appeal is by revenue and following specific grounds have been raised before us: "1. On facts and in circumstances of case, AAC Range 'A', New Delhi, has erred in directing Wealth-tax Officer to adopt value of Escorts Ltd. shares at cost and not market value. 2. On facts and in circumstances of case, AAC Range 'A', New Delhi, has erred in allowing full liability of Rs. 50,000 under section 2(m)(ii) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957." 2. respondent-assessee is resident-individual. assessment year involved is 1975-76 and valuation date shown is 31-3-1975. 3. As regards ground No. 1, vide orders dated 29-5-1982 made by Tribunal, Delhi Bench 'A' at New Delhi, in case of Mrs. Dolly Nanda v. WTO [WT Appeal Nos. 590 to 597 (Delhi) of 1981], identical grounds and issue stands decided in favour of assessee. Again, Tribunal, Delhi Bench 'D', had also appeals by revenue in WT Appeals Nos. 1886 and 1887 (Delhi) of 1980 and there also assessee succeeded. Yet again, Tribunal, Delhi Bench 'D', vide orders dated 15-9-1983 made in WT Appeals No. 1204 (Delhi) of 1982 relating to assessment year 1973-74, on appeals by revenue and in case of this very assessee, rejected revenue's appeal and thereby decided issue in favour of assessee. In view of all these decisions ground No. 1, taken by revenue before us, merits to be rejected, which we do. 4. However, since at time of hearing of present appeal, there was reliance on decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers v. WTO [1984] 145 ITR 485, parties were also heard on this aspect and reliance of revenue. 5. Having had benefit of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers (supra), we are of opinion that ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in above case does not alter decisions already taken and arrived at by Tribunal mentioned as above and in this view of matter also, ground, No. 1 taken by revenue merits to be rejected. Our reasoning to that effect is as under: "In above case Hon'ble Supreme Court was basically concerned with question as to whether interest of karta representing his HUF in firm is exigible to wealth-tax. In this context, their Lordships held that, 'Reading sections 2(e), 2(m) and 3 of Wealth-tax Act, 1957 together, it would be clear that partner's interest in firm either in his individual capacity or in his capacity as karta of his HUF is property, and is includible in expression 'assets' as defined in section 2(e), and will have to be taken into account while computing net wealth or individual or HUF and on such net wealth charge has been imposed under section 3." 6. other issue was as to whether deemed provision under section 4(1)(b) of Wealth-tax Act, 1957, ('the Act') only applies to individual and not HUF. Their Lordship held that "the deeming provision in section 4(1)(b) is referable only to quantification of his interest in firm. Section 4(1)(b) only relates to quantum of his interest as determined in prescribed manner which is includible in net wealth." 7. third issue involved was valuation of HUF's interest in partnership firm and on page 494, paragraph No. 3, while interpreting section 7(1), 7(2)(a), 7(3) of Act and rules 2A and 2B of Wealth-tax Rules, 1957 ('the Rules'), their Lordships held that expression used in section 2 is 'net wealth' which is to be determined on respective valuation date first and determination of net wealth of firm as required under rule 2 automatically requires determination of net wealth as defined in section 2(m) which implies valuation as provided in section 7. Therefore, section 7(1) automatically comes into play for determining net wealth of firm and WTO is empowered to estimator price of asset of firm which, in his opinion, it would fetch if sold in open market on respective valuation date. 8. fourth issue decided by Supreme Court was adjustments required under rule 2B(2) for determining net value of assets of business as whole, when market value of asset exceeds its written down value or t h e book value or value adopted for purposes of assessment under Income-tax Act, 1961, by more than 20 per cent, then market value be substituted. 9. Their Lordships were in fact valuing partner's interest in partnership firm which has in number of decisions by Hon'ble Supreme Court and in fact by Mr. Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar himself, who had incidentally also delivered judgment aforesaid, held in Malabar Fisheries Co. v. CIT [1979] 120 ITR 49 that "a partnership firm under Indian Partnership Act, 1932, is not distinct legal entity apart from partners constituting it and equally in law firm as such has not separate rights of its own in partnership assets and when one talks of firm's property or of firm's assets all that is meant is property or assets in which all partners have joint or common interest". Similarly, Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 1 held "a shareholder who buys shares does not buy and interest in property of company which is juristic person entirely distinct form shareholders". Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to hold that nature of income in hands of company which in that case was agricultural company would be different from nature of income in hands of shareholder which in that case was dividend. Similarly, Supreme Court in CIT v. Ramniklal Kothari [1969] 74 ITR 57 held "business carried on by firm is business carried on by partners. Profits of firm are profits earned by all partners in carrying on business". Therefore, distinction drawn of partner's interest in partnership assets and income is different from shareholder's interest in limited company, hence, ratio of Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers' case (supra) has absolutely no bearing on issue involved din appeal before us, viz., valuation of shareholder's interest in limited company. 10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers' case (supra) was further not interpreting expression used in section 7(1), i.e., "subject to any rules made in this behalf, value of any asset, other than cash, for purposes of this Act, shall be estimated to be price which in opinion of Wealth-tax Officer it would fetch if sold in open market on valuation date". What Supreme Court was interpreting was entirely different issue, in fact it was interpreting expressions, as stated before, contained in section 4(1)(b) and one limb of section 7(2), i.e., 'notwithstanding anything contained in 4(1)(b) and one limb of section 7(2), i.e., 'notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)'. expression 'subject to any rules made in this behalf' has been judicial interpreted by Delhi Special Bench of Tribunal in case of Biju Patnaik v. WTO [1982] 1 SOT 623 in which Tribunal has held that said expression used in first part of section 7(1) would override section part of section 7(1) and rules of nature of rules 1D and 1BB of Rules were mandatory in nature and had to be given effect to in law. 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in aforesaid judgment was then interpreting expression 'having regard to balance sheet of such business' (on p. 496), whereas expression used in rule 1D is as under: "The value of all liabilities as shown in balance sheet of such company shall be deducted form value of all its assets shown in that balance sheet..." expression interpreted by Supreme Court is materially different from expression as used in rule 1D. Their Lordship of Supreme Court have very rightly held that expression 'having regard to balance sheet of such business' would not make values shown in balance sheet as conclusive or binding or decisive. However, expression as in rule 1D is much narrower and confines itself to values as shown in balance sheet only. 12. Rule 1D is artificial method for determining market value of unquoted equity share of certain companies, and has to be strictly complied with for determining market value. higher burden of tax on citizen cannot be levied unless it is intended by statute or by rules made thereunder, and if as result of rules lower burden of tax is to be put not he citizen, State cannot demand larger share. Rule 1D only envisages adjustments in values as shown in balance sheet as per Explanation, viz., Explanation II which reads as under: "For purposes of this rule- (i) following amounts shown as assets in balance sheet shall not be treated as assets, namely:- (a) any amount paid as advance tax under section 18A of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or under section 210 of Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961); (b) any amount shown in balance sheet including debit balance of profit and loss account or profit and loss appropriation account which does not represent value of any asset; (ii) following amounts shown as liabilities in balance sheet shall not be treated as liabilities, namely:- (a) paid-up capital in respect of equity shares; (b) amount set apart for payment of dividends on preference shares n d equity shares where such dividends have not been declared before valuation date at general body meeting of company; (c) reserves, by whatever name called, other that those set apart towards depreciation; (d) credit balance of profit and loss account; (e) any amount representing provision for taxation other than amount refereed to in clause (i)(a) to extent of excess over tax payable with reference to book profits in accordance with law applicable thereto; (f) any amount representing contingent liabilities other than areas of dividends payable in respect of cumulative preference shares." 13. above two adjustments are only adjustments envisaged by said rule in value of assets shown in balance sheet of company and no further adjustments can be made in same. If Legislature had thought it just and proper that adjustment as envisaged in rule 2B(2), i.e., substitution of market value of asset in place of value as shown in balance sheet in case difference is more than 20 per cent, was also required to be made in rule 1D, then such proviso could be added in Explanation 11 itself. As there is no such adjustment called for by rule 1D, no adjustment of type asked for by revenue can be made, since we have to apply law as it is and not as it ought to be or is required to be. 14. it is evident from above that case of Juggilal Kamlapat Bankers (supra) has no application to present dispute. 15. As regards grounds No. 2, in impugned order learned firs appellate authority has relied on ratio of decision of Hon'ble Madras High Court in CIT v. M.N. Rajam [1982] 133 ITR 75 and in absence of any counter decision relied upon by learned departmental representative, this grounds also stands rejected. 16. In net result, appeals fails and stands dismissed. *** WEALTH-TAX OFFICER v. MRS. RITU NANDA