S.P. KAPUR, J.M. ORDER appeal is by assessee, resident-registered firm. assessment year involved is 1976-77 with previous year having ended on 31st March 1976. assessment has been framed under s. 143(3) r/w s. 144B of IT Act, 1961 and following specific grounds have been raised before us: "On facts and in circumstances of case: 1. assessment framed is illegal and void ab initio on various grounds and hence same be quashed. 2. Without specific order under s. 123 having been passed reference under s. 144B pending before IAC, Range)-I, Bhopal, could not be transferred suo motu by IAC, Range-I, Bhopal to IAC, (Assessment ), Indore. 3. learned IAC (Assessment), Indore did not assume valid jurisdiction for disposing reference under s. 144B. Thus, assessment framed by ITO, SIC-I, Indore relying on basis of directions given by IAC (Asst.) Indore (who had admittedly no jurisdiction over reference in absence of valid order under s. 123), is bad in law. 4. return file by assessee on 31st Aug., 1976 cannot be termed as return under s. 139(1) and on other hand it is return filed under s. 139(4) and, therefore, learned CIT(A) erred in law as also on facts in holding that return furnished on 31st Aug., 1976 was return furnished within extended time under s. 139(1). 5. It is against facts on record to hold that on date when original return was filed i.e. on 31st Aug., 1976, there was any extension of time granted for filing said return and, therefore, said return filed on 31st Aug., 1976 stood entered into compartment of s. 139(4) of Act. 6. facts of case and that of assessee's letter dt. 17th Feb., 1979 have been totally misconstrued by learned lower authorities. totality of facts/statements of case did not conclusively proved either by inference or by material facts on record that time for furnishing return under s. 139(1) was originally extended by ITO upto 30th Sept., 1976 and that subsequent order of ITO dt. 21st Feb., 1979 was merely duplicate of original order, as erroneously observed by learned CIT(A) 7. That order of learned ITO contained in ITNS-15 dt. 21st Feb., 1979 had no nexus to return furnished on 31st Aug., 1976 nor had effect of lifting said return from compartment of sec. 139(4) and in placing it in compartment of sec. 139(1) of Act. 8. order of learned ITO contained in ITNS-1 5 dt. 21st Feb., 1979 could not bring in its ambit return filed on 31st Aug., 1976. order so made on 21st Feb., 1979 was void ab initio and not warranted on facts of case. 9. learned CIT(A) erred not only on law but also on facts in holding that return furnished by assessee on 2nd March, 1979 was revised return falling under s. 139(5) of Act. 10. learned CIT(A) should have appreciated and held that assessment framed on 23rd Aug., 1980 was beyond period of limitation provided under Act. According to assessee limitation for completion of assessment subsists upto 31st March, 1979. 11. learned CIT(A) erred in law in holding that validity of assessment could not be challenged by assessee at appellate stage before him. 12. Application of proviso to sec. 145(1) was not warranted as assessee maintained regular books of accounts and no material evidence has been brought on record to conclusively establish that book results are not capable of complete verification or that assessee had in fact earned more than what has been returned on basis of regular books of accounts maintained. 13. That assessee had adopted consistent and systematic method for valuation of closing stock and, therefore, in absence of any conclusive evidence brought on record it is against facts on record it is against facts on record to hold that assessee had under valued closing stock of year in question. It is prayed that value of closing stock shown be accepted and addition of Rs. 4,87,130 upheld by CIT(A)be deleted. 14. Without prejudice to what has been submitted in S. No. 13 above, value of closing stock fixed by CIT(A) is highly arbitrary and same be reasonable reduced. 15. learned CIT(A) was not justified in throwing away or unsettling assessee's consistent method of stock valuation and in replacing same by his own method and upon that basis in retaining considerable addition. 16. CIT(A) should have held that sum of Rs. 2,34,817 had been spent inpurely temporary erections and, therefore, rate of depreciation thereon should have been allowed @ 100 per cent as claimed. 17. Shri R.C. Kansal was removed from Partnership on 31st March, 1975 without settlement of account on relevant date and thereafter firm derived pecuniary benefit by using his share of assets of firm till date of settlement. Therefore, payment of Rs. 21,451 so made to Shri R.C. Kansal should not have been disallowed having regard to provisions of sec. 37 of Indian Partnership Act and sec. 88 of Indian Trust Act. 18. It should have been held that sum of Rs. 21,451 paid to Shri R.C. Kansal was of revenue nature and should have been allowed as revenue expenditure having incurred for commercial expediency. 