This is appeal filed by assessee against order of Commissioner (Appeals). 2. assessee is limited company. In course of proceedings for assessment year 1965-66, assessee claimed for first time that its ACSR Division was newly established industrial undertaking and on capital employed in this newly established industrial undertaking, assessee- company was entitled to deduction as laid down under section 84 of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'), as it then stood. This claim of assessee was accepted by ITO while making assessment for 1965-66. We were given to understand at time of hearing of appeal that for subsequent assessment years also, assessee was allowed deduction on capital employed on this newly established industrial undertaking and for assessment years 1967-68 and 1969-70, since profits were not enough for allowance of this deduction, deficiency was worked out which for allowance of this deduction, deficiency was worked out which amounted to Rs. 1,55,354 for assessment year 1967-68 and Rs. 2,96,292 for assessment year 1969- 70. For assessment year 1972-73, under appeal before us, ITO while making assessment by assessment order dated 22-3-1975 allowed assessee's claim of deduction of this deficiency for assessment years 1967- 68 and 1969-70, aggregating to Rs. 4,51,646 in working out business income. Subsequently, however, ITO found that there were number of mistakes apparent from record in assessment order. He, therefore, issued show-clause notice pointing out, among other mistakes, mistake of deduction of deficiency of Rs. 4,51,646 which had been wrongly allowed and asked assessee to show cause why these mistakes, which were apparent from record, should not be rectified. In response to this show-cause notice, assessee objected only to withdrawal of deduction of deficient amounting to Rs. 4,51,646 and not other mistakes. ITO, therefore, by order under section 154 of Act not only rectified mistake of excess allowance of depreciation amounting to Rs. 7,549 but also withdrew deduction of deficiency of Rs. 4,51,646 which was wrongly allowed in assessment order. assessee was aggrieved by this order of ITO under section 154 and, therefore, went up in appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) Commissioner (Appeals), on consideration of balance sheets and directors' reports, came to finding that production in ACSR division, which was claimed to be newly established industrial undertaking, commenced in year 1963, i.e., during previous year relevant to assessment year 1964-65, which was also admitted by assessee's authorised representative, Shri H.R. Kamdar, and not in earlier year relevant to assessment year 1963-64 as wrongly held by ITO. On this basis, Commissioner (Appeals) held that deduction on account of capital employed in this newly established industrial undertaking was available to assessee for assessment year 1964-65 and four subsequent assessment years, i.e., 1965-66, 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69. He, therefore, came to conclusion that deficiency for assessment year 1969-70 was wrongly worked out by ITO in assessment order for 1969-70. In these circumstances, according to Commissioner (Appeals), there was no question of set off of this deficiency against business income for assessment year 1972-73 under consideration before him. He further held that since commencement of production of newly established industrial undertaking under consideration here was in previous year relevant to assessment year 1964-65, initial assessment year for this newly established industrial undertaking was assessment year 1964-65 and, therefore, deficiency, if any, in respect of this newly established industrial undertaking could not be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year. He, therefore, concluded that question of set off of deficiency for any assessee year is respect of this newly established industrial undertaking could only be considered up to assessment year 1971-72 and not beyond. Commissioner (Appeals), therefore, agreed with ITO that allowance of claim of deduction of deficiency aggregating to Rs. 4,51,646 in respect of this newly established industrial undertaking in working out business income for assessment year 1972-73 was mistake apparent from record and ITO rightly rectified this mistake by order under section 154. assessee's appeal was, therefore, dismissed. assessee has, therefore, come up in present appeal before us. 3. assessee's learned counsel, Shri Mukherji, submitted to us that when ITO had proceeded on basis that initial assessment year was 1963-64, it was not open to Commissioner (Appeals) to substitute for assessment year 1964-65. Proceeding further, Shri Mukherji submitted that if deficiency under section 80J of Act was wrongly worked out for assessment year 1969-70 in assessment order, it was for ITO to correct this mistake or in any case this mistake could only be corrected in order in proceedings relating to assessment year 1969-70 and not in proceedings relating to assessment year 1972-73 under appeal before us. Elaborating on his arguments Shri Mukherji submitted that as for reopening of assessment under section 147 of Act or for revision under section 263 of Act of order prejudicial to interest of revenue, action has to be justified by reasons recorded or mentioned in order hand not anything beyond it. Reference in this connection, was made by him to ruling of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in case of Hakim Uddin Khan v. ITO [1960] 40 ITR 402, wherein their Lordships of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court laid down that jurisdiction for rectification of mistake has to be adjudged form what was specified in notice for showing cause and not from any extraneous material which would justify order of rectification by ITO. Mention was also made by him to ruling of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Johri Lal (HUF) v. CIT [1973] 88 40 ITR 402, wherein their Lordships of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court laid down that jurisdiction for rectification of mistake has to be adjudged form what was specified in notice for showing cause and not from any extraneous material which would justify order of rectification by ITO. Mention was also made by him to rulings of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Johri Lal (HUF) v. CIT [1973] 88 ITR 439, Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Mrs. Freny Rashid Chenai v. ACED [1973] 90 ITR 31 and Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of CIT v. Jagadhri Electric Supply & Industrial Co. [1983] 140 ITR 490 in support of contentions that jurisdiction for rectification of assessment has to be judged on basis of findings of ITO in his order or show-cause notice requiring assessee to show cause why mistake apparent form record should not be rectified and it was not open to appellate authorities to improve upon case of revenue by considering other material which was not considered earlier while initiating action and assuming jurisdiction under section 154. Proceeding further, Shri Mukherji submitted, relying on rulings of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in cases of CIT v. Hindustan Antibiotics Ltd. [1974] 93 ITR 548 and J.M. Shah v. J.M. Bhatia [1974] 94 ITR 519 that commencement of production can only be from time product could be sold in market and not when trial run was started and product was being tested before sale in market and mistake on debatable point of law on which there may be conceivably two opinions is not mistake apparent form record which may be rectified by order under section 154. Elaborating on his argument, Shri Mukherji pointed out that requirements of section 154 were not met him present case and, therefore, even on basis of findings of Commissioner (Appeals), order of ITO under section 154 ought to have been cancelled, there being no error on face of record which could be rectified. Coming to provisions o f section 80J(3), Shri Mukherji submitted that proviso (i) thereof limiting period of seven years from end of initial assessment year for carry forward of deficiency has to be construed and interpreted taking into consideration proviso (ii) also, which has laid down that where there was more than one deficiency and each such deficiency relates to different assessment year, deficiency which relates to earlier assessment year shall be set off before setting off deficiency in relation to later assessment year. Shri Mukherji pointed out that proviso (ii) would have no meaning whatsoever if carry forward of all deficiencies, irrespective of assessment years to which they related, was to be limited to seven assessment years as reckoned from end of initial assessment year and viewed in this context proviso (i) should be interpreted as 'reckoned from end of initial assessment year and so on for each later year'. In this connection, Shri Mukerji referred to analogous provision in section 33A(2) of Act where it was not only laid down that unabsorbed development allowance of earlier assessment year shall first be set off before allowance of unabsorbed development allowance of subsequent assessment year, it was also laid down that carry forward of unabsorbed development allowance shall be up to eight assessment years succeeding assessment year in which deduction was first allowable. Shri Mukherjee, therefore, vehemently argued that carry forward of unabsorbed development allowance shall be up to eight assessment years succeedings assessment year in which deduction was first allowable. Shri Mukherjee, therefore, vehemently argued that deficiency worked out for assessment year 1967-68 and for assessment year 1969-70 could be carried forward for seven years from end of these assessment years and, therefore, deficiency worked out for both of these assessment years could carried forward and set off in working out business income for assessment year 1972-73 under appeal before us. Shri Mukherji filed before us copy of order of Tribunal Ahmedabad Bench 'A' in case of B. Engg. Ltd. v. ITO [C.O. No. 136 (Ahd.) of 1971-72] where Tribunal upheld contention of assessee that if there was mistake in order for earlier year that mistake could only be corrected in proceedings relating to that assessment year and not in proceedings relating to subsequent assessment year. Summing up, Shri. Mukherji vehemently argued before us that order of Commissioner (Appeals) was erroneous and should be reversed. 4. On other hand, learned departmental representative, Shri Kashyap, pointed out to us that whether initial assessment year in respect of newly established industrial undertaking under consideration here was assessment year 1963-64 as taken by ITO or assessment year 1964-65 s taken by Commissioner (Appeals), assessment year 1972-73 under consideration here is beyond seven years from end of initial assessment year up to which deficiency cloud be carried forward and, therefore, nothing turns on controversy whether initial assessment year should be taken as assessment year 1963-64 as taken by ITO or assessment year 1964- 6 5 as taken by Commissioner (Appeals). He further submitted that reopening of assessment under section 147 or revision of order of ITO under section 263 on ground that order was erroneous and prejudicial to interest of revenue, are different from rectification of assessment by ITO on ground that order was erroneous and prejudicial to interest of revenue, are different from rectification of assessment by ITO on ground of mistake apparent from record. He further submitted that sub-section (1) of section 80J from record. He further submitted that sub-section (1) of section 80J read with sub-section (2) thereof laid down that deduction account of capital employed in newly established industrial undertaking was available for assessment year, during previous year relevant to which newly established industrial undertaking command manufacture or production of articles which, as mentioned in sub-section (2) itself, was described as initial assessment year and for each of four immediately succeeding assessment years. He, therefore, vehemently argued that whether initial assessment year was 1963-64 or 1964-65, there was no question of deficiency in respect of which was made by assessee's learned counsel, Shri Mukherji, in his arguments, words used are that unabsorbed development allowance shall be carried forward to following assessment year and so on up to eight assessment year immediately succeeding assessment year in which deduction was first allowable, proviso (i) of sub-section (3) of section 80J clearly lays down that deficiency or any part thereof shall not be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year. Shri. Kashyap vehemently contend that function of judicial authorities is to interpret law as framed by Legislature and not to add words thereto and, therefore, argued that addition of words 'and' so on for each later year', suggested by assessee's learned counsel, Shri Mukherji was not justified Shri Kashyap clarified that proviso (ii) to section 80J(3) which laid down that where there is more than one deficiency relating to different assessment years, deficiency which relates to earlier assessment year shall be set off first before deficiency for later assessment year is set off, is not in conflict with proviso (i) which laid down that in no case deficiency or any part thereof from end of initial assessment year and, therefore, there is no justification or reason why plain words of proviso (i) to section 80J(3) should not be given their natural meaning. Another point made out by Shri Kashyap was that once there is mistake on facts or on law, it is open to any authority to find out correct facts and, therefore, if Commissioner (Appeals) held that even working of deficiency for assessment year 1969-70 was incorrect, there was no excess of jurisdiction by Commissioner (Appeals). Summing up, Shri Kashyap justified order of Commissioner (Appeals) and submitted that there was no merit in assessee's appeal. 5. We have carefully considered rival submissions. At outset it would be necessary to point out that whether initial assessment year, i.e., year in which newly established industrial undertaking under consideration here commenced production was assessment year 1963-64 of assessment year 1964-65, assessment year 1972-73 is beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year and, therefore, nothing turns on controversy whether Commissioner (Appeals) had jurisdiction to substitute for initial assessment year 1963-64 taken by ITO, initial assessment year 1964-65 as found by Commissioner (Appeals) and admitted by then authorized representative of assessee- company. It will also be necessary to point out that while under provisions of section 33A(2), unabsorbed development allowance can be carried forward for eight assessment years immediately succeeding assessment year in which deduction was first allowable as laid down by clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of section 33A, in case of section 80J(3), deficiency cannot be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year. When wordings of section 80J(3) are different from wordings of section 33A(2), it will be wrong to describe section 33A(2) as analogous provision. In fact, wordings of section 80J(3) and proviso thereto are very clear that no deficiency shall be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year and initial assessment year itself has been defined in sub-section (2) of section 80J as assessment year during previous year relevant to which newly established industrial undertaking begins to manufacture or produce articles, etc., etc. According to ITO, as mentioned by Commissioner (Appeals), initial assessment year was assessment year 1963-64, while according to Commissioner (Appeals), initial assessment year was assessment year 1964-65 and even then authorised representative of assessee-company admitted before Commissioner (Appeals) that initial assessment year was assessment year 1964-65. Whichever way matter is looked into, assessment year 1972-73 is beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned form initial assessment year. It is by now settled law and does not admit of any dispute, as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons [1966] 60 ITR 392, that meaning and intention of provision in statute must be collected from clear and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notion which may be entertained as to what is just or expedient. Viewed in this context, there can be no doubt that proviso (i) of sub-section (3) of section 80J clearly lays down that deficiency worked out for any assessment year in respect of newly down that deficiency worked out for any assessment year in respect of newly established industrial undertaking shall not be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned form and of initial assessment year. When wordings of this provision are so clear and unambiguous, we countered into it to mean that words 'and so on for each later assessment year' should be added to it and carry forward of deficiency should be up to seventh assessment year from end of assessment year in which deficiency was worked out. There can, therefore, be no doubt whatsoever that in respect of newly establish industrial undertaking deficiency worked o u t for any assessment year cannot be carried forward beyond seventh assessment year as reckoned from end of initial assessment year. In these circumstances, when according to ITO, initial assessment year was assessment year 1963-64 and according to Commissioner (Appeals) and s admitted by then authorised representative of assessee-company before him, initial assessment year was assessment year 1964-65, there was no question of carry forward of deficiency for any assessment year after t h e assessment year 1970-71 or 1971-72, i.e., in any case, there was no question of carry forward and set off of deficiency in working out business income for assessment year 1972-73 under consideration here. controversy, therefore, whether Commissioner (Appeals) was within his jurisdiction to comment that deficiency for assessment year 1969-70 was wrongly worked out and determined also, therefore, is immaterial inasmuch as whether deficiency in assessment order for year 1969-70 was correctly worked out or not, it cannot be brought forward and set off in assessment year 1972-73 under consideration here. It is found from show- cause notice issued to assessee by ITO wanted to rectify by order under section 154 was deduction under section 80J of Rs. 4,51,646 which has been wrongly allowed. Even in order under section 154 along with another mistake this very mistake had been rectified by ITO. It cannot, therefore, be under section 154 was not based on show-cause notice and order of ITO but on other extraneous material. Considering all this and looking to totality of facts and circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to conclusion that deficiency worked out for assessment years 1967-68 and 1969-70 aggregating to Rs. 4,51,646 was wrongly brought forward and set off in working out business income for assessment year 1972-73, this was mistake apparent from record and mistake was rightly rectified by ITO by order under section 154. This action of ITO, therefore, in our view, was rightly upheld in appeal by Commissioner (Appeals). 6. appeal filed by assessee fails and is hereby dismissed. *** JAIPUR METALS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. INCOME TAX OFFICER