In as many as 21 grounds of appeal which are unnecessarily full of arguments and narrative, objection i taken to order of commissioner (appeals) dated 25-2-1984 holding that appeal filed by Pan American World Airways (Panam) against order passed by ITO under section 230(2) of t h e Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') was not maintainable in law. Commissioner (Appeals) had considered at length submissions made before him land then after analysing provisions of section 246 of Act after consulting various commentaries of Income-tax Law come to conclusion that no appeal lay against order for recovery of tax which was passed by ITO under sub-section (2) of section 230 . 2. Shri Veda Vyas, advocate, learned authorised counsel of appellant has, after stating relevant facts, contended that Commissioner (Appeals) misconstrued provisions of section 246(1 ) (c) in declining to entertain as maintainable appeal filed against order of ITO under section 230(2). According to learned counsel appeal filed by Panam ought to have been entertained by Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246(1) (c) as Panam was as assessee within meaning of section 2(7) (c) of Act, and as it was denying its liability to be assessed under Act and in particular under provisions of section 230(2). Referring to order passed by ITO under sub-section (2) of section 230 and after analysing these provisions, learned counsel says that order passed by ITO amounted to as assessment in respect of taxes demanded and, therefore, for this reason and for reason that amount of tax demanded was determinable by ITO under sub-section (2) of section 23 0, appeal filed by Panam was squarely covered by provisions of section 246(1) (c ). According to him there should have been no doubt about maintainability of assessee's appeal within provisions of section 246(1) (c) and that any case even if there was any possibility of doubt appeal ought to have been entertained by Commissioner (Appeals) ask right of appeal which is valuable right cannot be denied on grounds of denial non-conformity (sic). According to Shri Vyas provisions relating to appeals should be given liberal interpretation and that unless there are unmistakable indications to contrary, right should not be denied. In support of his contention that appeal filed by Panam before Commissioner (Appeals) was maintainable under provisions of section 246(1) (c ), Shri Vyas has relied on number of decided cases. Firstly, he has referred to decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Kanpur Coal Syndicate (1964) 53 ITR 225. It is submitted on authority of above decision that expression 'denial of liability' as appearing in section 246(1) (c ) is comprehensive enough to take into account not only total denial of liability but also liability to tax under particular circumstances. next authority on which he placed reliance is in Gopi Lal v. CIT (1967) 65 ITR 477 (Punj.). In this case decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kanpur Coal Syndicate (supra) had been taken note of and it had been held by Hon'ble High Court that expression 'denial of liability' not only includes case where liability to tax under Act was altogether denied by assessee but also included case where liability was denied in particular circumstances. third authority on which reliance is placed by learned counsel is in Mohan Lal Khemka v. CIT (1971) 81 ITR 89 (All.). Here once again guidelines laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kanpur Coal Syndicate (supra) had been taken note of by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court and it had been held that provision granting right of appeal to subject being valuable right should be construed liberty and that expression 'denial of liability' was comprehensive enough to include not only total denial of liability but also denial of liability to tax under particular circumstances. 3. On other had shri N. K. Chakraborty, learned departmental representative, has refuted all contentions taken by learned counsel of Panam. Raising preliminary objection to maintainability of appeal filed before Tribunal, learned authorised representative says that grounds of appeal being full of arguments and being contrary to provisions contained in rule 8 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, appeal should be rejected in limine. Thereafter learned departmental representative submits that directions which had been given by ITO under provisions so sub- section (1) of section 230 to Panam not to allow tax defaulter Dr. Jayanti Dharma Teja to avail to travailing facilities on any of aircraft belonging to Panam without production of tax clearance certificate was valid order and for that placed reliance on decision of Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Dr. Jayanti Dharma Taja v. Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance (1984) 148 ITR 316. According to him, valid direction under section 230(1) having been issued to Panam not to allow Dr. Teja any travel facilities unless he had produced tax clearance certificate in accordance with section 230(1) and that direction having been flouted and Dr. Teja having been allowed to leave India on one of Panam flights, ITO was justified in taking executive action of recovering taxes due from defaulter from Panam itself in accordance with provisions of section 230(2). According to learned departmental representative right of appeal does not exist in air and that it can be availed of only when it is specifically provided under statute. According to Shri Chakraborty, order passed under sub-section (2) of section 230 was merely executive order or direction and that such executive order or direction of fastening