19. Since voluminous evidence having been filed by assessee CIT(A) should have himself dealt with grounds relating to addition on account of cash credits and arrived at positive conclusion instead to restore matter to file of ITO. 20 . learned CIT(A) should have adjudicated grievance of appellant regarding determination of WDV and calculation of depreciation. Even IAC not (Assessment) while giving effect to impugned order of CIT(A) erred in removing irregularities and inaccuracies on this account. 21. return having been filed on 31st Aug., 1976, provisions of sec. 139(8) were not attracted and hence charging of interest under s. 139(8) be quashed. It is also vitiated in law because of non-speaking direction of ITO and IAC's directions also did not meet objections of assessee. 22. That charging of interest under sub-s. 216, and 215 are illegal and were not warranted on facts of case. ITO's order should not have been set aside on points". 2. We have heard at length ld authorised representative of parties. We have perused carefully assessee's paper-book (109 pages) since placed on our file. Orders of lower authorities have also been thoughtfully gone through by us. 3. At time of hearing, ground Nos. 12, 13, 14,15,19 and 20 having not been pressed, these stand rejected. 4. As regards ground No. 1, out-come of appeal meets this ground since it is in nature of prayer clause. 5. As regards ground Nos. 2 and 3, narration in assessment order dt 23rd Aug., 1980 made by ITO, special Investigation Circle-I, Indore, in his file Circular No. S-18-010-FX-0307, reads as under : "Earlier case was under jurisdiction of ITO, B-Ward, Bhopal who had examined case. As variation between returned income and assessed income was more than Rs. 1 lakh, he forwarded draft order dt. 25th Feb., 1980 to assessee on 26th Feb., 1980, in view of provisions of s . 144B of IT Act. assessee filed objection to said proposed additions and, therefore, ITO B-Ward, Bhopal referred case to IAC, Bhopal Range, Bhopal. Subsequently, jurisdiction over case was transferred by CIT, MP-I, Bhopal to ITO (sic) I, Indore vide its Notification N o . 5/IT/MP-I/80 dt. 9th July, 1980. Consequently IAC, Bhopal Range, N o . 5/IT/MP-I/80 dt. 9th July, 1980. Consequently IAC, Bhopal Range, Bhopal also forwarded draft order alongwith objection to IAC (Assessment), Indore for issuing necessary directions under s. 144B of IT Act. IAC (Assessment ), Indore has issued directions dt. 21st Aug., 1980. This order is being passed keeping in view directions issued by IAC (Assessment), Indore." 6. On above facts grievance of assessee stood brushed aside by Id. CIT(A),Indore and narration in impugned order (vis-a-vis ground Nos.2 and 3 taken by assessee before us), reads as under : objection of appellant is that though assessment proceedings have been validly transferred under s. 127 from ITO B Ward, Bhopal to ITO (SIC) I, Indore there is no valid transfer of pending reference under s. 144B (1) from IAC, Range X, Bhopal to IAC (assessment) Indore. learned counsel argued that IAC (Asst.) Indore does not assume jurisdiction over reference as consequence of order passed under s. 127 Unless CIT passes specific order under s. 123 (1) transferring aforesaid reference from IAC, Bhopal to IAC (Asst) Indore, former continues to have jurisdiction over reference. In other words, disposal of reference by IAC (Assessment) Indore was without jurisdiction, This being so, benefit of extended limitation was not available to Department. In support of this view, learned counsel cited judgment of Calcutta High Court in case of ITO vs. Ashok Glass Works (1980) 125 ITR 491 (Cal) I am afraid I do not find any substance in this contention scheme of Act is quite simple and logical. In this case,the CIT has fixed jurisdiction of two IACs under s. 123 in support of areas, persons classes of persons etc. assessed by certain specified ITO s. He has also fixed jurisdiction of ITOs under s. 124. Consequently, where case is transferred from one ITO under one IAC to another ITO under another IAC change in jurisdiction of IAC is automatic by reason of existing orders under s. 123 No. separate order under s. 123(1) is necessary in respect of transfer of reference under s. 144B from one IAC to another IAC, learned counsel has merely relied on obiter dicta made by learned judges of Calcutta High Court in aforesaid case. learned judges were not required to and in fact did not decide this issue at all. On contrary, they have made reference to another case of same High Court which supports case of Department viz. Madhusudan Naidu vs. Union of India in C.R. No. 2489 (W) of 1969 (unreported case.) Though this case has been quoted with disapproval, law as laid down in that case remains unaltered for reason that issues involved in case before learned judges were altogether different In second place, perusal of provisions of s. 123 would reveal that in such case, transfer of pending reference under s. 144B is not only necessary but also impermissible Section 123 does not only speak of jurisdiction of IAC in terms of individual case. On contrary, it speaks of his jurisdiction in terms. of pluralities viz. areas persons classes of persons income classes of incomes, etc. Perusal of this section makes it patently clear that unlike sec. 127. it does not provide for transfer of individual pending proceeding or case from one IAC to another IAC. Considering foregoing discussion it is held that IAC (Assessment), Indore was fully competent to dispose of reference under s. 144B challenge to validity of assessment therefore fails, No relief is due to appellant on this account. 