Shri G. M. Abhyankar died on 19-2-1981. His widow Smt. Mangala G. Abhyankar is accountable person and she has filed this appeal against order dated 21-3-1983, passed by Controller (Appeals). 2. first ground relates to amount of Rs. 52,500 being amount of commission payable to deceased on date of his death. assessee was managing director of Hico Products Ltd. He was entitled to commission from his employer under clause 5(1) (b) of agreement dated 31-7-1979. Clause 5(1) (a) and (b) read as follows: "(1) In consideration of performance of his duties, company shall, during continuance of this agreement pay to managing director. (a) Salary of Rs. 90,000 per annum. (b) Commission at rate of 1 per cent of annual net profits of company computed in manner referred to in section 198 of Companies Act, 1956 subject to maximum of Rs. 45,000 ..." 3. commission payable to deceased on date of death was as follows: Rs. Commission for calendar year 1980 (1-1-1980 to 31-12-1980) 45,000 Commission for period from 1-1-1981 to 12-2-1981 (date of death) 7,500 ------- Total 52,500 ------- 4. accountable person had included Rs. 45,000 in return but had not included Rs. 7,500. According to her, said amount was not due to deceased on date of death (19-2-1981) and that said amount had become due on 31-12-1981, at end of accounting year and, as such, said amount did not represent property passing on death. Reliance was place on certain decisions which we shall consider presently in this order. Assistant Controller rejected this plea and included said amount of Rs. 7,500 in property passing on death. Before Controller (Appeals), accountable person raised plea that whole amount of Rs. 52,500 was not includible because accounts of years 1980 and 1981 of employer-company had been finalised after death of assessee and before such finalisation, accountable person had no beneficial interest in commission. This plea was not sustained by Controller (Appeals), who held that commission became payable as soon as services had been rendered and that fact that quantification took place subsequently was immaterial. accountable person has raised same contention now before us. 5. We have already reproduced items (a) and (b) of clause 5(1) of agreement of deceased with employer. It is significant that although salary payable is Rs. 90,000 per annum [vide item (a)], accountable person did not raise any objection to inclusion of Rs. 7,500 being salary payable for month of February 1981 and that amount was included in return. It is only in respect of commission of Rs. 7,500 due for period form 1-1-1981 to 19-2- 1981 that objection was raised before Assistant Controller while before Controller (Appeals) objection extended also to Rs. 45,000 payable for financial year 1980. words of clause 5(1) of agreement are quite clear. commission is payable for services rendered and calculation of commission payable is to be made at rate of 1 per cent on annual net profits subject to maximum of Rs. 45,000. There is no clause in agreement which states that deceased would have no beneficial interest in commission payable for services already rendered till accounts of employer-company were finalised. deceased would acquire beneficial interest in commission as soon as he rendered services although quantification would take place at subsequent date. As already stated, it is specifically mentioned in agreement that commission was payable for services rendered. We are unable to agree with submission of learned representative of assessee that amount in question was not liable to be included in property passing on death. 6. two decisions on which learned representative for assessee has relied are not of assistance. first decision is CIT v. Birla Gwalior (P.) Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 266 (SC). ratio of that decision is that commission receivable if given up prior to making up of accounts was not liable to be included in income when no date had been fixed by agreement for payment o f such commission. second decision is CIT v. Mehar Singh Sampuran Singh Chawla [1973] 90 ITR 219 (Delhi). In that case it was held that salary, commission and bonus which had been foregone before end of relevant accounting year did not constitute income of that year. concept of accrual of income is different from concept of beneficial interest in property passing o n death. right to receive commission constitutes property in praesenti although commission is to be quantified and to be actually received on future date and this property would certainly pass on death of deceased and value thereof would be liable to be included for calculating estate duty. We, therefore, confirm order of Controller (Appeals) on this point. 