This appeal is filed by revenue against order of AAC, Nasik dt. 27th Aug., 1984. It is common ground that shares of M/s. Enzo-Chem Laboratories P. Ltd., are to be valued in accordance with r.1D of WT Rules. WTO determined value of 1 share at Rs. 677.92 taking balance sheet as on 31st March, 1981 as per para 3 of his order dt. 28th Dec., 1983. WTO excluded advance tax paid by company from value of asset, but while deducting tax liability, he deducted only Rs. 97,992 which according to him represented actual tax liability as determined in assessment for 1981-82 after giving deduction of advance tax. In appeal AAC changed only figure of tax liability deductible from value of assets. Although balance sheet provided for Rs. 1,60,330, AAC deducted Rs. 1,11,671 to arrive at value of Rs. 613 per share as per working in para 5 of his order. Apparently AAC followed ratio of CWT vs. Ashok K.Parikh (1981) 129 ITR 46 (Guj), CWT vs. Arivindbhai Chinubhai (1981) 24 CTR (Guj) 228: (1982) 133 ITR 800 (Guj) and Special Bench judgment in WTO vs. Sheth, C.J. (1983) 4 ITD 706 (Bom). Against this decision revenue has come in appeal. Shri Sathe submitted that Special Bench judgment which was influenced by fact that there is no judgement contrary to CWT vs. Ashok K.Parikh (1981) 129 ITR 46 (Guj) has lost its persuasive value in view of Bombay High Court judgment regarding s. 80J on similar point. CIT vs. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (1984) 39 CTR (Bom) 246: (1984) 149 ITR 94 (Bom). It has been held that it would have been legitimate for company to have on liabilities side tax liability as reduced by advance tax paid. Therefore, capital employed should be determined after deduction of net liability of tax. Their Lordship have considered impact of CWT vs. Arivindbhai Chinubhai (1981) 24 CTR (Guj) 228: (1982) 133 ITR 800 (Guj) which follows (1981) 129 ITR 46 (Guj) and yet held that only net liability should be deducted for purpose of s. 80J capital. Further, Shri Sathe submitted that Special Bench did not have benefit ofAshok Kumar Oswal vs. CWT (1984) 43 CTR (P&H) 216: (1984) 148 ITR 620 (P&H) dissenting from (1981) 129 ITR 46 (Guj). Accordingly Shri Sathe caught restoration of order of WTO. In reply Shri Rathi pointed out dangers of applying principles of 80J to artificial rule like 1D. He also submitted that (1984) 148 ITR 620 (P&H) (supra) has not considered impact of (1982) 133 ITR 800 (Guj) has dissented from (1981) 129 ITR 46 (Guj) (supra). Drawing analogy from rr. 2A, 2B and 2C Shri Rathi contended that intention is to give concession to shareholder where companies do not defer unnecessarily advance tax. Some companies who might show T.D.S. as asset do not get benefit possibly because T.D.S. has no element of violation but advance tax does have such violation. Special Bench judgment in WTO vs. C.J. Sheth (1983) 4 ITD 706 (Bom) is thus still good law. In his rejoinder Shri Sathe invited our attention to T.V. Srinivasan vs. CWT (1985) 152 ITR 599 (Mad)wherein it is held that advance tax paid in excess is asset. That is however, case of individual and not of company but dissent from (1982) 133 ITR 800 (Guj) (supra) clearly. Their Lordships have considered wordings of r. 2D also. In view of difference of opinion, Their Lordships have granted leave for appeal to Supreme Court. We agree that second look at Special Bench judgement is called for i n view of later development in form of latter Bombay, Punjab & Haryana High Court judgements referred to by learned departmental representative. rule that in case of conflict of present view in favour of tax payer has not been accepted as universally applicable Nandlal Soohanlal vs. CIT (FB) (Punjob) (1977) 110 ITR 170 (P&H) Chinnappa Reddy J. (As he then was) observed at page 211: "I am afraid I cannot subscribe to be proposition that judge faced with conflict of precedent should abdicate his judgement and accept view which is favourable to assessee. It is only where possible and he is unable to decide which is better view, that he may adopt rule of interpretation that view favourable to assessee might be accepted." We have thus to see whether two views are equally tenable or whether on proper reading of conflicting judgements, one of two is more convincing than other. Rule 1D was enacted precisely to avoid embarrassing situations, which were arising prior to introduction of rule. Each WTO would adopt his own working yet swearing by principle of break up method (which formed foundation of r. 1D). This caused discrimination between two shareholders merely because they were assessed in different WTOs though they were all examining same balance sheet. Rule 1D now gives no discretion to WTO. It states precisely what should be taken as asset and what should not be. It also states clearly what liability should be deducted and what should not be. On assets side, there can be no two opinions. If advance tax paid is shown as asset it should not be included in value of asset shown in balance sheet, further Explanation II(1)(e) reads as under: following amounts shown as liabilities should not be treated as liabilities, (a) any amount representing provision for taxes other than amount referred to in cl. (i) (a) to extent of excess over tax payable with reference to book profits in accordance with law applicable thereto. This provision for tax for not being treated as liability should be amount other than amount referred to in cl. (1) (a). Clauses (1) (a) is regarding assets and not liabilities. hormonious reading of two would show that amount of provision for tax higher than advance tax would show would not be allowable unless such amount represents liability on book profits. In other words, for determining liability on basis of profits one has to consider provision for tax only in excess of advance tax. legal position that (prior to introduction of r. 1D) balance sheet could be scrutinised to see if any excess provision for tax is made has became final in CWT vs. Sardar Ajaib singh (1971) 82 ITR 842 (SC). introduction of r. 1D does not have effect of nullifying these observations. It would thus appear that Punjob and Madras views also find that observations of Bombay High Court in Hoechst case (supra) though dealing with r. 19A show that location of item in balance sheet should not be allowed to cloud basic issue regarding net worth. One cannot discriminate between two shareholders one of whom holds shares in company which prefers to show advance tax as asset and another who holds shares in company which prefers to show on liabilities side provision for tax less advance tax. We also find from observation of Supreme Court in Shree Sajjan Mills vs. CIT (1985) 49 CTR 193 (SC) that there cannot be differential treatment between two companies one of which makes provision in accounts for gratuity and other which does not, both not fulfilling conditions of s. 49A(7). Their Lordships disapproved arguments favouring latter. We accordingly hold that for uniformity of approach on taking plain meaning of Explanation II(ii) (e), one has to deduct provision for tax as shown on liabilities side of balance sheet less advance tax paid irrespective of place where advance tax payment is noted what would happen if company shows tax deducted at source as asset. Appeal is allowed. *** WEALTH-TAX OFFICER v. S.R. WARMA