7. Before us case of assessee is that ld. first appellate authority in his reasoning contained in paragraph 1.6 of impugned order has brushed aside legal objections in summary manner since what be has observed is wholly misconceived and is against facts and law. ld. authorised representative of assessee strongly relied on provisions of law as contained in s. 123, 127 and 144B of Act and contended that there was inherent lack of jurisdiction on part of IAC Indore since he was not competent in law to have assumed jurisdiction under s. 144B of Act and accordingly he could not have issued directions on basis of which assessment has been framed assessee in nut shell contends that since assessment order is based on directions of IAC Indore and since IAC Indore had not on facts and in law jurisdiction to give such direction there being total and inherent lack of jurisdiction assessment is as nullity Ratio of decisions reported as Narinder Singh Dhingra vs. CIT (1973) 90 ITR 683 (1978) 113 ITR 22 (Guj) and that of Tribunal special Bench Hyderabad, East Coast Marine Products (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (1983) 4 ITD 73 (Hyd) (SB) have been pressed in service along with Mulla s C.P.C. volume I, P.157 and Concludingly strong reliance has been placed on decision of Hon ble Calcutta high Court in ITO & Ors vs. Shoke Glass Works (1980) 125 ITR 491 at p.499 (Cal) revenues stand is that ld. departmental representative supports orders of lower authorities and contended that jurisdictions of ITO and IAC are inter linked and are general in nature and not specific hence once there was change of jurisdiction under s. 144B of Act DR also contended that no separate order is required sine this is not plausible and secondly, that if at all, there is any infirmity attached to directions of IAC, Indore given under s. 144B of Act, it amounts to irregularity and not nullity Sec. 127 of Act, reads as under ; Power to transfer cases. 127. (1) Commissioner may, after giving assessee reasonable opportunity of being heard in matter wherever it is possible to do so, and after recording his reasons for doing so, transfer any case from one or more of following officers, subordinate to him, namely; (a) any ITO or ITOs; (b) any ITO or ITOs having concurrent jurisdiction with IAC. to any other ITO or ITOs (whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction with IAC) also subordinate to him and Board may similarly transfer any case from (i) any ITO or ITOs, or (ii) any ITO or ITO having concurrent jurisdiction with IAC, to any other ITO or ITOs (whether with or with out concurrent jurisdiction with IAC). Provided that nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to require any such opportunity to be given where transfer is from any ITO or ITO s (whether or with or without concurrent jurisdiction with IAC) to any other ITO or IAC) and offices of all such officers are situated in same city, locality or place; Provided further that. (a) where any case has been transferred from any ITO or ITOs to two or more ITOs, ITOs to whom case is so transferred shall have concurrent jurisdiction over such case and shall perform their functions in accordance with such general or special orders in writing as Board or Commissioner or IAC authorised by Commissioner in this behalf may make for purpose of facilitating performance of such functions. (b) where any case has been transferred from any ITO or ITOs (Whether with or without concurrent jurisdiction with IAC) to two or more ITOs with concurrent jurisdiction with IAC), Officers (including IAC) to whom case is so transferred shall have concurrent jurisdiction over such case and shall perform their junctions in accordance with such general or special orders in writing as Board or Commissioner may make for purpose of facilitating performance of such functions, and ITO shall perform their functions also in accordance with such orders or directions as IAC may make under sub-s. (2) of s. 124 or, as case may be, under sub-s.(2) of s. 125A. (2). transfer of case under sub-s. (1) may be made at any stage of t h e proceedings, and shall not render necessary re-issue of any notice already issued by ITO or ITO s from whom case is transferred. Explanation: In this section and in s. 121,123, 124 and 125, word "case", in relation to any person whose name is specified in any order or direction issued three under, means all proceedings under this Act in respect of any year which may be pending on date of such order or direction or which may have been completed on or before such date, and includes also all proceedings under this Act which may be commenced after date of such order or direction in respect of any year)." 8. reading of above section make it clear that Commissioner can after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to assessee and after recording his reasons for doing so transfer any case from one or more of ITO subordinate to him to any other ITO or Officers whether having concurrent jurisdiction with IAC (Assessment ) or not. section postulate transfer of case and 'the case' has been defined in Explanation attached to sub-s (2) of s, 127 of Act. 9. Sec. 124 of Act deals with jurisdiction of ITO s and it reads as under: "Jurisdiction of ITO s 124. (1) ITO s shall perform their functions in respect of such areas or of such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or of such cases or classes of cases as Commissioner may direct. (2) Where any directions issued under sub-s. (1) have assigned to two or more ITO s, same area or same persons or classes of persons or same incomes or classes of income or same cases or classes of cases, they shall have concurrent jurisdiction (and shall perform their functions in relation to said area, or persons or classes of persons, or incomes or classes of income, or cases or classes of cases, in accordance which such general or special orders in writhing as Commissioner or IAC authorised by Commissioner in this behalf, may make for purpose of facilitating performance of such functions. (3) Within limits of area assigned to him, ITO shall have jurisdiction (a) in respect of any person carrying on business or profession, if place at which he carries on his business or profession is situated within area, or where his business or profession is carried on in more places than one, if principal place of his business or profession is situate within area, and (b) in respect of any other person residing within area. (4) Where question arises under this section as to whether ITO has jurisdiction to assess any person, question shall be determined by Commissioner; or where question is one relating to areas within jurisdiction of different commissioners, by Commissioners concerned or, if they are not in agreement, by Board. (5) No person shall be entitled to call in question jurisdiction of ITO (a) after expiry of one month from date on which he has made return under sub-s.(1) of s. 139 or after completion of assessment, whichever is earlier ; (b) where he has made no such return, after expiry of time allowed b y notice under sub-s. (2) of s. 139 or under s. 148 for making of return. (6) Subject to provisions of sub-s. (5), where assessee calls in question jurisdiction of ITO, then ITO shall, if not satisfied with correctness of claim, refer matter for determination under sub-s. (4) before assessment is made. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section (or in s. 130A) every ITO shall have all powers conferred by or under this Act on ITO in respect of any income accruing or arising or arising or received within area for which he is appointed." 10. above section speaks of jurisdiction of ITO in performing their functions in respect of such areas or of such persons or classes or persons or of such incomes or classes of income or of such cases or classes of cases as Commissioner may direct. 1 1 . Sec. 123 of Act deals with jurisdiction of IAC and said provisions read as under : "Jurisdiction of IAC s. Sec. 129 (1) IAC s shall perform their functions in respect of such areas or of such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or of such cases or classes of cases as Commissioner may direct (2) Where any directions issued under sub-s. (1) have assigned to two or more IAC, same area or same persons or classes of persons or same incomes or classes of income or same cases or classes of cases, they shall have concurrent jurisdiction and shall perform such functions in relation to said area or persons or classes of persons or incomes or classes of income or cases or classes of cases as Commissioner may, by general or special order in writing, specify, for distribution and allocation of work to be performed." 12. bare reading of above makes it clear that IAC has to perform his functions in respect of such areas or of such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or of such cases or classes of cases as Commissioner may direct. 1 3 . comparison of ss. 123 and 124 of Act makes it clear that jurisdiction of ITO or IAC is what is vested in them by Commissioner and officials have to perform their functions as Commissioner may direct but these are not automatic or inter-linked. 14. Now on facts of assessee's case, assessment order itself speaks of fact that earlier jurisdiction over assessee was held by ITO B-Ward, Bhopal, who forwarded draft order dt. 25th Feb., 1980 which was received by assessee on 26th Feb., 1980. IAC Bhopal Range, Bhopal, was also seized of proceedings under s. 144B of Act. Subsequently jurisdiction was transferred to ITO Special Investigation Circle-I, Indore, and IAC Bhopal Range, Bhopal, transferred proceedings pending before him to IAC Indore, despite fact that there was no change in his jurisdiction. 15. CIT Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, vide his letter dt. 15th July, 1980 in his case file No. J-25/1/79-80, proposed to assessee transfer of assessee's income-tax case from B-Ward, Bhopal to ITO Spl. Investigation Circle, Indore and it was notified to assessee that this was notice within meaning of s. 127(1) of Act. copy of this letter is placed on our file as p. 3 of assessee's paper-book. Since there is order of transfer under s. 127(1) of Act, jurisdiction over assessee stood validly transferred from ITO B- Ward, Bhopal to ITO Special Investigation Circle-I, Indore, but that does not suo moto give jurisdiction to IAC Indore. This is what ld. authors Chaturvedi and Pithisaria have to say in their Commentary on IT Law (Third Edition) Volume 3 p. 2546; on issue involved in these grounds of assessee : "Transfer order under s. 127(1), ordinarily affects ITO's jurisdiction. Strictly speaking, s. 127(1) affects jurisdiction of ITO and order thereunder by itself cannot affect jurisdiction of IAC in respect of proceedings pending before him. This is so because jurisdiction of IAC can only be affected by order under s. 123(1) (ITO vs. Ashoke Glass Works (1980) 125 ITR 491 (Cal). It may be remembered that above principle is restricted to proceedings already pending before him and not in respect of any future proceedings. Such future proceedings have to be referred by transferee ITO s to his own IAC. Commissioner's order under s. 127(1) and that under s. 124(1) Fields of operation. If case of particular assessee is transferred under s. 127(1) by Commissioner from one ITO to another, transferee-officer gets exclusive jurisdiction to assess him. This is so because order of transfer under section 127(1) must necessarily be made in connection with "case" and for that matter with particular assessee. But order under s. 124(1) is ordinarily not made with reference to particular "case" or assessee. conferment and/or realignment of jurisdiction under s. 124(1) is made, inter alia, with reference to certain cases or class of cases. Thus, where ITO "A" continues to possess plenary jurisdiction over particular assessee, mere conferment of concurrent jurisdiction with pecuniary limit on another ITO "B" cannot take away jurisdiction of "A" in respect of that assessee even though such assessee falls within stated pecuniary limit Kistoor Mal vs. C.P. Singh (1983) 140 ITR 95, 111-2 (Raj). In that case, assessee was being assessed at Bombay upto asst. yr. 1950-51. He closed his business at Bombay and shifted his residence to Jodhpur sometime in year 1949. For subsequent years, he filed his returns at Jodhpur and was assessed b y ITO, Jodhpur. Jodhpur Officer issued reassessment notices to assessee in respect of asst. yrs. 1946-47 to 1949-50. It was held that on facts of case notices were not without jurisdiction even though no transfer order under s. 5(7A) of 1922 Act (corresponding to s. 127(1) of 1961 Act) was made by Board." 1 6 . In view of above fact reasoning and authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court ITO & Ors. vs. Ashoke Glass Works (1980) 125 ITR 491 (Cal), it has to be held that on facts and in circumstances of case, with which we are seized of, IAC, Indore, has no jurisdiction over assessee and accordingly he could not have given directions under s. 144B of Act and these directions could not have been made basis for assessment in law in as much as there can be no confirmation of power through misconstruction of statute and jurisdiction cannot be conferred by parties or also by consent of assessee. There being no doctrine of implied powers or global jurisdiction, there was on facts and in circumstances of case want of jurisdiction vis-a-vis IAC, Indore, and since want of jurisdiction results in order and proceeding which are void ab initio assessment order along with 144B proceedings are held to be so and amounts to nullity. We hold and direct accordingly with result, that orders of lower authorities stand cancelled. grounds by assessee succeed and stand allowed. 17. As regards ground Nos. 4 to 11 taken by assessee before us, chart placed by assessee as p. 2 of its paper-book gives following facts : 31-7- (i) Date on which return was due to be filed. 1976 31-8- (ii) Date on which return was actually filed. 1976 2-3- (iii) Revised return filed, 1979 (iv) Statutory form No. 6 prayer for extension upto 30th 31-7- Sept., 1976 filed on. 1976 (v) Time extended upto 30th Sept., 1976 vide orders dt. February, 1979. 