7. next point raised is that Controller (Appeals) had erred in holding that deceased's interest in properties of HUF (smaller) of which deceased was karta and coparcener, is, and extends to, whole of properties of said HUF rejecting assessee's stand that only one-half of value of properties would be deemed to pass under section 7 of Estate Duty Act, 1953 ('the Act') or under any other provisions of Act. On date of death, smaller-HUF consisted of deceased, his wife n d his daughter. There was no son. deceased was sole surviving coparcener. wife and daughter had no right to demand partition. Consequently, whole property would pass on his death. We are unable to agree with submission of learned representative for assessee to effect that only half of said property would pass on death of deceased. point in issue is covered against assessee by decision of Allahabad High Court in CED v. Smt. Kalawati Devi [1980] 125 ITR 762, where it was held that entire property passed on death of deceased when that property is received on partition from bigger-HUF by deceased having no son but only wife and daughter. No decision taking any contrary view was brought to our notice. We, accordingly, reject this ground. 8. third ground is that learned Controller (Appeals) had further erred in holding that deceased's one-half coparcenary share in estate of HUF (bigger) passes under section 7 read with section 39 of Act. According to accountable person, only one-fourth share deceased. This argument is based on same argument on which earlier had rested. That ground was that wife of assessee had half share in property on date of death of deceased. This contention cannot be accepted in view of decision already referred to. Reliance is placed on behalf of accountable person on decision of Calcutta High Court in Satyanarayan Saraf v. ACED [1978] 111 ITR 432. In that case, it was held that in order to ascertain lineal descendants of deceased under section 34(1) (a) of Act, notional partition of smaller-HUF was also contemplated between son and son's son of deceased. In such partition, son's wife would be entitled to share equal to that of her son and that share of son's wife was not liable to be taken into account for purposes of aggregation under section 34(1) (c). principle laid down in this decision would not be applicable in present case. It is well settled that wife cannot herself demand partition but if partition takes place between her husband and his son, she is entitled (except in South India) to receive share equal to that of son and to hold and enjoy that share separately even from her husband. In that decision, there was son's son of deceased and as such, it was held that wife of son would be entitled to share and that share was not liable to be included under section 34(1) (c). In present case, deceased had no son and as such, there was no question of his wife getting any share. principle laid down in that decision would not be applicable in present case where deceased was sole surviving coparcener. This ground is, therefore, rejected. 9. fourth ground is that Controller (Appeals) had erred in holding that no deduction should be made towards estimated charge by way of maintenance of widow of deceased, from value of properties of HUF (bigger) as also properties of HUF (smaller) of which deceased was karta and coparcener, whilst determining amount of share of deceased in properties of said families under section 7 read with section deceased in properties of said families under section 7 read with section 39. On behalf of accountable person reliance was placed on decision in CED v. Dr. B. Kamalamma [1984] 148 ITR 434 (Mad.). In that case deduction for certain sum representing provision for marriage of daughter of deceased was allowed form principal value of estate, on ground that obligation was enforceable against ancestral property which deceased has possessed. This principle laid down in that decision would not be applicable in present case. In our case, deduction is claimed towards estimated charge by way of maintenance of widow of deceased. What we have to see is whether there was any charge on property of deceased at time of death of deceased in respect of maintenance of his wife. Under Hindu law, wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband whether he possessed any property or not. maintenance of wife by her husband is matter of personal obligation arising from existence of relationship and quite independent of possession by husband of any property, ancestral or self-acquired. maintenance being matter of personal obligation wife has no claim for maintenance against her husband's property in hands of transfer from him. Her remedy is to obtain decree of civil court creating formal charge on property. If no such decree is obtained, there is no charge on property. Consequently, no deduction is permissible from value of property of HUF (smaller) of which deceased was sole surviving coparcener. On death of deceased his interest in coparcenary property of HUF (bigger) devolved on his widow and daughter. There is no question of claim of maintenance when she has inherited property on death of deceased. claim as laid down in above ground appears to be misconceived and was rightly rejected. 