victoriously liability of defaulting assessee on aircraft carrier who disregards directions issued under section 230(1) would not be appealable order as it would not fall with in provisions of section 246. Reading from order of Commissioner (Appeals) learned departmental representative says that clause (c) of section 246(1) c be dissected into two parts. Firstly, according to him appeal would lie under section 246(1) (c ) where assessee denies his liability to be assessed under Act. Secondly, appeal would lie where assessee objects to order of assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 144 of Act in respect of amount of income assessed or to amount of tax determined or to amount of lass computed or to status in which assessment is made. According to departmental representative, assessee's case does not come within any one of limbs of section 246(1) (c ). Referring to order dated 15-2-1983 passed by ITO under section 230(2) , departmental representative says that this order had been made on defaulting assessee named Dr. Jayanti Dharma Teja and that liability of defaulting assessee had been fastened on Panam not because any assessment had been framed on Panam but because it had defaulted within meaning of sub- section (2) of section 230. provisions of sub-section (1) of section 230 were applicable in case of Dr. Jayanti Dharma Teja (supra) and this fact had been duly brought to notice of Panam and since in spite of that information Panam as owner of aircraft operating in India had allows Dr. Teja to leave India and to go to United States of America, order under section 230(2) had been passed merely as measure of recovery of taxes from Panam. Such order according to departmental of any tax on Panam and that it merely tantamounted to asking Panam to pay taxes which were due from tax defaulter Dr. Teja who had been allowed to leave India without insisting upon him to produce tax clearance certificated. learned departmental representative further submits on authority of decision of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in case of Kalinga Air Lines (P.) Ltd. v. ITO (1972) 85 ITR 443 that matter regarding issuance of tax clearance certificate is purely executive matter and, therefore, there was no question of their being appeal being permissible under provisions of section 246(1) (c) . After making analysis of different Chapters of Act, laying down procedure of assessment and procedure of recovery, learned departmental representative submits that order passed under section 230(2) on Dr. Teja was not order of assessment within Chapter XIV of Act and that it was order which fell within Chapter XVII-D of t Act which provides for various modes of collection and recovery of taxes from assessees who are in default or assessees who are deemed to be in default. In these circumstances, according to Shri Chakraborty, when liability to tax had been fastened on Dr. Teja and when it had been victoriously demanded from Panam on account of section 230(2) , there was no question of assessee's case falling under any one of two parts of section 246(1) (c) . According to departmental representative it could not be case of denial of liability to be assessed under Act on part of Panam which in fact is assessed to tax in India in respect of its Indian income. Similarly, according to him, this also could not be case which fell within second part of section 246(1) (c) inasmuch as it was not case of assessee objecting to income assessed or to amount of tax determined or to loss computed or to status under which assessment was framed. Shri Chakraborty admits that liberal interpretation should be placed on provisions relating to filing of appeals but at same time maintains that liberal interpretation can be given where in fact any appeal is provided but it cannot be given where statute did not intend that executive order be made appealable. Ultimately, shri Chakraborty concludes is arguments by saying that process of recovery and process of assessment are different and that since order under section 230(2) was not order of assessment and was merely executive direction issued to Panam, Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in holding that appeal filed before him by Panam was not maintainable. According to Shri Chakraborty, all orders that may be passed by income-tax authority cannot be claimed to be appealable and he gives instances of those orders which were considered and held to be not appealable by Hon'ble Supreme Court or High Courts decisions in CIT v. Amritlal Bhogilal & Co. (1958) 34 ITR 130, Shell Co. of India Ltd. v. CIT (1964) 51 ITR 669 (Cal.), Delhi Registered Stockholders (Iron & Steel) Association Ltd. v. CIT (1966) 59 ITR 16 (Punj.) and Vineet Talkies v. CIT (1984) 148 ITR 66 (MP). 4. Before we adjudicate upon rival contentions ably taken by learned representative of two sides we may briefly state facts which led to controversy in question. One Dr. Jayanti Dharma Teja had been assessed on large amounts of income-tax and wealth-tax during assessment years 1963-64 to 1977-78. As per particulars given in order passed by ITO under sub-section (2) of section 230 on Dr. Teja there was total liability of income-tax and wealth-tax amounting to Rs. 4,75,24,031 which had not been paid by defaulting assessee. Since ITO was of opinion that Dr. Teja may leave India with intention of not returning to India, he had intimated various aircraft carries operating in India that Dr. Teja should not be allowed to avail of travel facilities on their aircraft unless tax clearance certificate had been produced by him. information sent by ITo acting under section 230(1) had been duly received by Panam and fact that this information had been received by them had been duly acknowledged. In spite of threat Dr. Teja was allowed to leave India on 14-5-1977 on Panam flight to America en route to Sanjose in Costarica. Panam had allowed travel facilities to defaulter without insisting on production of tax clearance certificate under section 230(1). For default committed in form of allowing tax defaulter to leave India without producing tax clearance certificate, notice was sent to Panam under sub-section (2) of section 230 calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not be proceeded against for recovery of taxes due from Dr. Teja up to date of his departure from India. In reply Panam stated that whole of responsibility for escape of Dr. Teja could not be fixed upon Panam and that it was primary responsibility of customs authorities and not of Panam to insist for production of customs authorities and not of Panam to insist for production of tax clearance certificate. It was also stated in reply that it was Government of India which had deliberately allowed Dr. Teja to leave country. ITO held in his order dated 15-2-1983 that none of contentions of Panam were tenable and that since it had allowed Dr. Teja to escape from India on one of its aircraft it was liable for recovery of taxes assessed on Dr. Teja in accordance with provisions of sub- section (2) of section 230. 5. In background of abovementioned facts, we have given our very careful consideration to contentions raised by learned authorised representatives of assessee and department. We have very carefully gone through various decisions on which reliance has been placed by Shri Vyas, learned counsel for assessee or by Shri Chakraborty, learned departmental representative. We have also gone through provisions regarding appealable orders as contained in Chapter XX of Act and provisions relating to tax clearance certificate as contained in section 230. 6. provisions of section 230 appear under chapter XVII-D under heading 'Collection and recovery'. Apart from providing for levy of penalty and interest under sections 220 and 221 of Act for no-payment of taxes, etc., demanded under section 156 of Act and under other provisions of Act, provisions of Chapter XVII-D also provide for other modes of recovery. provisions of sections 222 to 225 of Act provide for initiation of certificate proceedings against defaulting assessee and forwarding of certificate of recovery by ITO to TRO. provisions of section 226 of Act, amongst others, empower ITO to recover taxes from any person or persons from whom money is due or may become due to defaulting assessee. provisions of section 227 of Act provide for recovery of taxes through State Governments. provisions of sections 228 and 228A of through State Governments. provisions of sections 228 and 228A of Act provide for recovery of Indian taxes in Pakistan and taxes recoverable in pursuance of agreement with foreign countries. In section 229 of Act it has been clarified that any amount imposed by way of interest, fine, penalty, etc., could be recoverable under Chapter XVII as arrears of tax. Thereafter appear provisions of section 230(1) which provide that no persons whether he is domiciled in India or not shall be allowed to leave territory of India by land, sea or air unless he produced tax clearance certificate from competent authority to effect that he has no tax liability under various tax Acts or that satisfactory arrangement have been made for payment of taxes due from him. provisions of sub-section (2) of section 230 provide that if owner or character of any ship or aircraft carrying persons from any place in territory of India to any place outside India allows any person to whom provisions of sub-section (1) of section 230 apply to leave India without satisfying that such person is in possession of clearance certificate, he shall be personally liable to pay whole or any part of amount of tax payable by such persons as ITO may, having regard to circumstance of case, determined. In sub- section (3) of section 230 lit has been further provided that if owner or character of any ship or aircraft fails to pay taxes demanded from him under provisions of sub-section (2) of section 230 , he shall be deemed to be assessee in default and sums payable by him will be recoverable in manner provided in Chapter XVII as arrears of tax. After carefully going through scheme of recovery of taxes as envisaged in abovementioned sequence, it does appear to us that these provisions which come into play after assessment is framed cannot be equated with any process of assessment. Assessment in its most comprehensive sense can be said to include entire proceed for imposing liability upon taxpayer in respect of his income. As has been opined by commentators on Income-tax Law, 'assessment' consists of three steps. Firstly, it involves computation of taxable income of assessee. In second place, tax payable by him on basis of such computation of income has to be determined. Finally, notice of demand specifying taxes on income payable by assessee has to be served upon t h e assessee. Viewed from this comprehensive angel, proceedings of recovery do not come within meaning of word 'assessment'. In these circumstances, we would agree with point of view of learned departmental representative that order within meaning of section 230(2) in Chapter XVII-D dealing with recovery and collection of taxes would not be part of assessment. In other words, when order is passed under section 230(2) , person against whom order is passed cannot be said to have been assessed under Act. 7. We would now proceed to examine provisions of section 246(1) (c) w hich according to learned counsel for appellant permitted filing of maintainable appeal against order under section 230(2). Before we do that we may say few words about law regarding interpretation of provisions which permit filing of appeals under statute. We would agree with learned counsel for appellant that liberal interpretation has to be put on provisions regarding appeals. right of appeal is valuable right of litigant and according to us it should never be denied unless its forfeiture or abandonment is conclusively shown. At same time we are also aware that right of appeal is creature of statute and that there can be no right of appeal unless it is conferred by statute. If right of appeal stands conferred by certain statute then undoubtedly it has to be liberally construed. Now examining provisions of section 246(1) (c ), we find that its dichotomy results in two parts. These are that any assessee can appeal firstly where he denies his liability to be assessed under Act, or where assessee objects to any order of assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or section 144 or where he objects to amount of income assessed or to amount of tax determined or to amount of loss computed or to status under which he is assessed. If assessee has grievance against order passed against him and if tha grievance does not fall within any one of situations mentioned above, then provisions of section 246(1) (c) will not apply. So far as second limb of section 246(1) (c) is concerned, it cannot by any stretch of imagination embrace within itself appeal against order passed under sub- section (2) of section 230. learned counsel for appellant also admits so, but as stated earlier his contention is that case of appellant falls within first limb of section 246(1) (c) , i. e. within denial of liability to be assessed under Act. In order to judge whether assessee's case falls within expression 'where assessee denies his liability to be assessed under this Act' we have as very fist step looked into decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanpur Coal Synidate's case (supra). Their Lordships had examined meaning of expression 'denial of liability' and held relied upon by learned casual of appellant, i. e., those in Gopi Lal's case (supra) and mohan Lal Khemka's case (supra) do not support case which is being made out by him inasmuch as these decisions had been pronounced in entirely different facts and circumstance. Guided by majority view of various Hon'ble High Courts as found in abovementioned decision we would hold that order passed by ITO under section 230(2) against Panam, in facts and circumstances stated above, did not fall within expression 'denies his liability to be assessed under this Act'. Since procedure of recovery does not amount to procedure of being assessed under Act, question of appellant contending that its case falls within denial clause does not arise. At this stage we are remind of celebrated decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court which is in Amritlal Bhogilal & Co.'s case (supra). There their Lordships were considering scope of sections 30 and 31 of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which provide for appeals to AAC under that Act. Their Lordships held that, however, wide powers of AAC may be in appeal, they can be exercised only in respect of matter which are specifically made appealable and if any order has been deliberately left out form jurisdiction of AAC, it is not up to him to entertain plea about correctness, propriety or validity of such order. Here in present case before us we find that neither provisions of section 246(1) (c ) nor any other provisions of section 246 permit appeal against executive order passed by ITO under sub-section (2) of section 230 for recovering taxes initially assessed upon assessee who had defaulted and which are vicariously demanded to extent fixed by ITO. From person who had failed to comply with provisions of sub-section (1) of section 230. In fact there is only one section out of various sections mentioned in Chapter XVII- D which finds mention in provisions of section 246. That section is section 221 , which nables assessing authority to impose penalty on assessee who is in default or who is deemed to be in default. In respect of other modes of recovery appeals are provided to extent that they are mentioned in Income-tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962. whole code for recovery proceedings has been devised in Rules and these Rules provide for appeals against order of TRO. As far as order under section 230(2) is concerned, it does not find mention any where either in section 246 or in any one of said rules. But that does not mean that order passed under section 230(2) is without any remedy whatsoever. appellant could have moved in accordance with provisions of section 264 of Act but as far as provisions of section 246 are concerned, we find that in fact there is no clause which permits appeal against executive order or direction which is made by ITO under section 230(2). mere fact that ITO is entitled to determine quantum of taxes which is demanded from person under provisions of section 230(2) does not make that order appealable. In case statute makers actually intended that appeal was permissible against order under section 230(2) they could have made provision like one as contained in section 248 of Act. That having not been done by framers of statute and there being nothing in section 246 permitting appeal against order under section 230(2) which as per decision in Kalinga Air Lines (P.) Ltd.'s case (supra) is merely executive direction, we would agree with order passed by Commissioner (Appeals) rejecting appeal filed by appellant in limine. 8. In result, appeal fails. *** PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS v. INCOME TAX OFFICER