18. whole case of assessee is that since there has been no valid and formal rather speaking orders of extension granted by ITO, return filed by assessee on 31st Aug., 1976 has to be taken as return filed under s. 139(4) of Act, hence revised return said to have been filed on 2nd March, 1979 cannot be in law taken to be revised return in as much as return filed on 31st Aug., 1976 was not return filed under s. 139(1) or 139(2) of Act. 19. reasoning of lower authorities merits to be upheld and grounds of assessee on this issue merit to be rejected, which we do, on simple reasoning that assessee vide letter dt. 17th Feb., 1979 addressed to ITO B-Ward, Bhopal, stated categorically that Form No. 6 (application) were filed for each of cases (firm and partners) seeking time upto 30th Sept., 1976 and information was given to assessee by then ITO that time stood extended upto 30th Sept., 1976. assessee also contended in this letter that, "unfortunately cards intimating extended time are not traceable in our record." 20 . In face of this stand of assessee, ITO B-Ward, Bhopal vide his letter dt. 21st Feb., 1979 granted assessee extension of time upto 30th Sept., 1976. This letter of ITO is based on representation made by assessee vide assessee's letter dt. 17th Feb., 1979 and accordingly on facts and in law assessee having represented and made ITO to believe that extension stood granted to him by then ITO for filing of returns (firm and partners) upto 30th Sept., 1976, assessee cannot turn back and claim now that letter dt. 21st Feb., 1979 was not to be taken notice of by us. It is true that provisions of Indian Evidence Act, strictly speaking are not applicable in income- tax proceedings, but rules of evidence do apply here also and in this view of matter doctrine of constructive estoppel comes into play. assessee represented that extension has since been granted to him and ITO acted on his representation and if that be so, which on facts is so, return filed by assessee on 31st Aug., 1976 has to be taken as return filed under s. 139(1) of Act. We hold accordingly. Since return filed by assessee on 31st Aug., 1976 is return under s. 139(1) of Act, revised return filed by assessee on 2nd March, 1979 was valid revised return on facts and in law, hence assessment framed was within limitation. Ground Nos. 4 to 11 taken by assessee before us stand rejected. 2 1 . Ground No. 16 deals with temporary erections and rate of depreciation which assessee claims it to be 100 per cent. Admitted facts are that it is purely temporary erection and assessee has no vested right in it since it is on leasehold basis because assessee is ancillary unit of BHEL. ld. authorised representatives were categorical that this issue is covered in favour of assessee by earlier order of ITAT hence ground stands allowed. total expenditure on temporary erection which is in nature of pure temporary one is held to be allowable as revenue expenditure or also we can say that as alternative 100 per cent depreciation is to be allowed to assessee on this head of expenditure. 22. Grounds No. 17 and 18 deal with payment of Rs. 21,451. Shri R.C. Kansal was erstwhile partner of assessee firm. payment is made to him for business expediency. We hold accordingly. In fact affidavit of Shri R.C. Kansan when read along with his letter dt. 16th July, 1975 addressed to BHEL and agreement dt. 16th July, 1975 between assessee and said Shri Kansal proves assessee's case. assessee has been delaying settlement of accounts of said Shri Kansal although there is said to be parting of ways between said Shri Kansal and continuing partners of assessee firm as on 31st March, 1975. His dues were not given in time rather used by assessee firm for its business and on these facts amount of Rs.21,451 is allowable as expenditure in nature of revenue one under s. 37 of Act having been expended by assessee for business expediency and carrying on of business vis-a-vis difficulties and troubles between Shri Kansal and continuing partners. Ground Nos. 17 and 18 succeed and Shri Kansal and continuing partners. Ground Nos. 17 and 18 succeed and stand allowed. Rs. 21,451 is allowable as revenue expenditure. We hold accordingly. 23. Ground Nos. 21 and 22 deal with charging of interest under s. 139(8), 215 and 216 of Act. On facts and in circumstances of case, provisions of statutory Rule 40, 117A and 116A should have been complied with. This issue merits to be decided afresh. We hold accordingly. Ratio of decision of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Mahabir Prashad & Sons (1980) 17 CTR (Del) 161 : (1980) 125 ITR 165 (Del) as also that of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in CIT vs. Elgin Mills Co. Ltd. (1980) 123 ITR 712 (All) are to be kept in mind. ITO is directed accordingly, more so, in face of fact that assessee had got substantial relief in quantum. However, on our part, and for us, this becomes academic in nature since we have allowed ground Nos. 2 and 3 by assessee and accordingly do hold that assessment order was nullity and orders of lower authorities stand cancelled. assessment having been held to be nullity and void ab initio, appeal by assessee succeeds and stands allowed. *** SHELLEY RPODUCTS v. INCOME TAX OFFICER