10. Fifth ground raised is that learned Controller (Appeals) erred in holding that for computing principal value of equity shares of Hico Products Ltd., no cognizance be taken of fact that stock exchange quotation do not always furnish infallible guide in matter of valuation of shares and, besides, do not take into account erosion of value of shares induced by death of deceased. It was submitted that deceased had towering personality as far as business of Hico Products Ltd. (of which he was managing director) was concerned. tremendous progress made by said company was entirely due to herculean efforts made by deceased. said company had acquired particular status because of reputation of deceased. On death of deceased sudden void was created and this resulted in serious erosion of intrinsic worth of shares of said company. value of shares depreciated considerably by reason of death of deceased. Consequently, according to learned representative for assessee, stock exchange quotation on date of death of deceased should not be taken as fair market value of shares of said company. stock exchange quotation on that date, according to him, did not reflect real value of those shares. This was proved by subsequent steep fall in value of shares. submission, therefore, was that value estimated by Assistant Controller in respect of shares of said company held by HUF (bigger) and HUF (smaller) of assessee was abnormally high and, as such, said value should be revised. 11. learned representative for assessee filed stock exchange quotations of price of shares of said company from 2-1-1981 to 31-3- 1982. These quotations indicated that from 3-1-1981 to 19-2-1981, fluctuation in value of shares was very small. It ranged between Rs. 36 and Rs. 38 per share. However, from 22-4-1981, there was continuous fall in price of shares and ultimately on 31-3-1982, price was Rs. 23 per share. He filed quotations of price of various other limited companies to indicate that there was no such fluctuation in their prices. It was submitted that subsequent fall in price of Hico Products Ltd., was due to death of deceased and, as such, this factor should have been taken into account in estimating value of shares of deceased. Similar contention was raised before Controller (Appeals). He negatived this contention and observed that Act did not concern itself with future value of shares but only value as on date of death of deceased and that value is reflected in stock exchange quotation as on date of death of deceased. He further observed that no other evidence was produced to indicate that actual sale price at time of death deceased was different from stock exchange quotation. He, therefore, negatived contention that shares should not be valued at price quoted on stock exchange on date of death of deceased. 12. After hearing parties, we are of opinion that learned Controller (Appeals) has ignored provisions of proviso section 36(2) of Act. In main provision in section 36(2), it is mentioned that Controller shall fix price of property according to market price at time of deceased's death. Thus, according to main provision, what is material is market value at time of deceased's death. However, in case which fall under proviso market price at time of death of deceased is not material. It is laid down in proviso that where value of property has been depreciated by reason of death of deceased, depreciation shall be taken into account in fixing price. It is obvious that depreciation would not take place at very moment of death of deceased. It would take place after lapse of reasonable period after death of deceased. Consequently, when death of deceased is cause of depreciation in value of property, it is depreciated price which shall be principal value of property and not market price at time of deceased's death. When deceased is doing small business and if depreciation takes place by reason of his death, depreciation will be discernible within short period. However, when deceased is managing director of big company, and if depreciation takes place by reason of his death, that depreciation in value would be visible only after lapse of bit longer time. period of about two to four months would be considered as reasonable period in which effect of death of deceased on value of property would be visible. In present case, Controller (Appeals) was in error in rejecting plea of accountable person to take into account erosion in intrinsic value of shares which had taken place by reason of death of deceased. This plea requires consideration and if, on considering materials conclusion was that value of property had in fact depreciated by reason of death of deceased, said depreciation should be taken into account in fixing price. In present case, this aspect has not been considered at all. In circumstances, we have to option but to restore matter to Controller (Appeals). We restore matter to him with direction that he would give opportunity to both parties to bring on record necessary material for determining question whether value of shares of Hico Products Ltd., had depreciated by reason of death of deceased. If it is proved to his satisfaction that value had so depreciated that depreciation shall be taken into account and price shall be estimated accordingly. 13. In result, appeal is partly allowed. *** SMT. MANGALA G. ABHYANKAR v. FIRST ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY