This appeal by department arises out of proceeding for assessment of estate duty. deceased, Shri Nalinbhai B. Munshaw, died on 16-2-1976. At time of his death, he was member of HUF governed by Mitakshara law. Section 34(1)(c) of Estate Duty Act, 1953 (' Act '), lays down that for purpose of determining rate of estate duty to be paid on any property passing on death of deceased, in case of property so passing which consists of coparcenary interest in joint family property of Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law, interest in joint family property of all lineal descendants of deceased member shall be aggregated so as to form one estate and estate duty shall be levied thereon at rate or rates applicable in respect of principal value thereof. Assistant Controller aggregated interests of all lineal descendants of deceased under this provision. In appeal filed by accountable person, Controller (Appeals) relied on two decisions of Tribunal rendered in 1975 and 1981 in which it was held, following decision of Madras High Court in V. Devaki Ammal v. ACED [1973] 91 ITR 24, that section 34(1)(c) was unconstitutional and deleted said aggregation for calculating rate of estate duty. department has now come in appeal before us. 2. Shri L.N. Joy, learned departmental representative, relied before us on several decisions of High Courts, wherein it has been held that section 34(1)(c) was constitutional. decisions relied on by him are: N.V. Somaraju v. Government of India [1974] 97 ITR 97 (AP), Hari Ram v. ACED [1975] 101 ITR 539 (Punj. & Har.), Badri Vishal Tandon v. ACED [1976] 103 ITR 468 (All.), S. Devendra Singh v. CED [1982] 136 ITR 176 (All.) and Ramniklal J. Daftary v. CED [1982] 136 ITR 422 (Guj.). 3. learned representative for assessee, on other hand, relied on decisions of Madras High Court in V. Devaki Ammal's case and CED v. R.K. Chettiar [1980] 125 ITR 605, wherein it has been held that said provision was unconstitutional. He also relied on decision of Tribunal in CED v. C.C. Dalal [ED Appeal No. 23 (Bom.) of 1980 decided on 5-3-1981], wherein on basis of decision of Madras High Court and also decision of Tribunal in ED Appeal No. 19 (Bom.) of 1974-75 dated 13-5- 1975, it was held that said aggregation should not be made under section 34(1)(c). Shri Desai further relied on fact that Supreme Court has dismissed special leave petition filed by department against decision of Madras High Court in R.K. Chettiar's case. 4. We have considered rival submissions. We find that question of constitutional validity of section 34(1)(c) had come up for consideration before large number of High Courts. All High Courts before whom this question came up for consideration, except Madras High Court, have taken view that said section was not ultra vires constitution. Thus, preponderance of judicial view is that said provision is constitutionally valid. No decision of Bombay High Court has been brought to our notice. In circumstances, we deem in proper to follow preponderant view which is found enunciated in decisions of other High Courts. As regards dismissal of special leave petition against decision of Madras High Court in R.K. Chettiar's case Shri Desai has relied on information published in [1984] 143 ITR (St.) 67 wherein it has been mentioned that Supreme Court had dismissed special leave petition by department against judgment dated 15-4-1980 of Madras High Court in R.K. Chettiar's case, whereby High Court, on reference, had held that where lands were gifted by deceased but income therefrom was used by him in his business, value of lands gifted could not be included in principal value of estate, and also had further held, following V. Devaki Ammal's case that interests of lineal descendants could not be included in ancestral property. From above note published in Statute portion of Income-tax Reports, it is not clear whether special leave petition. had been sought by department on both questions that had arisen for decision in R.K. Chettiar's case or whether special leave petition had been sought only on one of those two questions. Besides, since Supreme Court has already granted special leave petition against decision of Madras High Court in V. Devaki Ammal's case, it follows that question of constitutional validity is before Supreme Court pending for final adjudication. That matter does not stand concluded by dismissal of special leave petition in R.K. Chettiar's case. Consequently, we are not inclined to follow decisions of Madras High Court in cases of V. Devaki Ammal and R.K. Chettiar, solely on ground that special, leave petition against latter decision has been dismissed by Supreme Court. 5. As far as decisions of Tribunal are concerned, those decisions are of years 1975 and 1981. learned representative for assessee expressly stated before us that he was not aware of any decision of Tribunal rendered in subsequent years which had followed view of Madras High Court in preference to preponderance of view of other High Courts. At time when two decisions of Tribunal were given in years 1975 and 1981, decisions of several other High Courts were not available before Tribunal for consideration. In fact, in decision of Tribunal cited before us, there is reference to decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court, which has been distinguished by Tribunal. Since, at present, we have before us decisions of large number of High Courts, which have taken view contrary to that taken by Madras High Court, we would follow decisions of those High Courts in preference to decision of Madras High Court on this point. We may mention here that in Madras High Court, earlier view was that said provision was constitutional---PL.S.RM. Ramanathan Chettiar v. ACED [1970] 76 ITR 402 (Mad.). 6. It is true that when two views are reasonably probable relating interpretation of particular provision of statute, one which is in favour of assessee should normally be preferred. However, where there is difference of opinion on question whether particular provision of statute was constitutionally valid, view in favour of constitutional validity should normally be accepted, particularly when said view is taken by majority of High Courts before whom question came up for consideration. In this view of matter, we prefer to follow decisions of other High Courts rather than those of Madras High Court on question of constitutional validity of section 34(1)(c). Accordingly, we set aside order of Controller (Appeals) on this point and restore that of Assistant Controller. 7. In result, appeal is allowed. *** CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY v. HAMIRBHAI B. MUNSHAW