided in Explanation 1(iv) to s. 153. question is what is period that has to be deducted from total span of time under aforementioned Explanation. two intermediary points of time are date of "forwarding" of draft order to assessee and date on which IAC 's directions are received by ITO. As to second date, is no dispute. Record shows for certain that IAC 's directions were reduced by ITO on 3rd Sep 1982. draft order was signed by ITO on 8th March, 1982. It was received by assessee on 23rd March, 1982. date of forwarding could be any day in period from 8th March, 1982 to 23rd March, 182, these two dates not excluding. Before CIT(A), it had been contended on behalf of assessee that crucial date was 23rd March, 1982, suggesting that it was date on which draft order had been forwarded. case of Revenue held been that draft had been forwarded to assessee on 8th March, 1982 through notice serer. submission of ITO was accepted by CIT(A), who held that period should be reckoned from 8th March, 1982 (and not 23rd March, 1982). Sri Dastur, arguing for assessee, stated that prima facie assessment being beyond two years, it is for Revenue to prove by placing material which would show date of forwarding and that such information being exclusively in possession of Revenue, burden lay upon it. Revenue placed on record copy of correspondence addressed by ITO to IAC which is dt 27th April, 1982. After objections were received from assessee to draft proposed, ITO made onward transmission of entire record to IAC under s. 144B. That letter contains information relevant to ground. letter reads that ITO had forwarded proposed draft assessment to assessee on 8th March, 1982. Sri Roongta, arguing for Revenue, stated that in face of this evidence it should be held that thet date of forwarding was same date ITO prepared draft, namely, 8th March, 1982. decision of Tribunal interest he case of ITO vs. Hind Fielders (P) Ltd (1982) 1 ITD 323 (Bom) was cited to urge that word "forwarding means date on which paper was despatched for service. There can be no doubt that "forwarding" does not mean "receipt", and there is no warrant to presume that draft order must have been despatched by ITO on 23rd March, 1982, date on which it was received by assessee. Service of order could be through post or departmental machinery. This is case where draft order had been entrusted to server of Department for effecting service. By Revenue, decisions of High Court in case of Jai Hanuman Trading Co. P. Ltd. vs. CIT (1977) 110 ITR 36 (P&H) (FB), K.U. Srinivasa Rao vs. CWT (1985) 46 CTR (AP) 256: (19855) 152 ITR 128 (AP), CIT vs. Sheo Kumari Debi (1986) 50 CTR (Pat) 350: (1986) 157 ITR 13 (Pat) were cited. Our attention was invited to Tribunal's decision case of Paper House. vs. ITO (1983) 5 ITD 301 (Cal) and case of Chandan Wood Products vs. ITO (1985) 21 TTJ (Ind) 296: (1984) 9 ITD 729 (Ind). Except (1985) 152 ITR 128 (AP) (supra) other High Court decisions are on point that date of issue of notice is not of service. (1985) 152 ITR 128 (AP) (supra) is that date of assessment order must be deemed to be date on which it purposts to have been made. So none of them is applicable. (1983) 5 ITD 301 was case where draft had also been sent by registered post. What is explained in (1984) 9 ITD 729 (supra) is that "forwarding" connotes putting draft assessment order in course of transmission to assessee and not actual service on assessee. Sri Dastur contended that court cannot presume from draft order that it had been forwarded on very day it was signed by ITO and that there must be some aliunde evidence to show date of actual sending, that is to say date on which server was put in custody of document to be served, for according to his submission, there would be no forwarding until I T O actually loses seisin of it. Forwarding is to send away for outward transmission so that it may be taken for being delivered to nominated person. We agree with counsel for assessee that date of draft order cannot be date of forwarding. It was explained on behalf of Department that no other office record is available at this distance of time and that letter dt 27th April, 1982 addressed by ITO to IAC in ordinary course of official duty should be given full credence to. When assessee fills objections to draft order ITO is bound to send same to IAC. It is in that connection letter dt 27th April, 1982 had been written which contains internal evidence that order had been forwarded to assessee on 8th March, 1982. There could have been no motive for ITO to mention in letter to IAC that draft had been forwarded to assessee on 8th March, 1982. Perhaps, it was to give indication to IAC so that period allowed under Expln. 1(iv) did not cross 130 days. However, as on 27th April, 1982 Revenue was not running any risk of limitation and could have been no reason for ITO to mention date not true, in circumstances, we are convinced, that letter dt. 27th April, 1982 is dependable to infer that order must have been forwarded to assessee on 8th March, 1982. When ITO passes draft order it will not leave his office unless followed by some official Act performed in administrative side for transmitting same to assessee inviting his objections (if any) and normally such same to assessee inviting his objections (if any) and normally such administrative Act is to address letter to which draftee order would accompany. When ITO does that administrative Act he would be doing so only to carry out follow-up action and Act of forwarding is inherent in itself. It is not necessary for Revenue to show on what date server had been actually put in possession of draft assessment to be served on assessee. All that law requires is that there should be forwarding by ITO and it is enough if draft order leaves outward tray for, on his part, there is nothing more to be done to complete Act of forwarding. letter of ITO dt. 27th April, 1982 addressed to IAC is firm evidence to show that draft order has been forwarded by him on 8th Feb.,, 1982. Consequently, assessment made is within time. second ground is whether royalty income is to be taxed on basis of accrual or on actual receipt basis. CIT(A) elaborately discussed this issue and held that royalty income had accrued by virtue of s. 5(2)(b) and that it is accordingly taxable although assessee (a non-resident) is entitled to actual payment only when Reserve Bank grants permission. On this question, CIT(A) refers to Special Bench decision of Tribunal in case of Allied Chemical Corporation. USA (ITA Nos. 870 and 1605 of 1980) wherein decision of Madras High Court interest he case of CIT vs. Standard Triumph Motor Co. Ltd (1979) 119 ITR 573 (Mad) has been followed. These decisions are clear answer to question. royalty income which accrues by virtue of s. 5(2)(B) is taxable in year of accrual although actual payment is postponed till Reserve Bank's permission is received. second ground is, therefore, found against assessee. next ground was that at least in respect of two contracts accrual would be in next year. two contracts are those made with Khatau Junker Limited and Universal Cables Ltd. It was stated that income cannot b e considered to have accrued in this assessment owing to term in contract (similar to both) which reads as follows: "Licensee agrees to pay royalties specified in Paragraph A. 2 of this Art. VI of General Electric within ninety (90) days after end of each June and December of each calendar year and within ninety (90) days after date of expiration or termination of this Agreement." As urge by Sri Roongta, time of ninety days allowed does not stop accrual. It only grant time to other party for making payment although obligation to pay had arisen. We see no substance in ground No. 3. Lastly, it was urged by Sri Dastur that credit for tax which was deducted at source for royalty income assessed in this year must be given. In this regard, CIT (A) has, in para 9 of impugned order for asst. yr. 1979-80, directed ITO to allow credit tax deducted at source from royalty income after due verification. similar direction is also given by firs appellate authority in appeal for 1980-81. prayer of assessee has been rightly considered by CIT (A) and we uphold his decision. In result, appeals fail. They are dismissed. *** GENERAL ELECTIC CO. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER