assessee is aggrieved of order dated 16-10-1981 of learned Commissioner (Appeals). 2. assessee is HUF. It derives income from house property, share income from Mayfair Theatre and other sources. only point urged before us in this appeal related to assessment of income from rent received from Vijaya Bank Ltd. who is tenant of assessee in shop in Thadani Mansion adjacent to Mayfair Theatre building. In that connection, facts are that those premises were earlier in tenancy of Allied Electric and Radio Corpn., Lucknow, since 1973 ('Allied'). arrangement was arrived at between Allied, Vijaya Bank Ltd. and assessee whereby it was agreed that Allied would vacate portion occupied by them in favour of Vijaya Bank Ltd. Vijaya Bank Ltd. paid sum of Rs. 75,000 to Allied who vacated shop. Vijaya Bank Ltd. got this portion allotted to itself with consent of assessee. rent of portion occupied by Vijaya Bank Ltd. was fixed at Rs. 2,500 per month but it was agreed that till bank was in position to recover Rs. 75,000 given to Allied on behalf of assessee, it would pay to assessee sum of Rs. 1,250 per month only towards its rent liability, remaining Rs. 1,250 being adjusted towards aforesaid amount of Rs. 75,000. On above facts, it was claimed by assessee-HUF before IAC (Assessment) that assessee-HUF should be assessed on income of Rs. 1,250 per month only and not on Rs. 2,500 per month. However, IAC (Assessment) did not accept this contention and assessed income from rent from Vijaya Bank Ltd. at rate of Rs. 2,500 per month. 3. assessee, being aggrieved, came up in appeal before learned Commissioner (Appeals). learned Commissioner (Appeals) took view that sum of Rs. 75,000 was in fact payment by assessee to get premises vacated and was in nature of capital expenditure which enabled assessee to earn higher rent. According to him, recovery of loan taken for making this payment in instalments of Rs. 1,250 per month out of rent of Rs. 2,500 per month payable by Vijaya Bank Ltd. could not affect taxability of rental income at rate of Rs. 2,500 per month. Accordingly, he confirmed order of IAC (Assessment). 4. assessee being aggrieved, has come up in appeal before us. At time of hearing of appeal, on behalf of assessee application dated 17-2-1983 was moved for leave to file following papers: (i) Copy of letter from assessee to Shri Sadanand Shetty of Vijaya Bank Ltd. dated 10-4-1973; (ii) Copy of letter dated 14-4-1973 from assessee to Shri A. Narasimha, Manager Designate, Vijaya Bank Ltd., Lucknow; (iii) Copy of letter dated 2-5-1973 from Allied Electric and Radio Corporation to Vijaya Bank Ltd.; (iv) Copies of 8 pay orders of Vijaya Bank Ltd. to assessee; (v) Copy of letter dated 15-1-1983 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. admitting that goodwill was paid by it; and (vi) Copy of letter dated 2-5-1973 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. to assessee acknowledging receipt of documents of title, etc., in pursuance of security clause in proposed lease agreement. contention of assessee was that aforesaid papers went to root of matter and were necessary for deciding controversy in issue. It was also submitted that question as to what was rent paid by Vijaya Bank Ltd. for premises let out by assessee was also subject-matter of dispute before additional District Judge, Lucknow, in MCA No. 287 of 1979 in proceedings taken by Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow. assessee also sought to file copy of judgment dated 18-1-1983 of learned Additional District Judge, Lucknow, which was said to be relevant for deciding controversy in appeal. Shri Gulati for assessee submitted that letter dated 14-4-1973 was not filed by assessee before Commissioner (Appeals) and, therefore, it had become necessary to file copies of both letters dated 10-4-1973 and 14-4-1973. letter dated 15-1-1983 was said to be not in existence on date when this matter was decided by lower authorities. judgment dated 18-1-1983 was said to be not available to assessee when matter was decided by authorities below. It was, therefore, submitted that these documents be taken into consideration. Reliance was also placed on behalf of assessee on following decisions: Omar Salay Mohamed Sait v. CIT [1959] 37 ITR 151 (SC), Sultan Bros. (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1964] 51 ITR 353, 362 (SC), CIT v. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd. [1967] 66 ITR 710 (SC), R.S.S. Shanmugam Pillai & Sons v. CIT [1974] 95 ITR 109, 112 (Mad.), CIT v. Gangappa Cables Ltd. [1979] 116 ITR 778 (AP), Smt. Lalita Todi v. CIT [1980] 123 ITR 40 (Pat.), Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1982] 133 ITR 231, 236 (Punj. & Har.) and CIT v. Cawnpore Club Ltd. 1983 UPTC 243. Shri Gulati submitted that alternative plea also arose and assessee could claim deduction from income from house property under section 24(1)(iv) of Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act'), relating to annual charge which stood defined under section 27(iv) of Act. He urged that even though this plea had not been raised before income-tax authorities earlier, assessee was entitled to raise this claim for first time before Tribunal because income chargeable under head 'Income from house property' had to be determined and deduction claimed by assessee under section 24(1)(iv) was relevant for same. He also submitted that letter dated 2-5-1973 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. referred to above was relevant in this connection. He submitted that one of questions for determination would be that if amount of goodwill was paid by assessee, whether that amount could constitute charge on property. According to him, matter had been decided by authorities below without referring to any material and that at no stage assessee was required to prove its case in that light. 5. On other hand, Shri R. K. Upadhyay, learned departmental representative kly opposed reception of aforesaid documents in evidence. Reliance was also placed by him on following decisions; Velji Deoraj & Co. v. CIT [1968] 68 ITR 708, 714 (Bom.), A. K. Babu Khan v. CWT [1976] 102 ITR 757 (AP), Ram Prasad Sharma v. CIT [1979] 119 ITR 867, 871 (All.) and CIT v. Anand Prasad [1981] 128 ITR 388 (Delhi). Shri Upadhyay also submitted that rent agreement, which was very material document, had not been produced by assessee before income-tax authorities. Thereupon learned counsel for assessee filed copy of lease deed dated 25- 4-1974. 6. We have considered rival submissions as also decisions referred to above, whether or not specifically referred to in this order. There is no doubt that lease deed now filed on behalf of assessee is very relevant piece of evidence which requires to be taken into consideration by income-tax authorities for deciding matter in issue. So is position of certificate dated 15-1-1983 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. which was obtained by assessee after impugned order of learned Commissioner (Appeals) and which could not have been filed earlier. Similar is position of order dated 18-1-1983 of learned Additional District Judge, Lucknow, in second appeal under section 476 of Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam. Therefore, assessee's application would be justified with reference to these three papers. So far as copies of letters dated 7-4-1973, 10-4-1973, 14-4-1973, 2-5-1973, 8-5-1973 and copies of pay orders are concerned, they are also relevant and necessary for proper determination of controversy in issue. We are, therefore, only left with letter dated 2-5-1973 from Vijaya Bank Ltd., which assessee seeks to file. So far as decision in case of Omar Salay Mohamed Sait is concerned, it is not relevant as it refers only to improper rejection of material on record and not to improper reception of material. So far as scope of rule 29 of Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 ('the 1963 Rules') is concerned, it was held by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in case of Velji Deoraj & Co. that admission of additional evidence at appellate stage is dependent solely on requirement of Court and that mere fact that evidence sought to be produced is vital and important does not provide substantial cause to allow its admission especially when evidence was available to party at initial stage and had not been produced by him. In case of A. K. Babu Khan, Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court held that rule 29 does not intend to allow that parties to patch up weak particulars or to fill up omissions. It was also held in that case that assessees who are guilty of remissness and gross negligence were not entitled to indulgence to be shown to adduce additional evidence in second appeal. In case of Ram Prasad Sharma it was held by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court that powers of Tribunal to admit additional evidence under rule 29 were limited and that discretion had to be exercised reasonably. In case of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court also held that power of Tribunal in appeal to allow additional plea and, consequently for additional evidence being taken, has been given to do substantial justice between parties and that judicial mind has to be applied. So far as raising of alternative plea is concerned, it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd. that whether allowance was admissible under one head or another, subject-matter for appeal remained same and that for reasons recorded by departmental authorities, grant of relief on another ground was justified. It was, therefore, held that it was open to them and to Tribunal to grant that relief. In case of Anand Prasad, Hon'ble Delhi High Court was considering case of profit from sale of plots assessed as business income. ITO did not raise alternative contention that capital gains tax arose. Appellate Tribunal refused to permit ITO to raise such contention on ground that ITO ought to have raised it before AAC. High Court upheld order of Tribunal. Lastly, in case of Gangappa Cables Ltd., Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court held that Tribunal had power to allow assessee to put forward new claim, notwithstanding fact that such claim was not raised by him before ITO or AAC, provided there was sufficient material on record to allow such claim. This point had come up before Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Addl. CIT v. Gurjargravures (P.) Ltd. [1978] 111 ITR 1 and following observations therein are illuminating: ". . . We are not here called upon to consider case where assessee failed to make claim though there was evidence on record to support it, or case where claim was made but no evidence or insufficient evidence was adduced in support. In present case neither any claim was made before Income-tax Officer, nor was there any material on record supporting such claim . . . ." Thus, it is clear that there can be three distinct situations. Firstly, there can be situation where claim or plea raised by party is there but party wishes to adduce additional evidence. In such case, additional evidence can be received if adequate explanation is given as to why additional evidence be received if adequate explanation is given as to why additional evidence could not be produced or was not in its power. second situation can be where there exists material on record for supporting claim which is newly raised for first time before Tribunal. There can be no difficulty in allowing such claim to be raised. Then comes third situation where not only plea raised is new but also evidence sought to be adduced is new in sense that either it has been newly obtained or satisfactory explanation is not afforded as to why evidence was not forthcoming earlier. This is exact situation with which we are seized at moment with reference to letter dated 2-5-1973 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. There is no explanation whatsoever of assessee for not being able to file this letter earlier before either of income-tax authorities. In our view, for this inadvertence or remissness, assessee has to thank itself and there would be no justification for permitting assessee to bring in evidence this paper at this stage. We are, therefore, clearly of view that letter dated 2-5-1973 of Vijaya Bank Ltd. cannot be allowed to be taken as additional evidence at this stage nor plea which is sought to be newly taken with reference thereto. However, with reference to other papers, we are of view that matter should be restored to learned Commissioner (Appeals) for decision afresh in accordance with law after giving due opportunity of hearing to assessee as also to department to meet them and if necessary after obtaining remand report from IAC (Assessment). We, accordingly, set aside order of learned Commissioner (Appeals) subject to above observations. We, therefore, express no opinion on merits of assessee's claim. 7. In result, appeal is partly allowed as above. *** GULU G. THADANI (HUF) v. INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (ASST.)